France and Her Eastern Allies
1919–1925

French-Czechoslovak-Polish Relations from the Paris Peace Conference to Locarno

BY PIOTR S. WANDYCZ

The University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis

© Copyright 1962 by the University of Minnesota. All rights reserved

PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AT
THE LUND PRESS, MINNEAPOLIS

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 62-62512

PUBLISHED IN GREAT BRITAIN, INDIA, AND PAKISTAN BY THE OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
LONDON, BOMBAY, AND KARACHI, AND IN CANADA BY THOMAS ALLEN, LTD., TORONTO

To my Mother

PREFACE

DURING the interwar period the relations between France, Czechoslovakia, and Poland occupied a most important position in European diplomacy. Beginning with the breakdown during the First World War of the old political, social, and economic order on the Continent, these relations went through many different phases. This book deals with the crucial period from the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 to Locarno in 1925, when Franco-Polish-Czechoslovak relations were marked by attempts to establish an eastern barrier, a *barrière de l'est* — which by keeping Germany and Bolshevik Russia apart would guarantee European peace and security. Poland and Czechoslovakia, the only two states in East Central Europe with which France at this time had formal alliances, naturally became the pivot of the scheme. While an effective eastern barrier never materialized, and after Locarno even the term itself lost most of its meaning, the attempt to create one was a worthy and in many ways an important undertaking.

Although the history of the efforts to set up an Eastern barrier provides the theme of this study, one cannot ignore the whole complex of relations between France and the two western Slav states. Thus the barrier theme, despite its importance, may at times recede into the background, just as it did in the everyday diplomatic intercourse between the three states.

In analyzing the complexities of French-Czechoslovak-Polish relations during the first six years after the Peace Conference the student of course encounters certain difficulties. I am aware that this book often raises questions which cannot as yet be fully answered. The opening of the French archives, unrestricted use of Polish and Czechoslovak archival material, and the possibility of using confidential documents of other European powers would have enhanced the value of this study. At the same time no one can tell when these archives will be accessible to scholars and when a fully documented history could appear.

In my long and painstaking research I was, however, able to discover a surprising variety and richness of sources, including archival collections which had never been used, and this material threw new light on

many events in European diplomatic history in general, and Polish, French, and Czechoslovak foreign policy in particular. While this volume is in a sense a pioneering study in a field where much remains to be done, it may yet—I hope—provide exhaustive treatment of some questions where additional material could only add details and fill in minor gaps.

This study could never have been written without the generous help of numerous institutions and individuals. A grant from the Social Science Research Council enabled me to spend several months in the archives in Washington, the Hoover Institution, and several collections in western Europe. I was able to travel to Europe for two consecutive summers, thanks to faculty summer research grants from the Graduate School of Indiana University. Other financial assistance by the Graduate School provided for typing of the manuscript and covered the expenses incurred in writing.

I am vastly indebted to my friend and colleague Professor Robert H. Ferrell, who with untiring patience and understanding read the entire manuscript and improved it greatly stylistically and in numerous other ways. His cooperation as well as that of his wife, Lila E. Ferrell, which went well beyond the call of ordinary friendship, was immensely valuable and I want to thank them both for their kindness.

In the course of my work many scholars generously assisted me with their advice. I am particularly grateful to General Marian Kukiel, who read my manuscript and offered valuable suggestions; to Professors Pierre Renouvin and Maurice Baumont of the Sorbonne, who talked to me about the problems connected with my research; to Professors Oscar Halecki and Tytus Komarnicki, who encouraged me in my work; to Professor Norman J. G. Pounds, who most kindly drew the maps for this book; and to the successive chairmen of the department of history at Indiana University, Professors Harold J. Grimm and Robert F. Byrnes, who always showed appreciation and understanding of my research work. I should like to thank my colleagues in the department, Professors H. Trevor Colbourn, Robert E. Quirk, John W. Snyder, and Leo F. Solt, who read the concluding chapter of this book and offered helpful suggestions. Finally I want to thank my friend and colleague Professor Václav Beneš, with whom I discussed many a time—agreeing and disagreeing—various problems of Czechoslovak-Polish relations. Professor Beneš kindly read my conclusions and gave his candid view on their merits and shortcomings.

During my research in libraries, archives, and private collections I was fortunate to receive generous help and cooperation from many persons. I would like to thank Mr. Oktawian Jastrzembski, whose help and hospitality I enjoyed in Montreal; Mr. Jerzy Giedroyc, the editor of the

Paris *Kultura*; Professor Witold Sworakowski and his wife, who guided me in the labyrinth of the Hoover Institution; Dr. Czesław Chowaniec and Miss Wanda Borkowska of the Bibliothèque Polonaise in Paris; Dr. Robert F. Brockmann, who helped me in research in Washington; Mr. Zbigniew Rapacki in Paris; Colonel Adam Koc of the Józef Piłsudski Institute of America in New York; and the staffs of the General Sikorski Historical Institute in London, the National Archives in Washington, and the Bibliothèque de Documentation Internationale Contemporaine in Paris.

I am grateful to several French, Czechoslovak, and Polish diplomats and statesmen who were active in the 1920s and who contributed their personal recollections and interpretations of the events discussed in this volume. Among them were the two French ambassadors, the late M. Jules Laroche and M. Léon Noël; the Czechoslovak ministers, Mr. Štefan Osuský and Mr. Juraj Slavik; and the Polish ambassadors and ministers, the late Mr. Józef Lipski, Mr. Kajetan Morawski, Mr. Jan Starzewski, and Mr. Jan Librach. They were all kind enough to discuss with me various aspects of Franco-Polish-Czechoslovak relations and indicate their opinions. In this respect I am especially indebted to General Kazimierz Sosnkowski, who commented at my request on the Franco-Polish alliance of 1921 and helped me to understand its background.

Lastly I would like to thank members of my family — my father, Damian Wandycz, who in 1918 carried Piłsudski's letter to Masaryk and who has always remained interested in Polish-Czech problems, and my sister, Dr. Anna Maria Mars, and my brother, Witold Mars, who in the past influenced me in the direction of historical studies. Their constant interest in the progress of my work, which they read in various drafts and commented on, brought encouragement and served as a great stimulus.

In view of all the excellent assistance and advice which I received while writing this book it is only fair to say that I alone bear the responsibility for any error or misinterpretation which may be found here. The conclusions which I draw in this volume are also mine alone.

P. S. W.

November 1961

ABBREVIATIONS

AANA *Auswärtiges Amt Archives* (microfilm), National Archives, Washington

AGND *Akta Adjutantury Generalnej Naczelnego Dowództwa*, Józef Piłsudski Institute of America, New York

APGE *Archives of the Polish Government-in-Exile* (Documents from the Polish Embassy in London), Montreal

AR *Akta Generała Rozwadowskiego*, Józef Piłsudski Institute of America, New York

BPPP Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, *Bulletin périodique de la presse polonaise* (Paris, 1919–1925)

BPPT Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, *Bulletin périodique de la presse tchècoslovaque* (Paris, 1919–1925)

CD *Ciechanowski Deposit*, Archives of the Polish Legation and Embassy in the United States, 1920–1938, Hoover Institution, Stanford

CE Comité d'Etudes, *Procès-verbaux des réunions, rapports, 1917–1918* (mimeographed), Bibliothèque Polonaise, Paris

DBFP E. L. Woodward and R. Butler, eds., *Documents on British Foreign Policy* (London)

DK *Dossier Klotz*, Bibliothèque de Documentation Internationale Contemporaine, Paris

FR Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States* (Washington)

FRH Francis Deák and Dezsö Ujváry, eds., *Papers and Documents Relating to the Foreign Relations of Hungary: I, 1919–1920* (Budapest, 1939)

PCIJ Permanent Court of International Justice, *Publications* (Leyden)

SDNA *State Department Archives*, National Archives, Washington

SI *Documents from the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Political Department*, General Sikorski Historical Institute, London

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABBREVIATIONS xi

Background

FRANCE AND HER ALLIES 3

The Peace Settlement

1 POLAND'S WESTERN BORDERS 29
2 THE CZECHOSLOVAK SETTLEMENT 49
3 THE PROBLEM OF TESCHEN 75
4 POLISH FRONTIERS IN THE EAST 104

The Crisis of 1920

5 FROM PARIS TO SPA 135
6 FROM SPA TO RIGA 161
7 DANUBIAN UNION OR LITTLE ENTENTE? 186

In Search of Security

8 FRENCH-POLISH ALLIANCE 211
9 THE BENEŠ-SKIRMUNT PACT 238
10 RUHR AND JAVOŘINA 265
11 FRENCH-CZECHOSLOVAK ALLIANCE 292
12 HERRIOT AND THE NEW COURSE 312
13 THE ILLUSION OF LOCARNO 341

Appraisal

A PATTERN OF RELATIONS 369

APPENDIXES 393

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY 407

INDEX 429

Maps

The Western Border of Poland 31

The Czechoslovak Territorial Settlement 51

The Duchy of Teschen 77

The Eastern Border of Poland 106

Background

FRANCE AND HER ALLIES

On the early afternoon of January 18, 1919, the leading statesmen of the Allied and Associated Powers assembled in the Salle de la Paix of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs — the Paris Peace Conference was about to begin. At that moment France seemed at the height of her power. The French army was the largest on the European continent, and Marshal Ferdinand Foch occupied the position of supreme commander of the Allied forces. The choice of Paris for the Peace Conference, the election of Georges Clemenceau to its presidency, the appointment of a French diplomat, Paul Dutasta, as the conference's secretary general — all pointed to the high prestige which the victorious Third Republic enjoyed before the world.

The position of France in international relations was, however, far less secure than it appeared during that magnificent scene in the Salle de la Paix in January of 1919. Victory already had a bitter taste. France had lost over four million men in killed and wounded. The northern provinces lay in ruin, the country's entire economic life was endangered. Production of coal had fallen from forty to twenty-five million tons. There was an appalling crisis in transportation. The indebtedness of France, measured in internal and external loans, amounted to thirty-four milliard gold francs, roughly $8.5 billion. There was a permanent population weakness; Germany's collapse could not change the fact that there were still twenty million more Germans than Frenchmen. And France's diplomatic position was extremely insecure. The prewar alliance system had been destroyed by the collapse of France's principal continental associate, Imperial Russia, and the difficult task of rebuilding alliances east of Germany was a most formidable objective for the French delegation to the Peace Conference.

The delegates of France were led by the fiery septuagenarian premier, Georges Clemenceau, whose spirit had earned him the nickname of "Tiger." Clemenceau was of course a strong and colorful personality. He clearly dominated his associates: the weak foreign minister, Stephen

Pichon; the colorless minister of finance, L. L. Klotz; the brilliant André Tardieu (Clemenceau's right-hand man); Ambassador Jules Cambon, who was the only professional diplomat in the group; and finally, Marshal Foch, whose views often ran counter to those of his premier. The Tiger generally acted in a despotic fashion but he made full use of foreign ministry personnel. The French on the whole did not suffer at the Peace Conference of 1919 from qualms about secret diplomacy, and they made no attempt to relegate the professional diplomat to an inferior and ambiguous position, as did the British. Even if the supposed brain of the Quai d'Orsay, Philippe Berthelot, did not become secretary general of the conference, Berthelot was available when needed and could assist the statesmen with his prodigious knowledge of diplomatic facts and ideas.[1]

Clemenceau had a strong political position in France. Even so, he was not altogether free from domestic difficulties. Marshal Joseph Joffre was probably correct when he said that no organized opposition to Clemenceau existed, but he admitted that the opponents of the premier had "not disarmed." [2] Groups of both the Right and the Left attacked him, and President Raymond Poincaré and Marshal Foch gave him difficult moments. Pressure was put on Clemenceau to include former premier Aristide Briand in the delegation to the conference, but he resisted successfully. The premier was in a fortunate position in regard to the Chambers and general public opinion, and he kept both uninformed about French policy at the conference. He also controlled the press.

But he did not and could not control his Allies. French policy makers at Paris in 1919 had to calculate the divergencies between France and the other victorious Allies, chiefly Britain and the United States. The French premier was aware of the different views among the major powers — on the peace settlement in general, and Central European matters in particular — and in his speech of January 18, 1919, he appealed for the solidarity which "united us during the war [and which] ought to remain unimpaired during the negotiations and after the signature of the treaty." [3] He recognized that France would have to struggle to realize her objectives. Later, in his memoir, *Grandeur and Misery of Victory*, the Tiger would cite a conversation in which he told Lloyd George

[1] The unexpected nomination of Dutasta as secretary general resulted from a struggle for that position between two leading officials at the Quai d'Orsay: Berthelot, supported by Pichon; and Pierre de Margerie, supported by President Raymond Poincaré. Clemenceau solved the controversy by choosing Dutasta, whom he could dominate more easily. See Jules Laroche, *Au Quai d'Orsay avec Briand et Poincaré* (Paris, 1957), p. 66.

[2] *Foreign Relations of the United States: Peace Conference* (13 vols., Washington, 1942–47), I, 381. *Foreign Relations of the United States* will hereafter be cited as *FR*, followed by the appropriate subtitle.

[3] *FR Peace Conference*, III, 162.

that immediately after the armistice "I found you an enemy of France." To which the British prime minister rejoined: "*was it not always our traditional policy?*"[4] It was, to be sure, the long tradition of British diplomacy that prompted Lloyd George to move away from victorious France in 1919 and thereafter and seek a *rapprochement* with the defeated states, Germany and Russia, to preserve a European balance of power. But since the British public felt bitter toward the Germans and still thought in terms of the wartime comradeship with the French, Lloyd George pursued the traditional policy cautiously while pretending to follow the voice of public opinion.[5] Both he and his later foreign secretary, Lord Curzon, constantly mistook French desire for security as desire for imperialism, and the great French diplomat Paul Cambon summed it all up neatly by saying that the British unfortunately failed to realize that Napoleon had been dead for quite some time.[6]

Franco-British differences could be explained largely by the traditional rivalry enhanced by the clashing personalities of Lloyd George and Clemenceau. Disagreements over policy between France and the United States were of a different nature. President Wilson and Clemenceau were men who thought in opposite ways, saw international relations from divergent angles, and barely spoke the same political language. Even if in specific cases there were more common interests between the French and Americans than between Paris and London, problems of personal communication remained. Wilson's views on the peace settlement of 1919 are too well known to require repetition in detail here. The president was no doctrinaire, but he viewed the world in moral terms, with strong Calvinist (to use the truly appropriate word once again) overtones. He had a large and immediate vision of a new international order. To realize his splendid dream he would appeal to the people over the heads of governments. Clemenceau could think of balance of power, of strategic frontiers, of an international order which would place France in an unassailable position. Wilson was not blind to realities, but he believed that repetition of the past could be prevented only if one struck at the very root of all evil in international relations. Clemenceau had no such ambition. His view of politics was far more prosaic.

To find some agreement between the two statesmen an intermediary was needed, and for the most part Colonel Edward M. House played this role in Paris, arousing in Lloyd George suspicion of Franco-American "deals."

[4] *Grandeur and Misery of Victory* (New York, 1930), p. 121. Italics in original.

[5] See Harold Nicolson, *Curzon: The Last Phase 1919–1925* (London, 1934), p. 192; Auguste Comte de Saint Aulaire, *Confession d'un vieux diplomate* (Paris, 1953), pp. 537ff.

[6] Quoted by Saint Aulaire, *Confession*, p. 536.

There thus existed at Paris a serious divergence in views bearing on the foundations of the future peace settlement, a discrepancy that was bound to affect France's hopes for the future of East Central Europe. The Allied statesmen in Paris used identical terms but attached different meanings to them. Security meant one thing for continental France and another for insular Britain, and Wilson saw the principal means of achieving security in the future League of Nations. Justice could mean retributive justice and the strengthening of the innocent at the expense of the guilty — this was principally the French view, which Wilson shared up to a point — but it could also mean wiping out the past and reconciling the ideas of justice as held by both the victors and the defeated. That was what the British had in mind, for they not only had less to forget and to forgive than the French but wanted European stability to rest on a balance of power and national interests. Was politics or economics the key to the new postwar world? Here, too, no complete agreement prevailed.

It was Clemenceau who defined peace as "a disposition of forces, supposed to be in lasting equilibrium, in which the moral force of organized justice is surrounded by strategical precautions against all possible disturbances."[7] In his opening speech at the conference the French premier emphasized the justice which required "punishment of the guilty and effective guarantees against an active return of the spirit by which they are tempted."[8] He also stressed security, and later would write that a peace treaty "is and can only be a prolongation of war activities until complete fulfillment."[9] These pronouncements were representative of Clemenceau's and of the French way of thinking, and they conflicted with British and American conceptions.

2

French policy toward Poland and Czechoslovakia at the Paris Peace Conference was naturally influenced by the course of events during the First World War, and French ideas, commitments, and sympathies can only be understood by looking at the wartime relations of the French, Poles, and Czechoslovaks. Clemenceau admitted frankly that

"our programme, when we entered the war was not one of liberation. . . . We had started as allies of the Russian oppressors of Poland, with the Polish soldiers of Silesia and Galicia fighting against us. By the collapse of military Russia, Poland found herself set free and re-created,

[7] Clemenceau, *Grandeur and Misery*, p. 202.

[8] *FR Peace Conference*, III, 163.

[9] Clemenceau's introduction to André Tardieu, *The Truth about the Treaty* (Indianapolis, 1921), p. 6.

and then all over Europe oppressed peoples raised their heads, and our war of national defence was transferred by force of events into a war of liberation." [10]

The outbreak of war had aroused Polish hopes of freedom by destroying the unity of the three partitioning powers, placing Germany and Austria-Hungary against Russia. This alignment of powers created difficulties for the Poles in deciding which side to support, and two major trends appeared among Polish leaders. Józef Piłsudski, supported on the whole by the parties of the Left, saw Russia as the main foe. He resolved to create a Polish military force linked with Austria's which at a propitious moment could play a decisive role in achieving Poland's independence. Roman Dmowski, the leader of the Right, considered Germany the main threat to Polish national survival. Believing in the need for diplomatic reliance on France, he thought that the best way to make the Polish question an international issue lay in showing Paris "the significance of Poland for the future of France" and linking the Polish cause with "the interests of the Franco-Russian alliance." [11] Dmowski began his activity in Petrograd, and largely under his influence the Russian commander-in-chief on August 14, 1914, issued a manifesto to the Poles promising restoration of a united Poland. The manifesto was vague and the fact that it was not signed by the tsar deprived it of a good deal of real value. The French public, nevertheless, greeted it enthusiastically, which confirmed Dmowski's views on a Franco-Polish community of interests.[12] In November 1915 Dmowski decided to transfer his activities to the west where possibilities of Polish diplomatic and military action seemed more promising than in Russia.

The French attitude toward the Polish question up to the spring of 1917 was marked simultaneously by friendliness toward the Poles and a fear of doing anything to offend France's Russian ally. A French Radical Socialist later recalled "the prudence with which one had to talk in France about Polish independence," [13] and Socialist deputies complained that by considering the Polish question as a "purely Russian" issue, the French "deprived themselves of the right to count on the support of Poles from Austria and Germany." [14] Existence of strong pro-Polish

[10] Clemenceau, *Grandeur and Misery*, pp. 190–192.

[11] Roman Dmowski, *Polityka polska i odbudowanie państwa* (Warsaw, 1926), pp. 67–68.

[12] See Georges Clemenceau in *L'Homme Libre*, Aug. 17; Gabriel Hanotaux in *Le Figaro*, Aug. 16; Denys Cochin in *Le Gaulois*, Aug. 21; Marcel Sembat in *L'Humanité*, Aug. 18; Stephen Pichon in *Le Petit Journal*, Aug. 16; *Le Temps* and *Le Journal des Débats* also acclaimed the Russian move.

[13] Louis Ripault, *Pendant la tourmente 1914–1918: France et Pologne* (Paris, n.d.), p. 2.

[14] Marius Moutet and Pierre Renaudel in the French Chamber. Chambre des Députés, *Débats*, 1917, Session ordinaire, 3776.

sentiment could not be denied,[15] but on the political level the interest of the Russian ally naturally took precedence over other considerations. Hence the French ambassador to Russia, Maurice Paléologue, could truthfully reply to Russian criticism of France's pro-Polish attitude by saying that to his knowledge "the French government had never recommended to the Russian government anything but integral Polish autonomy."[16]

When action came on Poland, it was not altogether the work of France. Timid French representations in Petrograd, such as the one in mid-1916 during the Viviani-Thomas mission to Russia, were brutally brushed aside. Nicholas II's announcement in an order of the day on December 25, 1916, that he was striving to create a "free Poland from all three of the until-now separated provinces" came only after the Central Powers' declaration of an "independent" Polish kingdom on November 5, 1916, and President Wilson's inquiry about the war aims of the belligerents. The French Chamber of Deputies had grasped the significance of the Central Powers' declaration by stating in its own *ordre du jour* that this declaration had "stamped the Polish question with international character."[17] But the French government together with the other Allies in their reply to Wilson merely referred to the tsar's statement, showing thereby that they still considered the Polish problem as essentially a Russian matter.[18]

French diplomacy did not capitalize on Wilson's "Peace without Victory" address of January 22, 1917—which spoke of a "united, independent and autonomous Poland"—to further Polish interests. France was preoccupied with her own future security on the Rhine, and she sounded out Britain on the subject of the Franco-German border. Obtaining no satisfaction she turned to Russia. In an exchange of notes in February 1917 Paris received Russian support for its general objectives in the Rhineland, in exchange for acknowledging Russia's unlimited right to fix her own western borders.[19] This French engagement meant, of course,

[15] Individuals such as Léon Bourgeois, Edouard Herriot, Franklin-Bouillon, General du Moriez, Rose Bailly, Denys Cochin, André Tardieu, and Auguste Gauvin, as well as most writers of the Left, could be counted as friendly to Poland. There were also societies like the *Ligue Française pour la Pologne Libre*, the *Comité Interallié Pro Polonia*, and the *Société d'Études Polonaises*.

[16] Maurice Paléologue, *La Russie des tsars pendant la grande guerre* (3 vols., Paris, 1921), III, 77.

[17] Quoted in Joseph Blociszewski, *La Restauration de la Pologne et la diplomatie européenne* (Paris, 1927), p. 34.

[18] Point seven of the Allied reply said that "the intentions of His Majesty the Emperor of Russia towards Poland are clearly indicated in the proclamation he has just addressed to the Armies." Tardieu, *The Truth about the Treaty*, p. 81. The proclamation aimed to re-establish Russo-Polish relations on a basis of autonomy as arranged after the Congress of Vienna in 1815.

[19] See F. Seymour Cocks, ed., *The Secret Treaties and Understandings* (London, 1918),

giving Russia a free hand in Polish affairs, and Paris realized the fact clearly. Briand, then premier, may have felt embarrassed at giving up all French rights to intercede on Poland's behalf, which probably explains the delays in the final French answer to Petrograd.[20] Coming on the eve of the Russian Revolution, this arrangement between Paris and Petrograd proved valueless, and when publicized by the Bolsheviks exposed only the shady bargaining of French diplomacy behind the backs of the British, at the sacrifice of Polish interests.

During the first three years of the war the problem of French-Czechoslovak relations differed greatly from the Franco-Polish issue. War had awakened Czech and Slovak hopes of liberation from Habsburg rule. There was a widespread feeling that the Russian armies would enter Czech and Slovak lands as liberators. Important Czech leaders like Karel Kramář, imbued with Russophilism, instructed their representatives "to work for a great Slav empire." [21] There also appeared another tendency, the so-called western orientation, which consisted of seeking help from the western allies as well as from Russia. Its chief spokesman was the well-known Czech professor and thinker Tomáš G. Masaryk, who went west in December 1914, and was joined in 1915 by his disciple and closest collaborator, Eduard Beneš. They began to work there for the Czechoslovak cause.

Their task was not easy. The Czech—let alone Czechoslovak—cause was practically unknown in the west, and Masaryk, contrasting it with the Polish cause, remarked that "of us, on the contrary, the French knew little." [22] Yet the Czechs enjoyed advantages over the Poles. They had only one foe, the Austro-Hungarian monarchy with which the Allies were at war; the two Czech orientations were reconcilable within the framework of the Entente, unlike the Dmowski-Piłsudski trends which were mutually exclusive. On the other hand, the Czechoslovak problem appeared at first as an internal matter of the Habsburg monarchy, and the success of Masaryk and Beneš hinged on French and Allied policy toward Austria-Hungary.

During the first years of the war the French government was not thinking in terms of an eventual breakup of the Habsburg monarchy. Berlin not Vienna was the principal foe, and Austria appeared an important element in the European balance of power. The Czechoslovak

Emile Laloy, *Les Documents secrets des archives de Russie publiés par les Bolchéviks* (Paris, 1917), *passim*.

[20] Opinions on the role of Poincaré differ. Alexandre Ribot felt that the president was not informed of the bargain, while Briand's biographer, Suarez, maintained that he knew of it and pressed Briand to expedite it.

[21] Quoted in Victor S. Mamatey, *The United States and East Central Europe 1914–1918* (Princeton, 1957), p. 33.

[22] Thomas G. Masaryk, *The Making of a State* (New York, 1927), p. 83.

problem seemed a secondary matter [23] that could be solved by a possible transformation of the Dual into a Trial (Austro-Hungarian-Czech) Monarchy.[24] The task of Masaryk and Beneš, ably assisted by a prominent Slovak scientist long settled in France, Milan Štefánik, consisted of persuading France and the west of the need to break up Austria-Hungary and establish a free Czechoslovak state. Beneš after his arrival in Paris embarked on a campaign of winning influential people — professors, journalists, and politicians — to the Czechoslovak cause.[25] He was eminently successful in his efforts, rendered easier by the pro-Russian and Slavophile tendencies in many French intellectual circles. Beneš was also fortunate in gaining the friendship of the all-important personage at the Quai d'Orsay, Berthelot, "to whom he owed a great deal for the realization of his plans." [26]

The Czechoslovak propaganda campaign in France was greatly assisted by a display of solidarity among leading Czech groups at home and abroad, which permitted them to set up in February 1916 a Czechoslovak National Council presided over by Masaryk. On February 3, 1916, Štefánik arranged a meeting between Masaryk and Briand, and the Czechoslovak leader explained to the premier the Czechoslovak political objectives. Masaryk wrote later that Briand understood and espoused his ideas, and Beneš obtained a similar impression.[27] Yet it is hard to believe that Briand in any way committed himself to the destruction of the Austrian monarchy.[28] Even a strong Czechophile like Berthelot was unwilling to make commitments when approached by Beneš early in 1916.[29] But the Czechs persisted in their efforts. A year later, in January 1917, the Allied reply to President Wilson (drafted largely by Berthelot) spoke of "the liberation of Czechoslovaks from foreign domination" as one of the Allied war aims. This statement con-

[23] Paléologue, *La Russie des tsars*, I, 246–247.

[24] Suggested by the Russian foreign minister, Sergei Sazonov, to the Allied ambassadors on Sept. 14, 1914. The Czech part was also to include Slovakia.

[25] He established contacts with Slav scholars such as Ernest Denis, Louis Eisenmann, Maurice Haumant, and André Chéradame; he gained access to the press through André Tardieu, Jules Sauerwein, and especially Auguste Gauvin. Two papers supporting the Czechoslovak cause, *La Nation Tchèque* and *Le Monde Slave*, were published in Paris.

[26] Laroche, *Au Quai d'Orsay*, p. 39. Laroche, who knew Beneš at that time, recalled that he was "endowed with great powers of persuasion" and adroit in finding supporters for the Czechoslovak cause.

[27] "Briand grasped the heart of the matter" and "was really convinced." Masaryk, *Making of a State*, p. 103. Briand said that France would not "forget your aspirations" and would do everything to bring "independence to the Czechs." Eduard Beneš, *Světová válka a naše revoluce* (3 vols., Prague, 1927), I, 109–110.

[28] According to E. Hölzle, as quoted by Ernst Birke, "Die französische Osteuropa-Politik 1914–1918," *Zeitschrift für Ostforschung*, III (1954), 339, Briand told Masaryk that he was for the maintenance of the Habsburg empire. Briand's biographer, Suarez, does not mention the conversation.

[29] Laroche, *Au Quai d'Orsay*, p. 40.

trasted with the simultaneous Allied dismissal of the Polish question by mere reference to the tsar's order of the day, but it did not signify a real pledge of Czechoslovak independence. France was showing interest at this time in secret negotiations with Austria by which the Allies hoped to detach Vienna from Germany. While these negotiations proved unsuccessful, they clearly indicated that in 1917 French circles still feared a complete disintegration of the Dual Monarchy, especially at a time when events in Russia had begun to look disquieting.

3

The outbreak of the Russian Revolution in March 1917 proved a turning point in French relations with the Poles and Czechoslovaks. On March 28, 1917, the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies proclaimed that Poland "had a right to free existence," and a day later the provisional government declared that the "creation of an independent Polish State from all the territories where the Polish people constitute a majority of population is a certain guarantee of durable peace in a future unified Europe." [30] Although this proclamation emphasized an ethnic Poland and qualified recognition of Polish independence by speaking also of a "free military alliance" with Russia, it released French hands with regard to the Polish question. Albert Thomas, the French minister of armament, told Polish circles in Russia that while in the past the alliance with Tsardom had cast a shadow over Franco-Polish relations, Paris was now unreservedly in favor of "complete unity and total independence of Poland." [31] This change was important indeed.

Franco-Polish cooperation was given new impetus. On June 4, 1917, President Poincaré issued a decree providing for a Polish army on French soil. The decree was largely a result of the French desire to gain control of Polish affairs once the Polish question had become internationalized. It is also probable that Petrograd urged that Polish matters be placed under French tutelage, which seemed to Russia a lesser evil than any other solution.[32] A Polish National Committee presided over by Dmowski was set up at Lausanne on August 15, 1917, and then

[30] Titus Komarnicki, *Rebirth of the Polish Republic* (London, 1957), p. 156. See also Wit Trzciński, "Uznanie niepodległości Polski przez Rosję," *Niepodległość*, VIII (1933).

[31] Blociszewski, *La Restauration de la Pologne*, p. 53. For Polish appreciation of the effect of the Russian Revolution on France's attitude toward Poland, see a letter of the Polish National Committee in Natalia Gąsiorowska, gen. ed., *Materjały archiwalne do historii stosunków polsko-radzieckich*, Vol. I (Warsaw, 1957), pp. 104–107.

[32] At that time there were vague plans to establish a Polish provisional government in America. See *FR Lansing Papers* (2 vols., Washington, 1939–40), II, 33–36. Also Komarnicki, *Rebirth of the Polish Republic*, pp. 169ff.

moved to Paris to act as spokesman for the Polish cause in the Allied camp.[33] Premier Alexandre Ribot of France recognized the committee on September 20 as a body to prepare the organization of a future sovereign and independent Polish state. At the same time, however, French diplomacy showed signs of makeshifts dictated by expediency. Paris was slow to grant the committee complete control over the nascent Polish army, and in secret negotiations with Austria, French representatives threw out suggestions for a Polish state "restored to the frontiers of 1772" and "attached by federal ties to Austria." [34] This was a strange scheme, which not only went counter to complete Polish independence but by aiming at the 1772 borders would have been unacceptable to France's ally Russia.

The Russian Revolution had relatively little influence on the development of the Czechoslovak situation. As a "definite Russophile" who had opposed Tsardom, Masaryk welcomed it and rejoiced in a democratic regime,[35] but he and other Czech leaders were disappointed by the limited enthusiasm which the new regime showed for their cause. The Revolution, however, had an effect on the relations between the Czechoslovaks and the Poles. Czech leaders, like the French, had until then favored simple autonomy for Poland within the Russian state, and consequently, as Beneš put it, "until the Russian revolution the official policy of our National Council was not in accord with Polish aims." [36] After the declaration of the Russian provisional government the Czechoslovak attitude changed, but even so it did not go one inch beyond the Russian position, and Masaryk in his telegram of March 1917 to Pavel Miliukov, the Russian foreign minister, spoke of "a united Poland, free within a free Russia" and advocated the "union of Russians [*sic*] of Galicia . . . with their countrymen from Russia." [37]

Dmowski resented the Czech insistence on a "little, purely ethnographic Poland" and suspected that the Czechs advocated it "so that it would not be superior to them in political power, and that they could have a direct border with Russia." [38] His bitterness was all the greater because he himself supported historical and not ethnic Czechoslovak borders in the west, and was prepared to back the Czechoslovaks against Hungary with whom the Poles had ties of friendship.[39]

[33] Among its leading members were Count Maurycy Zamoyski, Konstanty Skirmunt, and Marian Seyda.

[34] Komarnicki, *Rebirth of the Polish Republic*, p. 122; Leon Biliński, *Wspomnienia i dokumenty 1846–1922* (2 vols., Warsaw, 1924), II, 179; and Mamatey, *The United States and East Central Europe*, p. 219.

[35] Thomas G. Masaryk, *L'Europe nouvelle* (Paris, 1918), p. 186.

[36] Beneš, *Světová válka*, II, 95; Bénès, *Où vont les Slaves* (Paris, 1948), pp. 191–192.

[37] *Le Temps*, March 22, 1917; Beneš, *Světová válka*, III, 605.

[38] Dmowski, *Polityka polska*, p. 216.

[39] *Ibid.*, p. 218.

The outbreak of the October Revolution in Russia, and the prior entry of the United States into the war, opened the crucial period of ideological warfare which transformed the character of the conflict. For Poland and Czechoslovakia the importance of these developments was great. In France the near certainty that Russia would quit the war, and fear of Bolshevism, made the government realize the importance of a large and pro-French Polish state. When ideas of Allied intervention in Russia began to mature, Polish units on Russian soil appeared as a weapon that could be used in such a scheme.[40] While Dmowski's efforts to secure a joint Allied declaration on Poland proved futile, Pichon came out with a clear statement on December 27, 1917, in the Chamber of Deputies. France, he said, wanted Poland "united, independent, indivisible, with all guarantees of free political, economic and military development, and with all the consequences which could result therefrom."[41] The foreign minister went on to eulogize France's role "from the beginning of the war" in the struggle for Poland's independence.

The ensuing convulsions of the Bolshevik Revolution heightened French interest in Czechoslovakia, because of the presence of Czech troops in Russia. At first Masaryk and Beneš, fearing lest these troops become isolated in case of a Russo-German peace, suggested that they be brought over to fight on the western front, and this suggestion had great attraction in Paris. President Poincaré on December 16, 1917, issued a decree authorizing a Czechoslovak army in France under the political control of the Czechoslovak National Council. Later when the first clashes occurred between the Bolsheviks and the Czechoslovak troops, and the latter seized the Trans-Siberian railroad, Paris became aware of their usefulness as a spearhead of Allied intervention in Russia.[42]

The Bolshevik ideological campaign centering around the Brest-Litovsk negotiations of 1918 called for a new exposition of Allied war aims. On January 8, 1918, came President Wilson's speech containing the famous Fourteen Points, preceded by Lloyd George's declaration to the Trades Union Congress in London. Both Czechoslovak and Polish problems figured in these statements. Lloyd George emphasized a purely ethnic Polish state, and took a negative attitude toward the Czechoslovaks by declaring that "breaking up of Austria-Hungary is

[40] On the subject of Polish military units in Russia see letters of the Quai d'Orsay to Piltz, Dec. 20, 1917; Pichon to Piltz, Nov. 10, 1918; and Zamoyski to Pichon, Nov. 12, 1918 — in Gąsiorowska, *Materjały archiwalne*, I, 129–140, 343–346, 347.

[41] Chambre des Députés, *Débats*, 1917, Session ordinaire, 3795.

[42] Beneš, *Světová válka*, II, 189ff; Stephen Bonsal, *Suitors and Suppliants: The Little Nations at Versailles* (New York, 1924), p. 146; Georges Suarez, *Briand* (6 vols., Paris, 1938–52), V, 23; Joseph Noulens, *Mon ambassade en Russie soviétique* (2 vols., Paris, 1933), II, 80–90.

no part of our war aims."[43] Wilson went further. While also supporting an ethnic Poland he spoke of her need to have a "free and secure access to the sea" (Point Thirteen). As for the Czechoslovaks, Point Ten stated that the peoples of the Habsburg monarchy "should be accorded the freest opportunity of autonomous development." While these statements fell short of Pichon's speech, they indicated a growing American interest in East Central Europe which was important indeed.

News of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk stunned the French and made the prominent diplomat Jules Cambon exclaim that "this would cure France forever of an alliance with Russia."[44] Paris used Brest-Litovsk to urge an Allied protest against the new partition of Poland, and joint recognition of the Polish state.[45] French initiative helped decisively to bring about the joint declaration of June 3, 1918, which announced a free Polish state with access to the sea as one of the Allied war aims. The statement on Czechoslovakia was more guarded and said only that the Allies sympathized with the national aspirations of the Czechoslovak people, but even so it marked progress over preceding declarations of the Entente.

The Czechoslovak position improved greatly as a result of Brest-Litovsk and the final breakdown of the secret French-Austrian negotiations. The Poles were incensed by the Austrian role in the treaty with Russia and ostentatiously joined the Czechoslovaks and other representatives of the Dual Monarchy in the Rome Congress of Oppressed Nationalities in May 1918. Czech-Polish cooperation, which from then on became, in Beneš's words, "systematic, sincere, and rather successful,"[46] strengthened the position of both in their representations to the west. Meanwhile the Pittsburgh Declaration of May 30, 1918, bolstered the Czechoslovak cause by showing the solidarity of Czechs and Slovaks in America. The Czechoslovak leaders made agreements with Britain and Italy, and in the course of May and June prepared for French recognition of the Czechoslovak National Council as the official representative of Czechoslovakia.

Pichon informed Beneš on June 29, 1918, of the French recognition of the council "as a supreme organ representing all interests of the nation and as a foundation of the future Czecho-Slovak government," and added that Paris would seek "to realize at the proper moment your aspirations toward independence within the *historical borders* of your provinces."[47] Beneš had been particularly anxious to obtain such a rec-

[43] David Lloyd George, *The Truth about the Peace Treaties* (2 vols., London, 1938), II, 758.

[44] Quoted in Laroche, *Au Quai d'Orsay*, p. 46.

[45] See Jusserand to Lansing, March 8, 1918, *FR 1918, Supplement*, I, 871.

[46] Beneš, *Světová válka*, II, 100.

[47] *Ibid.*, 230. Italics added.

ognition which committed France to the defense of Czechoslovak territorial claims at the Peace Conference, and (after securing British and American recognitions of the council, though without territorial pledges) he proceeded to sign a full-fledged political agreement with Pichon on September 28, 1918. This agreement recognized Czechoslovakia as an Allied nation and the National Council as a *de facto* government which would be represented at Allied conferences dealing with Czechoslovak matters. France also agreed to support "an independent Czechoslovak state within the borders of its old historic provinces." [48] On October 14, Beneš notified the Quai d'Orsay of the creation of a provisional government with Masaryk as president, Beneš as foreign minister, and Štefánik as minister of war. Four days later the new government proclaimed the independence of Czechoslovakia.

French recognition of the future borders of Czechoslovakia was an act of capital importance, which necessarily had bearing on Czechoslovak-Polish relations. The historic Czech borders included the dominantly Polish-inhabited duchy of Teschen, and although Polish and Czechoslovak leaders abroad had discussed the Teschen question several times they arrived at only a vague general understanding to settle the matter. A more definite agreement was reached between the Czechs and Poles in the homelands, but even so a vagueness remained. French recognition, which was mainly intended to state France's case vis-à-vis Germany, prejudiced the issue in Prague's favor and involved France in later controversy. It resulted partly from a lack of understanding of the situation,[49] partly from the assumption that the Teschen problem would be or already was amicably settled by the parties. If the Quai d'Orsay was unaware of the Polish character of the duchy, there were French experts who knew the relevant facts. However, there is no indication that the Polish National Committee, which was informed about the original letter from Pichon to Beneš of June 29 (concerning historic borders), did anything to bring the matter to French attention.[50]

By mid-October 1918 Beneš could justly claim that "we overtook the Poles in political and military work." [51] Why did this happen? Although relations between Paris and the Polish National Committee grew closer, and the authority of the committee was successively enlarged by agree-

[48] *Ibid.*, 319.

[49] "We must loyally admit," Beneš wrote, "that at this time no one on the French side thought about the Teschen border and the controversy with the Poles. . . . Had I then come with the question of the borders with Poland, this agreement would have never been signed in this form." *Problémy nové Evropy a zahraniční politika Československá* (Prague, 1924), p. 62.

[50] Dmowski on July 13 merely congratulated the Czechoslovak National Council on its success. Marian Seyda, *Polska na przełomie dziejów: fakty i dokumenty* (2 vols., Poznań, 1927), II, 439–440.

[51] Beneš, *Světová válka*, II, 101.

ments on March 20 and May 31, and finally by a full-fledged convention on September 28, 1918, which dealt with the Polish army in France under command of General Józef Haller, no political agreement comparable to the Beneš-Pichon pact ever followed. The reason was the limited character of the National Committee, which represented only one, however important, political trend among the Poles. Dmowski saw that Czechoslovak successes came because their council "took the character of a Czech national government, officially acting on behalf of the whole nation," [52] and he deplored that his committee could not follow their example. The French government would have been glad to see Dmowski's committee transform itself into a provisional Polish government, and had suggested such a course in June. Members of the committee were doubtful and divided. They decided to follow French advice only on October 13, 1918,[53] but by then it was too late because of developments in Poland.

4

The collapse of the Central Powers found the Czechoslovaks and Poles in vastly different positions. On October 28 the Czechs took control in Prague and proclaimed a Czechoslovak republic. Merger of home authorities with the provisional government in Paris went smoothly. Masaryk was elected president of the republic, Kramář became prime minister, and Beneš was confirmed in his position of foreign minister. A recognized Czechoslovak government, with clear commitments from France, assumed control. In Poland a chaotic situation developed. German troops still occupied most of the country, and there was no central Polish authority internationally recognized. No territorial pledges had been given by France or any other Allied power.

Under these conditions there followed the general armistice negotiations with Germany and Austria-Hungary. The Polish question figured in Allied thinking, and a preparatory note for Foch from his staff on September 19, 1918, stated that "the future fate . . . of Poland, will be included, up to a point, in the text of the armistice with Germany." [54] Dmowski urged evacuation of Poland by the Germans and its occupation by Allied troops.[55] The French seemingly shared his viewpoint.

[52] Dmowski, *Polityka polska*, p. 290.

[53] Seyda, *Polska na przełomie*, II, 482.

[54] G. Hanotaux, *Le Traité de Versailles du 28 juin 1919* (Paris, 1919), p. 139.

[55] For Dmowski's intervention in Washington see William Phillips to Secretary of State, Oct. 14, 1918, *State Department Archives*, National Archives, Washington, 860c.00/10 (hereafter cited as *SDNA*). For his letter to the National Committee on Oct. 28, 1918, see Casimir Smogorzewski, *L'Union secrée polonaise: le gouvernement de Varsovie et le "gouvernement" polonais de Paris 1918–1919* (Paris, 1929), pp. 10–11.

Lloyd George was reluctant to agree to armistice terms which the Germans might consider too severe.[56]

The clash of opinion between France and Britain found full expression at the meeting of the Allied War Council on November 2, 1918. Foch proposed evacuation by German troops "of all the territories of Poland, as she existed before the first partition, with Danzig," and Pichon supported him by saying: "I wish to insist that in the evacuated territories all territories are clearly included which formed the Kingdom of Poland before the first partition of 1772. . . . There is need for mentioning this clause in armistice conditions in order to avoid all discussion at the time of the examination of the peace terms." [57] British foreign secretary Arthur Balfour objected that the Allies had never agreed to restore prepartition Poland, and in the face of English opposition the French dropped their proposal. It was merely provided by Article 12 of the armistice that the Germans withdraw to their 1914 borders, evacuating Russian Poland, and that the Allies be allowed (so ran Article 16) "free access to the territories evacuated by the Germans . . . either by Danzig or by the Vistula, so as to be able to furnish supplies to the population and also to be able to maintain order." [58]

The French request for an evacuation of Poland to the prepartition borders was strangely unrealistic. It is true that the French had mentioned these boundaries in past secret negotiations with Austria, and again in a letter which Clemenceau wrote to the Polish National Committee on November 5, 1918.[59] It also appears that this idea was not just Clemenceau's but had found support in the French Radical Socialist party.[60] The National Committee in its note to the Quai d'Orsay of November 4 — the Poles did not yet know the terms of the armistice — did not speak of these frontiers but insisted on German evacuation and Allied occupation of Poland, including Silesia and southern East Prussia, neither of which was included within the borders of 1772. French insistence on the 1772 boundaries was certainly not meant to exclude

[56] Charles E. Callwell, *Sir Henry Wilson: His Life and Diary* (2 vols., London, 1927), II, 138. Balfour's fears that soft terms would mean "deserting the Poles and the people of Eastern Europe" met with Lloyd George's reply that one could not expect the British "to go on sacrificing their lives for the Poles." Duff Cooper, *Haig* (2 vols., London, 1936), II, 397.

[57] Mermeix (Gabriel Terrail), *Les Négotiations secrètes et les quatre armistices* (Paris, 1921), p. 247; the English text is from Harry R. Rudin, *Armistice 1918* (New Haven, 1944), p. 299.

[58] *FR Peace Conference*, III, 478. The French rejected Balfour's proposal that the Germans leave one third of their arms to the population of the evacuated territories.

[59] Clemenceau spoke in his letter to Zamoyski of Poland within "cadres et limites historiques." Stanislaw Filasiewicz, ed., *La Question polonaise pendant le guerre mondiale: recueil des actes diplomatiques, traités et documents concernant la Pologne* (Paris, 1920), p. 527.

[60] Ripault, *Pendant la tourmente*, pp. 115ff.

these two provinces because France supported Polish claims to both.[61] The French position also brought in question the Russo-Polish borders; and even if Paris considered Russia powerless at this time, it seems strange that France would want to commit herself to the 1772 frontiers in the east. One can only conclude that the proposal of these frontiers was made without full realization on the part of Paris of what they really meant.

The armistice terms, as agreed, left the Polish question, to all practical purposes, out of the general arrangement. Article 12 was changed upon German insistence so as to allow German troops to remain in Poland,[62] while Article 16, providing for free Allied access, proved a dead letter. The inadequacy of the armistice arrangement was in part remedied by the Poles themselves. Piłsudski, after his release from the German fortress of Magdeburg, succeeded in clearing Russian Poland of German troops, and thanks to his action a free Polish state emerged east of Germany before the Peace Conference. Piłsudski's *fait accompli* succeeded where French diplomacy had failed.[63]

Paris did not manage to create, through the armistice terms, favorable conditions for the future settlement between Poland and Germany, and its handling of the entire Polish case in late 1918 was unimaginative. Bent on the recognition of the Polish National Committee as the future government of Poland, the French tried to ignore domestic developments. Between November 11 and 14, 1918, Piłsudski had assumed power in Poland, obtaining both the sanction of the moribund Regency Council in Warsaw and dissolution of a radical government set up meanwhile in Lublin. As head of the state he organized a government, presided over by the Socialist Jędrzej Moraczewski, which controlled, apart from the formerly Russian part of Poland, the major portion of Galicia. Piłsudski on November 16 notified the Allied Powers by wire-

[61] For instance in the French note on preliminaries of the peace left with the British Foreign Office by the counselor of the French embassy in London, M. de Fleuriau, on Dec. 7, 1918. *FR Peace Conference*, I, 373.

[62] Polish historians have long maintained that Article 12 was changed on the initiative of Dmowski who, upon learning that German armies were to withdraw to the 1914 borders and no Allied troops were to be sent in, "went immediately to Lansing" and demanded that German withdrawal be postponed until further Allied consideration of the matter. Dmowski, *Polityka polska*, p. 341. Professor Komarnicki shows conclusively that it was German initiative during the armistice negotiations, and not Dmowski's *démarche*, which led to this change. See *Rebirth of the Polish Republic*, pp. 233ff. Seeking a trace of Dmowski's visit in the Lansing Papers, deposited in the Library of Congress, I could discover only a laconic entry in Lansing's desk diary which reads, under the date of Nov. 11, 1918: "General [*sic*] Dmowski to say goodbye." There is no earlier mention of the Polish statesman's name.

[63] The significance of Piłsudski's action can be gauged when one realizes that German troops remained entrenched in the Baltic states until a year later. See Ignacy Matuszewski, *Wybór pism* (London, 1952), pp. 39–42. For French dissatisfaction with Article 12 see Auguste Gauvain, *L'Europe au jour le jour* (14 vols., Paris, 1921–24), XIV, 302.

less of formation of a Polish state, and asked that Allied diplomatic representatives come to Warsaw.[64] The French reacted by speeding up activity to obtain Allied recognition of Dmowski's National Committee and to make it Poland's representative at the forthcoming Peace Conference. French motives for promoting the National Committee were a mixture of loyalty to Dmowski and his followers and a deep distrust of Piłsudski, an ex-Socialist, who only recently had led the Polish legions in combat on the Austrian side.

Paris and the Polish National Committee had a strong bargaining position because of their control of the Polish army in France, which Warsaw needed desperately.[65] Yet they could not entirely ignore developments in Poland. Balfour, consulted by Pichon, said it would be premature to attribute to the committee "functions which are in reality those of a government of a recognized independent State." [66] The danger appeared that Poland would have no representation at all at the Peace Conference unless a compromise solution was adopted.[67] In December 1918 a leading supporter of Dmowski went to Poland, and early in January Piłsudski's delegates arrived in Paris. The Quai d'Orsay adopted a conciliatory attitude, but with bad grace. In a major speech in the Chamber on December 29, Pichon emphasized the position of the National Committee which he called a "regular government," "the real official government of Poland," enjoying widespread support in the country. Paris, he said, had "accepted and provoked the coming to France of representatives of General Piłsudski," implying that they were another group added to complete the united Polish government.[68] Pichon's remarks met with criticism from the deputies of the Left, and a large part of the Parisian press attacked the policy of the Quai d'Orsay toward Poland.[69]

As matters turned out, the Paris negotiations between Piłsudski's en-

[64] Józef Piłsudski, *Pisma zbiorowe* (10 vols., Warsaw, 1937–38), V., 20.

[65] Piłsudski appealed to Foch on Nov. 17 to send the Haller troops to Poland, and he renewed his request several times. These messages, shown to Dmowski by the French, could only embitter relations, and Dmowski felt that Piłsudski went over his head, treating the committee as a tool in French hands.

[66] Filasiewicz, *La Question polonaise*, pp. 484–485.

[67] *FR Peace Conference*, I, 312.

[68] Chambre des Députés, *Débats*, 1918, Session ordinaire, 3333ff.

[69] *Journal des Débats* on Jan. 16, 1919, termed it incoherent and a "sabotage of our diplomacy." Ripault in *Le Radical* accused the Quai d'Orsay of lack of imagination, and even *Le Temps* doubted whether the government had any policy toward Poland and eastern Europe. See Ripault, *Pendant la tourmente*, p. 126, and Gauvain, *L'Europe au jour le jour*, XIII, 339–401. According to Piłsudski's envoy, Berthelot, Margerie, Laroche, and Legrand were completely "in the hands of the Committee," while Briand and Franklin-Bouillon were against it. Sokolnicki's letter of Jan. 7, 1919, *Akta Adjutantury Generalnej Naczelnego Dowództwa*, Józef Piłsudski Institute of America, New York (hereafter cited as *AGND*).

voys and the National Committee did not bring a satisfactory solution, and the decision to form a coalition government was made in Poland without visible French influence. On January 16, 1919, an arrangement was achieved by which Piłsudski remained head of the state; the pianist Ignacy Paderewski, who stood close to the Right but was not a party man, became premier and foreign minister; and Dmowski was made the chief Polish representative at the Peace Conference.[70] Pichon welcomed the new government and stated that "the creation of a Polish state *in its historical boundaries* with a free access to the sea is one of the first conditions of a just and lasting peace." [71]

As for Czechoslovakia, the armistice with Germany did not directly affect that country—and the Austrian armistice dealt primarily with the Italian front—and so Beneš concentrated on the armistice with Hungary. He asked Clemenceau to instruct General Louis Franchet d'Esperey, the commander-in-chief of the eastern group of armies, not to enter into discussion of any political matters while concluding the Belgrade armistice with Hungary, and Clemenceau complied.[72] When the text of the Hungarian armistice reached Paris, the Czechoslovak foreign minister realized that despite all its harshness it included a point dangerous to the interests of Prague. The point in question promised Hungary noninterference with internal administration of the country, which Budapest construed to mean a right of continued control over Slovakia until the peace settlement.

In a closely reasoned memorandum Beneš explained to Pichon, on November 25, 1918, that since France recognized Czechoslovakia within its historic boundaries as a belligerent ally, it surely could not allow Allied territory to be occupied by a former enemy power. Pichon replied two days later assuring Beneš that Paris would send instructions that Hungarian troops withdraw from Slovakia at once,[73] and on December 3, Colonel Vyx, acting on behalf of Franchet d'Esperey, summoned Hungary to withdraw behind a line indicated by Beneš and adopted by the Quai d'Orsay. The Czechoslovak right to control the territory included within its historic borders plus Slovakia was confirmed by Paris even more explicitly on December 21, in a note sent by Pichon to the

[70] The compromise solution came because of internal and international reasons, and no single Allied government influenced it decisively. The theory that the Hoover Food Mission was the *deus ex machina*, developed by Louis Gerson in his *Woodrow Wilson and the Rebirth of Poland* (New Haven, 1953), pp. 107ff, is based on so many misconceptions and factual mistakes that it cannot be taken seriously.

[71] *Monitor Polski*, Jan. 31, 1919, quoted in Seyda, *Polska na przełomie*, II, 554–555. Italics added.

[72] Beneš, *Světová válka*, II, 481ff.

[73] *Ibid.*, 487.

Austrian government which had protested Czech occupation of German-inhabited regions in Bohemia.[74]

Thus before the Peace Conference the Czechoslovak government found itself in authority over almost all the territories it claimed, in contrast to the government in Warsaw which occupied less than half of postwar Poland. French support had proved decisive, and Masaryk emphasized in his first address to the Czechoslovak cabinet that "We must have one friend who will always take our side and this will be the French." [75] Paris was glad to capitalize on its aid to Prague, and Pichon told the Chamber on December 29 that "We were the first to work for the resurrection of Bohemia . . . [and] recognized the Czecho-Slovak government. We were those who had called their members to our counsels. We had created the Czecho-Slovak army." [76]

5

The sudden end of the war found France rather unprepared to preside over a settlement in East Central Europe. The French equivalent of the American Inquiry and of the research division of the British Foreign Office — the *Comité d'Études* — had been set up in 1917 to prepare material for the Peace Conference, but it was slow with results. Presided over by Professor Ernest Lavisse, the *Comité* was composed of scholars and it was not in close touch with the Quai d'Orsay. In October 1917 it began to discuss the question of Germany's eastern borders, but by the time of the German armistice it had produced only a brief study by Ernest Denis on Polish political programs.[77] In December 1918, André Tardieu started to coordinate the work of the *Comité* with that of an economic committee presided over by Senator Jean Morel, but he hardly had time to accomplish anything before the opening of the Peace Conference.

The paper by Denis contained some interesting conclusions. Stating that history taught that France could not enjoy security unless she leaned on "solid alliances" east of Germany, Denis asserted that the main problem was to "remake an eastern front" in which "a preponderant role would be played by Poland" as well as by the Czechoslovak state "which will be for us a sure ally." [78] To strengthen this front he

[74] The Czech text is in *ibid.*, II, 500–501; the English text is in *FR Peace Conference*, II, 383.

[75] Ferdinand Peroutka, *Budování státu* (4 vols. in 5, Prague, 1934–36), II/II, 1338.

[76] Chambre des Députés, *Débats*, 1918, Session ordinaire, 3333.

[77] See Laroche, *Au Quai d'Orsay*, pp. 58–59. Also Comité d'Études, *Procès-verbaux des réunions, rapports, 1917–1918*, mimeographed, Bibliothèque Polonaise, Paris (hereafter cited as *CE*). Also Comité d'Études, *Travaux* (2 vols., Paris, 1919), Questions européenes; Pt. III, La Tchéco-Slovaquie; Pt. IV, La Pologne et Russie.

[78] Ernest Denis, "Les Programmes polonais," *CE*, 1918.

wished a federal union which would link Poland, the Ukraine, Byelorussia, and the Baltic countries, and he warned against mistaking Poland's eastern plans for simple imperialism. The views of Denis, to be sure, represented only his opinions and possibly those of some other members of the *Comité*. To get some notion of the ideas prevailing at the Quai d'Orsay one must turn to two memorandums on the Polish question, dated respectively December 20 and December 24, 1918.

The first of the Quai d'Orsay memorandums asked for "a strong Poland as rapidly as possible," for the following reasons: first, because "Germany will not be really defeated unless she loses her Polish provinces"; second, because French security on the Rhine required a strong power on the other side of Germany; third, because "the more we aggrandize Poland at Germany's expense, the more certain shall we be that she will remain her enemy"; and finally, because Poland was then 'the necessary barrier between Russian Bolshevism and a German revolution," and "we will not triumph over Bolshevism unless we lean on Poland and make use of her armies." [79]

The memorandum recommended drawing the Polish borders as far west as possible, and to remedy the omission of Poland in the armistice terms it suggested that when the armistice was renewed, the Allies should demand German withdrawal from Silesia, Poznania, Western and Eastern Prussia, and parts of Pomerania. The document was far less explicit on the eastern frontiers of Poland, and there was visible preoccupation with Russia and "Polish imperialism." Asserting a connection between the latter and the large Polish-owned estates in the east, the memorandum recommended that Poland's eastern neighbors be allowed to expropriate large Polish property for suitable compensation. It urged Polish-Lithuanian union and inclusion of Eastern Galicia in Poland, and stated that this would not really prejudice a future liberal Russian state which was a far-off prospect anyway. The 1772 borders were nowhere mentioned.[80]

The second memorandum examined the Polish borders, and reached roughly similar conclusions. It mentioned the Polish-Czech border in Teschen. After stating that Teschen had a Polish majority, the document hoped that the Czechs and the Poles would settle this question amicably.[81]

The Quai d'Orsay also produced a memorandum on Czechoslovakia. As compared with the two documents on Poland, the memorandum on

[79] Affaires Étrangères, Mémoire, Dec. 20, 1918," *Dossier Klotz*, 14, Pologne, 1, a, Bibliothèque de Documentation Internationale Contemporaine, Paris (hereafter cited as *DK*).

[80] *DK*, 14, Pologne, 1, b.

[81] *Ibid.*, 2.

Czechoslovakia, dated November 20, 1918, was limited in scope. Since France had recognized the historic borders of Czechoslovakia, the document dealt with the issue of Czechoslovak nationality. After an ethnic and linguistic analysis it concluded: "there is no reason to pretend that the Czecho-Slovak nationality is not one, or that it does not correspond to reality." A more detailed analysis of the geographical distribution of Czechs and Slovaks followed, and doubt was expressed whether the Slovaks came as far south as the Danube. Concerning Teschen the document maintained that the duchy ought to be divided into Polish and German zones. "A Czech zone properly speaking does not exist." [82]

As was true of other material hastily prepared before the conference, one cannot say easily how far these various memorandums influenced French policy toward East Central Europe. A leading French diplomat noted at the time that "they accumulate documents and *dossiers* at the Ministry but they do not use them." [83] Still, French delegates at the Peace Conference would frequently express ideas contained in the three memorandums, and these ideas reflected the prevailing trends in French government circles in late 1918. Insistence on speedy settlement of the German borders and hesitation with regard to Russian problems were also apparent in the French proposals for organization and procedure of the Peace Conference; but these proposals were unacceptable to the Anglo-Saxon powers, and as a result no fixed agenda existed when the conference met for the first time.[84]

This state of affairs placed a burden on the Czechoslovak and Polish delegations to the Peace Conference, who had to be prepared at any moment to give their views and were expected to provide documentation for their claims. Their success depended to no small degree on their ability to impress representatives of the great powers and exploit contacts with the Allied political and diplomatic world.

The two Czechoslovak delegates at the conference were, respectively, the foreign minister, Eduard Beneš, and the premier, Karel Kramář. They were ably assisted by the secretary of the delegation, a young Slovak named Štefan Osuský.[85] Beneš in spite of his youth — he was in his early thirties — was an accomplished diplomat with excellent connections. Clemenceau called him "one of the best of them all," [86] and he impressed the Americans with his "rare gift of identifying his country's

[82] "Affaires Étrangères, Mémoire, Nov. 20, 1918," *DK*, 15, Tchécoslovaquie, 1.

[83] Paul Cambon, *Correspondance 1870–1924* (3 vols., Paris, 1940–46), III, 294.

[84] For the Berthelot and Tardieu proposals see Tardieu, *The Truth about the Treaty*, p. 86; Laroche, *Au Quai d'Orsay*, pp. 62ff, and "Plan des premières conversations entre les ministres alliés à partir du 13 janvier 1919," *DK*, 24, a.

[85] For a favorable appreciation of Osuský, see Laroche, *Au Quai d'Orsay*, p. 81.

[86] Clemenceau, *Grandeur and Misery*, p. 149. See also Joseph Paul-Boncour, *Entre deux guerres* (3 vols., Paris, 1945), II, 154.

aspirations with the postulates of a settled peace."[87] Charles Seymour has recalled that Beneš "made an excellent impression upon the Council of Ten,"[88] and even those who later called Beneš a "short sighted politician"[89] or a man "who lacked conscience"[90] recognized his political and diplomatic talents. Beneš's position was stronger than that of Kramář, whose party was forced out of the coalition cabinet in May 1919 and who relinquished his premiership on July 8. The two statesmen were very dissimilar. Kramář was emotional, Beneš self-possessed. Kramář was touchy on matters of prestige, and more aggressive than Beneš; he felt that Czechoslovakia could play a larger role if she adopted interventionist policies in Russia and helped restore the old tsarist regime to the Allied counsels.[91] His inflexibility and extreme Russophilism annoyed Beneš, who confided to Harold Nicolson that he found "a great gulf" between himself and people like Kramář who "thought only in terms of extreme Czech nationalism" and rendered Beneš's "position difficult."[92] Nicolson believed that Kramář was "behind everything nasty that Benes does,"[93] and this notion obviously enhanced Beneš's standing in Paris.

The Czechoslovak delegation relied on French support, and Beneš's wartime relations with Berthelot proved valuable. Berthelot made politics "with sympathies and antipathies for men or for nations,"[94] and while contemptuous of small nations he always "made an exception when Czechoslovakia was concerned."[95]

Polish questions, connected as they were with the big problems of Germany and of Russia, aroused more controversy than Czechoslovak issues. It was here that French and British interests clashed violently. The Poles themselves were not in complete agreement on their territorial program, as far as the eastern borders were concerned. And remnants of the Piłsudski-Dmowski feud added bitterness to the internal divisions.

The two Polish delegates at the conference were Roman Dmowski, who held no position in the government but was the principal Polish political figure in Paris, and Ignacy Paderewski, premier and foreign minister, a great patriot but hardly an experienced politician. Stanisław

[87] Emile J. Dillon, *The Inside Story of the Peace Conference* (New York, 1920), p. 85.
[88] Charles Seymour, "Czechoslovak Frontiers," *Yale Review*, XXVIII (1938–39), 275.
[89] Lloyd George, *The Truth about the Peace Treaties*, II, 942.
[90] Suarez, *Briand*, VI, 53.
[91] See Peroutka, *Budování státu*, II/II, 1043ff, 1129ff.
[92] Harold Nicolson, *Peacemaking: 1919* (London, 1945), pp. 195–196.
[93] *Ibid.*, p. 266.
[94] Cambon, *Correspondance*, III, 378.
[95] Emanuel Peretti de La Rocca, "Briand et Poincaré: souvenirs," *Revue de Paris*, VI (1936), 775. Saint Aulaire considered that Berthelot was for the Czechs and against Austria because of his "anti-Catholicism." *Confession*, p. 606.

Kozicki acted as secretary. Dmowski, a man of political experience, leader of the influential National Democratic party, fluent in foreign languages, cut an impressive but controversial figure. He had, in Beneš's words, "many antagonists, especially in London (Lloyd George) because of his anti-Semitism, which was often rather cleverly brought into the limelight, and also because of his pronounced nationalism in which many people saw the newly reborn Polish imperialism." [96] The French thought highly of him, and Lloyd George later wrote that Dmowski was an "exceedingly able and cultured Pole," [97] but during the Peace Conference the British prime minister ostentatiously avoided contact with the Polish delegate. At one point Lloyd George simply stated that Dmowski "did not represent the democratic opinion in Poland" [98]—a view probably shared by several other delegates. Dmowski took precedence at the conference until March 1919, when Paderewski came to the fore. Dmowski fell ill in November 1919 and withdrew for a time from politics.

Paderewski, whose metamorphosis from a pianist into a political figure impressed and amazed Secretary of State Robert Lansing, won admiration for his noble character and disinterested patriotism.[99] He was often "a forcible speaker, a close debater and resourceful pleader," [100] and his friendship with Colonel House was a political asset. He represented nobly the Polish cause if not a clear-cut political program.

It was taken for granted by the English-speaking powers that Poland "had been earmarked as the French sphere," and the French did not allow this to be forgotten "for one single instant." [101] This identification of French and Polish interests, which was not quite true with regard to the role of Russia in world affairs, often annoyed the independent-minded Poles, though most of them realized the advantage of a pro-French line. The outspoken Polish Catholicism also harmed the Polish cause at Paris; it must be remembered that two of the Big Three were Protestants and one an atheist.[102]

If relations between the Czechoslovak and Polish delegations eventu-

[96] *Světová válka*, II, 99.

[97] Lloyd George, *The Truth about the Peace Treaties*, I, 313.

[98] *FR Peace Conference*, IV, 680.

[99] Robert Lansing, *Big Four and Others at the Peace Conference* (Boston, 1921), pp. 197ff; Clemenceau, *Grandeur and Misery*, p. 149; Lloyd George, *The Truth about the Peace Treaties*, I, 311; Maxime Weygand, *Mémoires: II: Mirages et réalités* (Paris, 1957), pp. 81–82.

[100] Dillon, *The Inside Story*, p. 79. President Charles Seymour confirmed to me the high opinion the Americans had of Paderewski's oratory.

[101] General Sir Adrian Carton de Wiart, *Happy Odyssey* (London, 1955), p. 74. Also E. L. Woodward and R. Butler, eds., *Documents on British Foreign Policy*, 1st series, III, 365 (hereafter cited as *DBFP*).

[102] See the interesting remarks on Versailles being a "Protestant peace" in Bertrand de Jouvenel, *D'Une guerre à l'autre* (2 vols., Paris, 1940–41), I, 65ff. For a similar opinion of Briand see Saint Aulaire, *Confession*, p. 577.

ally were poisoned by the conflict over Teschen, on the eve of the conference there was hope for cooperation, especially on the German problem. Dmowski has written that the threat of the "German flood menacing the Czechs could never be a matter of indifference to us," [103] and Masaryk went further when he wrote that "without a free Poland there will be no free Bohemia, and if Bohemia is not free Poland cannot be free either." [104] But, while there was a large measure of agreement on the German issue, there was none on the question of Russia. To Poland, Russia, whether White or Red, presented a threat, and Warsaw hoped to take its place in the eastern alliance system. The Czechoslovaks deeply regretted the absence of Russia from European counsels, and hoped that a democratic Russia would be restored to the European balance of power.

There was, finally, a nationalistic rivalry between the Czechoslovaks and the Poles. The former, encouraged by their successes, felt supremely confident about the future and their position in Europe. The Czech press could write that "the whole world considers us a nation of extraordinary ability," and "the attitude of the Entente toward us is one of love mingled with admiration." [105] Beneš claimed in his memorandums for the Peace Conference that "the part which we took in the military operations is indubitably much greater than that of the Poles," [106] and explained at length how the Czechs gained "the first place among all Slav nations." [107] The Poles on their side "showed no interest in anything except the Polish question and judged everything from that standpoint." [108] This parochial attitude proved irritating to the Czechoslovaks. In an atmosphere of strong nationalist feelings there was little spirit of compromise on either side.

As things stood on the eve of the Paris Peace Conference, then, there existed a French-Czechoslovak-Polish front, but that front was far from solid or uniform. France supported both countries but had varying commitments to and attitudes toward Warsaw and Prague. No general French plan for settlement in East Central Europe really existed, and neither the Czechs nor the Poles, occupied with their own interests and problems, could supply one. Their policies, views, and opinions came out clearly when the Peace Conference began to resolve territorial issues.

[103] Dmowski, *Polityka polska*, p. 217. On Dmowski's pro-Czech feelings see Masaryk, *The Making of a State*, p. 234, and his address on Dec. 22, 1918, in Parliament, Národní Shromáždění, *Těsnopisecké zprávy*, I, 1054.

[104] *L'Europe nouvelle*, p. 179.

[105] Quoted in Peroutka, *Budování státu*, I, 224.

[106] Hermann Raschhofer, ed., *Die tschechoslowakischen Denkschriften für die Friedenskonferenz von Paris, 1919–1920* (Berlin, 1938), Mémoire No. 11, p. 322.

[107] *Ibid.*, Mémoire No. 2, p. 30.

[108] Stanisław Kutrzeba, *Kongres, traktat i Polska* (Warsaw, 1919), p. 135.

1

POLAND'S WESTERN BORDERS

ONE of the most important problems in the settlement in Europe faced at Paris in 1919, from the French point of view, was how to draw the Polish-German borders. The French believed that "If the Hohenzollern had fled, the Empire under the name of Reich would remain, and the German Reich would not change its soul."[1] They hoped that Poland could "keep Germany in check if she tried a revenge for the present defeat."[2] To play this part Poland obviously needed secure borders in the west. Security on the Vistula complemented security on the Rhine, and the more Germany was weakened in the east, the less menace she offered on the west. Similarly if France were to help Poland as well as maintain her own security, she needed strong strategic frontiers. The two issues, Franco-German and Polish-German, were closely related, and at their foundation lay fear of a resurgent, revengeful Germany. This emerges clearly from the Quai d'Orsay memorandums mentioned in the previous discussion, from Marshal Foch's memorandum of November 27, 1918, and from other contemporary French statements.

France's fears were not shared by London—Lloyd George maintained that "the Teuton was largely done for"[3]—and French preoccupation with security was mistaken for desire for hegemony in Europe. Poland, viewed as an instrument of French imperialism, faced opposition from Britain, which treated the German-Polish boundaries less on their own merit than as part of the French scheme of European settlement. From the outset the German-Polish frontiers promised to be the subject of violent controversies between Paris and London.

The situation prevailing in the German-Polish area on the eve of the conference did not facilitate a smooth and easy arrangement. Four days after the armistice, of which only the vague Article 16 bore on Prussian

[1] Léon Bourgeois, *Le Traité de Versailles* (Paris, 1919), p. 237.

[2] A contemporary propaganda leaflet entitled *En quoi la Pologne intéresse la France?* (Paris, n.d.).

[3] *FR Peace Conference*, VI, 212.

Poland — it spoke of Allied help through the port of Danzig (Gdańsk) — Polish deputies to the Reichstag proclaimed their independence and set up a diet in Poznań representing Poznania, Pomerania, the southern part of East Prussia, and Upper Silesia. The new diet sent an appeal to the Peace Conference, demanding inclusion of these provinces in Poland, but made no attempt to detach them by force from Germany. This was largely due to the influence of Dmowski, who counseled the Poles to await in calm the verdict of the Peace Conference. Arrival of Paderewski in Poland in late December 1918 led, however, to riots in Poznań which soon became an armed uprising against German rule. Since the Germans considered that the armistice did not treat Poland as a member of the Entente [4] and continued German control of the area, they resorted to reprisals. The Allies of course could not tolerate a violent German repression of Prussian Poland, which according to Allied war aims was to be transferred to Poland. A dangerous situation arose.

German-Polish hostility increased the critical state of affairs in Poland itself. There was a struggle going on between Poles and Ukrainians in Eastern Galicia, the Bolsheviks were advancing westward threatening Poland, and tension prevailed on the Czech-Polish border. Fantastic stories about conditions in Poland, some of them clearly fabricated, circulated in the west, adding to the confusion. Paris was alarmed, and Marshal Foch in a note of January 11, 1919, declared that developments in Poland spelled "danger for the whole of Europe." Referring to Article 16 of the armistice, Foch stated that the situation in Poland was "not in bearing with the promises made by the Allies in regard to Poland." [5] The Allied commander-in-chief advised rephrasing Article 16 to provide for military aid, and suggested sending the Haller army from France to Poland via Danzig. Assuming that the Germans might interfere with its passage, Foch advised dispatching Allied troops to occupy Danzig and the railroad line from Danzig to Toruń (Thorn). The British opposed Foch's proposal because of the generally uncertain conditions in Poland. Lloyd George expressed fears on January 23 that the Haller troops might either fight the Germans or conquer territories in the east, and if the Polish army were to fight against the Bolsheviks it was first necessary to arrive at some general Allied policy toward Russia. Balfour expressed the essence of British objections by saying that the Poles "were using the interval between the cessation of war and the decisions of the Peace Conference to make good their claims to districts outside Russian Poland," [6] and he protested against encouragement of the Polish policy

[4] Komarnicki, *Rebirth of the Polish Republic*, p. 224, quoting from *Der Waffenstillstand*, III, 126.

[5] *FR Peace Conference*, III, 477.

[6] *Ibid.*, III, 672.



The Western Border of Poland

of *faits accomplis*. France thought otherwise, and Foch voiced again the French fears that "Poland might be suffocated before its birth."[7] He reiterated the demand that Haller's troops go to Poland.

A new outburst of fighting, provoked by a Czech armed attack on the Poles in Teschen, provided French diplomacy with a chance to bring the entire Polish question before the Supreme Council. Dmowski and Piltz were summoned to a meeting of the council on January 29, 1919, and some of the Allied delegations were surprised to find that discussion was not limited to the Czech-Polish clash.[8] Clemenceau did not conceal his view that the Polish situation had to be examined in all its aspects "because there was a pressing necessity and fighting was taking place there."[9] Dmowski on his side realized that the Polish question was taken up by the conference at such an early stage thanks to French initiative.[10]

Dmowski's first appearance before the Supreme Council was a memorable event for the Polish delegation. The council sat in an impressive Quai d'Orsay office decorated with seventeenth-century tapestries, with Clemenceau presiding at a Louis XV table and the other delegates surrounding him. Some thirty-five people in all listened to Dmowski's speech, delivered first in French and repeated in English. A British diplomat termed it a "wonderful performance,"[11] and Clemenceau congratulated the Polish delegate on his "masterly statement."[12] Dmowski dealt mainly with two aspects of the Polish question, discussing first the general situation of a country endangered from east, west, and south, and then turned to Polish territorial demands and aspirations. He appealed for Allied help, pointing out that Article 16 had become a dead letter. He especially urged Allied occupation of Danzig.

As a result of Dmowski's hearing the Supreme Council decided to send an inter-Allied mission to Poland presided over by Joseph Noulens, former French ambassador to Russia, and including among others a high-ranking French officer, General Henri Niessel.[13] The task of the mission was to put an end to German-Polish hostilities, and to report on

[7] *Ibid.*, III, 674.

[8] Miller noted that the subject of discussion was "not as I expected it." David Hunter Miller, *My Diary at the Conference of Paris* (21 vols., New York, 1926), I, 96. Lloyd George considered the session a waste of time, while Balfour and Sonnino were merely surprised by the general nature of the discussion.

[9] *FR Peace Conference*, III, 813–814.

[10] Dmowski, *Polityka polska*, p. 373.

[11] Sir Esme Howard, *Theatre of Life* (2 vols., Boston, 1935–36), II, 303.

[12] Dmowski, *Polityka polska*, p. 267. He complained that the summary of his speech in the minutes (*FR Peace Conference*, III, 773–774, 780–782) was unsatisfactory.

[13] The choice of Noulens was interesting since he was known for his fervent advocacy of Allied intervention in Russia. See Komarnicki, *Rebirth of the Polish Republic*, p. 257.

the general state of affairs in Poland.[14] The Noulens mission after its arrival in Poland demanded instant cessation of hostilities in Poznania. The Polish side agreed immediately, but the Germans offered resistance and claimed an absolute right "to ensure the protection of their own subjects within their own territory."[15] Describing Poznania as "German soil," Germany protested the Allied demand as the "final straw of foreign intermeddling with interior independence of a people."[16]

The situation was tense, and news of an important German military build-up in the east reached Paris, as well as rumor of German collusion with the Bolsheviks. Clemenceau wanted to stop hostilities at any cost, not only because of the danger to Poland but also because of the general question of German disarmament. The Allies, he said, "could not at the same time support the Poles in attacking Germany and ask the Germans to disarm."[17] But since the Poles had agreed to stop fighting, while the Germans met the Allied demand with a "blank refusal," they had to be forced to stop at once. Clemenceau declared that Berlin must be told that "an attack by them on the East would mean an advance by the Allies on the West," and that they would understand such language.[18] Wilson and Lloyd George do not appear to have been wholly convinced by the French argument, nor did they seem to endorse Clemenceau's opinion that the Polish situation was "worth an offensive."[19] They agreed, however, especially after the council's military committee advised a demarcation line in Poznania and pressure on Germans and Poles not to cross it. A convention to that effect was signed at Trier on February 16, 1919,[20] but the arrangement did not work smoothly and the Noulens mission had cause to complain about highhanded German acts and breaches of the convention.[21]

It is fairly clear that if the Germans could act with impunity it was largely because constant Polish demands for sending Haller's troops to Poland[22] via Danzig met with the opposition of Lloyd George in the Supreme Council. The Noulens mission, which supported entirely the Polish demand, recommended again and again "the immediate sending to Poland of the divisions of General Haller."[23] Clemenceau and Foch concurred. The British attitude was mainly political; Lloyd George and

[14] Instructions of Feb. 1, 1919, in *FR Peace Conference*, III, 839–840.
[15] *Ibid.*, III, 924–925.
[16] *Ibid.*, IV, 38–39.
[17] *Ibid.*, III, 695.
[18] *Ibid.*, III, 903–904.
[19] *Ibid.*, III, 976.
[20] Text in *ibid.*, IV, 42–43.
[21] See Noulens' letter to Pichon complaining about it, *DK*, 14, Pologne, 22. Also Miller, *My Diary*, XVII, 299–325, 351.
[22] See Piłsudski's letter to Clemenceau, Piłsudski, *Pisma zbiorowe*, V, 64–65.
[23] Conférence de la Paix 1919–1920, *Recueil des actes de la conférence* (36 vols., Paris,

Balfour suspected that landing Polish troops in Danzig would lead to an uprising against the Germans similar to that in Poznań, and place Pomerania in Polish hands before the decision of the Peace Conference, prejudicing the issue in Poland's favor. Moreover, Foch's suggestion of a line along the Danzig-Toruń railroad would, according to Lloyd George, mean incorporating the whole of East Prussia in the republic of Poland.[24] British statesmen would allow no diminution of German territory before the final verdict of the conference in which their voice would be of paramount importance.[25]

British suspicions were of course well founded. Landing Haller's army would have led to a Polish uprising, and Marshal Foch would have been glad to see implementation of the original pre-armistice proposal of the French that the Germans withdraw from Poland. The Paris press recommended Allied pressure on Germany for evacuation of Polish Pomerania, Danzig, and East Prussia,[26] and the question of sending Haller's army became inextricably linked with the wider territorial issue. Berlin offered to let the troops cross Germany, but not by way of Danzig, and British espousal of this proposal eventually led to a protocol signed by Foch and Matthias Erzberger on April 4, providing for transportation of Haller's army by the overland route.[27] This arrangement at such a late date not only deprived Poland of use of the Haller army for the first five months of her national existence — Czechoslovak troops had begun to return home in December 1918 — but lost for her the last chance of forcing German evacuation from Pomerania, which would have given her a route to the western world.[28] The fact that throughout the Peace Conference Germany controlled a large part of Polish-claimed territory worked in her favor and to Poland's disadvantage.

2

The Peace Conference, prompted by France, turned early to the question of the German-Polish borders. The Supreme Council established on February 12, 1919, a Commission on Polish Affairs "to deal with all

1924–34), IV, C (2), 962 (hereafter cited as *Recueil*). See also Noulens' telegrams of Feb. 14, 15, 28, 1919, in *ibid.*, pp. 690, 699–700, 767.

[24] Lloyd George, *The Truth about the Peace Treaties*, I, 287.

[25] See the discussion in the Supreme Council on March 29, 1919. Paul Mantoux, *Les Délibérations du Conseil des quatre* (2 vols., Paris, 1955), I, 77–80, 104–105, 113ff.

[26] For instance Gauvain's articles in *Journal des Débats*, Feb. 6, 11, and 13, 1919. See *L'Europe au jour le jour*, XII, 453ff, 468, 473ff.

[27] Haller's troops consisted at this time of six divisions grouped into two corps, commanded by French generals and numbering around 80,000 men. See Wacław Lipiński, "Bajończycy i armia polska we Francji," *Bellona*, XXXIII (1929).

[28] Clemenceau wondered how the Allies could help Poland if she were invaded, and General Dupont wrote Foch that "you can do everything on the Rhine but nothing in Prussian Poland until the treaty is ratified." *FR Peace Conference*, VII, 937.

reports and requests for instructions from the commission sent to Poland." [29] Eight days later it enlarged its scope to include the study of borders between Germany and Poland, and instructed the commission to prepare a report for the council.[30] The former French ambassador in Berlin, Jules Cambon, became president of the commission and both he and such other French members as Jules Laroche and General Henri Le Rond played conspicuous parts. Cambon generally favored the Poles, although he apparently felt that they were "out for a sharp bargain," and he reproached Clemenceau for taking a "much too romantic view of the Poles." [31]

On February 28, 1919, Dmowski submitted to Cambon's commission a document entitled "Note on the Western Frontiers of the Polish State," which comprised an exposition of Polish territorial demands.[32] The note stated, first, that re-creation of the Polish state should be viewed as an act of international justice obliterating the eighteenth-century partitions. Therefore an examination of Polish borders should start from Poland's last legal frontiers, namely those of 1772. Second, Poland's rebirth should be looked upon as a result of the development of Polish national forces, and consequently the 1772 borders needed to be revised in accordance with this consideration. In some cases growth of Polish nationalism would require revision in Poland's favor but in others, where Polish nationalism had dwindled and local nationalism revived, changes would have to be to Poland's disadvantage. Third, the revival of Poland had to be considered in relation to the need to establish a truly independent state between Germany and Russia, and this would necessitate taking into account economic and strategic factors in drawing Polish boundaries. With regard to the western frontiers Dmowski, led by the above three considerations, urged incorporation into Poland — on historical and ethnic grounds — of Poznania and Pomerania and — because of strategic, economic, and ethnic factors — of the southeastern part of East Prussia. He also claimed Upper Silesia, mainly on ethnic ground since the province had not formed part of the Polish state

[29] *Ibid.*, III, 1007.

[30] After the dissolution of the Noulens mission on April 26, 1919, the Commission on Polish Affairs was authorized on June 25, 1919, to deal with all aspects of the Polish question including current affairs. *Ibid.*, IV, 856.

[31] According to Clemenceau himself as quoted by Bonsal in *Suitors and Suppliants*, p. 130.

[32] The French text is in *Recueil*, IV, C (2), 655–659, and in Sekretariat Jeneralny Delegacji Polskiej, *Akty i dokumenty dotyczące sprawy granic Polski 1918–1919* (4 vols., Paris, 1920–26), I, 109–123 (hereafter cited as *Akty i dokumenty*). The Polish text is in Dmowski, *Polityka polska*, pp. 521–525. Dmowski had previously presented Cambon with a copy of a memorandum — prepared for Wilson on Oct. 8, 1918 — accompanied by observations for the use of the commission. *Akty i dokumenty*, II, 8–11.

in 1772. The note advised neutralizing the remnants of East Prussia and placing them under the protectorate of the League of Nations.[33]

France supported Dmowski's territorial program practically in its entirety,[34] and on the whole Polish demands were not out of line with the views of the American Inquiry or the historical section of the British Foreign Office.[35] This fact became evident when the Commission on Polish Affairs turned to detailed study of the German-Polish border. The commission met on February 20, established a working subcommittee presided over by General Le Rond, met again on March 6 to discuss the findings of this group, and proceeded to draft a report for the Supreme Council. It also listened to Dmowski, who addressed the commission. Judging by the minutes of the subcommittee and of the commission, disagreement between the French and the British members was relatively small and centered on disposition of the eastern bank of the Vistula and the district of Allenstein (Olsztyn), where the British demand for a plebiscite was accepted by other members, though Le Rond was unhappy about it.[36] The commission accepted the final text unanimously on March 12 and submitted it to the council.[37]

The report did not constitute a blank endorsement of Polish claims and in fact cut them down considerably.[38] The reason can be found in the introductory remarks which point out that primarily ethnic considerations guided the commission. Polish claims were much reduced in East Prussia, and a provision for a plebiscite in Allenstein was inserted. Other changes were slight. The commission retained the principle of demilitarizing East Prussia but did not advocate its separation from Germany.[39] Polish reaction to the report was not on the whole unfavorable, and Poles in Paris felt that it was better than could have been expected. Dmowski, while saying that the Cambon commission "adopted

[33] The first note was followed later by more detailed memorandums prepared by the Polish delegation. See Commission Polonaise des Travaux Préparatoires au Congrès de la Paix, *Questions relatives aux territoires polonais sous la domination prussienne* (Paris, March 1919).

[34] See Quai d'Orsay memorandum of Dec. 20, 1918, *DK*, 14, Pologne, 1, a, b; Comité d'Études, *Travaux*, pp. 149ff; Foch's memorandum of Jan. 10, 1919; and French proposals left by Fleuriau in London on Dec. 7, 1918.

[35] See Inquiry Project of Jan. 21, 1919, Miller, *My Diary*, IV, 209–281, and map No. 6. Also Foreign Office, Historical Section, *Peace Handbooks* (London, 1920): No. 39, *East and West Prussia*; No. 40, *Upper Silesia*; No. 45, *Prussian Poland*.

[36] *Recueil*, IV, C (2), 319–320.

[37] Report No. 1 of the Commission on Polish Affairs, "Frontier Between Germany and Poland." English text: Miller, *My Diary*, VI, 350–366; French text: *Recueil*, IV, C (2), 53–73, which includes a map missing from Miller's work.

[38] Claimed: 85,644 sq. km., 3,189,800 Poles, and 2,937,600 Germans. Proposed: 58,632 sq. km., 2,854,800 Poles, and 2,132,600 Germans.

[39] French members pressed for demilitarization but it seems that the British opposition if any was slight. Compare Charles Benoist, *Les Nouvelles frontières de l'Allemagne et la nouvelle carte d'Europe* (Paris, 1920), pp. 141–142, and *Recueil*, IV, C (2), 17.

a reserved attitude to our demands, [and] . . . drew a boundary very difficult for the [Polish] state," admitted that the commission worked "efficiently and objectively" and although sympathetic to the Poles it was not partial to them. The Polish leader considered the full agreement between the British members and the French — who of course "supported us strongly" — a great achievement.[40]

The happy harmony of views between the experts did not find a counterpart on the higher political level. Cambon presented the report to the Supreme Council on March 19, analyzed it, and explained in detail why ethnic considerations were outweighed by others in the case of Danzig and Marienwerder (Kwidzyń). He emphasized the unanimous stand of the commission. Then Lloyd George took the floor and launched a criticism of the report. He said that two million Germans must not be included in Poland because it would spell trouble for that country. The Poles, he said, "had not a high reputation as administrators."[41] He remarked that the proposed borders would make it hard for the German government to sign the peace treaty and might lead to its collapse. He particularly opposed the transfer of Marienwerder to Poland.

Lloyd George's stand surprised the French and other delegates, for he apparently had already "expressed privately his agreement with the report and had actually informed a British member of the Commission on Poland that he would support it in the Council of Ten."[42] The French, backed by President Wilson who emphasized that many Poles would also be left in Germany, took up the issue. Cambon, Tardieu, and Pichon defended the report strongly. Tardieu pointed out that difficulties were bound to arise in the case of states recovering their independence after long foreign domination, and stressed that all the experts on the commission were in agreement. Lloyd George replied that the British member had agreed "reluctantly," though there had been no indication of it so far. The report was returned to the commission for a further examination.

It is obvious that the large issue at stake was not strict adherence to ethnic principles — Lloyd George was prepared to disregard them on other occasions — but a much greater problem connected with French security and the place of Germany in Europe. To understand fully the discussion of the report on Polish western borders one must view it in the general context of French demands for security on the Continent.

Before the beginning of the Peace Conference, the French had urged on several occasions that Germany be excluded from the Rhineland and

[40] Dmowski, *Polityka polska*, p. 372.

[41] *FR Peace Conference*, IV, 415.

[42] Henry Wickham Steed, *Through Thirty Years 1892–1922: A Personal Narrative* (2 vols., New York, 1924), II, 297.

the 1814 French borders be restored, which would bring the Saar into France. On the eve of the conference Foch had expressed this point of view in his memorandum of January 10, 1919, and he returned to the question in another memorandum on February 18. In both documents he dwelt on the need of occupying the Rhineland and of weakening Germany from the western side, just as she would be weakened in the east by joining Upper Silesia and Danzig to Poland. Foch indicated that in his opinion the Allies in their present "favourable military situation, can obtain acceptance of any peace *conditions* . . . provided that they are presented without much delay." [43] Lloyd George opposed this reasoning and termed it a "typical military view." [44]

Three weeks later the French government addressed to the principal Allies a lengthy memorandum on the Rhineland question.[45] The new French explanation showed that Paris was skeptical about safeguards provided by limitation of armaments or by the League of Nations, and insisted on security based on strategic advantage. The main French objective as exposed in this document was to deprive Germany of offensive means in any future conflict, by taking away from her the Rhineland basin and drawing the French boundary along the 1814 line. As long as Germany controlled the Rhineland militarily, the memorandum said, France could not feel secure. The problem was more grave than it had been in 1914 because Russia, "which was a counter balance, exists no more and the recently created states do not really exist as yet." [46] The Rhine border, moreover, was linked with the security of East Central Europe and offered "indispensable protection to the new states." The memorandum elaborated by stating that if Germany sought to "strangle" the states on her eastern border, their only hope would be speedy help from the west, which could be forthcoming only if Germany did not hold the Rhine. The argument made sense from a military point of view, since only offensive action on the part of France could bring immediate relief to Poland or Czechoslovakia as events of the Second World War were to prove. It was more debatable politically and both Lloyd George and Wilson opposed — though for different reasons — French demands which would entail incorporation of the pre-

[43] Quoted in Lloyd George, *The Truth about the Peace Treaties*, I, 390. Italics in original. (The text of Foch's memorandum of Jan. 10, 1919, is in Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, *Documents relatifs aux . . . garanties de sécurité contre une agression allemande* (Paris, 1924), pp. 7–14.)

[44] *Ibid.*, I, 392.

[45] "Mémoire du gouvernement français sur la fixation au Rhin de la frontière occidentale de l'Allemagne et l'occupation interalliée des ponts du fleuve," Bourgeois, *Versailles*, pp. 272–299. English text: Tardieu, *The Truth about the Treaty*, pp. 157–167. The original was dated Feb. 25, 1919, although Tardieu gave the date as Feb. 26.

[46] Bourgeois, *Versailles*, p. 292.

dominantly German Saar into France, and separation of the purely German Rhineland from the rest of the country.[47]

A deadlock threatened, and Clemenceau asked for British counterproposals. It was at this point that Lloyd George conceived the idea of a joint military guarantee by the United States and Britain to France against any future German aggression. The offer was tempting although it contained the seeds of many dangers. An American-British guarantee was not so precise as a strong strategic border on the Rhine, and besides it separated the question of the German-French border from that of the German-Polish border. With an exclusive guarantee of the western borders Germany would turn eastward; an Anglo-American guarantee would "increase rather than decrease their [Polish and Czechoslovak] danger from Germany."[48] This consideration as well as many others made Clemenceau adopt a cautious attitude. He acknowledged the guarantee offer gratefully on March 17, but suggested working out more precise arrangements.

It was in this heavy international atmosphere that the Cambon commission presented its report on Poland to the Supreme Council.

Lloyd George's reasons for an uncompromising stand on the German-Polish borders appear, then, in a new light. His proposal for a joint Anglo-American guarantee would reduce France to a defensive position and prevent her from too far-reaching commitments in East Central Europe. Weakening Poland in turn by depriving her of sound strategic borders would also weaken France, because Lloyd George considered Poland an instrument of the French policy of dominating the Continent.[49] But while Cambon showed the French position clearly by saying that there was "no use to set up a Poland deprived of access to the sea as it would inevitably be the prey of Germany or Russia,"[50] Lloyd George took refuge behind slogans about the German right to self-determination. He betrayed his real object at a later date when he spoke at a meeting on June 12, 1919, about Germany's need for security because there was a "danger that a weakened Germany will be attacked by its neighbors."[51]

News of Lloyd George's stand in the council leaked out to the Paris press, and the British prime minister complained bitterly about attacks directed against him. If the press campaign was meant to soften Lloyd

[47] Lloyd George's analysis of the French memorandum is particularly misleading and leaves out all the implications for East Central Europe. *The Truth about the Peace Treaties*, I, 393ff.

[48] Robert Lansing, *The Peace Negotiations: A Personal Narrative* (Boston, New York, 1921), p. 180.

[49] "A greater Poland suited French policy — and the greater the better," Lloyd George wrote later. *The Truth about the Peace Treaties*, I, 310.

[50] *FR Peace Conference*, IV, 416. [51] Mantoux, *Conseil des quatre*, II, 391.

George it did not produce that effect, and the new report prepared by the commission on Poland found him unchanged.[52]

Cambon presented the report to the council on March 22, with the unanimous backing of the commission including the seemingly "reluctant" British expert, Sir William Tyrrell. The commission reaffirmed its position and stated with regard to the issues raised by Lloyd George that "the importance to Poland of retaining complete control over the Danzig-Mlawa-Warsaw railway [running through Marienwerder] overrides the historical and ethnographical arguments in favour of Germany in this area." [53] The report exposed Lloyd George's seeming preoccupation with the transfer of a large German population to Poland by pointing out that "the cession of the Mlawa railway is a comparatively small factor" in that respect.[54] The British statesman refused to change his opinion, however, and the decision on the Polish-German border was postponed.[55]

The question of Polish western borders, linked to the French search for security, cast a shadow over the conference. The British-French clash coupled with Franco-American difficulties connected with matters of security, reparations, and the League of Nations, led on March 27, 1919, to transformation of the Supreme Council into the Council of Four. The German-Polish settlement then became dependent on the outcome of the Big Three struggle over French security. The conference entered its most dramatic phase.

3

Three days after discussion of the second report of the Cambon commission, Lloyd George prepared the so-called Fontainebleau memorandum. The document was a powerful blast against French policy toward Germany. After praising the Germans, "one of the most vigorous and powerful races of the world," and berating the smaller nations east of Germany, Lloyd George declared that he absolutely opposed separation of the Rhineland from Germany. With regard to the Polish-German frontier he advised strict adherence to ethnic criteria "irrespective of strategic or transportation considerations." [56]

[52] Text of report: *Recueil*, IV, C (2), 81–82; Miller, *My Diary*, VII, 75–78.

[53] *FR Peace Conference*, IV, 453.

[54] *Ibid.*, IV, 459.

[55] Lloyd George praised the commission for its "perfect spirit of impartiality," which did not prevent him from writing later that the French members of the commission "were obsessed with a desire of reducing Germany" while the "American Polish experts were fanatical pro-Poles." *The Truth about the Peace Treaties*, II, 990–991. Lloyd George omitted of course mention of the other members so as not to admit that the British and the Italians concurred with the views of the French and American experts.

[56] Lloyd George, *The Truth about the Peace Treaties*, I, 104ff.

The French government replied in a note of March 28, accusing Britain of suggesting sacrifices to France and other continental states after having first satisfied her own interests. The French note emphasized the role of Poland as a barrier between German expansion and Russian Bolshevism, and declared that French policy was "to give strong support" to Poland and other "young nations," and "not to seek at their expense to attenuate — which besides would be useless — the colonial, naval, and commercial disaster which the Peace inflicts on Germany." [57] Lloyd George's riposte was a fine example of demagogy. Sneering that what "France really cares for is that the Danzig Germans should be handed over to Poland," the British leader threatened to withdraw his offer of guarantee since France apparently did not appreciate it.

Clemenceau found himself in a dilemma. To give up the demands on the Rhine and withdraw support from Poland would be tantamount to a defeat of French diplomacy. Still, there was danger of a breakdown of the Entente and subsequent French isolation. Clemenceau decided then, in the teeth of opposition from President Poincaré and Marshal Foch,[58] to accept the offer of a joint American-British guarantee against unprovoked aggression, and agree to a fifteen-year Allied occupation of the Rhineland. Lloyd George thus gained a partial and temporary success. From the point of view of Franco-Polish relations, Lloyd George's policy lessened the possibility that France could contribute to Poland's security and added to postwar instability.

Having broken French resistance in the matter of the Rhineland, the prime minister could concentrate on the Polish-German issue. Clemenceau again defended Polish rights in the meeting of March 27 and stressed that strategic considerations could not be put aside. When the question of Danzig came up for consideration on April 1, the Allied statesmen suggested various arrangements (autonomy, free city, or direct incorporation into Poland), and discussion continued on April 3. Clemenceau was weakening, especially since Lloyd George assured him that he was only concerned with Danzig and had no other objection to the Cambon report.[59] Poland became alarmed, and because Lloyd George's antipathy for Dmowski was well known, Paderewski rushed to Paris to try to influence the British prime minister. His eloquent pleading before the council failed. Lloyd George also disregarded a new note from the Cambon commission on April 12 [60] and the report which the

[57] Tardieu, *The Truth about the Treaty*, pp. 116–119.

[58] Foch intervened on March 21, April 20, and May 6. Poincaré wrote Clemenceau and tried to influence the cabinet on April 25. He also threatened to resign and complained that the Parliament did not do its duty, because it "should have overthrown Clemenceau." See Alexandre Ribot, *Journal et correspondances inédites* (Paris, 1936), p. 273, and René Lhopital, *Foch, l'armistice et la paix* (Paris, 1938), pp. 35–47, 199–236.

[59] Mantoux, *Conseil des quatre*, I, 126. [60] *Recueil*, IV, C (2), 113.

Noulens mission presented after its return from Poland on April 17,[61] both of which unanimously recommended giving Danzig to the Poles. The Supreme Council appointed a small committee to draft new recommendations on Danzig and on the district of Marienwerder in accord with Lloyd George's wishes.[62] Clemenceau still attempted to reintroduce the two questions, on April 12, 15, and 18, to obtain some modification in Poland's favor, but in vain. The final text adopted on April 18 provided for a plebiscite in Marienwerder, which in this case was tantamount to leaving it with Germany, and established a Free City of Danzig whose relations with Poland were to be worked out in a special convention.

Loss of Danzig was a blow to the Poles, a defeat for French diplomacy. "The affair of Danzig is a scandal which covers us with ridicule," wrote the *Journal des Débats* on April 7, 1919,[63] and Cambon added that "everyone will be disgusted with the adopted solution, the Germans as well as the Poles." [64] As already seen, the British experts had not advocated it,[65] and President Wilson, who was fully conscious that the decision on Danzig ignored sound strategic and economic reasons, gave his reluctant approval, mainly because he felt that "if Danzig went to the Poles he would have to consent to Fiume being Italian." [66] Final articles on Danzig were discussed on April 22 and 26, Paderewski doing his best to safeguard as many Polish rights as possible, and then were incorporated into the official peace conditions for Germany. The plenary session of the conference took cognizance of them on May 6, and a day later presented them to the Germans. The Polish delegation thus saw the full and complete text only one day before it was handed to the former enemy.

The German delegation led by Count Ulrich Brockdorff-Rantzau examined the peace terms and replied on May 29 with the famous "Observations of the German Delegation on the Conditions of Peace." This document challenged the Allied decision on the German-Polish border in a fashion which later made a British historian write that "every possible concession to Poland was refused, every possible territorial claim denied, every possible attempt made to depreciate Polish civilization

[61] *Ibid.*, pp. 943–975. It suggested a hundred-mile-long coastline for Poland.

[62] The committee established on April 9 was composed of Charles H. Haskins, J. W. Headlam-Morley, and A. Tardieu, none of whom was a member of the Commission on Polish Affairs.

[63] Gauvain, *L'Europe au jour le jour*, XIV, 86.

[64] Geneviève Tabouis, *Jules Cambon par l'un des siens* (Paris, 1938), p. 349.

[65] Sir William Tyrrell of the Cambon commission and Sir Esme Howard of the Noulens mission. The former British ambassador to Paris, Lord Bertie, was equally critical of Lloyd George's stand. *The Diary of Lord Bertie of Thane 1914–1918* (2 vols., London), II, 322ff.

[66] Miller, *My Diary*, I, 208; *FR Peace Conference*, V. 86.

and capacity." [67] The document exalted Germany, which enjoyed "the freest democratic form of State," and referred to Poland contemptuously as the "pogrom zone." [68]

The Polish delegation did not have a difficult task in refuting exaggerated German claims and assertions. In two documents it dealt with every point raised by the Germans, often using German statistics and testimonies: "Observations of the Polish Delegation on the Subject of Remarks of the German Delegation Bearing on Peace Conditions," and "Additional Remarks of the Polish Delegation on the Observations of the German Delegation on the Conditions of Peace." [69]

This effort proved futile, because the vehemence of the German reaction alarmed Lloyd George, and lest Germany refuse to sign the peace treaty he "suggested unthinkable concessions on almost every point," provided they did not affect British interests.[70] Since the Upper Silesian settlement was one of the main targets of the German delegation, and also because Lloyd George and British financial circles considered the industrial potential of Upper Silesia important for the economic recovery of Germany, the prime minister turned his attention to that particular provision of the peace conditions.

In a meeting of British and Dominion delegates on June 1, Lloyd George declared that peace terms went "too far" and suggested satisfying certain German counterdemands, especially in the case of Upper Silesia. General Smuts, whose idealism in European affairs did not interfere with his determination to annex German West African colonies to the Union of South Africa, seconded him by making judgments on Polish history.[71] Balfour expressed his dissent from the view that Germany "had undergone a conversion" and that there was no hope for Poland to behave "as a reasonably civilised state." He termed some of the German complaints "impudent" but agreed to go along with Lloyd George in regard to Upper Silesia.[72]

[67] Harold W. V. Temperley, ed., *A History of the Peace Conference of Paris* (6 vols., London, 1920–24), II, 4.

[68] *FR Peace Conference*, VI, 839–881. This reference to the Jewish issue in Poland was typical, for German propaganda spared no pains to exploit the anti-Jewish riots in Poland during the first chaotic months of her existence. See Komarnicki, *Rebirth of the Polish Republic*, pp. 302ff. It took reports of such qualified observers as the Coolidge and Morgenthau missions to reduce the fantastic stories to their true and relatively insignificant proportions. See *FR Peace Conference*, II, 231, and 774–799.

[69] The text of the first document, prepared mainly by Marian Seyda, is in *Akty i dokumenty*, II, 110–125, but does not appear in either Miller or *FR*. The second is in *Akty i dokumenty*. The English text is in Miller, *My Diary*, XVIII, 427–477.

[70] Tardieu, *The Truth about the Treaty*, p. 120.

[71] "Poland was an historic failure, and always would be a failure, and in this Treaty we were trying to reverse the verdict of history." Quoted in Lloyd George, *The Truth about the Peace Treaties*, I, 693.

[72] *Ibid.*, I, 697. Compare Blanche E. C. Dugdale, *Arthur James Balfour* (2 vols., New York, 1937), II, 204–207.

In a long speech in the Council of Four on June 2, the British prime minister declared that after consulting all shades of British and Imperial opinion he was most anxious for a modification of the peace terms bearing on German-Polish borders. He proposed minor changes in the north and west, but insisted on a plebiscite in Upper Silesia so that "no question of a war of revenge would arise." With tongue in cheek he asserted that his "personal view was that Upper Silesia would vote in favor of Poland" [73]—after expressing a different opinion in the meeting of the British delegates.

The French government was alarmed. Cession of Danzig was bad enough, although it concerned the Baltic region in which French interests were subordinate to the British. Silesia, however, directly interested France because of its economic potential. Clemenceau viewed Upper Silesia as a German arsenal. Tardieu felt that while France could keep an eye on what went on in the Ruhr, she could hardly watch developments in Upper Silesia.[74] Besides, as Gauvain put it in *Le Journal des Débats*, the whole point was "to disarm Germany economically and arm Poland and Czechoslovakia." [75] Clemenceau therefore reacted vigorously to Lloyd George's new criticism of the peace terms. The British, he said, seemed to believe that all one had to do was to make one concession after another, but the French who knew the Germans far better "believed that the more concessions we made, the more the Germans would demand." [76] To weaken Poland by depriving her of the coal basin would mean placing her at the mercy of Germany, and would also open the way for German colonization of Russia, and if this happened "the blood which had flown for five years would have been spent in vain." [77]

In the ensuing discussion on June 3, Wilson sided with the French, pointing out that Germany did not need Upper Silesian coal, and he warned that chances of a genuine plebiscite in an area dominated by a few German magnates and capitalists would be small indeed. Lloyd George questioned this view, and stated again that "Upper Silesia would vote Polish." [78] This did not prevent him from saying later to Paderewski that the area was not Polish at all, and that "you should not absorb into Poland populations which are not Polish and which do not want to become Polish." [79] The truth is that Lloyd George wanted Upper Silesia

[73] *FR Peace Conference*, VI, 140.

[74] Bonsal, *Suitors and Suppliants*, p. 126.

[75] *L'Europe au jour le jour*, IV, 238.

[76] *FR Peace Conference*, VI, 142.

[77] Mantoux, *Conseil des quatre*, II, 270. Clemenceau quoted a speech of Erzberger's to the effect that Germany, with Russian resources at her disposal, could resume its march on Paris.

[78] *FR Peace Conference*, VI, 151.

[79] *Ibid.*, VI, 197.

for Germany, and only "compromised on a plebiscite,"[80] while his remarks to the contrary were intended for Wilson.

The prime minister used every weapon in his political arsenal to convince and outmaneuver Clemenceau and the American president. He reminded the latter of the Fourteen Points and the principle of self-determination, in a manner which provoked a rebuke from the president but made his position uncomfortable.[81] Clemenceau fought on, and declared himself afraid of getting into greater difficulties in order to avoid the existing ones. He went on: "We shall have in peace all the difficulties of war and we shall be confronted by a situation probably much graver than it is now. M. Lloyd George does not want to go to Berlin; neither do I . . . [but] One must have the courage to say no."[82]

Lloyd George remained adamant, and France having compromised on the Rhineland issue was unwilling to risk a showdown on the Upper Silesian plebiscite. The decision to substitute a plebiscite for an outright cession was taken on June 4. As in the case of Danzig, the opinion of the Commission on Polish Affairs, which reaffirmed its stand on the original Upper Silesian solution,[83] was disregarded, and the Supreme Council appointed a new Commission on the Eastern Frontiers of Germany to prepare the clauses on Upper Silesia.[84]

The Polish dismay caused by the Allied stand can easily be imagined. The press bitterly inquired why the decision to attach millions of Germans to Italy and Czechoslovakia was not revised but only the case of Upper Silesia.[85] The Polish delegation in Paris circulated on June 5 a note entitled "Why Upper Silesia ought to be attributed to Poland without a plebiscite"[86] and Paderewski appeared before the council to plead the Polish cause. His appeal to Allied justice led to a heated exchange between him and Lloyd George in the course of which the latter accused the Poles of imperialism.[87] Paderewski tried also to move Clemenceau, and on June 9 wrote him that "your great heart of a patriot will

[80] Lord D'Abernon, *The Diary of an Ambassador* (3 vols., Garden City, N.Y., 1929–31), I, 146.

[81] This argument, like most others made by Lloyd George, was demagogic, and even the Germans realized that Wilson's Fourteen Points implied the possible loss of Upper Silesia. See Stresemann's letter of Oct. 26, 1918, in Eric Sutton, ed., *Gustav Stresemann, His Diaries, Letters, and Papers* (3 vols., New York, 1935–40), I, 17.

[82] Mantoux, *Conseil des quatre*, II, 281.

[83] The British member took no part in the opinion. *Recueil*, IV, C (2), 179.

[84] It was presided over by General Le Rond. Minutes of the sessions and the report of June 10, 1919, are in *ibid.*, 1182–1223.

[85] See Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, *Bulletin périodique de la presse polonaise*, June 6–27, 1919, No. 70 (hereafter cited as *BPPP*).

[86] *Akty i dokumenty*, II, 140–143.

[87] *FR Peace Conference*, VI, 197; Mantoux, *Conseil des quatre*, II, 310. For an eyewitness account (that of Count Aldrovani di Maresotti), see Komarnicki, *Rebirth of the Polish Republic*, p. 353, n. 59.

understand the anxiety of one who has to defend his native soil." [88] But neither this appeal nor the second appearance of Paderewski and Dmowski before the council changed the situation in Poland's favor. Wilson was unhappy about the whole business; he declared on June 11 that "all sacrifices by the Allies had been abandoned. Now it was proposed to place the sacrifice on the Poles." [89] Colonel Bonsal called the Allied decision "a black day for the Poles; for France; perhaps for all of us," [90] and the French bitterly accused the British prime minister of having become an "advocate of Germany." [91]

Lloyd George's statement that the plebiscite could be free and unfettered was questioned in the report submitted by the Commission on the Eastern Frontiers of Germany, which showed the hold of Germany on the population of Upper Silesia. His confident prediction that no disturbances would take place in that area [92] were belied as early as August 17, 1919, when there occurred a bloody uprising of Polish workers, known as the first Silesian rising. The situation was critical, but appeals of the French general Paul Henrys to send Haller's army into Upper Silesia were rejected by the Supreme Council.[93] While tension rose in Upper Silesia the Allies had to await ratification of the Treaty of Versailles before they could send occupation troops into the plebiscite area.

During the months which separated the signing of the treaty from its ratification, Germany took measures to enhance its position in Upper Silesia. The Allies worried through the summer and autumn of 1919 and since it was Balfour who now dealt mainly with the whole issue, Franco-British cooperation in Paris became much smoother. Balfour suggested that the situation could be eased "if Polish Government would be informed that the Allied Powers are bringing pressure to bear on German authorities." [94] Berthelot concurred, and it was strange that Pichon should have voiced annoyance with the action of the Polish workers which had "the purpose of rendering Allied intervention necessary." [95] It may be that the remark resulted from Pichon's *maladresse*, but it

[88] *Akty i dokumenty*, II, 148.

[89] *FR Peace Conference*, VI, 304.

[90] *Suitors and Suppliants*, p. 129.

[91] Cambon, *Correspondance*, III, 338.

[92] *FR Peace Conference*, VI, 657.

[93] See the report of General Alphonse Nudant to Foch, *ibid.*, IV, 765; General Paul Henrys to Paris, *ibid.*, VII, 149–151; Herbert Hoover's report, *ibid.*, VII, 728; Sir Percy Wyndham's report, *ibid.*, VII, 700; Zamoyski to Pichon, *ibid.*, V, 745–746; circular of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Aug. 20, 1919, signed by Aleksander Skrzyński, "Górny Śląsk 1919–20," *Ciechanowski Deposit*, Archives of the Polish Legation and Embassy in the United States, 1920–1938, Hoover Institution, Stanford, California (hereafter cited as *CD*).

[94] *FR Peace Conference*, VII, 735.

[95] *Ibid.*, VII, 736.

may also have reflected the feeling at the Quai d'Orsay that the Poles were trying to force France's hand. It seems probable that Paris, having once agreed to the plebiscite, was hopeful of its outcome and did not want to be accused of partiality. This consideration possibly underlay French insistence that troops scheduled for occupation of the plebiscite zone contain British as well as French contingents. Clemenceau declared that no "military occupation of Poland should take place without the French being represented,"[96] but he also stressed the need for the occupation to be international in character. When the final agreement was reached, Britain promised to provide two battalions and Italy agreed to send a contingent, but the bulk of the occupation army was to be French.

If Allied representations and pressures, coupled with the stand of the Poles in Upper Silesia, were instrumental in producing a *détente*, the situation was far from settled when the Treaty of Versailles was ratified on January 10, 1920. Taken as a whole the treaty did not stabilize German-Polish relations. It failed to achieve a complete border settlement. Plebiscites in Upper Silesia, Allenstein, and Marienwerder did not allow a speedy normalization of relations between Berlin and Warsaw. Moments of crisis and tension still lay ahead. The whole settlement of the German-Polish borders at the Peace Conference could not fill the Poles with undue optimism, and they resented the financial clauses of the Treaty of Versailles and also the minority protection treaty which the Allies imposed upon them. The Poles had encountered British opposition in several cases, and American help did not prove decisive on such issues as Danzig or Upper Silesia.

Poland did receive substantial support from France. As Dmowski put it, "all that we realized . . . we owe primarily to France."[97] The Polish delegates also knew that French support was not and perhaps could not be unqualified. Dmowski said that Polish claims received French backing "to the extent they corresponded to French understanding of things,"[98] and another member of the Polish delegation noted that France, "dependent on the good will of the other two states [Britain and America], had her hands tied in many instances."[99] Still, the French faithfully supported Poland in as many cases as they could.

The drawing of Polish-German frontiers in Paris revealed both a fundamental identity of Franco-Polish interests vis-à-vis Germany and a political dependence of France on Great Britain. French policy toward Poland, even at this early stage, indicated that in approaching the Pol-

[96] *Ibid.*, VII, 816.
[97] Dmowski, *Polityka polska*, p. 226.
[98] *Ibid.*
[99] Kutrzeba, *Traktat*, p. 96.

ish question Paris had to consider not only its relations with Germany and Russia but also its relations with Britain. To fit France's eastern policy into the framework of the Anglo-French Entente became a crucial problem. That France needed to reconcile her continental policies with her British alliance was evident again and again as the Peace Conference turned to other issues.

2

THE CZECHOSLOVAK SETTLEMENT

THERE was a considerable difference between the Czechoslovak territorial settlement and that of the Polish western borders. The Czechs held an unusually favorable position in Paris, having obtained both a general recognition of their frontiers and an Allied blessing for occupying disputed territories before the Peace Conference ever began. As Beneš put it, "We came to the Peace Conference having our territorial problems . . . [except in Teschen and in the Subcarpathian Ukraine] fully prepared for a favorable settlement." [1] The British historian of the conference noted that the task confronting the Czechoslovak delegation "consisted above all in guarding what had already been obtained." [2] The claims of Czechoslovakia, though hotly contested by Austria and by Hungary, did not affect any territory that had formerly belonged to Germany, and the Allies by preventing a union of Germany and Austria made it impossible for Berlin to take up Austrian grievances. If Germany had united with Austria, the problem of the Germans in Bohemia would have looked very different. Czechoslovak demands were thus unlikely to arouse difficulties connected with the German issue or to provoke on that ground British opposition to French sponsorship of Czechoslovakia.

Discussion of the Czechoslovak settlement in Paris did not affect its basic aspects and centered on local frontier matters. Seen from a European perspective the problems were not difficult, and the Allies were sympathetic toward Czechoslovakia. Beneš recalled that "We entered the Peace Conference under the influence of our Siberian developments, news about the organization of our army . . . all this gained sympathy for our demands." [3] Beneš used to his full advantage the problem of Czechoslovak troops in Siberia, which came up for discussion several times during the conference.[4] While Prague insisted on bringing its

[1] Beneš, *Světová válka*, II, 498.
[2] Temperley, *A History of the Peace Conference*, IV, 267.
[3] Beneš, *Problémy nové Evropy*, p. 16.
[4] *FR Peace Conference*, III, 582ff; VI, 635, 674, 708ff, 743, 744–745, *passim*.

troops home, France insisted on keeping them in Russia and employing the Czechoslovak army for intervention against the Bolsheviks. This issue offered possibilities for bargaining; the exploits of the army in Siberia, and its control of the Trans-Siberian railroad, undoubtedly contributed to Beneš's diplomatic successes.[5]

With relative ease the Prague government assumed authority over Bohemia, Moravia, and parts of Silesia, largely because Beneš had arranged for the transportation of Czech troops from France and Italy toward the end of December 1918. Difficulties appeared only in districts heavily populated by Germans, where the disintegrating Austria attempted to claim sovereign rights. Local movements demanded the right of self-determination for Germans, and "German Bohemia" (Deutschböhmen) and "Sudetenland" sought to establish themselves as political units. Both collapsed with the advance of Czechoslovak troops. Their appeals to Vienna and to Berlin proved fruitless.[6] Austrian protests were of little avail, and in fact helped Beneš demand an explicit Allied declaration of the right of Czechoslovakia to control the territory within her historic boundaries as well as Slovakia. France was the first nation to make such a statement, followed by Britain and the reluctant United States, who feared the effect of such recognition on the other states of East Central Europe.[7] Already on Christmas Eve 1918 Beneš felt assured of full French support and instructed Kramář to proceed with establishing control over Czechoslovak-claimed territory. He wrote that "As regards the Germans in Bohemia we need not fear Paris; we can act very energetically."[8]

French pressure on Hungary had led to a demarcation line between Hungary and Slovakia before the conference began, so for the time being no difficulties arose in that area. Except for Teschen, the Czechoslovak government assumed authority over all the historic provinces, and counting on French support it made an attempt to seize Polish-held Teschen by force. The clash between two of the Allies over Teschen in January 1919 led, as mentioned earlier, to the introduction of Polish and Czechoslovak questions in the Supreme Council.

Clemenceau used the Teschen question to facilitate a general discussion of the Polish situation on January 29, 1919, and he wanted it to be

[5] Beneš, *Světová válka*, II, 513.

[6] See Peroutka, *Budování státu*, I, 159–162, 202–203, 306ff; Josef Borovička, *Ten Years of Czechoslovak Politics* (Prague, 1929), pp. 9ff.

[7] The declaration read: "The Czecho-Slovak State shall organize and govern the peoples living within the historical boundaries of Bohemia and Moravia, of Austrian Silesia and Slovakia. . . . [A descriptive boundary followed.] This temporary decision shall be later examined by the Peace Conference which will give to the problem the definite solution. But, for the present the German inhabitants and adjacent Governments would have to submit to the arrangement that is outlined above." *FR Peace Conference*, II, 382.

[8] Beneš, *Světová válka*, III, 537–538.



The Czechoslovak Territorial Settlement

followed by a similar presentation of the Czechoslovak case so that the conference would have to deal with the entire territorial settlement in East Central Europe. Since the other Allied statesmen believed that the meeting was to deal primarily with the Teschen crisis, Beneš was allowed to present the Czechoslovak view on that particular question.[9] The general presentation of Czechoslovakia's territorial claims was postponed for nearly a week. Beneš and Kramář appeared before the Supreme Council on February 5, but before the session took place, the Czechoslovak delegation submitted to the Peace Conference several memorandums on territorial questions.

These memorandums, prepared by Beneš at the request of Masaryk, were written "quickly, almost improvised, and without preparatory material and literature." [10] They are of considerable interest. There were originally seven, and later they totaled eleven. Beneš admitted that because of their hurried composition "there appeared in them some basic errors for which I was later blamed and accused of making tendentious statements." [11] In fact, these Czechoslovak memorandums later became the object of severe criticism and were described as purely partisan writing.[12] While this judgment may be too sweeping, the memorandums included of course all the arguments that could have been mustered to bolster the Czechoslovak case.

Memorandum No. 2, called "The Territorial Claims of the Czechoslovak Republic," contained a general exposition of the issues considered basic to the territorial settlement.[13] They were, first, the question of the historic provinces of the Czech crown, namely Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia; second, the demand for rectification of the historic Czech borders at the expense of Germany and Austria; third, the question of Slovakia; fourth, the problem of the Ruthenians (Ukrainians) of Hungary; fifth, the proposal for a "corridor" linking Czechoslovakia to Yugoslavia; sixth, the demand for internationalization of the rivers Elbe, Danube, Oder, and Vistula, as well as of certain railroads; and seventh, the presentation of the problem of the Lusatian Sorbs in Germany, whose fate was of interest to Czechoslovakia. Thus, it is easy to see that, as a member of the American delegation remarked, the Czechs "came to Paris with very broad demands." [14]

[9] *FR Peace Conference*, III, 783–784.

[10] Beneš, *Světová válka*, II, 503.

[11] *Ibid.*

[12] See Raschhofer's remarks in his introduction to *Tschechoslowakischen Denkschriften*, described as "devastating criticism" by Francis Deák, *Hungary at the Peace Conference: The Diplomatic History of the Treaty of Trianon* (New York, 1942), p. 34, n. 18.

[13] Mémoire No. 2, "Les revendications territoriales de la république tchécoslovaque," Raschhofer, *op. cit.*, pp. 34–83.

[14] Seymour, "Czechoslovak Frontiers," p. 282.

Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia obviously constituted the kernel of the new state, and their historic borders were declared indisputable. This meant, as far as Germany was concerned, maintenance of the prewar German-Austrian frontier. The memorandum suggested certain minor changes in Czechoslovakia's favor, namely, the addition of certain districts in the region of Glatz (Kłodzko) and Ratibor (Racibórz)—both in Upper Silesia—and of two areas in Lower Austria, Gmünd and Themenau. The reasons advanced were of an ethnic, economic, and historic character.[15] In the region of Ratibor, Czechoslovak claims clashed with the Polish demand for Upper Silesia, and the memorandum attempted to minimize Polish ethnic arguments.[16] In the case of Glatz, however, Czechoslovak aspirations were presented as beneficial to both Czechoslovakia and Poland because the two states "cannot develop in full security as long as between them there will be a German enclave which could obstruct direct communications between the towns of Prague and of Warsaw, and which would give great strategic advantages to Prussia in case of attack against either of the two states."[17] The memorandum expressed Czech willingness to give up a small area comprised of Javořnik and Frýdeberk, if such a concession were thought advisable.

The question of the minor border changes was not as difficult as that of the Czech insistence on historical borders, which raised the issue of the Germans of Bohemia, who lived in solid groups along the western frontiers. The Czechoslovak delegation explained its position on this issue in a separate memorandum.[18] Citing official Austrian statistics on the number of Germans involved,[19] the memorandum questioned the figures and indicated that they should be reduced by as much as 800,000 or even a million. This was debatable, and the Czechoslovak case rested on much more solid ground when economic and political reasons were advanced against the separation of these districts from Czechoslovakia. The document pointed out that the economic unity of Czechoslovakia would be destroyed by the separation of the heavily industrial districts of the border regions, which, furthermore, were divided by mountain ranges from Germany. The configuration of the country showed also that if the Peace Conference should detach the German areas from

[15] Three special memorandums dealt with those questions in detail: No. 8, "La Haute Silésie tchèque" (Région de Ratibor); No. 9, "Le Problème de la région de Glatz"; No. 10, "Problèmes de rectifications des frontières tchécoslovaques et Germano-autrichiennes." Raschhofer, *op. cit.*, pp. 254–265, 266–275, 276–297.

[16] Mémoire No. 8 spoke of the inhabitants as "an intermediary tribe between the Poles and the Czechs," and advanced an argument that they only became aware of their nationality in 1903 when they voted for Polish candidates.

[17] Mémoire No. 9, Raschhofer, *op. cit.*, p. 268.

[18] *Ibid.*, Mémoire No. 3, "Le Problème des Allemands de Bohême," pp. 84–109.

[19] In Bohemia, 2,467,734; in Moravia, 719,435; in Silesia, 324,523.

Czechoslovakia and annex them to Germany, the natural Czech defenses in the west would be gone. The Germans, the memorandum stressed, were colonists artificially established in this region, and their interests linked them with Bohemia, not with Germany. The Czechoslovak memorandums took special pains to emphasize that the Germans like the other minorities in the Czechoslovak state would be exceptionally well treated. Czechoslovakia's "regime would resemble that of Switzerland," one document stated,[20] and another added that "the essential character of the Czechoslovak state will be . . . the very incarnation of modern democracy." [21]

France supported unreservedly the Czechoslovak territorial program. The *Comité d'Études* thought that three principles — nationality, historical claim, and the right to independent existence — should guide the Czechoslovak settlement. It advocated inclusion of Glatz in Bohemia, the need for natural frontiers, and Czech demands for internationalized rivers and railroads, which would open this landlocked country to foreign markets. The *Comité* stated that it was hardly surprising that "we came to adopt practically all Czech revindications. There is no doubt that our [French] interest lies in creating a Czecho-Slovak state strong enough not only to survive but to continue as one of the most powerful obstacles to Germanic expansion." [22] Hence, reasons of security weighed heavily in French calculation, and the general staff, considering the Czech quadrilateral a strong military base in East Central Europe, determined to control this position.[23] Bohemia was a worthy ally also because of its mighty economic power.[24] Léon Bourgeois said that "among all the nations which came back to life, there is none the liberation of which would cause us greater satisfaction than that of the Czecho-Slovak state," [25] and he did not mean it as an empty phrase.

The British and the Americans moved more cautiously in their approach to the Czechoslovak settlement. The British Foreign Office in its memorandum of November 13, 1918, drew attention to the difficulties of the historic borders of Bohemia, and suggested minor alterations. But

[20] Mémoire No. 3, Raschhofer, *op. cit.*, p. 100.

[21] *Ibid.*, Mémoire No. 2, p. 54.

[22] J. E. Pichon, "Les Frontières de L'État Tchéco-Slovaque," in Comité d'Études, *Travaux*, II, 108. Pichon had used almost identical expressions in his letter to Beneš on June 29, 1918. Beneš, *Světová válka*, II, 230. See also the appraisals of the French views in Peroutka, *Budování státu*, III, 598, and in Seymour, "Czechoslovak Frontiers," p. 280.

[23] Pierre E. Flandin, *Politique française 1919–1940* (Paris, 1947), p. 114.

[24] It is worthwhile to recall that the Czech state within its historic boundaries comprised 92 per cent of the old Habsburg monarchy's sugar factories, 90 per cent of the glass industry, 80 per cent of the building and ceramic industry, 75 per cent of the chemical industry, and 70 per cent of the leather and paper industry (not to mention the rich coal mines).

[25] Bourgeois, *Versailles*, pp. 50–51.

the British felt that apart from some rectification in Opava (Troppau) and Upper Silesia, economic and strategic reasons were sufficient "to override all other considerations." [26] The American attitude approximated that of the British even if the Americans insisted on a more rigid application of ethnic criteria on borders between Germany and Bohemia. The Inquiry favored Czechoslovak claims to historic borders with some change to avoid the dominance of purely strategic factors.[27] Even so, British and American reservations were of minor importance, and it is no wonder that Beneš felt sanguine about the outcome of the conference. In the weekly *Czechoslovak Correspondence* he wrote that "Our claims are accepted everywhere at the Conference without resistance . . . and our program triumphs." [28]

2

The Supreme Council invited the Czechoslovak delegates to present their case at a formal hearing on February 5, 1919, and Beneš assisted by Kramář made the principal speech, which, according to Nicolson, lasted from 3:00 P.M. to 6:00 P.M. and forced Clemenceau to exclaim to Kramář: "Mais il a été d'une longueur votre Benes." [29] It was a remarkably adroit presentation of the Czechoslovak position. Beneš emphasized ethnic principles for the benefit of Wilson and Lloyd George, far more strongly than the memorandums had done. He adopted, as he put it, a "European and human point of view," basing Czechoslovak claims "on the very principles the Conference was assembled to establish." [30]

Lloyd George cross-examined Beneš, but while he showed skepticism of the presentation's accuracy, he did not seem to take a clear-cut antagonistic attitude.[31] It is true that at times the Czechoslovak minister had overstated his case. His assertion that Bohemia, Moravia, and Slovakia had been one country "from the sixth century" was neither accurate nor necessary. To insist that the Germans in Bohemia numbered "about 1,500,000" was at best debatable.[32] His frequent remarks about the Czechoslovak regime's resemblance to that of Switzerland were

[26] *FR Peace Conference*, II, 376–377. See also Foreign Office, *Peace Handbooks*: No. 2, *Bohemia and Moravia*; No. 3, *Slovakia*; No. 4, *Austrian Silesia*.

[27] Miller, *My Diary*, IV, 323, maps 6 and 16.

[28] *Československá Korespondence*, quoted by Peroutka in *Budování státu*, II/I, 590.

[29] Nicolson, *Peacemaking*, p. 210.

[30] *FR Peace Conference*, III, 877.

[31] Lloyd George wrote later in his book that Beneš in his presentation "either ignored or minimised the fact that he was claiming the incorporation in the Czechoslovak Republic of races which, on the principle of self-determination, would have elected to join other States." He sneered that the Czech statesman "larded his speech throughout with phrases which reeked with professions of sympathy for the exalted ideals, proclaimed by the Allies." *The Truth about the Peace Treaties*, II, 930–931.

[32] *FR Peace Conference*, III, 878–879.

propagandistic. A noted Czechoslovak journalist has admitted "the intention of all Czechs from the right to the left wing, from nationalists to humanists like Masaryk and Beneš, has never been anything else but to create a national state." [33]

Beneš's justification of the historic frontiers on economic grounds was far more convincing. His statement that the "Czecho-German parts of Bohemia contained nearly the whole of the industries of the country" [34] was a powerful argument in favor of Czechoslovakia, and could also justify minor frontier rectifications. Beneš's plea for the protection of the Lusatian Sorbs and his remarks on the freedom of Czechoslovak communications with the outside world rounded out his exposition. The outcome of the hearing was a resolution of the Supreme Council to set up a special commission to examine Czechoslovak problems, "reduce the questions for decision within the narrowest possible limits and make recommendations for a just settlement." [35]

The Commission on Czechoslovak Affairs constituted itself on February 27 under the presidency of Jules Cambon, and it included on the French side Laroche and General Le Rond. The French maintained perfect unity of action in the Czechoslovak and Polish cases by using the same representatives on both commissions. During the Czechoslovak commission's first meeting a subcommittee headed by Le Rond was appointed to prepare a preliminary report. Laroche expressed the French view that the commission ought to adopt as the start of its inquiry the historic borders of Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia, as well as unity with Slovakia, because these things were implied in Allied recognition of the Czechoslovak state. The other delegates did not seriously question this approach.[36]

The subcommittee worked from March 1 to 13, 1919, listening to Beneš on March 4, and preparing a preliminary report on March 12. Then the commission met in a general session, considered on March 19 a communication from Kramář, and prepared a final report on March 26.[37] Discussion in the commission and the subcommittee centered on frontier rectification, and French insistence on strategic factors clashed with American advocacy of ethnic considerations. Cambon criticized the Americans for being "too much disinterested in European security,"

[33] Peroutka, *Budování státu*, II/I, 779.

[34] *FR Peace Conference*, III, 879.

[35] *Ibid.*, III, 887.

[36] *Recueil*, IV, C (1), 9. Besides Laroche and Le Rond, Charles Seymour and Allen W. Dulles from the United States, Sir Joseph Cook and Harold Nicolson from Britain, and Marquis G. F. Salvago Raggi and A. Stranieri from Italy were members of the commission.

[37] Rapport présenté au Conseil Suprême des Alliés par la Commission des Affaires Tchéco-Slovaques," with annexes and maps. *Recueil*, IV, C (1), 69–94.

and told them that "strategic considerations mean something to people who are exposed to battle every day." [38] The British were less reluctant than the Americans to accept the strategic considerations, and at least one British representative felt that the best policy was to let "our friends the Czechs have what they want." [39] The Americans eventually made some reservations, and Beneš, probably to placate them, offered to give up the territory around Friedland and expressed willingness for concessions in the Cheb (Eger) district. The French refused, and the British and the Italians concurred in this refusal.[40]

The report of the Czechoslovak commission was ready at the moment when the French-British tension at the conference reached its height. Lloyd George dispatched his Fontainebleau memorandum — which also mentioned "rectifications in Bohemian borders" — and the French replied with their note of March 28. On the same day in the Supreme Council Clemenceau made a passing reference to Czechoslovakia in asking Lloyd George how he could "pull the Karlsbad Germans out of Bohemia without destroying Bohemia itself." [41] But the council did not take up the report of the commission, having its hands full with the Rhineland issue, and channeled it to the Council of Foreign Ministers. The Czechoslovaks were lucky indeed to deal with this body, where a more judicious and calm atmosphere prevailed. Lloyd George later would bitterly contrast his efforts in the Supreme Council to satisfy nationality claims with the efforts of the foreign ministers on behalf of economic and strategic demands.[42]

The Council of Foreign Ministers considered Cambon's report on April 1, and decided to deal only with those parts of it which concerned the Czechoslovak-German borders. Cambon in presenting the report declared that the commission had "attempted to do justice to ethnic claims but economic and strategic considerations had also to be given weight as a purely racial frontier would have left Czecho-Slovakia defenceless and economically crippled." [43] Cambon suggested with regard to frontier rectifications that the matter of Ratibor be left unresolved until the Czechoslovak and Polish commissions worked out a common recommendation since that issue affected both countries. As for Glatz, the report proposed some alterations in favor of Czechoslovakia, but not as far-reaching as those originally demanded by Beneš. The commission

[38] Tabouis, *Cambon*, pp. 335–336.

[39] Sir Joseph Cook, quoted by Seymour in "Czechoslovak Frontiers," p. 277.

[40] See *Recueil*, IV, C (1), 127ff; Seymour "Czechoslovak Frontiers," p. 284; *FR Peace Conference*, IV, 546.

[41] Mantoux, *Conseil des quatre*, I, 71.

[42] Lloyd George, *The Truth about the Peace Treaties*, II, 924ff.

[43] *FR Peace Conference*, IV, 543.

favored cession to Germany of a district around Friedland, but not any area in Cheb (Egerland).

The American secretary of state, Lansing, made the main criticism of the report. He drew the attention of the council to the American reservations and asked for a plebiscite in the district of Romburk (Romburg) which bulged into Germany. Laroche in reply warned against such a procedure because a plebiscite "could not be proposed in an isolated salient without extending it to the remainder of the German Bohemians." If this were done "the Czecho-Slovak state would be reduced to very slender proportions." [44] Lansing showed strong dislike for this kind of reasoning, and the French delegates turned angrily against him. Cambon said that new states "should be set up under conditions which would enable them to survive," and he believed that this also was the opinion of President Wilson. "If a nation was to be composed strictly according to the national sentiment of each village," Cambon went on, "the results would be a country as discontinuous as the spots on a panther's skin." [45] It was finally left to Pichon to sum up the French attitude with regard to Czechoslovak western borders, and answer the American objections. The foreign minister said he

"could not allow Germany to be fortified by populations taken from what had been Austrian Dominions, taken moreover, from Bohemia, which he trusted would remain an Ally of France, and handed over to Germany, which, as far as he was concerned still remained a country to be feared. If America refused to take into account considerations of national defense, France was not in a position to neglect them." [46]

The council then adjourned to allow the Czechoslovak and Polish commissions to work out jointly a recommendation on the Polish-Czechoslovak borders in Upper Silesia and elsewhere.

The two commissions presented a joint report on April 6,[47] which reduced Czech claims in Ratibor. The Council of Foreign Ministers on April 23 accepted these recommendations with the rest of the original report, the Americans having withdrawn their objections under the influence of Colonel House.

The Czechoslovak-German borders were thus settled, and both Paris and Prague could look with pride and satisfaction upon the result. Bourgeois called the border "the most rational and at the same time the most just," [48] and it is clear that resolute French support of Czechoslovak claims in the commission and in the Council of Foreign Ministers had

[44] *Ibid.*, IV, 545–546.
[45] *Ibid.*, IV, 544. See also Tabouis, *Cambon*, p. 345.
[46] *FR Peace Conference*, IV, 546.
[47] *Recueil*, IV, C (3), 22–25.
[48] Bourgeois, *Versailles*, p. 50.

been most influential. The German "Observations on the Conditions of Peace," delivered on May 29, did not seriously press for boundary changes. While Ratibor was mentioned, and the document demanded "the right of self-determination . . . be respected where the interests of the Germans in Bohemia are concerned,"[49] this stricture could hardly compare with the savage German criticism of the Polish settlement.

The Allied decision to hold a plebiscite in Upper Silesia affected the Czechoslovak settlement only in a minor way. The district of Leobschütz, which had been assigned to Czechoslovakia on the assumption that it would border Polish territory in the north, would now be divided between Germany and Czechoslovakia — if the former won the Upper Silesian plebiscite. It is true that Wilson remarked in the Supreme Council on June 11 that if the plebiscite was to apply to Upper Silesia it would be difficult "to avoid applying it also to the part of Upper Silesia granted to Czecho-Slovakia, namely the district of Ratibor,"[50] but Clemenceau immediately objected, saying that the conference had already granted Ratibor to the Czechs and could not take it away from them. Nothing more passed, and the matter rested.

The Allies turned their attention, then, to the Czechoslovak-Austrian borders, and since French initiative had led to formal prohibition of *Anschluss*, the Czechoslovak frontier with Austria could be treated entirely on its own merits, not as part of a larger settlement affecting Germany.

On May 9 the Commission on Czechoslovak Affairs presented the section of its report dealing with the Czech-Austrian border to the Council on Foreign Ministers. It recommended, with minute changes, the old administrative and historic boundary between the Bohemian kingdom and Austria. The Czechoslovak demands for Gmünd were partly satisfied, and the other rectifications were unimportant. The foreign ministers accepted the report without difficulty and passed it to the Supreme Council for final approval, which was given on May 12.

The Austrian delegation arrived in Saint-Germain two days later, and Beneš protested to the secretary of the Peace Conference against inclusion in it of the Germans from Bohemia.[51] The Council of Foreign Ministers, to which the matter was referred, decided to disregard the protest. Then the French, backed by the Czechoslovaks and other East Central European countries, objected to the name "German Austria" as used by the delegation. The Czechoslovaks notably felt that use of the adjective *German* seemed "to lead to the re-attachment of Austria to Germany [and] . . . it would create a bond between the Germans residing in Bo-

[49] *FR Peace Conference*, IV, 797.
[50] *Ibid.*, IV, 317.
[51] *Ibid.*, IV, 727–728.

hemia and those residing in Austria and serve as a pretext for a pro-German division in part of the territories of Czecho-Slovakia." [52] The Allies chose not to recognize the adjective, and Prague achieved another success. Although peace terms were to be presented to Austria on May 30, a joint protest of the smaller states forced the conference to postpone it so that interested countries would have time to study the final peace terms.[53] Consequently, the peace conditions were not presented until June 2, 1919.

The Austrian delegation led by Chancellor Karl Renner submitted its initial observation on the peace terms in a general comment dated June 10.[54] It protested the Allied conditions which, it claimed would not permit Austria to be a viable state. With regard to the Czechoslovak-Austrian borders, the note stated that the Allies proposed to incorporate into Czechoslovakia "coherent areas, inhabited by nearly three million Germans in compact masses," which contradicted the principle of national self-determination. Five days later Renner sent a new communication, which dealt specifically with the Germans of Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia.[55] He complained that "the flagrant injustice" of the proposed measures would "drag the Czecho-Slovak people itself into an adventurous and disastrous policy," and ended by demanding plebiscites in all contested regions.

The first two communications were mainly introductory statements, and on June 16 came the formal "Note of the Austrian Delegation on Frontiers Imposed by the Conditions of Peace." [56] This voluminous document renewed the demand for plebiscites, and offered a long list of localities whose populations were ready "to declare themselves unanimously in favor of reunion with their country." There were numerous annexes. The Austrians demanded that in case the Allies would not agree to returning all the Germans of Bohemia, they should at least concur with "the incorporation in our state of the German Southern Districts of Bohemia and Moravia" contiguous to Austria.

While the Allies deliberated over the reply, Beneš sent a detailed note to the Commission on Czechoslovak Affairs contesting the Austrian arguments. His communication of June 19,[57] accompanied by statements by President Masaryk and some Bohemian Germans, assured the Allies

[52] *Ibid.*, VI, 106.

[53] Temperley called this move "a revolt of the Small Powers against the dictation of the Great." He pointed out that in "the German Treaty only Poland [among the smaller powers] had been directly affected. In the Austrian Treaty several Small Powers were vitally interested." *A History of the Peace Conference*, I, 273.

[54] *Recueil*, V, B, 14–18; the English translation is in Nina Almond and Ralph H. Lutz, eds., *The Treaty of Saint Germain* (Stanford, 1935), pp. 204ff.

[55] *Recueil*, V, B, 22–46; Almond and Lutz, *Saint Germain*, pp. 448ff.

[56] *Recueil*, V, B, 50–72; Almond and Lutz, *Saint Germain*, pp. 276ff.

[57] Almond and Lutz, *Saint Germain*, pp. 460–466.

that German aspirations would be fully satisfied within the Czechoslovak state. It added that the municipal elections in Czechoslovakia showed that "purely German regions do not exist."

The commission, instructed by the council to reply to the Austrians, heard Beneš and Kramář and found unanimous decision impossible. The French favored the proposed border, and were generally supported by Britain, Italy, and Japan. The American members advocated stricter adherence to the historical border, with the possible exception of one small area. The French were indignant; and Tardieu speaking in the Council of Heads of Delegations on July 10—it had replaced the Supreme Council ten days earlier—accused the Americans of having in fact reopened the issue of the Austrian-Czechoslovak frontiers. He stated that this maneuver might produce bad political effects in Prague, and to end further discussion proposed that Czechoslovakia give up half of the Gmünd district and two thirds of the Feldsberg area, in exchange for a bridgehead near Bratislava (Pressburg). After Lansing introduced small corrections the council accepted the solution [58] and communicated it to the Austrians on July 20. The Austrian note which had come in the meantime [59] and which listed districts in which plebiscites were desired was simply ignored.

The Austrian delegation replied on August 6 with the important "Observations Presented by the Delegation of German Austria." [60] This note was unhappy in tone, called again for plebiscites in southern Bohemia and Moravia, and gratefully acknowledged Allied consent to hold them in the areas of Hungary and Yugoslavia bordering Austria.

The Allies discussed Austrian peace terms for the last time on August 25, and controversy arose only in regard to tiny frontier alterations. The British objected to Czechoslovak retention of the Gmünd railroad station, but the French balked at even the smallest concession because of the effect it might have on Czechoslovakia. The French point of view eventually prevailed. The final Allied note, "Reply to Austrian Observations on the Peace Treaty," of September 2,[61] explained at length the reasons for the decision on the Czechoslovak-Austrian frontiers. It declared that the historic borders had to be maintained and that the Allies had "deemed that the German speaking people living on the borders of these provinces ought to remain connected with the Czech peoples in order to cooperate with them in the development of the national unity in which history has associated them." If the Allies had to "overstep

[58] *FR Peace Conference*, VII, 96ff.

[59] Almond and Lutz, *Saint Germain*, pp. 299–309. The note was of July 10.

[60] *Recueil*, V, B, 319–477.

[61] *Recueil*, V, B, 496–548; Almond and Lutz, *Saint Germain*, pp. 470ff.

slightly" the historic boundaries, they did it to maintain Czechoslovakia's economic unity, which was essential.

The treaty of peace with Austria, signed on September 10, 1919, in Saint-Germain, represented a complete Czechoslovak victory. The Austrian notes demanding plebiscites had met with a different fate than the German demand for a plebiscite in Upper Silesia. Czechoslovakia benefited greatly from the political weakness of Austria and from the determined French attitude to allow no changes detrimental to Prague. The popularity of the Czechoslovaks at the conference [62] and the fact that the Council of Foreign Ministers rather than the Supreme Council dealt with their case proved added advantages. All in all, the Czechoslovak statesmen surveying the results of Saint-Germain, not to mention Versailles, could look upon their achievements with considerable satisfaction.

3

The union of Slovakia with the three historic provinces of the Czech crown and the drawing of borders between Hungary and Slovakia definitely presented more problems to the Czechoslovak government than did the border settlement with Germany and Austria. At the end of the war, however, things looked simple enough, and Czechoslovak delegates returning from a meeting with Beneš in late October 1918 reported in Prague that "We were told that we can take as much of Slovakia as we want to. We were advised to push forward to the Danube. As far as frontiers are concerned, the Allies . . . are of the opinion that it should be left to our decision and consideration what borders we will choose, the only decisive criterion being our own interest." [63] Unlimited optimism reigned in Prague. Beneš suggested to Kramář on November 28 that in the Slovak case the decisive factor was "a *fait accompli* created without much noise; a direct action and control over the situation." [64] The Czechoslovak government began, then, to establish its authority in Slovakia, and using local volunteers, irregulars, and Sokols, succeeded in setting up an administration under a Slovak, Dr. Vavro Šrobar.

The Belgrade armistice between Hungary and General Franchet d'Esperey came as a shock to the Czechoslovaks, insofar as it implied Hungarian control over Slovakia until a decision was made at the Peace Conference. Beneš's action in Paris resulting in pressure by the French

[62] Lloyd George stated correctly that "the Czechs were especially favored by the Allies," but he also tried to imply that he opposed their claims all along. *The Truth about the Peace Treaties*, II, 942. For discrepancies between Lloyd George's words and acts see Seymour, "Czechoslovak Frontiers," pp. 290–291.

[63] Peroutka, *Budování státu*, I, 222.

[64] Beneš, *Světová válka*, III, 524.

government on the Hungarians to withdraw from Slovakia — which they had begun to reoccupy — has been discussed earlier in this study.[65] It obviously decided the issue, because even French officers who were on the spot did not fully support Czechoslovak *faits accomplis* in Slovakia and were unlikely to help Prague.[66]

Hungarian withdrawal from Slovakia raised, however, the difficult problem of where the border should run between the two countries. Slovakia had been part of the Hungarian state for nearly a thousand years. To make matters more complicated, the demarcation line appeared in a different light when viewed from Slovakia, where fear of Hungary was real, than from Paris, where Hungary was regarded as defenseless and defeated. Local negotiation between the Slovak envoy, Milan Hodža, and the Hungarian minister of war, V. Bartha, led to a demarcation line adhering strictly to ethnic principles,[67] which was far less advantageous to Czechoslovakia than Beneš expected. The latter intervened immediately in Paris to obtain French support for a new line, and he instructed Prague to disavow the Hodža-Bartha agreement, which Prague also disliked because it smacked of a direct Hungarian-Slovak deal.[68]

French recognition in December 1918 of the Czechoslovak right to control the three historic provinces and Slovakia contained a description, suggested by Beneš, of the line separating Slovakia from Hungary.[69] The boundary was modified in Czechoslovak favor in early January 1919 after consultation between Beneš, Pichon, Berthelot, Foch, and General Maxime Weygand.[70] Hence, when the Peace Conference met in Paris, the situation in Slovakia was well under Prague's control. French and Czechoslovak units coming from France took Prešov and Košice on December 28, and Bratislava by January 1, 1919. Thanks to determined French support Slovakia, or at least the major part of it, was under the control of Prague.

The Czechoslovak demands regarding Slovakia were outlined in the already-discussed general memorandum of the delegation,[71] and elaborated in a special document.[72] Slovakia was claimed by virtue of national self-determination, unlike Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia where histori-

[65] See above pp. 20–21.

[66] Beneš, *Světová válka*, II, 488.

[67] Peroutka, *Budování státu*, I, 379; Beneš, *Světová válka*, II, 494.

[68] Peroutka, *Budování státu*, I, 348ff.

[69] It ran "along the Danube from the present western boundary of Hungary to the river Eipel (Ipoly), along the stream of the Eipel to the town of Rima Szombat, then in a straight line proceeding from west to east to the river Ung, then following the course of the Ung to the frontier of Galicia." *FR Peace Conference*, II, 389.

[70] Deák, *Hungary at the Paris Peace Conference*, p. 356.

[71] Mémoire No. 2, Raschhofer, *op. cit.*, pp. 45–56.

[72] *Ibid.*, Mémoire No. 5, "La Slovaquie — le territoire revendiqué en Slovaquie," pp. 158–205.

cal rights were advanced. The memorandums gave the number of Slovaks as 2,500,000 out of a total population of three million. They indicated that one "should add to this figure nearly 700,000 Slovaks who had emigrated to America," because "the greater number of those emigrants would immediately return after the establishment of a free Czecho-Slovak state." [73] The proposed southern boundary followed the Danube, including the island of Grosse Schütt (Žitný Ostrov in Slovak, or Csallóköz in Hungarian), to Véc (Vác), then an almost straight line just north of Miskolc, and finally a northeastern course to the river Uh.[74] This meant that the Czechoslovaks demanded a frontier that included important Hungarian groups and that went far beyond the existing demarcation line.

The two memorandums admitted that some Hungarians would find themselves within the borders of Czechoslovakia, but declared that they were mostly dispersed all through Slovakia, and besides would be balanced to some extent by a Slovak minority left in Hungary. The most important argument in favor of this southern border was economic-political in nature. The memorandum stated that the "frontier on the Danube is, for the Czecho-Slovak Republic, of the most vital importance. It admits of no concession, nor yet of being discussed with the Magyars." [75] The document set out that this border alone would enable Czechoslovakia to become a real Danubian state, which was of capital importance because the Danube was "one of the columns needed to support all the weight of her political and economic edifice." [76] The claim to the capital, Bratislava, despite admission that its population was largely non-Slovak, was made because the Czechoslovaks needed an important harbor on the Danube.

The Czechoslovak delegation presented two other demands connected with the Hungarian-Slovak settlement. The first concerned Subcarpathian Ukraine, advocating its transfer from Hungary to Czechoslovakia; the second dealt with creation of a corridor which would link Czechoslovakia with Yugoslavia and thus separate Hungary from Austria.

The first demand, embodied in a special document,[77] stated that while the Czechoslovaks did not claim Subcarpathian Ukraine, having neither historic nor ethnic rights to it, they suggested that since the population wanted freedom from Hungary the best solution would be to attach this area to Czechoslovakia as an autonomous province. The memorandum justified its position by referring to declarations by the Ruthenian

[73] *Ibid.*, p. 48.

[74] See map No. 3, attached to Mémoire No. 2, and maps Nos. 9, 10, and 11 attached to Mémoire No. 5.

[75] Raschhofer, *op. cit.*, pp. 50–52.

[76] *Ibid.*, p. 52.

[77] *Ibid.*, Mémoire No. 6, "Le Problème des Ruthènes de Hongrie," pp. 206–215.

(Ukrainian) National Council of the Carpathians on December 18, 1918, and January 7, 1919, favoring union with the Czechoslovak republic.[78] The memorandum added that Poland did not claim this territory, and that the Ukraine did not wish "to come down on the other side of the Carpathians." [79] This last observation showed the reason for the Czechoslovak demand, namely fear that the Ukraine — whether united with Russia or not — would expand south of the Carpathian Mountains and separate Czechoslovakia from Rumania.[80]

As for the second memorandum, the Czechoslovak request for a band of territory which would unite the country with Yugoslavia, it also was presented as a suggestion rather than a formal demand and relied on political and strategic considerations. The memorandum suggested that although such a corridor might contradict ethnic principles — Slavs in the strip were said to amount to 25 per cent, and in reality were probably far fewer — its value would lie in contributing to stability in East Central Europe by driving a wedge between Austria and Hungary and connecting Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia.

France supported Czechoslovak claims with regard to Hungary with an energy equal to that displayed in the German-Czech settlement. Even the extravagant idea of a corridor received a favorable hearing because of its strategic advantages. Although Laroche later would qualify the proposal as a "strange idea of Beneš's," [81] ignoring the fact that Masaryk had advocated it during the war,[82] other French diplomats seemed to favor it. Tardieu thought that Allied acceptance of the corridor "would have been a matter of European interest and favourable to two of our Allies," [83] and discussions during the conference showed that he was not alone in his stand.[84]

The British view of the Slovak-Hungarian borders was on the whole cautious, for Czechoslovak claims appeared "excessive" to the Foreign Office.[85] The corridor idea was to Lloyd George a "very audacious and indefensible proposal," [86] and Harold Nicolson on hearing Beneš and

[78] In fact, the Subcarpathian Ukrainians were split into three groups favoring respectively Hungary, which on December 25, 1918, decreed autonomy for the region; union with Czechoslovakia; and union with the West Ukrainian republic established at that time in Eastern Galicia.

[79] Mémoire No. 2, Raschhofer, *op. cit.*, p. 56. It is more than doubtful if Ukrainian nationalists would have agreed with this statement.

[80] It is interesting that Masaryk previously, in his telegram to Miliukov of March 22, 1917, had advocated union of "the Russians of Hungary" with Russia.

[81] Laroche, *Au Quai d'Orsay*, p. 82.

[82] Masaryk, *L'Europe nouvelle*, p. 220.

[83] *FR Peace Conference*, VII, 608.

[84] There was even a French book favoring the corridor: Arthur Chervin, *De Prague à l'Adriatique* (Paris, 1919).

[85] Lloyd George, *The Truth about the Peace Treaties*, II, 930.

[86] *Ibid.*, II, 940.

Kramář repeat arguments in favor of it finally lost his temper: "Je vous en prie," he burst out, "n'en parlez pas. C'est une bêtise." [87]

The largest opposition to the southern borders of Slovakia came from the American delegation. The Inquiry favored Slovak access to the Danube but opposed a line running from Bratislava to Esztergom, let alone Véc. The Americans were less critical of the Subcarpathian-Ukrainian solution, because it was "advocated by Ruthenian representatives," and besides the Inquiry agreed that it was "undesirable that Russia should ever extend across the Carpathians." [88] At the same time the general American attitude toward Hungary was friendly, and the Hungarians felt that their only hope was "in God and President Wilson." [89] They tried accordingly to influence the Americans. Archibald Coolidge reported that they "point out that the Czechs, who are so categorical in demanding this unity [geographical and economic] for Bohemia, refuse to pay the slightest attention to it in their demand for the Slovak territories of Hungary, a state whose natural and geographical limits are equally well marked." [90]

Beneš in his hearing before the Supreme Council on February 5, 1919, spoke of Slovakia and the Subcarpathian Ukraine, and mentioned the corridor to Yugoslavia. Slovakia, he announced, had "at one time formed part of the Czecho-Slovak State," but was then "overrun by the Magyars at the beginning of the 10th century." He assured the council that the Slovak population "still felt Czech [*sic!*] and wished to belong to the new state. There was never any suggestion of separatism in Slovakia. The same language, the same ideas and the same religion prevailed." [91] Beneš then spoke of communication needs in Slovakia. The council obviously had no objection to Slovakia's becoming part of the Czechoslovak state, and discussion turned to the border between Slovakia and Hungary.

Here Beneš repeated briefly the arguments in Czechoslovak memorandums, and Lloyd George, Wilson, and the Italian foreign minister, Baron Sidney Sonnino, attempted to cross-examine him on the strength of the Slovak and Magyar populations in the districts. The Czechoslovak statesman was vague. The claims of Beneš apparently perturbed Lloyd George, who requested General Smuts (who had been on a mission to Hungary) "to extend his journey to Prague and to investigate the effects of these proposals there, and report upon them." [92] Mean-

[87] *Peacemaking*, p. 222. [88] Miller, *My Diary*, IV, 322. See maps No. 8 and No. 16.

[89] Quoted in Deák, *Hungary at the Peace Conference*, p. 17.

[90] *FR Peace Conference*, II, 234.

[91] *Ibid.*, III, 883. It is possible that some of the more extreme statements quoted above resulted from an over-simplified rendition of Beneš's speech in the minutes which were not stenographic reports.

[92] Lloyd George, *The Truth about the Peace Treaties*, II, 941.

while the Supreme Council established the Commission on Czechoslovak Affairs, the purpose and composition of which has been discussed.

The commission dealt with the Slovak question during its second meeting on February 28, and in spite of Lloyd George's critical attitude in the council the British members went along with the French in trying to restrict as little as possible the Czechoslovak claims on the Danube. The Americans insisted, however, on stricter application of ethnic criteria, and the Italians showed little enthusiasm for inclusion of Subcarpathian Ukraine in Czechoslovakia.[93] The subcommittee could not at first reconcile British and French views with the American-Italian position. When Beneš addressed the subcommittee on March 4, he insisted on Grosse Schütt (Žitný Ostrov) going to Czechoslovakia, drawing a gloomy picture of reaction at home if this were not done.[94] Three days later the subcommittee agreed to compromise on the Slovak borders except for Grosse Schütt. On March 8, agreement came on that issue as well, in favor of Czechoslovakia, and the subcommittee put its recommendations in the report of the commission. As noted, the Council of Foreign Ministers limited examination of the report to the section dealing with German-Czechoslovak borders, leaving the Slovak issue for a later session.

In May 1919 the possibility of reopening the question of the Slovak-Hungarian border emerged as a result of new elements introduced after the return of Smuts from Prague. Smuts had submitted a memorandum of a conversation with President Masaryk on April 7, in which the latter allegedly said that "he would prefer to waive all claims" to Grosse Schütt in exchange for a "small strip of Hungarian territory south of the Danube in Pressburg [Bratislava]."[95] The British immediately introduced a resolution in the Council of Foreign Ministers to instruct the Commission on Czechoslovak Affairs to re-examine the Slovak-Hungarian border.

The French and the Czechoslovaks stormed. Pichon declared in the council that "he feared that there had been some misunderstanding as to what President Masaryk had said, and that the whole question required to be cleared up."[96] Laroche explained that Beneš had already referred the matter to Prague and obtained Masaryk's answer to the effect that Smuts must have misunderstood him, since he had only said that "certain parties in Bohemia held the view," but not the president himself. Asked by Lansing if Beneš would confirm this, Laroche replied that Beneš was prepared to do so and would so testify in the commission.[97] The British thereupon took back their resolution.

[93] Miller, *My Diary*, XVII, 94.
[94] *Recueil*, IV, C (1), 131–132.
[95] *FR Peace Conference*, IV, 669.
[96] *Ibid.*
[97] *Ibid.*, IV, 666.

When the commission discussed the Grosse Schütt on May 5, two days after the session of the Council of Foreign Ministers, Laroche reiterated his statement.[98] Nicolson, who had accompanied Smuts on his tour and who was primarily responsible for raising the whole matter, felt disappointed, and believed that "Pichon put up Laroche to say that he had heard from Beneš that Smuts had 'completely misunderstood' old Masaryk."[99]

The Council of Foreign Ministers took up the question of the Hungarian-Slovak borders on May 8, 1919,[100] and Laroche in presenting the report emphasized the unanimous stand of the commission, stating that it had rejected the proposal to exchange Grosse Schütt for a bridgehead opposite Bratislava. The commission, he said, had so "reduced the claims of the Czechs that only 850,000 Hungarians instead of 1,300,000 would become subjects of Czecho-Slovakia."[101] The Council of Foreign Ministers, after a short discussion, accepted the proposed Slovak-Hungarian border, but postponed the final settlement of Subcarpathian Ukraine. The commission was to study the status of that province, define its autonomy within the Czechoslovak state, and prepare recommendations. It seems that while the foreign ministers had no doubts about linking Subcarpathian Ukraine with Czechoslovakia,[102] they were not clear about the manner in which it should be done.

The Council of Foreign Ministers submitted the approved report on Hungarian-Slovak borders to the Supreme Council which adopted it without discussion on May 12. On May 23 the foreign ministers dealt with the remaining question of the Subcarpathian region, on the basis of a report prepared by the commission which also forwarded Beneš's memorandum on the autonomous status of Subcarpathian Ukraine. The foreign ministers made some changes in the report, but endorsed it by deciding in favor of the union of Subcarpathian Ukraine with Czechoslovakia.[103]

It seems that the union was approved partly because under the exist-

[98] *Recueil*, IV, C (1), 96–99.

[99] *Peacemaking*, p. 265. Nicolson felt that the Czechs who were "in the pockets of the French" would now be told that the latter "had nipped in the bud an anti-Czech intrigue." *Ibid.*, p. 266. While this may be true, the reputation of General Smuts as Lloyd George's expert on East Central Europe sufficed to make the French suspicious of the whole thing.

[100] Simultaneously the commission submitted a paper on the Grosse Schütt: "Note présentée au Conseil Suprême des Alliés par la Commission des Affaires Tchéco-Slovaques au sujet de l'île de la Grande Schutt." *Recueil*, IV, C (1), 100–103.

[101] *FR Peace Conference*, IV, 676.

[102] They ignored a Ukrainian memorandum of March 5, 1919, signed by G. Sidorenko and claiming that a meeting of one hundred delegates at Huszt voted on February 21 for union with the Ukraine. It added that the Ukrainian troops had been in control of parts of Subcarpathian Ukraine. See Miller, *My Diary*, XVII, 161.

[103] *FR Peace Conference*, IV, 748–761.

ing international circumstances no one knew exactly what to do with that region. As the French expert M. de Martonne put it, the adopted solution did not seem worse than any other.[104] One must not, of course, forget that France favored giving Subcarpathian Ukraine to Czechoslovakia for strategic reasons. Seymour in looking at things from within the Commission on Czechoslovak Affairs has written that the adopted solution gave to Czechoslovakia and Rumania "a common frontier, thus facilitating the French policy of creating a friendly bloc." [105]

4

While the Peace Conference was putting its last touches to the Czechoslovak settlement in Slovakia and Subcarpathian Ukraine, events on the Hungarian-Slovak border boded ill for general peace in that part of East Central Europe.

The Prague government had long watched the gathering political storm in Hungary, determined to exploit it to improve its borders in Slovakia. In early March 1919, Beneš alarmed the conference by revealing a Hungarian plot prepared with the connivance of Berlin and Vienna, and declared that his country could not "be left defenceless in a difficult situation in which it is placed." [106] An Allied commission, asked to investigate the plot, could find no evidence. Meanwhile on March 21 Hungarian councils of workers and soldiers proclaimed a proletarian dictatorship, and Béla Kun and the Communists swept into power. Beneš demanded that the Hungarians be ordered to withdraw from the parts of Slovakia and Subcarpathian Ukraine which they still controlled, and which the conference was just about to give to the Czechoslovak state. In a letter to Pichon on March 26, Beneš intimated that Czechoslovakia was willing to participate in an anti-Bolshevik intervention in Hungary.[107] Shortly afterward the Czechoslovak minister of war, Václav Klofáč, issued orders for preparing a Czechoslovak drive against the Hungarians.[108] Some three weeks later, on April 27, Czechoslovak troops began a movement in a southeastern direction and crossed in several places the demarcation line drawn by the Allies between Hungary and Slovakia.[109] They seized the rich mining area of Salgotarjan and Miskolc, an area which figured on the list of Czechoslovak territorial claims.

[104] Quoted by Benoist, *Nouvelles frontières*, pp. 108–109.

[105] Seymour, "Czechoslovak Frontiers," p. 290.

[106] *FR Peace Conference*, IV, 328.

[107] Vladimir Soják, ed., *O Československé zahraniční politice 1918–1939* (Prague, 1956), p. 48, quoting from Archiv Min. Zahraničních Věci, Pařížský Archiv, č.24.

[108] Quoting from Vojenský Ústřední Archiv, Min. Narod. Obrany, 1919, 323/13, č.j.10.807, *loc. cit.*

[109] The order to cross the line was apparently given by Klofáč on April 26. *Loc. cit.*, quoting Vojenský Ústřední Archiv, Min. Narod. Obrany, III, č.345/3.

On May 1 the Czech troops established contact with advancing Rumanian forces. The military situation changed in early June, and the Hungarian Red Army began a counteroffensive in Slovakia; it advanced on Kosiče, approached Bratislava, and seized Nové Zamký. A Slovak Soviet Republic was proclaimed on June 16.[110]

The Peace Conference in Paris was alarmed. Clemenceau informed the Supreme Council that "the Magyars had attacked the Czechs and that a very serious situation had been created."[111] Two days later he recommended that the conference order the Hungarians to stop immediately "or we shall use force."[112] The council discussed the problem on June 9 and generally agreed that, as Lloyd George put it, the Czechoslovaks "were wholly to blame" because they had overstepped the demarcation line.[113] The French thought otherwise; Clemenceau insisted that Beneš and Kramář be allowed to tell their side of the story. He gained his point, and on the following day the two Czechoslovak statesmen appeared before the council. Their explanation was labored. Kramář declared that he had "no idea whether Czecho-Slovak armies had crossed the line of demarcation,"[114] but he dwelt at length on the Bolshevik threat to his country. Beneš thought that "some mistake had been made," and recalled that the original demarcation line had been altered in agreement with Marshal Foch.[115]

Evidence points to the following reasons for the Czechoslovak advance. First, the Prague government wished to prepare the ground for a more favorable decision on the Slovak-Hungarian border — the line corresponded roughly with maximum territorial claims. Second, it seems that Foch, who had plans for a joint intervention against Bolshevism in Hungary, encouraged the bellicose Czechoslovak attitude.[116] Since the Anglo-Saxon powers had not supported the idea of intervention, and Czechoslovak military action proved unsuccessful, the net result of the expedition was a censure passed by the Supreme Council on Prague.

Hostilities in Slovakia had their effect on Czechoslovak-French relations. Apart from the connection between the Czechoslovak advance and the interventionist plans of Foch, the critical situation in Slovakia

[110] See Peter A. Toma, "The Slovak Soviet Republic of 1919," *American Slavic and East European Review*, XVII (1958), *passim*.

[111] *FR Peace Conference*, VI, 189.

[112] Mantoux, *Conseil des quatre*, II, 338.

[113] *FR Peace Conference*, VI, 526.

[114] *Ibid.*, VI, 285.

[115] *Ibid.*, VI, 287. Lloyd George pointed out that Foch made this decision without consulting the council. Mantoux, *Conseil des quatre*, II, 374.

[116] See Peroutka, *Budování státu*, II/II, 994ff. The official Czech explanations in Borovička, *Ten Years of Czechoslovak Politics*, p. 20, and Beneš's remarks to Clemenceau quoted by Deák, *Hungary at the Peace Conference*, p. 79, are, as Peroutka says, "laconic," "vague," and "conflicting."

led to a novel arrangement between the French military mission in Czechoslovakia and the government in Prague. Czechoslovak-French military cooperation had existed since January 20, 1919, when Beneš and Clemenceau signed a contract for a French military mission to Czechoslovakia.[117] The head of the mission, General Maurice Pellé, arrived in Prague in mid-February 1919, but the mission's activity remained restricted,[118] because the Czechoslovak troops, returned from Italy and stationed in Slovakia, were under the orders of General Luigi Piccione, who also theoretically commanded all Czechoslovak armies. In practice the French were in command in Bohemia and Moravia, and the Italians in Slovakia, an arrangement that gave rise to Franco-Italian friction and rivalry.

The Czechoslovak reverses in Slovakia cast discredit on the Italian command, and on June 4, 1919, Masaryk appointed General Pellé commander-in-chief of the Czechoslovak forces. This move was especially significant because Masaryk was not considered to be at the time "in great sympathy with France or French national characteristics."[119] The status of the French military mission accordingly changed from a "counseling mission" to a "mission of command."[120] The reorganized Czechoslovak army, led by the French generals Eugène Mittelhauser and Edmond Hennocque, reinforced by detachments from the Polish border—the Poles apparently gave assurance that they would not take advantage of the Czechoslovak plight by occupying contested areas[121]—counterattacked and succeeded in stopping the Hungarian advance. The British chargé d'affaires reported from Prague that were it not "for the skill and energy displayed by the French generals," the whole of Slovakia "must have fallen into the hands of the Magyars."[122] The Czech position however was not secure, and the British diplomat voiced doubt "whether French military support alone will be sufficient to enable Bohemia to maintain its position as an independent Nation."[123] Diplomatic efforts in Paris, therefore, had to complement activities in the field.

[117] See Mission Militaire Française auprès de la République Tchéco-Slovaque, Cabinet du Général, "Rapport de fin de mission," No. 3369/Cab., Prague, Dec. 15, 1938. The Mimeographed report is in the Bibliothèque de Documentation Internationale Contemporaine, Paris.

[118] It is true, of course, that Foch in his capacity as commander-in-chief of Allied armies also commanded the Czechoslovak forces, and was in a position to insist, for instance, that the French should control railroads in Czechoslovakia. *FR Peace Conference*, XI, 193.

[119] British chargé d'affaires in Prague, Cecil Gosling, to Lord Curzon, June 23, 1919, *DBFP*, 1st series, VI, 3.

[120] "Rapport de fin de mission," Bibliothèque de Documentation Internationale Contemporaine.

[121] Peroutka, *Budování státu*, II/II, 1084.

[122] Gosling to Curzon, July 11, 1919, *DBFP*, 1st series, VI, 71.

[123] *Ibid.*, June 23, 1919, VI, 4.

The Supreme Council agreed that Béla Kun had to stop, and on June 9 and 13, telegrams went out ordering the Hungarians to retire behind a new line corresponding to the Hungarian-Slovak border already accepted by the Supreme Council and communicated to Beneš and Kramář. The council previously had rejected the advice of General Pellé that the demarcation line should be farther south of the Czechoslovak-Hungarian border.

The proposal of Pellé was of interest, because although it advocated this demarcation seemingly for reasons of security, the line happened to coincide with the maximum territorial demands of the Czechoslovak delegation.[124] It thus appears that the Czechoslovak government and the French army, but not Clemenceau or the French government, still wanted to keep the Hungarian issue open — Prague hoping for more territory, Foch thinking in terms of an anti-Bolshevik intervention. In fact, the Czechoslovaks were unhappy about the attitude of Paris and felt that Clemenceau's feeling toward them was cold. It was Pellé and his generals who "saved France from incurring active unpopularity" in Czechoslovakia at that time.[125]

Under these conditions neither Prague nor Foch thought that withdrawal of the Hungarian army from Slovakia and then from Subcarpathian Ukraine would solve the problems. Foch, assuming that it was necessary to have in Hungary "a government of order with which the Entente will be able to sign a peace corresponding with its intentions,"[126] was the prime mover of interventionist plans. The marshal prepared a report on the military action to be taken against Béla Kun by Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Yugoslavia. The Council of the Heads of Delegations discussed the problem on July 11. Prague was interested, and Masaryk wrote Beneš that with Allied help Czechoslovak troops could reach Budapest; he suggested that the corridor to Yugoslavia might be a suitable reward for Czechoslovak action.[127] But the Czechoslovaks also wished to make sure that they would not face the Hungarians alone, and their earlier experience made them cautious. Beneš hesitated before endorsing the plans of Foch, and on July 12 inquired of Masaryk about the state of the army. He received the reply that "we are ready."[128] In spite of that, Beneš felt that the attitude of the powers in Paris was equivocal, and he was reluctant to commit himself. Kramář declared that the most favorable time for intervention had been during

[124] The text of Pellé's telegram is in *FR Peace Conference*, IV, 820. Neither Pichon nor Tardieu seemed to favor it.

[125] Gosling to Curzon, July 11, 1919, *DBFP*, 1st series, VI, 72.

[126] *FR Peace Conference*, VII, 190.

[127] Soják, *O Československé politice*, p. 50, quoting from Archiv Min. Zahr. Věci, Pařížský Archiv, č.10610.

[128] *Ibid.*, pp. 51–52, quoting from the same archive, č.209.

the fighting in Slovakia. Now after the armistice had been signed "What pretext . . . was there for the Czechs to attack the Hungarians"?[129] Since the other delegates displayed similarly cautious attitudes, Clemenceau remarked pointedly that the result of the discussion "did not appear to furnish Marshal Foch with a very coherent force."[130]

Five days later Foch presented a more detailed plan for an offensive against Béla Kun, but in the ensuing discussion there appeared to be wide political differences between the Allies. Italy was jealous of the strong French position in Czechoslovakia and opposed arming the Czechs, favoring, instead, direct help to the Hungarian counterrevolutionary forces in Szeged. Beneš, supported by the Rumanians, objected, saying that all Hungarians "remained Imperialists in spirit" and would profit from Allied help "to turn the tables on their neighbours."[131] Clemenceau said that except for the remnants of two French divisions, and the Yugoslav, Czechoslovak, and Rumanian troops, no forces were available for intervention. The intentions of the conference toward Hungary were a question to which "it was hard to give . . . an answer."[132] Under these circumstances Clemenceau refused to send French divisions into combat. He added that as far as he was concerned, "He would encompass Hungary with a ring of hostile States, and rely on her to rid herself of the tyranny of a minority in her own way."[133]

All plans for an Allied intervention in Hungary came to naught, and Béla Kun's regime collapsed largely as a result of a unilateral action by Rumania. The assertion of power by Admiral Nicholas Horthy and the Szeged group followed. The signing of the treaty of Trianon was delayed until June 4, 1920. A discussion of the negotiations and intrigue surrounding it will appear later in this study. Suffice it to say here that they did not affect Czechoslovak-Hungarian borders as drawn in June 1919.

Nor was the Slovak settlement influenced by an initiative coming in the autumn of 1919 from a Slovak quarter. The leader of the Slovak Populist party Monsignor Andrej Hlinka succeeded in reaching Paris in September 1919, traveling on a Polish passport. He complained that no genuine Slovak voice had spoken at the conference and that consequently there were no arrangements to preserve the autonomy of Slovakia. Hlinka said that the new state was ruled in a centralized fashion from Prague, and that while the small Subcarpathian Ukraine was promised autonomy, not so Slovakia with its three and one-half million

[129] *FR Peace Conference*, VII, 107.

[130] *Ibid.* For the Czech attitude toward Foch's proposals, see Peroutka, *Budování státu*, II/II, 1091.

[131] *FR Peace Conference*, VII, 178.

[132] *Ibid.*, VII, 319.

[133] *Ibid.* Clemenceau really set out here the idea of a *cordon sanitaire*, which he would also apply to Soviet Russia.

people.[134] Hlinka established relations with some Americans,[135] but apparently found no entry to French political circles. His visit had dire consequences for relations between the Czechs and the Slovaks, but no international effect. Paris ignored the incident — which was embarrassing since Slovakia at this time was "under the dictatorship of General Mittelhauser of the French army," to borrow the expression of the British chargé d'affaires in Prague.[136]

The Czechoslovak territorial settlement in Paris truly represented a triumph of Czechoslovak and French diplomacy. Even if the financial arrangements were onerous and some of the more extravagant claims like the idea of a corridor to Yugoslavia were impractical, all "basic points of the program advanced by the Czechoslovak delegation were satisfied."[137] Apart from a fairly favorable initial position, and apart from the remarkable diplomatic talents of Beneš, Czechoslovak success was largely due to France. As Kramář expressed it, "We could put forward any demand — *eo ipso* we did not demand the impossible — and we always had France on our side." He repeated that France "was entirely on our side, always and in all cases."[138] The Franco-Czechoslovak community of interests with regard to Germany, Austria, and Hungary appeared unshakable. When one turns to the delicate Polish-Czechoslovak controversy over Teschen, it becomes clear that France favored Czechoslovakia even in that crucial respect.

[134] Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, *Bulletin périodique de la presse tchécoslovaque*, Sept. 1–Oct. 31, 1919, Nos. 4–5, p. 6 (hereafter cited as *BPPT*).

[135] See Bonsal, *Suitors and Suppliants*, pp. 160–162.

[136] Gosling to Curzon, Nov. 6, 1919, *DBFP*, 1st series, VI, 335.

[137] Peroutka, *Budování státu*, II/II, 1094.

[138] Kramář in the Prague Parliament on Aug. 30, 1919, *Těsnopisecké zprávy*, II, 2327.

3

THE PROBLEM OF TESCHEN

THE dispute over Teschen during the Paris Peace Conference is crucial for understanding Czechoslovak-Polish relations in 1919 and in the following years. It also brings out clearly the French attitude toward both Czechoslovakia and Poland. In fact, the Teschen question became for a time the focal point of relations between Paris, Warsaw, and Prague. The disputed Silesian duchy of Teschen (Cieszyn in Polish and Těšín in Czech) was a small area which together with the rest of Silesia had finally passed from Poland to Bohemia in the fourteenth century. On the eve of the First World War its population was predominantly Polish in three districts (Teschen, Bielsko, and Frysztat) and mainly Czech in the fourth district of Frýdek. The chief importance of Teschen lay in the rich coal basin around Karvina and in the strategically and economically valuable Bohumín-Košice railroad which linked Bohemia with Slovakia. Before the war the monthly coal output of the region was roughly 7,400,000 tons, and the production of coke reached 7,900,000 quintals (870,817 tons) in 1916. Furthermore the railroad junction of Oderberg (Bohumín in Czech, Bogumin in Polish) served as a crossroad for international transport and communications.

When Polish and Czechoslovak territorial programs were formulated during the last years of the war, Teschen and two small areas in the mountains, Spisz (Spiš) and Orawa (Orava), figured in both the Czechoslovak and Polish claims. The Poles demanded the major part of Teschen by virtue of the principle of nationality. The Czechoslovaks demanded Teschen in its entirety because it had been within the historic boundaries of the Czech lands. Masaryk, Beneš, and Dmowski discussed the problem on several occasions, without however reaching any final agreement.

At a Czech-Polish conference in Kiev in mid-November 1917, Masaryk and the Polish leader Władysław Grabski referred to Teschen and expressed hope that the controversy would not become really serious.[1] Paderewski and Masaryk discussed it in America. Beneš with his char-

[1] *Zahraniční Politika*, I (1922), 720ff.

acteristic practical approach to politics had a concrete arrangement in mind, which he outlined to Dmowski; he felt that the Czechs could make a small concession by giving up the land beyond the Vistula "which would join us economically with Poland." [2] This proposal constituted a departure from the historical Czechoslovak borders in Poland's favor, but it would still give most of the ethnically Polish territory to Czechoslovakia, and Dmowski could not accept it. In any event, Teschen appeared to be "a secondary problem which would be solved amicably." [3]

Beneš showed far more concern for Teschen than did most Czechs at home. Except for people who lived in that area, the Teschen problem "did not attract great interest in Bohemia," [4] and even such nationalist-minded newspapers as the *Národní Listy* of Kramář claimed in October 1917 only the predominantly Czech district of Frýdek.[5] Beneš's policy of keeping the issue alive probably resulted not only from his general insistence on historical boundaries but from his gradual appreciation of the tremendous economic value of Teschen for the future Czechoslovak state.

When the treaty of Brest-Litovsk and the Congress of Oppressed Nationalities in Rome in 1918 opened increasingly friendly relations between the Czechs and Poles, an attempt was made to settle the Teschen issue by direct agreement between representatives of both nations who had gathered in Prague in May 1918. The occasion, the fiftieth anniversary of the Czech national theater, gave rise to an impressive show of Czech-Polish and general Slav solidarity. Leading figures of both nations, to mention only Stanisław Głąbiński, Wincenty Witos, Aleksander Skarbek, and Jędrzej Moraczewski on the Polish side, and Kramář, František Stanek, Vladimir Sis, and Přemysl Šamal on the Czech, agreed on May 16 and 17 to coordinate their respective anti-Habsburg policies and to settle the Teschen question. According to the Polish version, they agreed to accept the ethnic principle as the criterion for division of Teschen and to work out the final border line at a later stage by means of a mixed commission composed of five Poles and five Czechs under a neutral chairman.[6] Czechoslovak accounts of the agreement,[7] which are less detailed, convey the impression that it was only agreed to postpone

[2] Beneš, *Světová válka*, II, 97. [3] *Ibid.*, II, 101.

[4] Peroutka, *Budování státu*, I, 232.

[5] Henri Grappin, *Polonais et Tchèques: La Question de la Silésie de Teschen* (Paris, 1919), pp. 32–33; Stanisław Kasprzak, *Stosunek Czech do Polski 1914–1921* (Warsaw, 1936), p. 22; Kurt Witt, *Die Teschner Frage* (Berlin, 1935), p. 86.

[6] *Akty i dokumenty*, IV, 36, 68–69; Stanisław Głąbiński, *Wspomnienia polityczne* (Pelplin, 1939), p. 337; Witt, *Die Teschner Frage*, p. 92; Filasiewicz, *La Question polonaise*, p. 459.

[7] Peroutka, *Budování státu*, I, 230–231; Mémoire No. 4a, "Memorandum sur la situation en Silésie," Annex A, in Raschhofer, *op. cit.* p. 136; Karel Kramář, *Pět přednášek o zahraniční politice* (Prague, 1923).



The Duchy of Teschen

the final settlement, which seems hardly probable. Kramář wrote later that he said, "we would not quarrel much about individual villages,"[8] which would indicate that the Czechs took a conciliatory attitude. It is highly significant that the Czech press, in the months to come, omitted reference to Teschen when discussing territorial claims.[9] It was not unreasonable for Dmowski to conclude that the Prague agreement had finally solved the question and in his memorandum for Wilson he wrote that

"It is understood between the Poles and the Czechs, that on the Czecho-Slovak frontier, the nationality of the inhabitants is to be determined by their language and that districts with a Czech majority must go to the Czecho-Slovak country, those with the Polish majority to Poland."[10]

This state of affairs changed because of the rapid and constant improvement in the position of the Czechoslovak National Council in Paris. On September 28, Beneš signed the already discussed pact with Pichon, which brought explicit French recognition of historic Czech boundaries. These boundaries naturally included Teschen.

Disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy led to a series of *faits accomplis*, and everywhere local elements seized or attempted to take control. Teschen proved no exception to this rule, and the locally organized Polish National Council of the Duchy of Teschen (Rada Narodowa Księstwa Cieszyńskiego) and the Czech National Council of Silesia (Zemský Národní Výbor pro Slezsko) took over the area on October 29. The former established its authority over the three districts of Cieszyn, Bielsko, and Frysztat, the latter over Frýdek. The Poles and the Czechs jointly disarmed the Austrian garrison, and at first friendly relations prevailed between the two national groups. Shortly, however, friction arose, and to prevent clashes the two councils signed on November 5, 1918, an agreement for temporary delimitation in Teschen.[11] The document signed in Polska Ostravá said among other things that

"The present agreement has a provisional character. It does not decide in advance the question of territorial delimitation which is entirely subordinated to the decision of the respective authorities, namely the Polish government in Warsaw and the Czech government in Prague."[12]

[8] Kramář, *Pět přednášek*, p. 68. He explained that his later change of attitude was caused by the Polish behavior and tendency to dominate.

[9] *Akty i dokumenty*, IV, 69.

[10] Memorandum of Oct. 10, 1918, *Akty i dokumenty*, I, 58.

[11] The text is in *Recueil*, IV, C (3); it is also in Commission Polonaise, *Mémoire concernant . . . Silésie de Cieszyn, Orawa et Spisz.*

[12] It was signed on the Polish side by Tadeusz Reger, Dr. Ryszard Kunicki, Paweł Bobek, and Józef Kiedroń; on the Czech side by Dr. Zikmund Witt, Dr. Ferdinand Pelc, Petr Gingr, and Jan Nohel.

The agreement of November 5 corresponded closely to ethnic facts. According to the Austrian census of 1910, in the three districts placed under Polish authority, 69 per cent (75 per cent according to the census of 1880) of the total population was Polish. While the Czechoslovaks later questioned the accuracy of these figures, one of the local Czech leaders maintained that the November agreement was "based on a national *status quo* which everyone knew and which everyone could see for himself." It was, as he put it, "the expression of the existing order of things." [13]

The local arrangement in Teschen caught the Prague authorities by surprise, and the National Council in the capital neither endorsed nor denounced it.[14] Prague recognized it implicitly in two telegrams sent to the Poles. The first of these, dated November 8 and signed by Antonín Švehla, Alois Rašín, and František Soukup on behalf of the executive committee of the National Council, was addressed to Głąbiński, the Polish foreign minister in the cabinet sponsored by the Regency Council. It ran as follows:

"If the Polish government will issue instructions to its authorities in the given districts [of Teschen] not to take any steps to change the existing state of affairs without a preliminary and formal agreement with the Czech authorities, the National Council is prepared to give similar instructions to its representatives in Moravská Ostravá. It is evident that the [existing] state of affairs in no way prejudices the aspirations of both nations who will make them known at the moment when the general conference of powers will assemble to determine definitely the new borders of [both] states." [15]

The National Council in Prague sent the second telegram to the Polish National Council in Teschen. It denied the information printed in *Národní Listy* that Prague had denounced the agreement of November 5. The telegram, dated November 15, said that "The agreement as it was signed with you continues to remain in force." [16]

Full realization of the political blunder committed by the Czechs in Teschen by signing the agreement dawned on Prague after it knew about the Beneš-Pichon pact and the French support given to the Czechoslovak program for achievement of the historic borders. The November agreement had, after all, split the coal basin roughly in half, given ten pits out of thirty-four to the Poles, and left them in possession of the railroad. In view of the good chance of getting all the territory, this compromise solution appeared intolerable to the Czechoslovak gov-

[13] Quoted in Peroutka, *Budování státu*, I, 234.
[14] *Ibid.*, I, 239–240.
[15] *Akty i dokumenty*, IV, 71.
[16] *Ibid.*, IV, 72. Also *Recueil*, IV, C (3), 214.

ernment, which by then had fully consolidated itself. Moreover the Polish side was clearly weak; the government in Warsaw was not yet recognized by the Allied Powers and existed side by side with Dmowski's committee in Paris. The Czechoslovaks exploited this Polish weakness, and even two months later Masaryk wrote that "the Poles do not have as yet a state." [17]

At this juncture the Czechoslovak consul in Cracow, Karel Locher, protested on November 30 against the agreement, and two days later denounced it to the new foreign minister in Warsaw, Leon Wasilewski. The latter refused to accept this communication since Locher had not been officially accredited to the new Polish government.

In December 1918 the Czechoslavak position improved both militarily and diplomatically. As early as November 4, Beneš had advocated — in his memorandum on the armistice conditions with Austria — sending Czechoslovak troops from France to the homeland, and he mentioned that they should occupy Polska Ostravá, Bohumín, and Teschen.[18] He thus advised seizure of Teschen by armed force. This coup was more difficult to accomplish after the agreement of November 5, but the steadily increasing number of returning Czechoslovak troops enabled Prague to approach the problem from a position of strength. While the Czechs from Teschen who feared an armed clash had apparently restrained Kramář from taking action after the November 5 agreement,[19] the Czechoslovak government could behave now with more boldness and assurance. This was especially true after France recognized the Czechoslovak right to control the territory within the historical borders until the final decision of the Peace Conference. Beneš notified Kramář of this recognition on December 22, and although there was obviously a difference between applying it with regard to the Poles rather than the Sudeten Germans or the Hungarians, Beneš wrote that he also "felt optimistic about the Teschen question." [20]

A change of tone in Prague and the arrival of large Czechoslovak units from France began to alarm the Poles. Wasilewski protested against troop concentration near the demarcation line in Teschen on December 6,[21] and some ten days later he dispatched a special mission to Prague composed of three members: Stanisław Gutowski, Professor Jan Ptaśnik, and Damian Wandycz. Since diplomatic relations were not yet offi-

[17] Masaryk to Beneš on Jan. 5, 1919. František Nečásek, *et al.*, eds., *Dokumenty o protolidové a protinárodní politice T. G. Masaryka* (Prague, 1953), p. 44. While this publication is blatantly propagandistic, it is unlikely that Masaryk's remark was falsified.

[18] Beneš, *Světová válka*, III, 490.

[19] Kramář, *Pět přednášek*, p. 88.

[20] Beneš, *Světová válka*, III, 537–538.

[21] Franciszek Szymiczek, *Walka o Śląsk cieszyński w latach 1914–1920* (Katowice, 1938), p. 63.

cially established between the two countries, and also to endow the mission with special importance, it carried a personal letter from Piłsudski, head of the Polish state, to President Masaryk. Piłsudski's letter proposed to call a mixed Czechoslovak-Polish commission, already envisaged in the Prague agreement in May, which would deal with controversial Czechoslovak-Polish issues in an amicable fashion.

Masaryk, who arrived in Prague on December 21, and Kramář received the mission, and while promising to consider the outlined proposal, they avoided commitments which could limit Czechoslovak freedom of action at that point. The mission left Prague without accomplishing anything, and it fully realized that arrangements could only be made in Paris.[22]

The failure of Piłsudski's initiative showed that Czechoslovakia was determined at that time to seize Teschen and hoping for French support wanted to avoid direct negotiations. Prague manifested its annoyance with the Poles but tried to avoid giving them the impression that any surprise moves were being planned. Masaryk told the Polish mission that "we must treat our mutual relations in a spirit of friendship and with a certain flexibility."[23] Masaryk and Kramář in their conversations with the Polish Socialist leader Ignacy Daszyński, who came to Prague late in December, accused the Poles of unilateral acts in Teschen, but they did not reject the idea of calling a mixed commission.[24] Even so, Kramář offered a different proposal for solution of the problem. He suggested that it would be best if French troops occupied Teschen and if Paris became the arbiter between the Czechs and the Poles.[25]

This suggestion, probably intended as a *ballon d'essai* to test Polish reaction, was closely connected with Czech plans to occupy Teschen militarily without provoking a Polish-Czechoslovak armed conflict. French approval and cooperation were obviously essential, and Beneš attempted to win over Paris to this idea. He urged Pichon on January 10, 1919, to place Teschen under Czech control, and used the argument that the mining district was fast becoming a center of Bolshevism which threatened Czechoslovakia.[26] In reality Beneš wanted to establish

[22] For the detailed personal recollections of a member of the mission, see Damian S. Wandycz, *Zapomniany list Piłsudskiego do Masaryka* (New York, 1953). Brief references to the mission can be found in Szymiczek, *Walka o Śląsk cieszyński*, p. 64; Grappin, *Polonais et Tchèques*, p. 24; and Kasprzak, *Stosunek Czech do Polski*, p. 35. See also *BPPP*, Dec. 17–31, 1918, No. 62, p. 8. Czech historians consulted here fail to mention the mission at all.

[23] Gutowski to Wasilewski, Dec. 26, 1918, *AGND*, 2/180. Compare with Wandycz, *Zapomniany list*, p. 18.

[24] Report of Major Ścieżyński, Dec. 31, 1918, *AGND*, 2/103. Kramář declared at this time that the May agreement in Prague carried a recognition of Czech aspirations in Teschen.

[25] *Ibid.* See also Daszyński's statement in the Polish Parliament on Feb. 22, 1919. Sejm, *Sprawozdania stenograficzne*, 1919, II–III, 147.

[26] Soják, *O zahraniční politice*, p. 46, quoting from Pařížský archiv, č.212.

Prague's control over the area, knowing full well that possession was nine points of the law.

In view of the scarcity of documentary evidence it is difficult to establish the exact nature of the secret exchanges between Prague and Paris. It appears that Marshal Foch was approached because as commander of all Allied and therefore all Czechoslovak forces he could have given an order to march which would have legitimized the operation. But Foch gave no reply.[27] According to the Coolidge mission which later investigated the clash in Teschen, the Czechoslovak government discussed the question with the French minister in Prague (presumably Clément Simon) and then asked Paris for Allied permission. For nearly three weeks no reply was forthcoming, and the Czechoslovak government had ordered its troops to move, when on January 18 the French minister "received word from his government that in their opinion it was advisable that this district of East Silesia [Teschen] be held by French troops and a detachment was consequently being sent at once." The French minister "counselled patience" to the government in Prague, and seemingly delayed the operation.[28] If this story is true, it explains the delay which did take place,[29] though some historians ascribe it to the restraining influence of Masaryk.[30] The French minister was apparently absent from Prague when the Czechoslovak action began,[31] but since he was back in the capital four days later[32] it looks as if he left on purpose in order not to implicate France. Hence, it seems that if France did not approve of the Czechoslovak action, she was aware of the preparations and could probably have stopped them had she so desired.

While Prague was preparing an armed occupation of Teschen and attempting to enlist French support for it, Czechoslovak public opinion stiffened. In his first address to the Czechoslovak Parliament on December 22, 1918, Masaryk criticized the way in which the Poles tried to strengthen themselves at the expense of "our land," but he also declared that when the Poles had a consolidated state "one could talk with them."[33] Parliament in reply moved that "We reject the claims of the

[27] Peroutka, *Budování státu*, II/I, 603–604.

[28] *FR Peace Conference*, XII, 320–321. There is some confusion here with regard to dates. Clément Simon officially assumed his post only on Jan. 19, so that either the report refers to some other French representative whom it calls minister or Simon was in Prague before that date.

[29] A report of the Polish general staff (sixth section) stated that the Czech attack was originally planned for Jan. 4–5 but did not take place "for reasons unknown." *AGND*, 4/472/T.

[30] Peroutka, *Budování státu*, II/I, 603–604.

[31] Grenard to Noulens, Feb. 23, 1919, *Recueil*, IV, C (2), 753.

[32] Lt. R. C. Foster of the Coolidge mission spoke to him on the 27th. *FR Peace Conference*, XII, 320.

[33] *Těsnopisecké zprávy*, 1918–1919, I, 1054.

Polish state on all Teschen Silesia,"[34] and asserted that such claims were contrary to historic and natural rights and endangered the country's economic life and unity with Slovakia. "The Czechs are much irritated at the recent seizure by the Poles of disputed territory in [Teschen] Silesia," Archibald Coolidge reported. He added that the Poles on their part "accuse the Czechs of imperialism."[35]

The Polish government made no preparations to meet the approaching crisis. Warsaw had decreed elections in Teschen which were designed to serve as a plebiscite and to show the existence of an overwhelming Polish majority, but at the same time it withdrew most of the Polish troops from the area and sent them eastward to relieve Lwów. The government dismissed alarming news coming from Teschen and, seemingly convinced that the Czechs would not dare to undertake a military expedition, assured the local population that no danger existed. The National Council in Teschen was not convinced, and it asked Warsaw for immediate help in a dramatic telegram of January 20, 1919. "The approaching [date of the] elections will decide the Czechs" to take action. Their troops had concentrated around Teschen—"we are now powerless."[36] Three days later, on January 23, 1919, the Czech troops struck, and a new chapter in Czech-Polish relations began.

2

The Czechoslovak government, failing to receive any definite French endorsement, decided not to wait any longer. While acting on its own, Prague attempted to make its military move appear to be an Allied-approved operation. Prague selected a group of officers, mostly of Czech origin serving with French, Italian, or American armies,[37] together with a few genuine French officers like Colonel Charles Gillain. This group constituted itself into an "Allied Commission," and backed by a strong Czech force belonging to the command of Colonel Armand Philippe,[38] it demanded immediate Polish evacuation of Teschen. The officers admitted later that they acted on orders from the Czechoslovak minister of national defense, except for Colonel Gillain who received his orders directly from Colonel Philippe.[39] There is no doubt, then, that French

[34] *Ibid.*, I, 1061. [35] *FR Peace Conference*, II, 227.

[36] The original telegram is in *AGND*, 14/248/T. File No. 14 contains numerous telegrams and communications from Teschen.

[37] The most prominent of them were Lt. Colonel Josef Šnejdárek, a naturalized French citizen who took a Czechoslovak passport in 1927; Lt. Voska, serving in the American army; and Major Noseda, serving with the Italian troops.

[38] According to Witt, the Czech troops numbered 10,000 men; Soják believed them to number 15,000. Szymiczek mentions the figure of 14,000–16,000 and sets Polish troops at 1300.

[39] See Peroutka, *Budování státu*, II/I, 607. For a detailed description of events see

officers participated in the operation, though it is impossible to say whether the French high command knew and approved of their actions.

Prague did not anticipate Polish resistance. In the words of Coolidge, the Czechs were "aglow with their triumph and confidence in their future." [40] Despite their many excellent qualities they seemed, as another American diplomat observed, "to have been seized lately with a strong attack of imperialism and a desire to dominate central Europe." [41] There was also a "tendency not only to underestimate the Poles but even to make them out as worthless." [42] This explains why the Czechs hoped "to bluff the Poles out of the contested region without fighting, and were surprised as well as troubled by the Polish resistance." [43]

The Czechoslovak bluff in Teschen failed dismally. The Polish commanding officer Colonel Franciszek Latinik refused to accept an ultimatum presented to him by officers whom he described as Czechs "masquerading" in Allied uniforms. Fighting began and the weak Polish troops were pushed back to the line of the Vistula, which they succeeded in holding after a three-day battle at Skoczów. Among their dead was the brother of General Haller, the commander of the Polish army in France. The Czechs now held almost the whole of Teschen.

The Czech advance and an armed clash between two Allies became an international scandal. Polish indignation was boundless,[44] and Piłsudski called "this unexpected aggression" an act of "indescribable treachery on the part of the Czechs." [45] The occupation of Teschen cut Poland off from direct contact with the west, and Warsaw could communicate with Paris only by means of radio. The economic life of the country was affected, and gas works in Cracow, Lwów, and Warsaw had to stop operation for two weeks. Some factories in Galicia were immobilized. The consequences of the Czech move were thus probably more serious than Prague had anticipated, and the latter tried her best to confuse the issue and keep the pretense of an Allied-approved operation. Acting-Premier Švehla declared in the Prague Parliament on January 24 that

"Our Allied troops led by Allied officers — French, English, American,

the reports of the Coolidge commission, which investigated the whole affair a few days later. *FR Peace Conference*, XII, 317ff. The most extensive Polish report is that of Jan Ciechanowski, who accompanied the Coolidge mission. Report of Jan. 26, 1919, *AGND*, 14/329/T.

[40] *FR Peace Conference*, XII, 331. Compare with Wandycz, *Zapomniany list*, p. 16.

[41] The diplomat was Hugh Gibson, *FR Peace Conference*, XII, 236.

[42] Beneš, *Problémy nové Evropy*, p. 64.

[43] *FR Peace Conference*, XII, 326. Peroutka on the whole shares this view. See *Budování státu*, II/I, 609–611.

[44] See the debate in the Polish Parliament on Feb. 20 in *Sprawozdania stenograficzne*, 1919, II–III, 68–72, 104–105.

[45] Władysław Baranowski, *Rozmowy z Piłsudskim 1916–1931* (Warsaw, 1938), p. 119.

and Italian — occupied the area of Karvina. This move was not undertaken without knowledge of the government on behalf of which I address you. And I want to state emphatically that it was not undertaken without knowledge of [*vyrozumění*] the Polish government in Warsaw." [46]

One of the Czech deputies naively tried to explain the clash by saying that "when we assumed that the Polish troops had been called away and when we sent Czech troops to occupy the evacuated area" it came out that the Poles were still there "and so an armed conflict took place." [47] The minister of defense, Klofáč, did his best to fan anti-Polish feeling in Czechoslovakia by expressing indignation that the Poles had armed workers in Teschen to oppose the Czech advance,[48] but on the whole there was a good deal of embarrassment and uneasiness over the entire incident. Coolidge reported that in the Teschen affair Masaryk "had been led rather than he had taken the lead himself, and he was evidently unhappy about the whole matter." [49]

As for the Peace Conference, Beneš had attempted to prepare it for the Czechoslovak move by presenting a memorandum dated January 21, written by Švehla, and simultaneously sent to the Poles, though the latter received it after the attack had already begun. The memorandum accused the Poles of an "occupation of Teschen," described the area as a center of Communist agitation in which peaceful citizens were "uncertain of their lives and possessions," and called the Polish acts in Teschen a breach of wartime agreements. The document ended by saying that in view of the unrest in Teschen, which threatened the whole of Czechoslovakia and paralyzed the important industrial district, the "Czechoslovak Government decided to send into the part of Teschen occupied by the Poles, troops of the Entente under the command of Allied officers to improve the situation." [50]

News of the clash in Teschen gave rise to conflicting rumors in Paris, and the *Journal des Débats* announced that the Poles had invaded the district, breaking the November 5 agreement.[51] The truth about the events came out almost immediately, and reports of Allied missions in East Central Europe condemned the Czech action strongly. General Marie-Joseph Barthélemy wrote in his report that the attack on Teschen was "real treachery on the part of the Czechoslovaks who attacked the Poles after having allayed their suspicions." [52] The British diplomat Sir Esme Howard wrote that the Czechs "had behaved very badly in

[46] *Těsnopisecké zprávy*, 1918–1919, I, 571.
[47] Vrbenský on Nov. 2, 1919. *Ibid.*, II, 2384.
[48] *Ibid.*, I, 885–887.
[49] *FR Peace Conference*, XII, 327.
[50] Mémoire No. 4a, Raschhofer, *op. cit.*, p. 136.
[51] Gauvain, *L'Europe au jour le jour*, XIII, 436.
[52] *Recueil*, IV, C (2), 686.

pretending the Entente Powers had authorized their attack on the Poles in Teschen." [53] The Noulens mission declared that the Allied governments "had nothing to do with these acts, had neither authorized nor approved of them." [54]

The great powers were both annoyed and embarrassed by the incident. Lloyd George declared angrily that he had never heard of Teschen and yet this question brought two Allies to the brink of war.[55] The Supreme Council issued a warning on January 24, 1919, against use of force in establishing claims to contested territory. Beneš was aware that the government in Prague had mishandled the affair and that the occupation of Teschen was, as he put it, "accomplished through improper means." [56] Both he and Kramář realized that the Czech position on Teschen "was not especially popular with anyone in Paris," the more so because the Germans in Teschen had sided with the Czechs.[57] Beneš complained that he had to listen to bitter reproaches, and Kramář, recalling the angry reaction of the Peace Conference, regretted that Russia, who would have been sympathetic to the Czech point of view, was absent from Allied counsels in Paris.[58]

Czechoslovak hopes centered on the French government. Clemenceau, as mentioned, used the Teschen incident to bring the Polish and Czechoslovak cases before the Supreme Council on January 29. A verbal battle between the Poles and the Czechs began. Dmowski recalled the agreement of November 5 which the Czechs had violated, and appealed for re-establishment of the demarcation line pending a final settlement. His remarks on Teschen found little sympathy with Clemenceau, who after congratulating him on his speech added that "as for the Teschen question you were not right." [59] Beneš and Kramář made long speeches on Teschen, questioned the validity of the Austrian population figures, and emphasized the irregularity of the local agreement. Kramář used almost violent terms. The Poles, according to him, had invaded the territory, ignored his protests, and created a situation which bred Bolshevism, yet for a long time he "had acted carefully so as to avoid bloodshed." The Czechoslovak premier dwelt on the economic aspects of the Teschen controversy, and stated that the Czechoslovak Republic "could not exist without the large coal area which was within the disputed area." [60] Dmowski thereupon expressed his regret that the Czechoslovak dele-

[53] Howard, *Theatre of Life*, II, 306.
[54] *BPPP*, Jan. 24–Feb. 18, 1919, No. 64, p. 3.
[55] *H. C. Deb*, 114, 5th series, col. 2938.
[56] Beneš, *Problémy nové Evropy*, p. 66.
[57] *Ibid.*, pp. 67–69.
[58] Kramář, *Pět přednášek*, p. 89.
[59] Dmowski, *Polityka polska*, p. 367.
[60] *FR Peace Conference*, III, 783

gates were misinformed, because "not a single soldier had been sent from Poland" to Teschen and consequently it was incorrect to speak of a Polish invasion.[61]

Having heard both sides, the Supreme Council asked the Noulens mission (on the point of departure for Poland) to examine the Teschen issue before leaving Paris. Ambassador Noulens presented the findings of his group two days later, informing the Supreme Council that he had approached the Czechoslovak delegation and asked them if they would consent to withdraw to the provisional line of November 5, but met with a refusal.[62] Noulens recommended therefore — if no Allied contingent occupied Teschen — leaving the Czechs in possession of the northwestern area with its coal mines, and asking them to evacuate the town of Teschen and the southeastern districts with a part of the railroad. He also recommended that a special commission, subordinate to the Noulens mission, be sent to Teschen, a device suggested by the Polish delegate Piltz. Finally the government in Prague ought to allow passage of arms and munitions to Poland.[63]

The Supreme Council accepted Noulens' recommendations, which made some concessions to the Czechoslovak viewpoint, and embodied them in a general warning not to use force in settling disputes, adopting a general declaration on February 1, 1919.[64] A draft on a Czech-Polish cease fire was drawn up simultaneously, and while Dmowski accepted it "with good grace," Kramář approached it "with violent protestations," and Beneš delayed signing it for two days.[65] The declaration of February 1 was signed two days later by the great powers, Czechoslovakia, and Poland and was generally known as the February 3 agreement.

Prague received news of the Allied decision with indignation. The Czechs felt sure of French backing and expected full endorsement of their action in Teschen. As Peroutka wrote, disappointment "resulted mainly from the fact that the [Czech] people were hurt in their position

[61] *Ibid.*, III, 784.

[62] "The Czech delegates maintained that the authority of Mr. Masaryk and Mr. Kramarcz [Kramář] would be compromised by the acceptance of this proposal . . . [and] that the Poles were incapable of maintaining order in the mining districts, and that as a result Bolshevism would spread into Czecho-Slovakia." *Ibid.*, III, 819.

[63] The exact wording of this important provision was "The Delegates register the promise of the Czech representatives that their country will put at the disposition of the Poles all its available resources in war material and will grant to them every facility for the transit of arms and ammunitions." *Ibid.*, III, 821. Preparing for the Teschen invasion, the Czechs had previously stopped all arms traffic to Poland.

[64] The full text is in *ibid.*, III, 836–837. The question of transit was later worked out in detail in a Polish-Czechoslovak-Austrian agreement signed in Vienna on March 26, 1919.

[65] Howard, *Theatre of Life*, II, 305. The German text of the cease-fire agreement signed on Jan. 2 is in *AGND*, 14/312/T.

as the 'darling of the Entente' and the 'greatest nation in the world.' They could not understand why things suddenly did not happen the way the government said they would." [66] The Czechoslovak government, having previously contributed to national self-confidence by diplomatic successes and by appeals to Czech nationalism, found these feelings boomeranging. Beneš later told the Parliament that the Czech people thought at that time that everything at the Peace Conference was smooth and easy, and that the Poles could be treated as a negligible quantity.[67] This was not so, and in such an atmosphere the Czechoslovak government was fast becoming a prisoner of the nationalist passions it had liberated. Its freedom to make compromises was seriously limited.

Czech resentment turned mainly against the Poles, and the Coolidge mission could report that the Czechs suspected the French of giving in to the Poles, who had "influence and connections in Paris." [68] This view persisted for a long time and found reflection in the writings of some historians,[69] though there is practically nothing to indicate that Paris ever wavered in its support of the Czechs. The French had done their best not to insist on Czech evacuation of the coal-mining area, and Clemenceau had expressed his disagreement with Dmowski's views on Teschen. There was little more they could do in such a case of flagrant attack by one ally on another.

Beneš unwillingly accepted the February 3 agreement. He instructed Švehla to order "immediate application of the decision which I have signed," [70] and assured Paderewski that the Czechoslovaks would stick to the agreement,[71] but he simultaneously sent a communication from Prague to the council filled with arguments against a Czech withdrawal. The note said that the inhabitants of the town of Teschen, which was "entirely German," feared the return of the Poles, that Czechs living in the districts provisionally assigned to Polish authority threatened to emigrate, and that Polish control of the railroad would be "a catastrophe for the region." [72]

The commission (the Inter-Allied Permanent Commission for Teschen), presided over by the French diplomat Grenard, arrived in Teschen on February 13 and immediately ran into difficulty because the local

[66] *Budování státu*, I, 223.

[67] Beneš, *Problémy nové Evropy*, p. 65.

[68] *FR Peace Conference*, XII, 351.

[69] See Felix J. Vondracek, *The Foreign Policy of Czechoslovakia 1918–35* (New York, 1937), p. 152.

[70] Letter of Feb. 21, 1919. Miller, *My Diary*, XVII, 37.

[71] Beneš's letter was full of assurance of friendship and he wrote that he had "only indirect news of the unpleasant disagreement which arose between us." *Ibid.*, XVII, 36.

[72] *Ibid.*, XVII, 37–38.

Czech authorities offered stubborn resistance. The commission complained that the Czechs were "unwilling to carry out the terms of the agreement as to withdrawal of their troops to the line of demarcation," and that they also "failed to deliver the stipulated quantity of coal to the Poles." [73] Grenard who was friendly to the Czechs proved unable or unwilling to force them to comply, and Noulens was obliged to remonstrate in letters sent to the commission and to Masaryk.[74]

It is interesting that French diplomats and soldiers on missions in East Central Europe were often influenced by the country in which they operated and consequently differed from one another in their opinions. Thus while Noulens and the two French generals in Poland, Henri Niessel and Barthélemy, inclined toward Poland, Grenard and General Pellé adopted a pro-Czech attitude. This at times was confusing.

Polish troops re-entered Teschen on February 25 "to great confusion of [the] Teschen Committee," [75] nearly three weeks after the Supreme Council made its decision. This was largely due to the efforts of Noulens and Niessel. But the difficulties of putting the February 3 agreement into operation were not yet over. Noulens telegraphed Paris on March 6 that the Czechoslovaks were not supplying Poland with coal, and that they sabotaged the Allied decision. He angrily added that "MM. Masaryk, Kramarcz [Kramář], and Benes ought to have enough influence to make themselves obeyed by the local authorities." [76] Even Grenard was forced to inform the Supreme Council a month later that the agreement of February 3 was "nothing more than a scrap of paper." [77]

While Prague, acting through local authorities, was doing its best to invalidate the February 3 agreement, Beneš used his diplomatic skills to influence the great powers in Paris. During his presentation of the Czechoslovak case before the Supreme Council on February 5, Beneš spoke about Teschen and tried to appeal to Wilson and Lloyd George by stressing ethnic considerations. In a letter to Clemenceau he pointed out the evil consequences of the Allied decision of February 3, and informed the French premier of the existence of a German-Austrian-Hungarian plot against the Czechoslovak republic. The foreign minister wrote that the Allied "decision with regard to Teschen has been a severe blow to us. The Germans are taking advantage of it, believing that they can treat us just as they like and that we are no longer protected." [78]

[73] *FR Peace Conference*, IV, 474.

[74] See *Recueil*, IV, C (3), 680, 725, 732, 738–740, 745–753, 777; Miller, *My Diary*, XVII, 37–39.

[75] Howard, *Theatre of Life*, II, 336.

[76] *Recueil*, IV, C (2), 811.

[77] On April 10, 1919. *DK*, 15, Tchécoslovaquie, 14.

[78] *FR Peace Conference*, IV, 327. The conference was skeptical of the "plot," and a study of it failed to reveal any evidence. Miller, *My Diary*, XVII, 504–506, XVIII, 40–49.

During April 1919, the Peace Conference dealt with the issue of the Czechoslovak-Polish boundary, which centered mainly on the question of Teschen. The problem was examined by various bodies and on various levels: the joint Commissions on Czechoslovak and Polish Affairs in Paris, the inter-Allied commission in Teschen, and the Council of Foreign Ministers. What were the official positions of Czechoslovakia and of Poland on Teschen, and what were the views of the great powers?

The Czechoslovak position emerges in a special memorandum submitted to the Peace Conference [79] and elaborated later at the meetings of the Supreme Council on January 29 and February 5, as well as before the joint commissions. The Czechoslovak memorandum states that for the Poles "the issue of Teschen Silesia is but of secondary importance, while for the Czechoslovaks the problem presents itself as a vital question on the solution of which depends the very existence of the Czechoslovak State." All the conceivable arguments were used to prove this point and to show the foundations of Czech rights.

Historically (so the argument ran) the region had been part of the crown of Bohemia since the fourteenth century, and ethnically the Polish majority was at best uncertain, the Poles being either recent immigrants from Galicia or recently "polonized" local inhabitants who belonged to an intermediary group between the Czechs and the Poles. On at least one occasion the Czechs predicted that a plebiscite would be to their advantage,[80] and in one document they claimed the area because they must "have the longest possible frontier with Poland." [81] The emphasis, however, was on economic arguments. The coal basin of Karvina was indispensable to Czechoslovakia, and the Bohumín-Košice railroad which connected Bohemia with Slovakia was of supreme importance. In the meeting of January 29, Kramář asserted that Czechoslovakia could not exist without the Teschen coal, and Beneš repeated the same argument on February 5. He claimed the entire duchy because the coal fields extended across the Vistula and "nothing less could ensure its [Czechoslovak] revival, and this claim could not be given up." [82] Thus the

[79] Mémoire No. 4, "Le Problème de la Silésie de Teschen," Raschhofer, *op. cit.*, pp. 110–125.

[80] *FR Peace Conference*, III, 882. As Professor Vondracek remarked, this was an imprudent statement because "Czechoslovak public opinion came to delude itself with the belief that a majority vote in a plebiscite would award Czechoslovakia the whole duchy." *Foreign Policy of Czechoslovakia*, p. 157.

[81] Mémoire No. 3, Raschhofer, *op. cit.*, p. 86.

[82] *FR Peace Conference*, III, 882. The Czechoslovaks had a tendency to overstate their points which led to contradictions between their memorandums. Thus in the memorandum on Upper Silesia, Czech claims were justified by the argument that the coal of "Teschen Silesia is but a tiny fraction of the deposits of Upper Silesia" and that "the

Czechoslovaks demanded the entire duchy of Teschen, having discarded the more moderate attitude displayed during the war and before occupation of Teschen in January.

The Poles like the Czechs also used all kinds of arguments to support their case. Their claims were contained in a special memorandum,[83] and Dmowski and Paderewski explained them more fully before the Supreme Council. The memorandum stated that it was essential for Poland and Czechoslovakia to live in perfect harmony and to form a common bulwark against German eastern expansion. Such harmony could only be realized if the frontiers between the two states followed national divisions and created no minority problems. The Polish side recognized that Silesia had passed from Poland to Bohemia in the fourteenth century, but recalled that the ecclesiastical ties between Teschen and Poland had remained. While Czechoslovakia might need coal more than Poland, Teschen coal was important for the latter country because of its high coking value. Polish possession of the railroad need not disrupt Czech communications with Slovakia because an additional small link could easily be constructed.

The Poles relied chiefly on ethnic considerations. Their memorandum pointed out that existence of a Polish majority was attested by such Czech linguists as Šafařík and Niederle, by several Austrian censuses, and by the will of the people as expressed in the November 5 agreement. It was recalled that a Pole represented Teschen at the Slav congress in 1848, that since 1907 three out of the four Teschen deputies to the Austrian Parliament were Polish, and finally that the Polish population were primarily workers who had long withstood the pressures of German and Czech directors, officials, and engineers. By virtue of the principle of nationality the Poles claimed three districts of Teschen plus certain communes in the fourth, thus going slightly beyond the line drawn up on November 5, 1918.[84]

There is no doubt that Czech insistence on economic factors and Polish stress on nationality stood out clearly among the host of other arguments, and the Peace Conference had to decide whether priority ought to be given to the one or the other.

Polish ethnic arguments were convincing enough, and Laroche, who was the leading French diplomat concerned with Teschen, wrote later that "all the delegations admitted that the Polish claims were legitimate

deposits of Ostrava [in Teschen] will shortly be exhausted." Mémoire No. 8, Raschhofer, *op. cit.*, pp. 262–264.

[83] Commission Polonaise, *Mémoire concernant la délimitation des frontières . . . en Silésie de Cieszyn, Orawa et Spisz.*

[84] Erazm Piltz wrote later that he considered the demand for more territory than that allotted to Poland in Nov. 1918 a grave tactical mistake. Piltz's report from Marianské Lazně of July 8, 1921, D. IV. 3403/21, *CD*, "Czechosłowacja."

from the ethnic point of view."[85] Although there were moments when Czechoslovak propaganda succeeded in obscuring the nationality aspect of the question, this was generally true. The *Comité d'Études* presented the statistical evidence of a Polish majority, and all the pro-Czech expert J. Pichon found to say on the subject was that the Poles were right from the ethnic point of view but wrong from the historical.[86] Memorandums of the Quai d'Orsay prepared on the eve of the Peace Conference also emphasized the dominantly Polish character of the duchy, and one of them[87] recommended inclusion of three districts in Poland and one in Czechoslovakia. The American Inquiry took an identical position,[88] and the British Foreign Office handbook after describing the Polish majority concluded that "The distribution of the different nationalities of the Duchy is thus unusually simple."[89] Even one of the Czech leaders from Teschen admitted that out of "four hundred thousand people in Teschen hardly one fourth claimed Czech nationality."[90]

The Czechoslovak economic arguments, on the other hand, also largely valid, were important because of their far-reaching political implication. Possession of the entire coal basin would not only satisfy Czechoslovak needs but leave a large surplus which could be, and eventually was, exported to Hungary and Austria, strengthening Prague's position with regard to these two former enemy states. Seen from this angle Czech rule of Teschen was of great importance indeed, and the Czechs were fully aware of it. Thus Masaryk wrote on January 5, 1919, to Beneš: "We must have Karvina (coal); when we shall have enough coal we shall be able to supply Vienna, Budapest, and Bavaria and so obtain an influence over these states."[91] In that respect a Polish memorandum drew the attention of the Quai d'Orsay, rather imprudently, to the international importance of the Teschen coal and railroad. Recalling that coal imports from Upper Silesia to Hungary had to be transported on this railroad, the document stated that when the November 5 agreement placed Teschen under Polish control, representatives of the Hungarian ministry of commerce came to Poland to negotiate an agreement

[85] Jules Laroche, "La Question de Teschen devant la Conférence de la Paix en 1919–1920," *Revue d'Histoire Diplomatique*, Vol. 62, (1948), 14.

[86] J. E. Pichon "Les Frontières de l'état tchécoslovaque," Comité d'Études, *Travaux*, II, 108. See also by the same author, "La Répartition des Polonais d'après les résultats des élections aux assemblées représentatives: I, Silésie autrichienne et Galicie," *ibid.*

[87] "Mémoire, Dec. 20, 1918," *DK*, 14, Pologne, 1, a.

[88] Project of Jan. 21, 1919, Miller, *My Diary*, IV, 225.

[89] Foreign Office, historical section, *Peace Handbooks*, No. 4, *Austrian Silesia*, p. 5.

[90] Ferdinand Pelc quoted in Peroutka, *Budování státu*, I, 234.

[91] Nečásek, *Dokumenty*, p. 91. Compare with Masaryk's statement to the Coolidge commission on Jan. 26, quoted in Zygmunt J. Gąsiorowski, "Czechoslovakia and the Austrian Question 1918–1928" *Südost-Forschungen*, XVI (1957), 91.

on coal deliveries.[92] Such an arrangement would have contributed to a Hungarian-Polish *rapprochement* dangerous for Prague. It was clear, then, that Polish possession of Teschen would disproportionately weaken Czechoslovakia, while Prague's control over the coal fields and the railroad would strengthen the country's economic and political position in the Danubian area. Thus the Teschen issue transcended a simple border controversy and affected the whole situation in East Central Europe. This explains why experts who dealt with Teschen and tried to evaluate claims and counterclaims on their own merits to reach an equitable solution did not influence decisively the final settlement which was determined by other motives.

The French government, bent on consolidating a Czechoslovak-Polish bloc, definitely favored Czechoslovakia for several reasons. Paris felt that to take coal away from Prague would mean "to put it at the mercy of Poland, or to lead it into the temptation of turning toward Germany, with all the political consequences which could result therefrom." [93] Besides, as Nicolson put it, Poland placed between two large enemy states was bound to be pro-Allied no matter what happened. The Czechoslovak case was different, and Prague could turn Pan-Slavist and work for *rapprochement* with Russia.[94] France therefore found it "desirable to attribute as much coal to the Czechs as possible." [95] Finally an Italian diplomat explained French support of the Czechs by reasons connected with Franco-Italian rivalry. He wrote that "France wanted to insure her political and military preponderance in Czechoslovakia which aimed at exclusion of our . . . military mission, and the nomination of a French general to the post of chief of general staff." [96] This factor may have played an important role, as well as French wartime commitments to Czechoslovak historic borders, which Paris found difficult to discard without serious loss of prestige.

It is true, although Beneš and some later historians exaggerated greatly, that there were some hesitations among French diplomats. Noulens, for instance, recommended very early a plebiscite as the best means of solving the Teschen question and so contributing to a Czechoslovak-Polish alliance.[97] General Le Rond felt at one time that Czech economic dependence on Poland could perhaps "become in the future a reason for a rapprochement between these two states." [98] In the summer of 1919 the *Journal des Débats* advised the Czechs to settle

[92] Memorandum of Dec. 29, 1918, for the Quai d'Orsay, *Akty i dokumenty*, IV, 46.
[93] Laroche, "Question de Teschen," p. 12.
[94] *DBFP*, 1st series, VI, 160.
[95] Laroche, "La Question de Teschen," p. 12.
[96] Francesco Tommasini, *Odrodzenie Polski* (Warsaw, 1928), p. 238.
[97] Noulens' report of April 17, *Recueil*, IV, C (2), 975.
[98] *DBFP*, 1st series, VI, 164.

their differences with Poland because their *raison d'état* clearly demanded it.[99] These instances, however, were isolated, and it is most unlikely that there ever was a Franco-Polish "plan" to establish a Czechoslovak-Polish alliance in which the weaker Czechs would have to adjust to the Poles.[100] The French government hardly wavered in support of the Czechoslovak position, and Dmowski was right when he said that "Clemenceau wanted absolutely to gain Teschen for the Czechs."[101]

The other great powers approached the Teschen question with an open mind. In the British delegation Balfour was more friendly toward the Poles than was Sir Eyre Crowe, and Lloyd George wavered, though in April 1919 he inclined toward the Polish view. The Americans were sympathetic toward the Poles but in no way committed to support them, while the Italians at one stage favored the Polish side, thinking a possible Italian-Hungarian-Polish bloc would counterbalance a Czechoslovak-Yugoslav *rapprochement*.[102] The Franco-Italian rivalry in Slovakia also affected the Italian attitude toward Czech problems. Under these conditions Beneš could count on French support but had to use his diplomatic talents to convince the other powers.

The question of Teschen at the Peace Conference went through stages during which first the Czechoslovak and then the Polish views seemed to prevail. The Teschen commission submitted its findings on March 26 in a separate report by the French chairman Grenard, advocating a basically pro-Czech division, and in a majority report which advised an autonomous state of Teschen. The second alternative[103] was clearly unacceptable. It corresponded to the interests of the local German capitalists and was later advocated by Vienna.[104] Given the small size of the duchy — some 850 square miles — it was hardly practicable and indicated that the commission had done a hasty and superficial study of the Teschen problem.

After Major René Marchal replaced Grenard as chairman of the commission, the body began more intensive work and three weeks later informed the Peace Conference in a telegram on April 18 of a new recommendation diametrically opposed to the first suggestion.[105] The recommendation, embodied in the complementary report of April 28, advocated a boundary based closely on ethnic considerations.[106] The re-

[99] Gauvain, *L'Europe au jour le jour*, XIX, 412.

[100] Beneš seemingly believed there was. *Problémy nové Evropy*, p. 64.

[101] Dmowski, *Polityka polska*, p. 393.

[102] Laroche, "Question de Teschen," p. 13.

[103] *Recueil*, IV, C (3), 255–263.

[104] See Austrian memorandum of June 15, 1919, in Almond and Lutz, *Saint Germain*, p. 451. For the activities of the German industrialists see the report of A. W. Dubois to the State Department, *SDNA*, 760c.60f/48.

[105] *Recueil*, IV, C (3), 266; *DBFP*, 1st series, VI, 93–94.

[106] Miller, *My Diary*, XVIII, 111–114; *Recueil*, IV, C (3), 264–265.

port explained the reasons for this reversal by saying that the commission had at first received many "well written documents" from the Czechs while the Polish material was not ready, and "in this struggle of influence this circumstance placed them [the Poles] in an unfavourable situation." The commission felt that it had by now mastered the facts and was unanimous in its recommendation. Unanimity "established after three months at Teschen seems to show that this solution satisfied the logic of things and the political necessities of the situation."

While the Teschen commission recommended a solution along ethnic lines, the joint Commissions on Czechoslovak and Polish Affairs in Paris produced a report favoring a completely different solution. It advocated attribution of three districts to Czechoslovakia and of only one (Bielsko) to Poland. The report, completed on April 6, 1919, and sent to the Supreme Council on April 14, was transmitted by the latter to the Council of Foreign Ministers which soon took it up. Laroche, presenting the report of the joint commissions on April 23, explained the motives which had guided them in formulating their recommendation. The French diplomat stated that the main dilemma consisted of having either to "reject the ethnological principle or sacrifice the economic future" of Czechoslovakia. He declared that the commissions hoped that "in a few years the passions of the moment would be appeased and the economic interests would preserve their importance." [107] Laroche mentioned that the Teschen commission advocated an ethnic division, but he felt that such a division was undesirable because it meant cutting the mining district in two.

The report of the joint commissions, in the words of Nicolson, who was a member of them, "violated the ethnic principle in order to give the Czechs the necessary coal and railway." [108] The report greatly relieved Czechoslovak anxiety. Beneš and Kramář had already agreed to divide their roles "in view of the fact that some concessions in the matter of Teschen would have to be made." Kramář "was to demand . . . the whole of Teschen, I [Beneš] was to be more compromising." [109] In accord with this new policy Beneš, in a talk with Paderewski on April 14, had offered to give up Czech claims to Bielsko, just what the report had recommended.

In spite of the report by the joint commissions the Czechoslovak position was not strong. Laroche's support of the report was received without enthusiasm. The Americans did not like it much, and the Italians pointed out critically that the proposed border would hand over to Czechoslovakia a large Polish population and "would produce a very

[107] *FR Peace Conference*, IV, 609. See also Laroche, "La Question de Teschen," pp. 12ff
[108] *DBFP*, 1st series, VI, 123.
[109] Beneš, *Problémy nové Evropy*, p. 66; Peroutka, *Budování státu*, II/I, 616.

perilous future for the country."[110] The report from the Teschen commission could not be completely ignored either. Facing a difficult situation, the Council of Foreign Ministers took refuge in an American proposal to ask Beneš and Paderewski to try to settle the issue in direct negotiations between themselves.

4

Direct Czechoslovak-Polish negotiations offered little hope for success in the existing atmosphere of nationalist excitement in Poland and especially in Czechoslovakia. Several Czech deputies protested in Prague on May 14, 1919, against an alleged settlement of the Teschen question to Czechoslovakia's disadvantage.[111] In Warsaw the Socialist leader Daszyński demanded that Poland extend help to Slovakia so that she could free herself from Czech domination—a policy designed as a weapon against Prague that would reappear at times of Czech-Polish crises.[112] Paderewski attempted to calm the *Sejm* by announcing that he had discussed matters with Beneš and would talk with Masaryk, and that a solution of the Teschen problem was under way.[113]

Masaryk and Paderewski met in Prague on May 25, 1919, and both statesmen agreed to call a Czechoslovak-Polish mixed commission, a device advocated without much success since mid-1918. But new delays intervened, caused by the fall of Kramář's cabinet and the formation of a new Socialist-Agrarian ministry under the premiership of Vlastimil Tusar on July 8. Four days later the Peace Conference requested the Czechoslovaks and the Poles to start negotiating, and fixed a limited period of time during which they were to reach an agreement. Consequently a conference opened in Cracow on July 21 and lasted for about a week.

The Cracow conference was on the whole a Polish diplomatic success. The Poles offered a plebiscite as a means of settling the controversy, and the Czechoslovaks rejected the proposal. During the discussion a Czech delegate made a *faux pas* with regard to France by stating that Paris had recognized historical Czech borders and therefore also the frontier in Teschen. The Poles retorted that if any such Czech-French agreement existed it was not binding on them, and in Paris Le Rond had a hard time trying to assure the joint commissions that "No engagement of this nature exists and that the French delegation retains all freedom of action in the question of Teschen."[114] Czech intractability in Cracow

[110] *FR Peace Conference*, IV, 610.
[111] *Těsnopisecké zprávy*, 1919, II, 1344–1345.
[112] *Sprawozdania stenograficzne*, 1919, IV–VI, 38.
[113] *Ibid.*, p. 22.
[114] *Recueil*, IV, C (3), 180.

made a British observer write Balfour that the Czech claims were "entirely extravagant" and that instead of talking about a plebiscite, the Peace Conference ought to impose a frontier based on ethnic lines.[115] Polish propaganda scored yet another point by successfully insinuating, with arguments borrowed from Czech National Democratic enemies of Tusar, that the new Czechoslovak premier was pro-German and pro-Communist.[116]

Prague was losing ground and in the weeks to come its position deteriorated further. The Czech case was saved ultimately by the determination of the French government to avert a Czech defeat over the Teschen issue, and by the brilliant diplomacy of Beneš. The Czechoslovak statesman, foreseeing an unfavorable recommendation on the part of the joint commissions, which were ordered to prepare a new report, concentrated on winning the Allied leaders to his point of view.[117] He appealed to Clemenceau in a dramatic letter on August 5:

"The question of Teschen has become for Czecho-Slovakia the main question of its general policy. It was never for us a local issue because fundamentally the Teschen question is a question for all Central Europe and it is around this question that, someday, the policy of Central Europe and of Eastern Europe will be made." [118]

In a conversation with Nicolson, Beneš assured him that if only the British would support the French the Czech case would be won. The Czechoslovak minister declared that he was certain the Poles could be induced to make concessions, and Le Rond made the same point in talking to Crowe. Beneš presented his defeat over Teschen as a "triumph of the anti-Polish party" in Czechoslovakia, and he said that Kramář was "frankly anti-Polish and looked to Petrograd." Le Rond seconded his efforts by telling the British that "a compromise favourable to the Czechs would both avert a grave political crisis in Prague and prove negotiable with M. Paderewski." [119] Teschen, the French general maintained, was "infinitely more important to the Czechs than to the Poles," and Beneš told the joint commissions that if Prague had to depend economically on Warsaw "the smallest diplomatic incident with Poland could have very serious repercussions on the economic development of Czecho-Slovakia." [120] Beneš finally recalled the services of the Czech

[115] Capt. P. Walsh to Balfour, July 24, 1919, *DBFP*, 1st series, VI, 93.

[116] Peroutka, *Budování státu*, II/II, 1261.

[117] He recalled later that having limited means of access to the commissions he engaged in constant discussions with the Allied statesmen and diplomats. *Problémy nové Evropy*, p. 67.

[118] *Recueil*, IV, C (3), 235.

[119] *DBFP*, 1st series, VI, 123.

[120] *Recueil*, IV, C (3), 178.

troops in Siberia, "which fight for the Allied cause. It would be a badly chosen moment to hurt too much their national feeling." [121]

Nationalist feeling in Czechoslovakia was certainly running high. The speaker of the Prague Parliament declared on August 10, 1919, that the Parliament would not allow the delegates in Paris to sign any agreement that would limit Czech rights in Teschen. Prime Minister Tusar stated that Czech rights "cannot be the object of any vote." [122]

The joint commissions meanwhile terminated their report and accepted it unanimously on August 22.[123] They explained the new report was needed because of the breakdown of the Cracow talks and the unanimous recommendation of the Teschen commission of April 28 which removed "the doubts entertained . . . as to the real aspirations on the part of the population of the Teschen district." The report stated that information received

"represents that population as giving proof of such Polish national feeling as to establish beyond serious dispute the fact that the ethnical factor is clearly in favor of the Poles in the three districts of Freistadt [Frysztat], Teschen, and Bielitz [Bielsko]. Moreover, the position of Poland from the point of view of coal production has become uncertain owing to the institution of a Plebiscite in Upper Silesia." [124]

The report recommended a boundary which practically coincided with that of the Teschen commission and was close to the line of November 5, 1918. It recommended special provisions assuring facilities of transport and importation of coal to Czechoslovakia. The proposed boundary gave 171,700 Poles and 10,400 Czechs to Poland, and 105,161 Czechs and 62,800 Poles to Czechoslovakia. As for the coal, 60 per cent went to Czechoslovakia. Harold Nicolson admitted that the new solution was "ethnically far more justifiable" than the earlier one. It gave "the Czechs the majority of the coalfields" and "their transport requirements can be met by guaranteed running rights over the railway." [125] The equity of the solution proposed by the joint commissions appears indisputable, but in view of the tension in Czechoslovakia, and because of the larger political perspective from which Paris and Prague viewed the Teschen question, it was clearly unacceptable to the Czechs.

Beneš, before being officially informed of the commissions' report, but having a good idea of what it would be like, wrote Clemenceau that if the Czech viewpoint did not prevail "the consequences would be very far reaching." [126] News coming from Prague seemed to confirm this.

[121] *Ibid.*
[122] *Těsnopisecké zprávy*, 1919, II, 1262.
[123] Text: *FR Peace Conference*, VIII, 87–93; *Recueil*, IV, C (3), 51–57.
[124] *FR Peace Conference*, VIII, 88.
[125] *DBFP*, 1st series, VI, 123. [126] *FR Peace Conference*, VIII, 86.

General Pellé telegraphed on August 28 that if the conference accepted the new recommendation it "would exclude all possibility of a future *rapprochement* between the Czechoslovak state and Poland." [127] In the Prague Parliament, deputies like Jaroslav Stranský, Antonín Němec, and Žika declared amid applause that "the whole of Teschen belongs to us" and that "even the smallest part of Teschen" cannot be given up.[128] The progovernment Agrarian paper *Venkov* described the Teschen question as dynamite which might destroy all the work of the Peace Conference in Central Europe.

The Council of the Heads of Delegations decided to heed Beneš's demand for a new hearing, and through September 4 and 5, 1919, Czechoslovaks and Poles again addressed the council. Beneš opened the discussion by repeating the old arguments about Czech rights, and he spoke of the dangers of Czech "reversion of feeling" toward the Allies and hostility toward Poland.[129] Dmowski in reply recalled the November 5 agreement, and said that the Poles had hoped that "Poland and Czecho-Slovakia would always stand together throughout the Conference." [130] The Polish position on Teschen had always been the same, and if the Czechs had changed their mind it was because their leaders made the people at home believe "that they could obtain the whole of Teschen from the Conference." [131] The Polish delegate reminded the council that by a strict application of the principle of nationality Poland had been deprived of Danzig, and surely the powers could not ignore the same principle in Teschen and deprive Poland of that area as well. Admitting that the Czechoslovak economic argument was "very strong," Dmowski insisted that "the worst cause of conflict between neighbors was the subjection of one nationality to another." Paderewski in turn made a moving appeal to the council's sense of justice. The Polish delegation felt that its exposition made a deep impression on the Allied statesmen. Dmowski wrote later that "Clemenceau understood it too, and that was why he closed, because of a late hour, the session putting off the decision of the Council until later." [132]

Five days elapsed during which the French and the Czechs prepared a reversal of the recommendation of the joint commissions. The council met on September 10 to give the final verdict. The Italian delegate

[127] *Recueil*, IV, C (3), 237.

[128] *Těsnopisecké zprávy*, 1919, II, 2355, 2369–2370, 2376.

[129] *FR Peace Conference*, VIII, 105.

[130] *Ibid.*, VIII, 118.

[131] *Ibid.*, VIII, 119.

[132] Laroche admitted as much, by writing that "The Council, probably in order to tone down the impression made at the meeting, adjourned its decision." His following remark that Paderewski's speech "was only a brilliant concerto piece to which one listens with delight but then returns to real business" showed that the French had made up their minds not be to influenced by Polish arguments. "Question de Teschen," p. 16.

Tommaso Tittoni opened attack. He informed the council that Beneš, "who had admitted the justice of the new line, from an ethnographic point of view," [133] told him that if ethnic arguments were to prevail, Polish rights to Eastern Galicia ought to be reconsidered. Beneš suggested that concessions to the Poles in Eastern Galicia ought to be matched by concessions to the Czechs in Teschen. This argument failed to impress Balfour, who could not see that the analogy was "very relevant," but the French diplomats seized it eagerly.[134] Pichon proposed a new division of Teschen which would give the coal fields to the Czechs. Seconded by Tardieu, Pichon declared that the Poles would get enough coal in Upper Silesia, and Berthelot remarked that Pichon's proposal would give the Poles more than "they had hoped for in the first instance." Pichon returned to the analogy of Teschen with Eastern Galicia which Beneš had suggested. Berthelot reiterated Beneš's point about the serious repercussions of an unfavorable decision on Czechoslovakia. Beneš, he said, was extremely moderate and conciliatory, and it would be a great misfortune if he found himself compelled to resign his post." Balfour remained unimpressed. The report of the joint commissions assigned 60 per cent of the coal fields to Prague and was "really favourable to the Czechs." Berthelot's remarks were "interesting" but "not of sufficient authority to outweigh a unanimous proposal by an Expert Committee." [135]

Reference to the joint commissions nettled Clemenceau, and a unique incident in French diplomatic practice at the conference took place. The French prided themselves on cooperating with their experts and as a rule accepted their opinions. In this case they had to disavow the French

[133] *FR Peace Conference*, VIII, 175.

[134] The analogy between Eastern Galicia and Teschen was apparent rather than real. It is true that both provinces came under the respective Polish and Czech rules in the fourteenth century, and in both provinces the ruling nation constituted a minority. The Poles amounted to 39.8 per cent in Eastern Galicia and the Czechs to 27.1 per cent in Teschen, according to the 1910 census. Here similarities ended. The urban and intellectual class in Eastern Galicia was dominantly Polish, which was not true for the Czechs in Teschen. The main value of Eastern Galicia for Poland was historical and strategic, though its economy also played a part. The Czechs considered Teschen primarily from an economic point of view, and — except for the local population in the area — Teschen before the war did not exercise much of an emotional attraction. The role of Eastern Galicia in Polish history was important indeed, and its capital Lwów was one of the major Polish cultural centers. The role of Teschen in Czech history was rather slender. Internationally the issue of Eastern Galicia raised multiple problems: the Polish-Rumanian frontier, the Russian-Czechoslovak border, the Polish-Ukrainian cooperation, and the general Russian question. The international importance of Teschen was far less. The Czech linking of the two problems was of a propagandistic nature, and when in 1920 the Conference of Spa decided on ethnic Polish borders in the east, it simultaneously decided in favor of nonethnic frontiers in Teschen. The Czechs naturally made no attempt to bring up the analogy again.

[135] *Ibid.*, VIII, 176–177.

experts, and Clemenceau vented his anger on them. He declared that "he did not understand the reasons that had prompted the French representatives on the Joint Committee to give their assent to a proposal of which they did not approve. He retained opinions independently of whether they were shared by others or not." Clemenceau approved Pichon's proposal and "hoped that it might have been adopted." [136] On hearing this the council agreed to return the report to the joint commissions for re-examination.

The commissions deliberated on September 10, and submitted their findings to the council the next day. The majority report maintained the original recommendation and emphasized that it really was "much more favourable to Czechoslovakia than to Poland." Any change would "involve grave injustice to Poland and lasting hostility between the two countries." [137] Failing acceptance of the recommendation, the majority report advocated solution of the Teschen controversy by plebiscite.

The French delegation, which had received from its government "a formal instruction to ask the joint commission to reconsider its decision," submitted a dissenting report. Laroche explained later that the French attitude was "motivated by internal difficulties in Czechoslovakia where the party strife drew arguments from the Teschen affair," [138] but talking to other delegates he made use of another argument, namely, that "the policy followed by the commission risked throwing Czecho-Slovakia into the arms of Germany." [139] The French minority report of course made no reference to these arguments, and spoke only of "moral considerations" and of the danger of leaving "lasting germs of discord between the Czecho-Slovaks and Poles" as the principal reason for its change of position.[140] It recommended either adherence to the new proposal of Pichon, or failing that, a plebiscite.

It was obvious that to avoid a pro-Polish decision a plebiscite remained the only alternative. Beneš clearly "preferred the plebiscite to the acceptance of a line proposed by the Commission, even at the risk of achieving less advantageous results for his country," because Czech public opinion "would not have accepted any concessions on his part." [141] Balfour who did not fully realize the difficulty of Beneš's position was surprised when the plebiscite idea was broached in the council on September 11. He said that "he feared that the result of the plebi-

[136] *Ibid.*, VIII, 178.

[137] The report recalled that Poland would lose 62,800 Poles and Czechoslovakia only 10,400 Czechs, and that Prague would obtain 60 per cent of the coal and 69 per cent of the coking coal. *Ibid.*, VIII, 195.

[138] Laroche, "Question de Teschen," p. 17.

[139] *Recueil*, IV, C (3), 61.

[140] *FR Peace Conference*, VIII, 196.

[141] Laroche, "Question de Teschen," p. 18.

scite in Teschen would be to deprive Czecho-Slovakia not of 40% of the coal, but of 100%. The territory was Polish" but if "Beneš appeared to accept a plebiscite, it must be assumed that he knew his own business best." [142] Consequently Balfour concurred with the other members of the council that a plebiscite be instituted.

The decision to solve the Teschen question by plebiscite was a victory for French-Czechoslovak diplomacy. A plebiscite signified delay and left the final settlement an open question. While the Czech nationalist press failed to realize it, and the National Democratic papers spoke of the plebiscite as "the greatest Czech defeat since the White Mountain," [143] the progovernment *Venkov* looked at the decision of the conference far more realistically. In an article on September 22, entitled "Vive la France," the Agrarian newspaper said:

"If M. Beneš managed to win in Paris it is because he had been constantly supported by French statesmen. New proof of this is just given in the question of Teschen where a plebiscite was only obtained thanks to a personal and energetic intervention of the foremost among the French, M. Clemenceau." [144]

The Poles, who had been so close to a complete victory, received the news of the plebiscite as further proof of Allied, and especially French, partiality to the Czechoslovaks. The Allied decision brought no *détente* in the relations between Warsaw and Prague, and lengthy discussions in Paris on the mode and methods of the plebiscite which followed only deepened mutual antagonism. Certain Poles, considering the Czechs basically inimical to Poland, again advocated playing the Slovak trump against the Czechs. A pro-Hungarian Slovak, Victor Dvorčak, who headed the "Slovak Ruling Council" in Warsaw, appealed for Polish support.[145] Monsignor Hlinka who made critical remarks about Beneš, who "even wants to absorb Polish Teschen," [146] received unofficially a Polish passport on which he traveled to Paris.[147] *Gazeta Polska*, in an article on October 7, 1919, spoke of the need for closer relations with the Slovaks and Hungarians and the need for breaking up "the Czech-Ukrainian corridor"— all of which sounded like a call for the destruction of the Czechoslovak state.

These expressions of anti-Czech sentiment in Poland never amounted

[142] *FR Peace Conference*, VIII, 184.
[143] Peroutka, *Budování státu*, II/II, 1383.
[144] *BPPT*, Sept. 1–Oct. 31, 1919, Nos. 4–5, p. 3.
[145] See his memorandum in *AGND*, 18/122/T.
[146] Bonsal, *Suitors and Suppliants*, p. 160.
[147] See above pp. 73–74. There is an interesting report of the delegate of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Teschen, Władysław Günther, which advocated help to the Hlinka group. Dec. 10, 1919, *CD*, "Czechosłowacja."

to a political program, but they showed clearly that the policy pursued by France on the Teschen controversy was not calculated to abate tension or end mutual recrimination. By seemingly trying to prevent Czech hostility toward Poland, Paris helped plant the seeds of Polish hostility toward Czechoslovakia. The issue of Teschen remained a constant irritant between Warsaw and Prague after the Peace Conference. The absence of a definite solution in 1919 complicated French-Czechoslovak-Polish relations, and later developments added new bitterness to the old.

4

POLISH FRONTIERS IN THE EAST

THE problem of Poland's eastern frontiers differed radically from the other territorial issues at the Peace Conference. It affected Russia, which in 1919 was in turmoil. The Bolshevik Revolution with its immense implications raised questions as to the future status of the Russian state, indeed the whole of eastern Europe. France, for whom Russia had been the chief eastern ally, now looked on Russian communism as a threat to the established order and found it hard to devise new, consistent policies. The two-sided (Russian and Bolshevik) issue dominated French and Allied thinking on the Polish territorial settlement. How could one establish valid borders between Poland and Russia under the prevailing conditions of uncertainty, with Russia absent from Paris? This was the formidable question which the peacemakers had to resolve.

The Polish eastern frontiers fell into two distinct — though undoubtedly related — categories. These were, first, Eastern Galicia, and second, the borders north of it, including the special issue of Lithuania.

The problem of Eastern Galicia, legally speaking, was divorced from the general Russian question. The province had been under Habsburg sovereignty, and the peace treaty with Austria could legalize its transfer to Poland. Politically, however, France and the other powers were aware of a connection between Eastern Galicia and the Russian question. This connection arose partly because of Russian wartime claims to Eastern Galicia (where there were Ukrainian majorities in many a district), and partly because Ukrainian-Polish hostilities in that province had a bearing on the general struggle between Communist Russia and Poland, not to mention the newly established Ukrainian Republic. French military leaders like Foch viewed the fighting in Eastern Galicia in the general context of their anti-Bolshevik strategy.

Eastern Galicia formed the eastern part of the so-called Kingdom of Galicia and Lodomeria, by which name Austria described its share in the partitions of Poland. The western part was ethnically Polish, the eastern was mixed with a general Ukrainian (or Ruthenian) majority,

though in such districts as Lwów and Tarnopol and in most towns the Ukrainians were in a minority. After the breakup of the Dual Monarchy, the Poles assumed control in the west, while the Ukrainians with some Austrian support seized the initiative in the east. Capturing a large part of the area, they proclaimed on November 1, 1918, a Western Ukrainian Republic and attempted to take control of the city of Lwów, where spontaneous Polish resistance led to severe fighting. In late November the Polish National Committee in Paris protested against German and Austrian machinations "with the aid of the Ukrainians . . . to obstruct the unification of the new-born Poland." [1] The Ukrainians, on their side, informed Paris via Vienna of the creation of an independent Ukrainian state and of their struggle against the Poles in Eastern Galicia, the Hungarians in Subcarpathian Ukraine, and the Rumanians in Bukovina.[2] A Ukrainian message from Vienna, signed by Dr. Eugene Petruchevich, protested attempts to annex the new "Western Ukrainian Republic" to Poland and complained about the Rumanian advance into Bukovina.[3] Thus on the eve of the Peace Conference all Eastern Galicia was aflame, and the Poles were assembling troops from other areas — among others from Teschen — to cope with this dangerous situation.

In his first presentation of Polish territorial claims before the Supreme Council, Dmowski spoke also of Eastern Galicia. He admitted that the region was "disputed territory," but pointing to the small number of Ukrainians capable of managing their affairs, he stated that they "might be entitled to home rule but they were unable to create a separate state." The Ukrainian state at present "was really organized anarchy." [4] Dmowski repeated the same points briefly in the first memorandum submitted to the conference which dealt primarily with Polish western borders. He added that Eastern Galicia had been part of the Polish state for an uninterrupted period of more than five hundred years and was important to Poland because of its natural resources (oil), and also because it enabled Poland to establish a common border with Rumania. Dmowski recalled that according to Austrian statistics the Ukrainians were 58.6 per cent of the population — a feeble majority.

Polish claims to Eastern Galicia rested then on history, on the political immaturity of the Ukrainian element — over 60 per cent of the population was illiterate — and on general political and economic grounds. There is little doubt that the Ukrainians were politically weak at that time. Some of them stood for total independence, some were pro-Polish,

[1] *FR Peace Conference*, II, 411.

[2] *Ibid.*, II, 195.

[3] *Ibid.*, II, 420. See also Michael Lozynsky, *Décisions du Conseil Suprême sur la Galicie Orientale: Les Plus importants documents* (Paris, 1919), and Bureau polonais des publications politiques, *Documents Ruthène-Ukrainiens* (Paris, 1919).

[4] *FR Peace Conference*, III, 781–782.



The Eastern Border of Poland

a few favored some form of association with Russia, and the question of whether the Western Ukrainian Republic (Eastern Galicia) should constitute a separate state or be united with the Ukrainian People's Republic, which proclaimed its independence of Russia on January 28, 1918, was a tricky problem that was never solved satisfactorily.[5]

How did France and the other great powers view the question of Eastern Galicia? Paris on the whole was friendly to the Polish point of view, and the Quai d'Orsay memorandums envisaged the province as an autonomous unit within Poland, forming "a Polish-Rumanian screen between Bolshevik Russia and Western Europe." [6] The American Inquiry saw two possible solutions to the Eastern Galician question: either assigning the province to Poland or linking it with a Ukrainian state.[7] As time went on, the first alternative became more popular. The Italians were chiefly pro-Polish, while the British took an opposite attitude. Lloyd George questioned "whether it was safe to admit that Galicia was Polish territory," [8] and his government warned that it "would view with serious displeasure any military or other action of the Polish Government in East Galicia." [9]

The Czechoslovaks, who had favored Russian aspirations in Eastern Galicia during the war, continued to do so during the conference. As Kramář put it in a speech to a National Democratic rally, the Poles wanted the province "lest Carpathian Russia [Subcarpathian Ukraine] should connect us directly with Great Russia." [10] Dmowski suspected the Czechoslovaks of working for Russian interests,[11] although their memorandum which mentioned Eastern Galicia spoke of three alternatives: union with Poland, union with Russia, or union with the Ukraine.[12] During the Teschen crisis the Czechs exploited their contacts with the Ukrainians in much the same way as the Poles used the Slovak question, namely, to embarrass the opponent and make him conciliatory.[13] Thus with the exception of the British (and the Czechoslovaks), the great powers favored an attribution of Eastern Galicia to Poland but only

[5] A union of the two states was proclaimed in January 1919, but it was "more nominal than real." John S. Reshetar, *The Ukrainian Revolution, 1917–1920* (Princeton, 1952), p. 230. For instance, while the Eastern Galician state fought against the Poles, the Ukrainian republic never declared war on the latter.

[6] "Mémoire, Dec. 20, 1918," *DK*, 14, Pologne, 1, a. See also the mémoire of Dec. 24, and L. Hautecoeur, "Le Problème de la Galicie Orientale," Comité d'Études, *Travaux*, II, 309–310.

[7] Miller, *My Diary*, IV, 225.

[8] *FR Peace Conference*, III, 624.

[9] *Ibid.*, II, 408.

[10] *Národní Listy*, Oct. 5, 1919, quoted in *SDNA*, 763.72119/8038.

[11] Dmowski, *Polityka polska*, p. 397.

[12] Mémoire No. 8, Raschhofer, *op. cit.*, p. 212.

[13] *České Slovo* recommended this method on June 2, 1919. *BPPT*, June 1–Aug. 30, 1919, Nos. 1–3, p. 4. Beneš made good use of it in Sept. (see above p. 100).

with safeguards and limitations, the exact nature of which emerged clearly in the course of discussion in Paris.

The first problem on Eastern Galicia which occupied the Peace Conference was a Ukrainian-Polish armistice. A truce had been arranged in late February 1919, but it lasted only three days. In mid-March, Marshal Foch introduced the question of Eastern Galician fighting before the Supreme Council in a general exposition of the Russian problem. Foch declared that the reports of the Noulens mission made it clear that something must be done. "The most imminent danger," he said, "related to the city of Lemberg [Lwów] which was infested by the Ukrainians, and whose fall would entail that of the Polish Government. Such an eventuality threatened to draw into anarchy a country menaced on three sides by the Germans, Bolsheviks and the Ukrainians."[14] Foch stressed the connection between Eastern Galicia and the general Bolshevik menace, pointing out that the serious military situation near Lwów constituted a gap in the eastern front. The marshal advocated a large-scale coordinated action in which Polish and Rumanian troops would participate with Allied support from Odessa. He also suggested sending the Haller army to Poland immediately.

Foch's plan for using Poland as an operational base for an offensive against the Bolsheviks was not new, and when Foch had pressed in January and February for sending Haller's troops to Poland, he had the same idea in mind. The British had opposed the idea then,[15] and Lloyd George objected to Foch's proposals also on March 17. He said that "at bottom [they] merely meant the setting up of a great army for the eventual invasion of Russia" under the guise of relieving Lwów,[16] and he later sneered at Foch for proposing to invade Russia with a multinational army using Haller's divisions as "the spearhead."[17] Thus Lloyd George's opposition to, just as Foch's advocacy of, relief to Lwów rested on their respective anti- or pro-interventionist policies rather than on the intrinsic merit of the Eastern Galician situation. Foch developed his intervention strategy more fully on March 25, but with equal lack of success.[18]

Failing to accept a wider solution for the military situation in Eastern Galicia, the conference turned to the more narrow issue of the Polish-Ukrainian armistice, and Pichon and Cambon advocated that the Allies

[14] *FR Peace Conference*, IV, 379.

[15] See above pp. 30–32.

[16] *FR Peace Conference*, IV, 380.

[17] Lloyd George, *The Truth about the Peace Treaties*, I, 219. For Foch's plan and Lloyd George's reactions, see also Callwell, *Henry Wilson*, II, 174–175, and George A. R. Riddell, *Intimate Diary of the Peace Conference and After, 1918–1923* (New York, 1934), p. 35.

[18] Mantoux, *Conseil des quatre*, I, 22–23. See also C. T. Thompson, *The Peace Conference Day by Day* (New York, 1920), p. 273.

exercise pressure in that direction. They proposed that a line be established leaving Lwów on the Polish side and the oil fields on the Ukrainian, and that Haller's army be sent to help the Poles make some show of force. These suggestions, however, were modified as a result of the hearing of Dr. Robert H. Lord, the American member of the Noulens mission, who recommended on March 19 that a temporary truce be imposed immediately and an armistice worked out by a special commission in Paris. In the course of the discussion Lord declared that the Polish character of Lwów "had been strikingly demonstrated by the events of the last four months." [19] This comment provoked some angry remarks from Lloyd George. Balfour proposed asking the Commission on Polish Affairs to examine "the ethnographical limits of Poland in order that when the Conference came to deal with the question of Lemberg [Lwów] and of the oil wells of Eastern Galicia, it should have before it an impartial judgment." [20] This was a perfectly sensible proposal especially since Dmowski had already submitted to the secretary general of the Peace Conference a memorandum on Polish eastern frontiers.[21]

The decision of the Peace Conference imposing an immediate truce in Eastern Galicia was accepted by both the Ukrainians and the Poles, though the latter complied unwillingly. Warsaw stated that a truce could only harm Polish interests, and declared on April 5 that

"The Polish armies fought and are still fighting for the Allied common cause in Siberia, at Archangel, at Odessa and in France, while when we are attacked by the enemy we are not only left completely to our own resources, but have not yet been able to obtain the return of the Polish army in France." [22]

Meanwhile the council proceeded to appoint a special body: an inter-Allied commission for the negotiation of an armistice between Poland and the Ukraine. This new commission began its deliberations on April 26.[23] Unlike other commissions which dealt with Polish or Czechoslovak affairs, the armistice commission was not presided over by a Frenchman but by General Louis Botha, who enjoyed the full confidence of Lloyd George and was greatly disliked by both the French and the Poles. It is hard to say whether this appointment resulted from British pressure, or from French reluctance to be closely identified with this body, or both,

[19] *FR Peace Conference*, IV, 409. [20] *Ibid.*, IV, 441.

[21] Exposé des revendications ayant trait aux frontières orientales de la Pologne, 3 March 1919, *Recueil*, IV, C (2), 659–661; *Akty i dokumenty* I, 125–133. The Polish text is in Dmowski, *Polityka polska*, pp. 526–528.

[22] Miller, *My Diary*, IX, 346. The Poles were further annoyed because Paris sent truce orders directly to local commanders near Lwów, bypassing the Polish delegation in Paris and the government in Warsaw. See Noulens' report of March 25, 1919, *ibid.*, XVII, 349.

[23] Minutes of the commission and of the drafting subcommittee, April 26–May 15, 1919, *ibid.*, X, 320–488.

but one thing is certain, namely, that the French members, General Le Rond and M. Legrand, were in constant opposition to Botha and the British point of view. At the first meeting the British put all the blame for the fighting on the Poles, and Le Rond defended them vigorously. At the third meeting the British objected to the type of questions the French put to the Ukrainian delegates, as, for example, whether Ukrainian authorities had control over their troops. The French retorted that British questions to the Poles were phrased in a way which assumed the Poles were responsible for the hostilities. Le Rond and Legrand emphasized the difficulties of an armistice, and Le Rond took up the Polish arguments about the close relation between the Eastern Galician situation and the vast issue of Bolshevism and the Polish eastern boundaries. He asked, ". . . in the event of the armistice being accepted by Poland, who would undertake the responsibility of defending her against Bolshevism?" [24]

The Botha commission decided on May 12, 1919, to draw a demarcation line which left Lwów on the Polish side and the oil fields on the Ukrainian. The line was in no way to prejudice the final settlement. The Ukrainian delegation accepted these terms with some reservations; the Poles rejected them on the ground that they treated the Eastern Galician situation in isolation from the general situation in the east. In May 1919 the Bolsheviks were approaching Podolia and Volhynia, having broken the resistance of the forces of the Ukrainian People's Republic under Ataman Semon Petliura, and the Poles insisted that the "military action in Galicia should be determined by the demands of the general military situation of Poland." Having to protect the southern part of the Russian front and strengthen it by a junction with Rumania, the Poles declared that they could only accept an armistice which would place most of Eastern Galicia under their military control.

2

Unable to obtain the agreement of both sides, the Botha commission referred the question of Eastern Galicia to the Supreme Council. Wilson and Lloyd George spoke on May 17 of sanctions against Poland to force her to accept the Botha report, but such sanctions were delayed by news of a wave of indignation in Poland which threatened to overthrow the Paderewski government. Both Wilson and especially Lloyd George were indignant about the Polish stand, and the Czechoslovaks also showed anxiety lest the Poles capture the whole of Eastern Galicia.[25] General Henry Alby reported that the "Ukrainians have asked the Czechs to help

[24] *Ibid.*, X, 413.
[25] *FR Peace Conference*, V, 754.

them against the Polish invasion; but the Czechs have no troops that could be spared." [26] News reaching Paris of a full-scale Polish offensive with the aid of Haller's divisions, which had returned home in mid-April, produced a tirade by Lloyd George at the meeting of the Supreme Council on May 21. The prime minister, having previously extracted a promise that Haller's troops would not go to Eastern Galicia, accused the general of a breach of faith, and the council approved the sending of a strongly worded telegram to Piłsudski. Furthermore, Botha and the Ukrainian delegates were summoned to express their views. The Ukrainians voiced their grievances against Poland and demanded complete independence. Botha urged forcing the Poles to submit, which provoked an exchange between him and Le Rond. The Frenchman argued that the economic sanctions envisaged by the council could only "starve the Poles or force them to become Bolshevists," and he felt that there "was some ground for the Polish desire for a continuous front." [27] Botha objected, and Lloyd George added that pressure on Poland could be quite effective because the question of Upper Silesia was "not settled yet." [28]

As a result of the meeting, the council on May 27 sent the telegram to Warsaw in which it threatened that Poland would no longer receive "supplies or assistance" unless hostilities stopped at once. In Paris there were more angry words about Poland, and Clemenceau declared that if "Poland was to receive Galicia it would be a great scandal and due to the British and French munitions that had been sent there." [29]

Clemenceau's outburst was surprising in view of the general French policy. It may have resulted from his genuine annoyance with the Poles, but it is far more likely that the French premier wanted to show Lloyd George that France was not encouraging the Poles. The British prime minister had made this accusation at the preceding meeting. He said that French experts had often failed to appear at sessions of the Botha commission, that apparently the French minister in Warsaw "had encouraged the Poles in their recent attacks on the Ukrainians," and finally that orders given by General Franchet d'Esperey to his armies to effect "a junction with the Poles" indicated "an attempt to squeeze out the Ukrainians." [30]

As mentioned, Lloyd George was further annoyed by the use of Haller's troops in the Eastern Galician fighting. Paderewski had promised him that they would not be used in this area.[31] When Piłsudski learned

[26] Mantoux, *Conseil des quatre*, II, 130.
[27] *FR Peace Conference*, V, 779–781.
[28] Mantoux, *Conseil des quatre*, II, 155.
[29] *FR Peace Conference*, VI, 83.
[30] *Ibid.*, VI, 60.
[31] While most of the documents speak of a promise made to Lloyd George, Wilson mentioned on May 7, 1919, a promise made to Lansing. Mantoux, *Conseil des quatre*, I, 505.

about this promise he changed his plans and withdrew the Haller divisions farther north, but in the meantime a bulky correspondence ensued between Warsaw and Paris, involving General Haller (who apparently made no promises of any kind),[32] the French minister in Warsaw, Piłsudski, and Paderewski. The whole incident strengthened Lloyd George's suspicions and led him to believe in a Franco-Polish "conspiracy." [33]

Clemenceau produced elaborate explanations to meet the British accusations. He spoke of misunderstandings, of the Poles' believing "rightly or wrongly" that they "had the support of Marshal Foch," [34] and he assured the council that he had instructed the French minister in Warsaw to inform the Poles that they "were not supported by the French Government any more than by any other Government." [35]

Despite Clemenceau's protests, some of Lloyd George's suspicions appear to have been well founded. The usually well-informed American minister in Warsaw reported in mid-May that the French minister in Warsaw, Eugène Pralon, had intimated to the Poles that if they occupied Eastern Galicia, they would "have the support of the French and of Monsieur Clemenceau." Gibson also reported that he had "gained the impression that French policy is to give the Czechs the greater part of Teschen and expansion in Hungary and to turn Polish ambitions toward Galicia and the east." [36] This curious linking of Eastern Galicia with Teschen appeared again in September in a different form and in circumstances already discussed.

The sequel to the Allied threat of sanctions against Poland was a telegram from Pralon to Pichon reporting that Piłsudski was ready to comply with the Allied request and that hostilities "were already in fact suspended." [37] The council expressed its satisfaction, and three weeks later reversed its stand on the armistice and use of Haller's divisions in Eastern Galicia. This total change of policy came as a result of news from that area, on the one hand, and because of general political and military considerations, on the other. President Wilson read an American report from Eastern Galicia which "marvelled at the restraint shown by the Polish troops" and described the Ukrainian government as

[32] Clemenceau declared in the Supreme Council on June 5 that "we had thought that General Haller had not respected our instructions . . . but it was impossible to find any trace of such." *Ibid.*, II, 321.

[33] Lloyd George, *The Truth about the Peace Treaties*, I, 312–313.

[34] *FR Peace Conference*, VI, 70.

[35] *Ibid.*, VI, 83. Pralon executed this instruction, and Piłsudski wrote to Paderewski on May 31 that the French position on Eastern Galicia was now identical with that of the other powers. The letter was published by Karol Lapter in *Sprawy Międzynarodowe*, 10–11 (1958), 93–100.

[36] Hugh Gibson to Secretary of State, May 15, 1919, *SDNA*, 860c.01/253. He repeated the story two years later in another communication to the State Department. See *SDNA*, 860c.00/164.

[37] *FR Peace Conference*, VI, 161.

"most unsatisfactory" and the Ukrainians as "not capable of self-government." Although Ukrainian troops had been guilty of "many outrages on the Poles," the reporter found "no antipathy to the Poles" in many districts.[38] This communication, followed by others, undoubtedly influenced the council, or at least its American members, in Poland's favor. Moreover, the Allied military experts in Poland, Generals Henrys and Carton de Wiart, recommended strongly that the Poles be permitted to advance to the river Zbrucz,[39] and the general military situation in the east seemed to justify this recommendation. At that moment the Red Hungarian armies had penetrated Slovakia, and the Bolsheviks advancing from the east met the Polish troops in Volhynia. The strategic importance of Eastern Galicia was apparent, and, as Balfour put it, while the Bolsheviks were on the offensive the Allies "were hampering the action of the Poles." [40] Lansing and Cambon agreed.

Balfour uttered these words in the Council of Foreign Ministers which had met on June 18 to consider a report on Eastern Galicia by the Commission on Polish Affairs. The commission had dealt with the eastern borders of Poland since mid-March. It had prepared first a general report on Polish frontiers north of Eastern Galicia, and on April 22 Cambon had asked for instructions regarding the study of the latter. He pointed out that if purely ethnic considerations were to prevail — as in the case of Poland's western borders — most of this province would remain outside the Polish state. The Council of Foreign Ministers, aware of the large implications of the Eastern Galician problem, asked the commission to make its study and recommendations strictly confidential, which also probably meant that the group had a certain freedom in the way it approached the subject.

During discussion within the commission, Le Rond said that Russia had no claims to Eastern Galicia,[41] and this would facilitate study of the subject given the extreme reluctance of the great powers to injure any possible Russian interests. The French delegates took a pro-Polish attitude; one of them, M. de Martonne, stressed the economic advantages of a common Polish-Rumanian boundary; members of the Noulens mission favored attribution of Eastern Galicia to Poland; and General Niessel emphasized the strategic importance of that province.[42] Even so, most members of the commission did not think in terms of annexation to Po-

[38] Lt. Foster's report, *ibid.*, VI, 118. For a retrospective analysis which confirms this report, see Pearson to Secretary of State, March 3, 1923, *SDNA*, 860c.01/384.

[39] American mission to State Department, June 10, 1919, *SDNA*, 860c.00/16.

[40] *FR Peace Conference*, IV, 828.

[41] *Recueil*, IV, C (2), 365–366.

[42] *Ibid.*, 904–909. Carton de Wiart unsuccessfully tried to persuade Lloyd George to give Eastern Galicia to Poland, but Lloyd George reacted violently and "never spoke to me again." Carton de Wiart, *Happy Odyssey*, p. 89.

land pure and simple, and advocated autonomy. Their reasons were complex. They had sympathy for the Ukrainian interests; some members thought that a loose union with Poland would not preclude future arrangements more pleasing to Russia; and there were also economic considerations involved, since French investments in Eastern Galician oil amounted to 44,800,000 francs and British investments to 10,125,000 pounds sterling.[43]

In the beginning of June, Lloyd George declared that to establish a valid border in Eastern Galicia a plebiscite ought to be held, and Wilson proposed that the Council of Foreign Ministers examine the matter together with the Commission on Polish Affairs. A week later the council took up the report of the commission.[44] Completed on June 16, the report recommended no single solution but outlined four possible alternatives: total independence, inclusion within Poland with or without autonomy, autonomy under a mandatory power, and a transition regime with plebiscites determining the ultimate settlement. The report stated that it did not see the possibility of union with the Ukraine because "no real Ukrainian State" existed. As for boundaries, the commission suggested that if Eastern Galicia became part of Poland, its boundary—really an administrative division—should be line A which left both Lwów and the oil fields within Eastern Galicia. If, however, Eastern Galicia were to become an independent state, the regular frontier between it and Poland should be line B which left Lwów and the oil fields on the Polish side.[45] The report stressed the Polish character of Lwów and stated that the oil industry had been developed by the Poles and was clearly oriented to the west.

Discussion in the Council of Foreign Ministers revealed two tendencies. One represented by Britain favored temporary Polish military occupation administered by a high commissioner of the League of Nations and a final settlement by a plebiscite. The second tendency represented by Cambon and Sonnino opposed a plebiscite and recommended placing the country under Polish sovereignty with guarantees for the Ukrainians. Cambon asserted that "Galicia, with local autonomy secured, and governed in a liberal spirit by Poland, was the solution."[46] Since there was no disagreement on the temporary military occupation, the council passed a resolution that Polish troops move eastward to the

[43] Figures of *Comité international pour la protection des intérêts anglais, français, belges et alliés en Galicie* are quoted in *Recueil*, IV, C (2), 1093. See also Barbara Ratyńska, *Rola nafty w kształtowaniu stosunku państw zachodnich do sprawy Galicji Wschodniej 1918–1919* (Warsaw, 1957).

[44] Report No. 3 of the Commission on Polish Affairs, "Question of Eastern Galicia," *DBFP*, 1st series, III, 829–843, and a map.

[45] The British favored line A in both cases.

[46] *FR Peace Conference*, IV, 830.

river Zbrucz. As for the political settlement, Cambon's commission was instructed to prepare a statute of autonomy for the region.

The commission had a new complementary report ready on June 20,[47] and the Council of Foreign Ministers submitted it together with their resolution on military occupation to the Supreme Council. The report assumed that Eastern Galicia would not be independent and suggested that two questions needed resolution: first, should the region be under a high commissioner of the League or under a provisional Polish administration? second, should a plebiscite be envisaged for the future? The first question was answered when the council adopted a resolution which the British first opposed and then accepted. It said:

"That the Polish Government be authorized to establish a civil government in Eastern Galicia under an agreement with the Principal Allied and Associated Powers which shall be conditioned to preserve as far as possible the autonomy of the territory and the political, religious and personal liberties of the inhabitants." [48]

On the second question the British-American view prevailed, and the council agreed in principle to a plebiscite.

The Allies on June 25 sent a message to the Polish government that the council authorized the Poles to advance to Zbrucz, and two days later added in a special telegram permission to use any Polish military formations "including General Haller's army" in Eastern Galicia.[49] As for a future Polish administration and a plebiscite, Pichon informed Paderewski of the Allied decision on June 29, 1919.[50]

The Treaty of Saint-Germain with Austria of September 10 included legal transfer of sovereignty from Vienna to the great powers, and the council could then officially dispose of Eastern Galicia. Consequently the Commission on Polish Affairs worked out the arrangement in its last report, which accepted line A as the western administrative boundary of the province and endowed it with an elaborate autonomous regime inspired by Beneš's proposed statute for Subcarpathian Ukraine.[51]

What made the Allies favor wide autonomy and an eventual settlement by plebiscite in the case of Eastern Galicia, which had been part of Poland for several centuries? The British delegate, Sir Eyre Crowe, has supplied us with at least a partial answer:

"The main idea which had guided the Council in all its discussions on the autonomy of Eastern Galicia had been that a people was being dealt

[47] Report No. 4, *Recueil*, IV, C (2), 221–225.

[48] *FR Peace Conference*, IV, 855.

[49] The text of the former is in *FR Peace Conference*, VI, 677; the text of the latter is in *ibid.*, VI, 731.

[50] *Akty i dokumenty*, III, 20.

[51] Report No. 5, *FR Peace Conference*, VIII, 280–297.

with who had retained marked sympathy for certain of its neighbours, more particularly Russia. It had always been the desire of the Council to look to the future with the possibility that this people might wish to ally itself with a regenerated Russia or any Ukrainian state which might be formed. . . . No obstacle should be placed in the way of an ultimate union of Eastern Galicia with Russia."

Hence the British, and according to Crowe the other powers, had always taken into account possible Russian interests in this area. Reference to the Ukraine was highly propagandistic, as Lloyd George — who often indulged in pious pro-Ukrainian statements — showed in one of his rare moments of sincerity: he said that "no one thought seriously about this country except as being part of Russia." [52] As for Ukrainian "marked sympathy" for Russia, the Ukrainian delegates who had addressed the Peace Conference did not show any sign of it. British insistence on loosening all ties with Poland came out clearly when the council agreed to delete from the preamble of the statute for Eastern Galicia the words "seeing that Eastern Galicia formed part of the former Kingdom of Poland until the partition of the latter." [53] French views did not emerge clearly from the debates, and the points on which the French and the British clashed were of a technical nature, though France opposed an autonomy which would break the Polish-Ukrainian links altogether.

At that juncture, as indeed throughout discussion of Eastern Galicia at the Peace Conference, French and British views must be seen against the wider Russian background. The early British-French clashes on military operations in that area were connected with French interventionist plans and Lloyd George's opposition to them. The failure of peace plans and an all-out offensive of the Whites in Russia, coupled with Communist danger to Poland and Czechoslovakia, made French and British views coincide on the desirability of a Polish offensive. But the successes of the Whites who thought in terms of Russia one and indivisible made the British, and the French somewhat, unwilling to make final decisions on Eastern Galicia that could antagonize the new Russian state they hoped for. The highly influential *émigré* Russian *Conférence Politique* in Paris submitted memorandums to the Peace Conference which spoke of an "overwhelming majority" of Russians (*sic!*) in Eastern Galicia, and advocated a common Russian-Czechoslovak frontier.[54] Under these conditions the Allies preferred to play safe.

The stand of the Peace Conference alarmed the Poles. On August 25 Dmowski sent a note to Clemenceau urging a pure and simple transfer

[52] *Ibid.*, VIII, 272–273.

[53] *Ibid.*, VIII, 270.

[54] See for instance, the memorandum of May 10, 1919, signed by Prince Lvov, S. Sazonov, M. Maklakov, and V. Tchaikovsky. *DBFP*, 1st series, III, 893–894.

of Eastern Galicia to Poland.[55] Paderewski went to Paris and appealed to the conference not to impose a solution that would only complicate the problem of Eastern Galicia. Poland, he said, "was at a loss to understand the decision taken by the Peace Conference," because order in the region had been restored and Warsaw had already granted local autonomy. The Poles were indignant about the decision "to cut out of its body politic a province which had been part of Poland since the 14th century." Paderewski recalled that "neither Admiral [Alexander] Koltchak, as representing Russia, nor General Petlioura [Semon Petliura], as representing the Ukraine, disputed Poland's just claims to Eastern Galicia," and he ended by an appeal to the conference not to uphold its decision "if the Council desired to see a firm allied state in Central Europe." [56]

The Allied statesmen discussed the issue once again on September 25. The British opposed permanent attribution of the province to Poland, saying that they had only agreed to a union because a plebiscite had also been accepted. The Americans felt that to preserve a vast autonomy it might be easier to make the union permanent, and the French generally agreed. The British then suggested granting a fifteen-year mandate to Poland, after which the League of Nations would decide the future of Eastern Galicia. In view of Franco-American opposition the British extended the proposed mandate's duration to twenty-five years. Polish delegates appeared again before the council and pleaded for a final settlement, promising that autonomy matters would be solved. The council began to weaken. Laroche declared that the Poles would be less opposed to a vast autonomy if Eastern Galicia was attributed to them for good, and Henry White of the American delegation stated that this "was after all a question which concerned Poland rather than Great Britain." [57] After much haggling within the council and after numerous exchanges with the Poles,[58] the conference agreed on a twenty-five-year Polish mandate after which the Council of the League of Nations would have "full powers to maintain, revise, or modify the statute." [59] This solution was a compromise which was never to be implemented.

Clemenceau, worried by the impending fall of the weak government of Paderewski, to which the Allied decision was a *coup de grace*, obtained a suspension of the mandate at a December 1919 conference with Lloyd George in London.[60] Coming too late, the suspension failed to save Pa-

[55] *Akty i dokumenty*, III, 40–45.
[56] *FR Peace Conference*, VIII, 331–332.
[57] *Ibid.*, IX, 248.
[58] *Akty i dokumenty*, III, 54–55, 58–59, 62–63, 92, 94–97.
[59] *FR Peace Conference*, IX, 286.
[60] The American ambassador in Paris reported that "Berthelot informs me confidentially that it was never intended to cancel the decision of the Council to grant 25 year mandate to Poland but merely to suspend action, the purpose at that time being to assist Paderewski." Wallace to State Department, Jan. 24, 1920, *SDNA*, 763.72119/8846.

derewski's cabinet which resigned on December 5, 1919, but it showed the futility of Allied policy toward Eastern Galicia. For eleven months the Peace Conference in Paris, obsessed with the idea of not injuring possible Russian interests, followed hesitant and changing policies, and the outcome was suspension of the final decision.

If this obsession were noticeable in the case of Eastern Galicia, which had only indirect connection with the general Russian question, it became even more so when the Peace Conference attempted to deal with the remaining Polish eastern borders which were of direct Russian concern. Here the policy toward Bolshevism and Russia intermingled with, and largely determined, French and Allied diplomacy regarding the Polish eastern settlement, producing grave and unfortunate results.

3

Dmowski had written that when the question of Polish eastern boundaries came up in Paris there "existed first of all a serious doubt whether the Peace Conference could establish a boundary line between Poland and Russia in the absence of Russia," and he added that although the conference "asked the Polish delegation to submit its demands with regard to the eastern frontier, it did not undertake any discussion with us about these demands." [61] Piłsudski realized just as clearly that while the fate of the Polish western borders depended on decisions in Paris, that of the eastern frontiers was a big question mark, and he believed that *faits accomplis* more than anything else would determine Polish territorial expansion in the east.

As is of course well known, Russia was in a turmoil on the eve of the Paris Peace Conference. Red armies faced the White counterrevolutionary troops, and Allied contingents occupied strategic points in northern and southern Russia and in Siberia. From late 1917 to late 1918, Finland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Byelorussia, the Ukraine, the Crimea, North Caucasus, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, the Don region, and the Kuban declared their independence and established their national states. The issue of nationalities complicated the Red-White contest, and the Bolsheviks with their clever use of nationality slogans had a clear advantage over the Whites who could only conceive of one and indivisible Russia. The great powers in Paris facing all these complex and confused issues were unable to arrive at a coordinated, clear, and logical policy.

France favored intervention, and at the same time tended to support the ideal of indivisible Russia against that of nationalities. Lloyd George declared that he was unprepared to "set Russia in order by force," [62] and

[61] Dmowski, *Polityka polska*, p. 404.
[62] *FR Peace Conference*, III, 582.

he went further in private conversation, asserting that he was "opposed to knocking out Bolshevism." [63] Wilson felt it best "to leave Russia to Bolsheviks—who will stew in their own juice . . . and to limit ourselves to preventing Bolshevism from invading other parts of Europe." [64] This was a negative conception which the French, after the failure of intervention, would later come to share. These divergent views, not even consistently maintained, could hardly be reconciled, and a joint Allied invitation to all Russian groups for a conference at Prinkipo (which never materialized, to the great relief and satisfaction of France) could not conceal this fact. Orlando summed up the Allied contradictions well when he said that

"We had to choose in Russia between two policies equally logical and defendable. The first is that of intervention; go to Moscow if necessary and crush Bolshevism by force. The second consists in regarding Bolshevism as a government *de facto*, and to establish relations with it, if not cordial at least more or less normal. We did not know how to adopt either one or the other and we have suffered the worst consequences of pursuing both policies at the same time. Without going to war, we really are in a state of war with Russia." [65]

The great and often-mentioned difficulty of applying intervention, namely the problem of who was to do the job, was not insurmountable, because the newly established border states, endangered by Russian imperialism, were on occasion willing to do it with Allied support and coordination. Lenin later admitted that their armies could easily have smashed Bolshevism.[66] But the price for it was recognition of their national aspirations and separate statehood, which ran counter to the idea of Russia one and indivisible. Neither the White Russians nor the French government, influenced by Russian *émigré* and White circles, were willing to pay it.[67]

Relations between Poland and Russia on the eve of the Peace Conference were extremely fluid. The Bolshevik Council of People's Commissars declared on August 29, 1918, that "All agreements and acts . . . referring to the partitions of Poland are irrevocably annulled" as "contrary to the principle of the self-determination of peoples," and stated

[63] Callwell, *Henry Wilson*, II, 163. Field Marshal Wilson called "this tacit agreement to Bolshevism" a "most dangerous thing."

[64] Mantoux, *Conseil des quatre*, I, 20.

[65] Supreme Council's session on March 27, 1919, *ibid.*, I, 56.

[66] Quoted in V. Potemkin, ed., *Histoire de la diplomatie* (3 vols., Paris, n.d.), III, 81. On the opposite side Winston Churchill said the same thing. *The Aftermath* (New York, 1929), p. 267.

[67] The declaration of the Supreme Council of Jan. 22, 1919, which appealed for an end of hostilities in Russia against any territory "whose autonomous action is in contemplation in the fourteen articles [points]" was largely platonic as long as the conference did nothing to help those whose independence and national rights were endangered.

that Russia "recognizes the inalienable right of the Polish nation to independence and unity." [68] At the same time the Red army began to move westward, taking over areas evacuated by the Germans which had been part of the Polish state before the partitions. Warsaw protested, but the Bolsheviks justified their action by the right of national self-determination of the border areas.[69] Since the Communists accorded this right not to the nations themselves but to "the proletariat of every nationality," [70] support of national self-determination meant support of communism.[71] Even with regard to Poland, recognition of Polish independence did not exclude a drive for creation of a Polish Soviet republic, and Red troops moved westward with the slogan "target Vistula" and included in their ranks such units as the "revolutionary regiment of Red Warsaw" and the "Mazovian regiment of Red Hussars."

While Bolshevik troops advanced westward, the Polish army moved east, basing its right on the repudiation of partition treaties and taking over what legally had been Polish territory. Besides, the Poles "could hardly be expected to hand over willingly to a Bolshevik regime large areas where members of their race constituted the bourgeois element and possessed the bulk of the land." [72] A clash was inevitable, and in February 1919 Polish and Russian troops came for the first time into armed contact.

What were the respective Russian and Polish views on the border between the two countries? Bolshevik views were flexible because of the subordination of nationality principles to ultimate revolutionary aims, but they generally envisaged Poland within its purely ethnic frontiers. The Whites thought of Poland in terms of the prewar Kingdom of Poland, or Congress Kingdom, which included Polish ethnic territories and excluded areas with large Polish minorities and occasional majorities. Polish views on the eastern borders, as presented at the Peace Conference, corresponded largely to the opinions of Dmowski,[73] and did not include other tendencies. There existed, however, two different Polish approaches to the eastern settlement which might be called respectively nationalist and federalist.

[68] Jane Degras, ed., *Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy* (3 vols., London, 1951–53), I, 98.

[69] Chicherin declared on Jan. 7, 1919, that "Lithuania is an independent country and so is Byelorussia." Quoted in Komarnicki, *Rebirth of the Polish Republic*, p. 449.

[70] For an analysis of Lenin's views see Richard Pipes, *The Formation of the Soviet Union: Communism and Nationalism 1917–1923* (Cambridge, Mass., 1954), p. 36; Komarnicki, *Rebirth of the Polish Republic*, pp. 181–187.

[71] "The principle of self-determination should be used as means of struggle for socialism, and it should be subordinated to the principles of socialism." Stalin in *Sochineniya*, III, 208–209, quoted by Komarnicki, *op. cit.*, p. 187.

[72] Temperley, *A History of the Peace Conference*, VI, 246.

[73] Dmowski told the Polish delegation that "only those things will be said on our side at the Conference with which I shall agree." *Polityka polska*, p. 369.

The nationalist idea as represented by Dmowski and his followers rested on a belief in the inherent value of an ethnically homogeneous state or its nearest approximation. Consequently Dmowski favored an eastern frontier which would include only those areas of the prepartition state which had remained in the Polish cultural and economic sphere and had at least a sizable and influential Polish minority. He believed in having a common border with Russia and was disinterested in the Ukraine or Byelorussia as buffer states, which because of their weakness would come under German influence, would prevent an eventual Russian-Polish understanding, and if associated in any way with Poland would only weaken the Polish state.[74]

The federalist program, inspired by the old Jagellonian tradition, rested on the recognition of self-determination of Lithuania, Byelorussia, and the Ukraine — all of which once had been within prepartition Poland. The federalists wanted to solve the problems of eastern European security and of the Polish boundaries by replacing the old Russo-Polish competition for the borderlands by a new system freely joining Lithuania, Byelorussia, and the Ukraine by federal links with Poland of one kind or another. The federalist program was represented, though in a very different manner, by Paderewski and Piłsudski. The former may be called a doctrinaire federalist who believed in a United States of Eastern Europe,[75] and he apparently favored a union of ethnic Poland with ethnic Lithuania, Byelorussia, and a state of Halich-Podolia-Volhynia.[76] Paderewski also hoped to win the western powers to his federalist ideas. Piłsudski was skeptical about the voice the Peace Conference would have with regard to the eastern settlement. Pragmatic by nature he was willing to accept Dmowski's proposed eastern border "if no other possibilities should materialize,"[77] but he believed that they existed and planned to prepare a federalist solution by *faits accomplis*. The Socialists and certain conservative groups supported Piłsudski's program,[78] which began to take shape in April 1919 when the Poles entered Wilno and Piłsudski appealed to the inhabitants of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania to determine their own fate. In May, Paderewski advocated a plebiscite in the eastern areas "in the spirit of the proclamation" of Piłsudski.[79] After Polish entry into Minsk, the Polish commander-in-chief declared that

[74] Stanisław Kozicki, *Sprawa granic Polski na konferencji pokojowej w Paryżu* (Warsaw, 1921), pp. 118–119. Also *Akty i dokumenty*, I, 75ff.

[75] According to Piłsudski, *Pisma zbiorowe*, VI, 122. Paderewski mentioned his ideas to the Commission on Polish Affairs. See Kozicki, *Sprawa granic*, p. 120.

[76] Seyda, *Polska na przełomie*, II, 474.

[77] Baranowski, *Rozmowy z Piłsudskim*, p. 124.

[78] Among the papers supporting Piłsudski's program were the conservative *Czas*, *Nowa Reforma*, *Gazeta Polska*, and the Socialist *Robotnik*.

[79] *Sprawozdania stenograficzne*, 1919, IV–VI/25.

his armies were bringing to the Byelorussian people the right of self-determination.

The practical difficulties of a federalist program were immense. Many Ukrainians and Byelorussians were suspicious of the Polish motives, especially since the Poles were largely identified with the landowning and bourgeois classes. Polish-Lithuanian negotiations broke down when the Poles declared their willingness to hand over Wilno to Lithuania only when the latter agreed to a federal union with Poland.[80] There was opposition to federalism in Poland itself on the part of the nationalists and some imperialists who favored simple annexations and opposed both Piłsudski and Paderewski.

France and the great powers watched with suspicion Piłsudski's policy of *faits accomplis*. The French thought that Poland ought to constitute "a barrier against Russian Bolshevism dangerous for all European civilization," [81] and not engage in furthering Polish political plans in the east. In late 1919 this policy took its most grotesque form when France asked Piłsudski to occupy Polish-claimed territory on behalf of the Russian Whites and introduce there Russian imperial emblems and flags. Piłsudski naturally refused.[82] The French were constantly unwilling to take Polish advice on the Russian settlement. "To judge Russian affairs one must not rely too much on the Poles," Clemenceau said. "Their judgment is distorted by hatred." [83]

Lloyd George went further. Looking upon Poland as a French tool for intervention, he was at times reluctant to admit that the Bolshevik drive westward endangered the Poles in any way. Although American observers reported from Poland that "something must be done quickly to stop the westward advance of Bolshevism," [84] the British prime minister wrote on February 19, 1919, that he saw "no evidence at the present moment that the Soviet Government have any intention or desire to invade these territories." [85] His worry was that the Poles under pretense of fighting Bolshevism might "push their conquests eastwards and face the Congress with the capture of Kovno or Grodno." [86] Small wonder that the veteran diplomat Paul Cambon should note at that time: "Nothing has been done, nothing will be done, and the Bolsheviks will end by entering Warsaw and capturing Noulens and his mission." [87]

[80] See Piłsudski, *Pisma zbiorowe*, V, 80.

[81] The pamphlet *En quoi la Pologne intéresse la France?* Compare with Foch's statement in the Supreme Council, *FR Peace Conference*, VIII, 212.

[82] Piłsudski, *Pisma zbiorowe*, VI, 123–124.

[83] Mantoux, *Conseil des quatre*, I, 508.

[84] William R. Grove of the Food Mission. *FR Peace Conference*, II, 429.

[85] *The Truth about the Peace Treaties*, I, 377.

[86] *FR Peace Conference*, III, 675. It is interesting that Lloyd George never consulted the Foreign Office expert on Russia and ignored his reports. Howard, *Theatre of Life*, II, 296ff.

[87] Cambon, *Correspondance*, III, 317.

Dmowski presented the Polish views on the eastern borders during his first hearing before the Supreme Council on January 29, and he developed them in a later memorandum submitted on March 3,[88] declaring then that Poland did not claim her prepartition borders, and that the "eastern frontiers of Poland should be curtailed and a large portion remain under Russia." [89] The territory he demanded corresponded roughly to that left to Poland after the second partition, and the memorandum admitted that even within these curtailed borders there were regions with Polish minorities, including, however, important Polish economic and cultural centers. Dmowski made a gesture toward the federalist point of view by mentioning the possibility of establishing some links between Poland, on the one hand, and the Ukraine and Lithuania, on the other.

As for the views of the conference on Polish eastern borders, there was certainly no unanimity. In France there was a wide variety of opinion concerning the eastern Polish settlement and the questions connected with it. Among the questions to be considered were these: indivisibility of the Russian state, federation under Russian control or a union of border states, reliance on either Russia or Poland as France's principal ally, and finally the border question properly speaking.

In late 1918 and early 1919 there was confusion in Paris as events in Russia indicated disintegration of the old unitary Russian empire. In December a representative of Piłsudski reported on a "Berthelot Plan" favoring indivisible Russia, and another wrote four weeks later that the Quai d'Orsay had dropped it and favored a great Polish state.[90] The French showed some interest in the nationalities that had emerged, and Sazonov complained bitterly to Cambon that France was working for the dismemberment of Russia. Cambon explained that this trend resulted from the French "deceived love" for Russia.[91] In any event it was not a general tendency, and some papers of the *Comité d'Études* emphasized that to support the Ukraine against Russia was contrary to the historical process and meant encouraging something comparable to "the war of secession in the United States." [92] The *Comité* also feared that if Lithuania and the other Baltic provinces were detached from Russia they would fall under German influence,[93] though several members of

[88] It was followed by more detailed documents of which the most important was Commission Polonaise des travaux préparatoires, *Les Confins orientaux de la Pologne* (Paris, March, 1919).

[89] *FR Peace Conference*, III, 782.

[90] Baranowski's report, Dec. 8, 1918, *AGND*, 1/47, and Sokolnicki's letter of Jan. 7, 1919, *AGND*, 2/183.

[91] Cambon, *Correspondance*, III, 334ff.

[92] E. Haumant, "Le Problème Oukrainien," Comité d'Études, *Travaux*, II, 368.

[93] See the minutes of the meeting of Jan. 22, 1919, *CE*. See also A. Meillot, "Pologne et Lithuanie," Comité d'Études, *Travaux*, II, 338–339, 354.

this body sugested that a federation of Lithuania, the Ukraine, Poland, and the Baltic countries would provide the best solution.[94]

Those French diplomats who supported a federation of states under Russian leadership did not intend the proposal as an anti-Russian device, but as a means of rebuilding Russian power under the new conditions. The deputy Franklin-Bouillon was well aware of this fact when he proposed instead a new system which would not rely on Russia but rather on the nationalities which had emerged. He advocated "a comprehensive and energetic policy" in that direction and asked the French Parliament to look "at the map from the Baltic to the Black Sea." [95] The Quai d'Orsay memorandums were favorable to Polish federalist plans in the east. One of them notably suggested that Wilno be used "as a bait to make the Lithuanians contract a federal link with Poland," [96] and another spoke with approval of Polish plans regarding Byelorussia.[97] The memorandums pointed out, however, that Polish landed property in the east was likely to be a cause of trouble between the Poles and the Ukrainians and Byelorussians, and indicated also a preference for drawing the Polish border along the Bug River to restrict the Polish state to the former boundaries of the Congress Kingdom. France, the memorandum of December 20 said, ought to work for the reconciliation of Russia and Poland. This sentiment was fairly general in France, and as a Rightist deputy expressed it, "Poland cannot live except on one condition: that is an intimate alliance with Russia." [98]

To sum up the French attitude in all its nuances, one could hardly improve on the statement of the secretary of the Polish delegation in Paris, who wrote:

"There were elements which were inclined to take disintegration of Russia as a starting point, and strive to replace it by Poland; others, however, did not cease to count on the resurrection of the old United Russia and did not want to injure [French-Russian] relations by supporting Poland to Russian disadvantage." [99]

His views are largely borne out by the French appreciation of the dilemma "either to create a great Poland, by weakening Russia, and to lean on her, or to make a little [Polish] state so as not to weaken our sad ally of yesterday." The *Mercure de France* felt that the "second of these formulae seemed to have enjoyed special favor of the higher circles." [100]

[94] E. Denis, "Les Programmes polonais," *CE*, 1918; H. Grappin, "La Propriété foncière sur les territoires de la Pologne historique," Comité d'Études, *Travaux*, II, 278–288.

[95] Chambre des Deputés, *Débats*, 1918, Session ordinaire, 3331.

[96] "Mémoire, Dec. 20, 1918," *DK*, 14, Pologne, 1, a.

[97] "Mémoire, Dec. 24, 1918," *DK*, 14, Pologne, 2.

[98] The deputy was M. de Chappedelaine. *Débats*, 1919, Session ordinaire, 3611.

[99] Kozicki, *Sprawa granic*, p. 115.

[100] *Mercure de France*, Vol. 145 (1921), 304.

The last point is confirmed by a Czechoslovak analysis, according to which "French conservative public opinion, fortified in its old views by a widely organized propaganda of the Russian *émigrés*, and despite its great sympathy for Poland, for a long time treated her [Poland] without much confidence, awaiting the salvation of France from Russia alone."[101] Thus, French interest in Russia, political as well as economic,[102] largely determined the attitude of Paris toward the Polish eastern settlement, and since French views were not uniform they made policy hesitant and changeable.

As for the American and British attitudes, the Inquiry recommended strongly the union of Poland and Lithuania, and failing a union supported Polish ethnic claims to the Wilno and Grodno regions. In the remaining areas it advocated ethnic borders.[103] The Foreign Office handbook expressed skepticism about the chances of a Polish-Lithuanian union, and held that Byelorussia gravitated toward Russia rather than toward Poland.[104] It also favored strict ethnic criteria for the Polish eastern frontiers.

The views of the Czechoslovak leaders, who were considered to have a good knowledge of Russia, carried some weight at the conference. Masaryk had long advocated a Russian democratic federation of nations,[105] and in Paris the Czechoslovaks "made efforts to exercise a moderating influence on the fixing of eastern borders of Poland,"[106] which meant that they generally opposed the Polish eastern program. As for the Russian *Conférence Politique* in Paris, presided over by Sazonov, it ceaselessly advocated the strict application of ethnic criteria to Poland, and used for that purpose the highly inaccurate Russian statistics of 1899,[107] which the western experts often took at face value. However the *Conférence* refused to apply the same criteria to the Russian state by claiming Lithuania, the Ukraine, and Byelorussia, which drew a sharp riposte from a French writer, Henri Grappin.[108] It favored a Polish border coin-

[101] *Zahraniční Politika*, II (1923), 1625.

[102] Nearly three fourths of the active capital in Russian banks originated in the French banking system, and 32.6 per cent of all foreign capital in Russia was French. Geographically, 80.4 per cent of the French capital in metallurgy was invested in the Ukraine, and nearly 79 per cent of the French capital in mining was concentrated in the Donetz basin. See Louis Fischer, *The Soviets in World Affairs* (2 vols., Princeton, 1951), I, 230; Charles H. Slovès, *La France et l'Union Soviétique* (Paris, 1935), p. 147.

[103] Miller, *My Diary*, IV, 219ff, map No. 6.

[104] *Peace Handbooks*, No. 44, *Russian Poland, Lithuania and White Russia*.

[105] Masaryk, *L'Europe nouvelle*, p. 223.

[106] Bénès, *Où vont les Slaves*, p. 190.

[107] An unofficial German census in 1916 which indicated Polish majorities in the Wilno and Grodno regions showed the utter unreliability of the Russian figures, though the Germans had certainly no interest in furthering Polish claims to these areas. See Komarnicki, *Rebirth of Polish Republic*, p. 193.

[108] *Mémoire sur l'application du principe des nationalités à la question Russe* (Paris,

ciding with the administrative division between the Congress Kingdom and Russia, with some concession to the Poles in the regions of Chełm and Suwałki.[109] The Russian views found currency in Paris, and influenced the French way of thinking about Polish eastern frontiers.

One cannot say the same thing about the Lithuanian and Ukrainian views, which on the whole carried little weight. The Lithuanians weakened their arguments by combining unmitigated attacks on the Poles with exorbitant demands for a Lithuanian state including in one instance six, and in another nine, million inhabitants.[110]

The Peace Conference, as mentioned, instructed the Commission on Polish Affairs in mid-March 1919 to study Polish eastern borders, and the commission faced immediately the "difficulty of ascertaining from what States Poland will be separated by these frontiers."[111] In the absence of a determined Allied policy, and given the fluid situation in Russia, this was a real problem, and the commission solved it by clinging to one thing which appeared noncontroversial, namely, that purely ethnic Poland would not antagonize Russia whatever ultimate form, character, or structure the latter might adopt. The French member, Albert Kammerer, put it succinctly by saying that "with regard to the eastern frontier of Poland, the commission has a sure basis, namely the declaration [of March 29, 1917] of the last regular Russian government."[112] The Italian delegate emphasized that "the Allies had always considered Russia an ally whose territorial integrity ought to be respected," and therefore the only territory which could be attributed to Poland was the Congress Kingdom.[113]

By restricting its examination of Polish eastern borders to territory uncontested by Russia, the commission could obviously bring forth no real solution. The report, adopted on April 22, recommended a line corresponding roughly to the boundary of the Congress Kingdom, and traced it to a point just north of Chełm and Eastern Galicia in view of the fighting in that area.[114] The council did not take up the report, and the attention of the commission shifted to Eastern Galician problems with the results already discussed.

Meanwhile developments in Russia made Paris center its attention on the White leaders, especially Admiral Kolchak, whose victories made

1919), written in reply to André Mandelstam's *Mémoire sur l'application du principe des nationalités à la question Polonaise.*

[109] Conférence Politique Russe, *Considérations sur les frontières orientales de la Pologne et la paix en Europe* (Paris, 1919).

[110] See the Lithuanian memorandum for the State Department on April 27, 1918, *SDNA*, 860m.01/77, and another one of March 24, 1919, Miller, *My Diary*, XVII, 398–402.

[111] *Ibid.*, XVII, 180–181.

[112] *Recueil*, IV, C (2), 95.

[113] *Ibid.*

[114] Report No. 2, Miller, *My Diary*, IX, 14–24; *Recueil*, IV, C (2), 129–139.

him the potential number-one ally in the east. In late May 1919 the Supreme Council addressed a message to Kolchak setting down conditions for full Allied recognition and support. The conference asked Kolchak, among others, to honor Russian debts, to summon a constituent assembly, to recognize the independence of Finland and Poland — their frontiers with Russia were to be settled by direct agreement, and failing that by arbitration of the League of Nations — and the autonomy of the Baltic provinces and of Caucasian and Transcaspian territories. There was no mention of the Ukraine.[115]

The Supreme Ruler, as Kolchak styled himself, agreed in his reply of June 4 to meet Allied demands. With regard to Poland he confirmed Russian recognition of her independence and put off the delimitation of frontiers till the future meeting of a constituent assembly. He spoke of a "final solution" of the Finnish question at a later date and vaguely promised autonomy for other territories. The evasive character of his answer did not deter the Allies from accepting his statements as satisfactory. In fact, the right wing *L'Action Française* had openly advised Kolchak to promise anything and worry about fulfilling his promises later.[116] Pichon told the Parliament on June 17 that France wanted a Russia "one, strong, and powerful," and the *Journal des Débats* rejoiced that the Allies had no plans for the recognition of small national states which "sooner or later should adapt themselves to the reconstitution of Russia." [117] Under these conditions the chances of getting Allied approval for Polish ideas of an eastern settlement were slender indeed.

For military reasons the Peace Conference in June allowed the Poles to advance to Zbrucz, but Paris frowned on Polish progress in Lithuania. In July Clemenceau expressed worry over Polish movement in that area "in defiance of the orders of the Conference," and suggested that the Poles be ordered to stop.[118] Cambon explained that Marshal Foch had authorized the Polish advance to a new line which did not go beyond Polish ethnic territory and was therefore legitimate. Clemenceau, suspecting Foch of letting strategic objectives override political considerations, inquired if the Foch line "had been accompanied by or was the result of an offensive action taken by the Poles," [119] and was only mollified by the assurances of General Maxime Weygand that General Henrys knew and approved of the move. The reason for Clemenceau's worry was obvious. The French at this time thought of Lithuania as Russian territory and wanted to prevent Polish encroachments there.[120]

[115] *FR Peace Conference*, VI, 73–75.
[116] See John A. White, *The Siberian Intervention* (Princeton, 1950), p. 339.
[117] Gauvain, *L'Europe au jour le jour*, XIV, 289.
[118] *FR Peace Conference*, VII, 88.
[119] *Ibid.*, VII, 316.
[120] In May, Piłsudski asked Paderewski to try to prevent the French military mission to

Piłsudski neither had faith in the ultimate triumph of the Whites in Russia nor did he desire it, knowing full well their political outlook. He realized that the Bolsheviks, hard-pressed by General Anton Denikin whose armies rolled toward Moscow in the summer and early autumn of 1919, were willing to make concessions. Although the Polish leader could not defy France, whom he needed, and make peace, he wanted at least to know what the Peace Conference proposed to do.

In mid-September Paderewski appeared before the council, "anxious to learn the view of the Allies with respect to Russia." [121] The Polish premier stated that his country "could not fight indefinitely" and that "very advantageous terms of peace had been offered him by the Bolsheviks." Paderewski told the conference that although Polish territorial aspirations "had been fulfilled"—at this time Polish troops had reached the line coinciding roughly with Warsaw's demands—the government was prepared to accept the wishes of the council with regard to war or peace. The premier had previously told Lloyd George that the Poles could advance on Moscow with an army of half a million men provided they received financial support and equipment, but the Allies did not like the idea. Clemenceau felt that "if Polish troops were employed, it would rally the whole of Russia against them," and Foch and Lloyd George agreed.[122] What the statesmen also probably thought, but did not express, was that a strong Poland might attempt to realize her federalist program and weaken and endanger Russia.

Clemenceau answered Paderewski's question by telling him that "he would not make peace nor would he make war." One should wait until "the Bolshevik situation would be clarified." [123] In other words, the Poles were to harass the Bolsheviks and thus help Denikin win a final victory, but under no circumstances should they try to get anything out of it for themselves. The council left unanswered Paderewski's remark that the conference "should not hold him responsible if the territories to be occupied by the Polish Army should declare themselves for Poland." [124] This was no theoretical observation. Some time later Piłsudski expressed a desire to institute plebiscites in the east, in accord with his federalist program, but France vetoed it on the ground that it was up to the Peace Conference to settle the Polish eastern frontiers.[125]

After the Paderewski hearing, the council felt that something ought to

Lithuania from filling the Lithuanian army with Russian officers. Piłsudski, *Pisma zbiorowe*, V, 85.

[121] *FR Peace Conference*, VIII, 218.

[122] *Ibid.*, VIII, 209.

[123] *Ibid.*, VIII, 219–220.

[124] *Ibid.*, VIII, 221.

[125] Tommasini, *Odrodzenie Polski*, pp. 116–117. See also Komarnicki, *Rebirth of the Polish Republic*, p. 455.

be done about the curious state of affairs on the Polish eastern borders. Polish armies were in control of vast territories, yet the conference had not made any pronouncement on the border settlement except for reference in the preamble to the minority treaty signed by Poland and the great powers on June 28, 1919. The preamble referred to the proclamation of the provisional Russian government in March 1917 which had "assented to the re-establishment of an independent Polish state," and to the fact that the Polish state exercised "sovereignty over those portions of the former Russian Empire which are inhabited by a majority of Poles." [126] Paris hence emphasized that it approached the Polish settlement from the Russian standpoint, and the Commission on Polish Affairs accepted this as its guiding principle.

The commission continued its work in the spring and summer of 1919, and in a meeting in May the French member Kammerer expressed the view that Lithuania, despite declarations to the contrary, would not really object to a union with Russia if the latter's government returned to a normal condition. During the discussion of the Polish frontier the commission sought advice from the president of the Russian *Conférence Politique*, Sazonov, who on May 14 suggested that the old administrative boundary between the Congress Kingdom and Russia become the new Polish frontier.[127] On September 25 the commission presented its report to the council, which proposed this very border extended to Chełm as a minimum Polish ethnic frontier.[128]

The report recommended this minimum boundary to end the prevailing "state of uncertainty," and also because it was "impossible to foresee at what date there will come into being the regular Russian Government," whose cooperation was "necessary to the definitive determination of the Eastern frontiers of Poland." The report explained that this frontier should be provisional "to the extent that, in the future, other territory situated to the East of that line may be incorporated with Poland." It was definitive "as regards the territory situated to the West of the same line." [129] This provisional, ethnic, and minimum border had few intrinsic merits, and "both the French and the Americans believed that the final frontier line should be farther to the east." [130] This latter proposal led to some confusion which could perhaps have been avoided if more emphasis were placed on the fact that the report was not "defining the eastern frontiers of Poland" but "according certain territories to Poland." [131]

[126] *FR Peace Conference*, XIII, 792.
[127] Weygand, *Mirages et réalité*, p. 84.
[128] Report No. 6 of Sept. 1, 1919; *FR Peace Conference*, VIII, 370–373.
[129] *Ibid.*, VIII, 372–373.
[130] Temperley, *A History of the Peace Conference*, VI, 275.
[131] *FR Peace Conference*, VIII, 350.

In view of possible misinterpretation the American representative on the council, Frank L. Polk, suggested that Poland be given the choice of either accepting this minimum border without prejudice to a final settlement or leaving the question "entirely open" until the time when "Russia and Poland considered it possible to make a definite settlement." [132] After long discussion the council decided to make a unilateral declaration on December 8, 1919, in which the Allies, desiring to "put a stop to the existing conditions of political uncertainty, in which the Polish nation is placed," and "without prejudging the provisions which must in the future define the eastern frontiers of Poland," declared that they thereby recognized Poland's right "to organize a regular administration of the territories of the former Russian Empire situated to the West of the line described below." Detailed description and a map followed, and the declaration repeated emphatically that "the rights that Poland may be able to establish over the territories situated to the East of the said line are expressly reserved." [133]

The declaration of December 8, 1919, reflected the inability of the Allies to take a stand on the Polish eastern borders — a recognition of uncontested territory hardly advanced the matter — as well as their hesitant and inconsistent policy toward Bolshevism and Russia.

By December 1919 Kolchak and Denikin were both decisively defeated; and Britain and France, after being united for a brief time in their support, were now farther apart than ever. Paris opposed peace with the Bolsheviks [134] and simultaneously refused to extend support to the nationalities, fearing that "any attempt to set up separate states in Russia" would make the Russians claim "that we were trying to dismember Russia." Thus throwing away the trump card of self-determination, which the Bolsheviks had used so skillfully, Clemenceau "proposed to withdraw and watch the result." [135] This amounted to no policy at all, and Lloyd George's idea of making peace with Bolshevism and raising the blockade had at least the merit of logic, even if it meant underestimating the Communist danger. Under these circumstances the London conference between the British and the French in December 1919 could only lead to an agreement to disagree.

Clemenceau covered his lack of a constructive approach by the formula of a "barbed wire fence." This "barbed wire entanglement" was to prevent Russia from "creating trouble outside" and to "stop Germany [from] entering into relations with Russia." [136]

[132] *Ibid.* [133] *Ibid.*, IX, 446–447. The declaration of Dec. 8 was adopted on Dec. 2.

[134] Clemenceau did not want the Baltic countries to make peace with Russia. *FR Peace Conference*, IX, 786.

[135] *DBFP*, 1st series, II, 736. Churchill strongly recommended full support to the nationalities; see *The Aftermath*, p. 265.

[136] *FR Peace Conference*, IX, 848.

Poland received the place of honor in this eastern barrier scheme, and Clemenceau declared that it "would be a great mistake if we did not maintain Poland to dam up the Russian flood and to provide a check on Germany." [137] Since Poland occupied the key position, Clemenceau told the Chamber of Deputies that all efforts must be made so that Poland received satisfaction "within the limits of her just demands." [138] But this stress on the importance of Poland, to which Lloyd George also paid lip service, led to only one concession to Warsaw — suspension of the mandate for Eastern Galicia. Otherwise Poland received no promise that her territorial aspirations in the east would be satisfied, nor was she encouraged to build together with the Baltic states an anti-Bolshevik league.[139] Further, while French and British statesmen generally agreed on the necessity of helping Poland defend her territories, they never determined what constituted Polish territories in the east.

One can say in conclusion that the Allies in setting up the provisional line of December 8, 1919, raised more issues than they resolved. They determined the fate of territories west of the line but not those east of it, and it was in the latter area that need for a settlement was most pressing. At that time Poland occupied militarily regions a hundred miles east of the December line, but no one suggested that the Poles withdraw and let the Bolsheviks take over. Poland was expected to be the main element in the "barbed wire" scheme and to act accordingly, yet the Allies said nothing about Polish rights in these regions.

[137] *Ibid.*, IX, 849.

[138] *Débats*, 1919, Session extraordinaire, 58.

[139] Lloyd George and Clemenceau felt that "this was not a very helpful expedient." *FR Peace Conference*, IX, 849–850.

5

FROM PARIS TO SPA

IN JANUARY 1920 the American ambassador in Paris wrote: "The beginning of the year finds France in a state of perplexity about both home conditions and international relations." [1] And indeed the postwar world offered few reasons for optimism and joy. Economically the French situation was far from satisfactory. The franc continued to decline. If six and one-half French francs bought one dollar in the summer of 1919, fourteen francs equalled a dollar in the spring of 1920; the franc by 1920 had only one fifth of its prewar buying power. Inflation discouraged investment; agricultural production lagged behind that of 1914; new tariff walls and dislocation of trade made the recovery more difficult. The chance of introducing a new spirit of cooperation in the relations between French employers and workers became dim by 1920, and class antagonism revived with strikes and deepened with the important developments within the Socialist party. In December 1920 the Communist party emerged at the Congress of Tours as a powerful force, and it was in 1921 that the trade unions split into Communist and non-Communist factions. Both the Left and the Right in France took more rigid positions, and national unity, largely realized during the war, now belonged to the past. The French did not exhibit the mentality of a victorious nation.[2] Recrimination accompanied the debate over the Treaty of Versailles and the other treaties of the peace settlement.

The treaty with Germany appeared to many Frenchmen as a compromise arrangement, a "mosaic of pieces separately melted and clumsily put together." [3] To the nationalist Right the peace treaty was inadequate, and to use the famous phrase of Jacques Bainville, "it was too soft a peace for all the harshness it contained." [4] The Socialists denounced it as an imperialist settlement and voted against its ratification. They objected to the German-Polish provisions, especially because Ger-

[1] Wallace to Secretary of State, Jan. 2, 1920, *SDNA*, 851.00/160.

[2] See Pierre Renouvin, ed., *Histoire des relations internationales* (7 vols., Paris, 1953–57), VII, 233.

[3] Louis Barthou, *Le Traité de paix* (Paris, 1919), p. 174.

[4] "Une paix trop douce pour ce qu'elle a de dur." Bainville, *Les Consequences politiques de la paix* (Paris, 1920), p. 25.

many, according to them, was now in the democratic camp and had to be retained there. The collapse of Imperial Germany and autocratic Russia changed the traditionally critical attitude of the Socialists to these powers and accounted for their postwar policies.

A powerful blast against the Peace Conference and its work came from England, with the appearance of John Maynard Keynes' *Economic Consequences of the Peace*. Keynes' book exposed to public ridicule the "morass" of Paris and the "debauchery of thought and speech" of the peacemakers, and was intensely critical of the German settlement in the east. His work was translated into eleven languages and sold some 140,000 copies. This was the best proof that such ideas found easy reception. Clemenceau, attacked by both the Right and the Left, wrote dourly that "Perchance our French opponents will have the grace to see that we could not have both 'betrayed' the Allies to the profit of France, as Mr. Keynes says; and France to the profit of the Allies as they themselves allege." [5]

The French peacemakers viewed the Treaty of Versailles as inextricably linked with the American and British guarantees, in exchange for which Paris had given up its demands for security on the Rhine. But in November 1919 the debate in the United States Senate revealed that both the guarantee and the treaty would be repudiated, and when Britain followed suit by withdrawing her guarantee, the French felt isolated, deceived, and deserted. Concessions to the Anglo-Saxon powers appeared to have been made in vain. France began to experience "an early measure of that weariness which was to grow progressively into mortal paralysis." [6]

For the time being, however, a reaction to the Right set in which found its expression in important political changes in the country. The election of November 1919 produced a Right-Center Chamber of Deputies, the famous "chambre bleu horizon," dominated by the National Bloc which ruled French politics until 1924. Clemenceau retired, and Alexandre Millerand formed a new cabinet on January 20, 1920; Millerand also retained the portfolio of foreign affairs. The conservative Maurice Paléologue became secretary general at the Quai d'Orsay, and pushing Berthelot into the background he assumed a leading role in the formulation of French diplomacy. Millerand's cabinet with its strong conservative overtones, supported by business interests which gained representation in the ministry, was expected to deal more firmly with the Communist problem in Europe and exhibit an uncompromising spirit in international affairs. The election of Paul Deschanel to the presidency of the republic on February 18, 1920, was another "proof offered to the world

[5] Clemenceau's introduction to Tardieu, *The Truth about the Treaty*, p. 6.
[6] Etienne Mantoux, *The Carthaginian Peace* (New York, 1952), p. 22.

that France" was "anxious and dissatisfied,"[7] and Deschanel in his inaugural address emphasized the fact that the French desires of November 1918 had not been fully gratified.

To strengthen international security Paris turned toward East Central Europe, which more than ever represented an important area of French interests, and where the peace settlement still awaited completion. During the parliamentary debate on ratification of the Treaty of Versailles several deputies stressed the importance of East Central Europe, and appealed for a more imaginative French policy toward Poland and Czechoslovakia. Franklin-Bouillon declared that these states had an important role to play and ought to become French allies. Criticizing the shortcomings of Quai d'Orsay diplomacy, he recalled that Paris had not been able to resolve the Czechoslovak-Polish conflict, and he asked whether France who had helped to re-create Poland had "assured her security from now on?" Franklin-Bouillon openly said that "By our hesitations, our contradictions, we go on creating difficulties for our friends, which become steadily worse," and he demanded that the government "take up again the traditional policy of France in favor of the small nations of Europe which we have liberated. Let us establish among them a fraternal union for common action. . . ."[8]

There were notable comments during this debate. M. de Gailhard-Baucel voiced his fears of Germany, which was surrounded "by a belt of weak, poor, barely formed states which she could subjugate any day."[9] Emile Bourgeois outlined the problem of France in East Central Europe, and asked the deputies whether "all these young states which she [France] contributed to recall to independence" were "not her natural allies: the Poles, the Czecho-Slovaks, the Yugo-Slavs?"[10] Describing them as a natural bulwark against Germany, Bourgeois assured the Chamber that "We could count on them if they understood that they could count on us."[11] And, he declared,

"Everything must be done to maintain an entente with them. It is up to France to take the initiative whenever necessary, so as to establish agreements with these young democracies and to arrange among them a close union which will increase their forces and will be an essential guarantee of European peace."[12]

Such sentiments appealed to wide sections in France including the business groups, and as Renouvin wrote, "a French 'military protectorate' in Prague or in Warsaw" opened "the way for economic and financial

[7] Military attaché in Paris to Secretary of State, Feb. 29, 1920, *SDNA*, 851.00/181.
[8] *Débats*, 1919, Session ordinaire, 3714.
[9] *Ibid.*, 3644.
[10] Bourgeois, *Versailles*, p. 205.
[11] *Ibid.*, p. 248.
[12] *Ibid.*, p. 254.

expansion in which the great Parisian banks" acted "hand in hand with the great metallurgical enterprises." [13]

Speakers in the French Parliament who emphasized the unsettled state of affairs in East Central Europe were simply drawing attention to realities, however unpleasant those realities might have been. There was much unfinished business in the case of the Polish and even the Czechoslovak settlements. In Paris the drawing of the Polish western borders, apart from emphasizing the French-British rivalry, had left open the questions of Upper Silesia, Allenstein (Olsztyn), and Marienwerder (Kwidzyń), whose fate was to be decided by plebiscites. The French were well aware that new Franco-British difficulties over Poland lay ahead, and many believed that "an irrepressible hostility of England toward Poland" was "one of the constants" of her policy.[14] While the Czechoslovak borders with Germany and Austria had been determined, the treaty with Hungary was not yet signed, and the Quai d'Orsay under its new leadership had many second thoughts about Hungary.

The Teschen question remained the principal obstacle to an alliance or close cooperation between Prague and Warsaw, which France strove to achieve. In that respect the policy of Millerand followed that of Clemenceau and tried to make Poland adjust to Czechoslovakia rather than vice versa. But the greatest and most ominous question was that of the Polish eastern settlement, and its connection with Bolshevism. Here the strongly anti-Bolshevik government of Millerand had to adopt a policy toward the Polish-Russian conflict, which was then nearing its climax. Was its policy any clearer and more consistent than that of Clemenceau?

In the winter months of 1919–1920 Warsaw stood at a crossroad. Exchanges between Piłsudski and Lenin through their respective negotiators, Captain Ignacy Boerner and Dr. Julian Marchlewski, had taken place from October to November 1919, and the Polish statesman had informed Lenin that he had no intention of being "the gendarme of Europe." This meant that Poland would neither support Denikin nor be a tool of intervention and harass the Bolsheviks without any obvious advantages. A period of relative inactivity followed, while Warsaw tried to ascertain the views of France. But while Piłsudski regrouped his armies and consolidated his position in the east, the Allies provided no constructive leadership nor could they agree on a common policy toward Russia.

The London meetings between Clemenceau and Lloyd George in December 1919 had led only to the formulation of the "barbed wire" principle, and the policies which followed had hardly the merit of consistency. The French proposed in the council, early in 1920, to put pressure

[13] *Histoire des relations internationales*, VII, 235.

[14] Saint Aulaire, *Confession*, p. 560.

on Poland to help Denikin,[15] but the council instead raised the blockade of Russia on January 16. This represented a victory for Lloyd George's policy of peace through trade, and did not really affect the French approach to Bolshevism. Three days after the council's decision Foch advocated an entente between Poland, Rumania, the Baltic states, and Finland which if joined by the Transcaucasian countries could surround the Bolsheviks.[16] But his views were not well received, and the Polish plans for a league with the Baltic countries, deprived of Allied support, proved to be a fiasco at the Helsinki conference held in January 1920.

All this activity mystified the Poles. The parties of the Right, traditionally pro-French, wanted to know what was expected of Poland. Those of the Left criticized the French attempts to make Poland a pawn in the hand of "a capitalist intervention." Both groups mentioned peace for which most people yearned in the war-weary country.

Comments in the French press were of little comfort because the French newspapers could not see much sense in the Allied policy. On January 25, 1920, Pertinax wrote in the Rightist *L'Écho de Paris* that the Allies simply had no Russian policy; the royalist *L'Action Française* had expressed the fear on the eighteenth that Poland must feel abandoned by the Allies; *L'Éclair* had asked two days later how Poland could adopt a policy toward Russia if the only Allied policy was one of trade with the Russian cooperatives. And yet it was abundantly clear that Warsaw could not indulge in a wait-and-see attitude and had to end the eastern conflict either by an all-out war or by peace.

Piłsudski had broken off talks with the Soviets in November 1919, but on December 22 the Soviet commissar, Georgi Chicherin, proposed peace negotiations, and the Council of People's Commissars repeated the offer in a declaration on January 28, 1920. The declaration, after stating that "Extreme imperialists among the Allies . . . are at present making every effort to draw Poland into a baseless, senseless, and criminal war with Soviet Russia," announced that the "Red armies will not cross the present line" held by Polish troops.[17] Was this line to be merely an armistice delimitation pending peace talks or did the Soviets view it as a future border between the two countries? Opinions differ, both on this point and on the motives of the Soviet offer.[18] Though one cannot provide an answer as long as Soviet archives are inaccessible, it is likely that Moscow at this point preferred peace negotiations to an all-out war. Such negotiations could isolate and weaken Poland (especially if Paris,

[15] Wallace to Secretary of State, Jan. 8, 1920, *SDNA*, 763.72119/8609.

[16] *DBFP*, 1st series, III, 921–922.

[17] Degras, *Soviet Documents*, I, 179–180.

[18] For a lengthy discussion of this point see Komarnicki, *Rebirth of the Polish Republic*, pp. 545ff.

disapproving them, would stop supplies of arms and munitions), subject the Poles to the full blast of Bolshevik propaganda, and make their country a channel through which Communist ideas would flow into Germany. Should negotiations break down, war would resume under conditions more advantageous to Russia. As Lenin said on March 29, 1920, "each month gives us a gigantic increase of our forces." [19] The final Soviet aim — a revolution in Poland and in Germany — to be attained either through peace talks or war, appears to have been unchanged. It is interesting to note at this point that Trotsky wrote to the French Communists in December 1919 about destroying Poland.[20]

Piłsudski had a choice between war or peace. He was apparently willing to make peace,[21] but on condition that the great powers participate and not leave Poland to a dangerous tête-à-tête with Russia. Should this prove impossible Piłsudski favored a rapid offensive which, profiting from temporary Bolshevik weakness, could reshape once and for all the balance of power in eastern Europe, creating a large federalized bloc between Germany and Russia. Only such a bloc could be an effective barrier between the two powers — a role which Paris had assigned to Poland alone. Piłsudski did not fear an armed conflict, but on the contrary, he believed that a lasting peace could be realized "only after a military victory." [22] Lord D'Abernon expressed later a similar appreciation of the situation when he wrote that "a crushing defeat of the Bolshevik army" was "an indispensable condition to any real peace with the Bolsheviks." [23]

Whether peace or war would be decided upon in Warsaw depended largely on the western powers and especially France. Consequently the Polish government sent only an interim reply to the Soviet peace proposal of January 28, 1920, and reserved its answer until a time when it would be able to consult with the Allies.

The new Polish foreign minister, Stanisław Patek, a lawyer close to Piłsudski, sounded out the western powers in January about cooperation with Poland on the Russian question. Lloyd George advised Patek to make peace, and it was fairly obvious that the British prime minister looked upon the temporary line of December 8, 1919, as the legitimate Polish frontier in the east. Italy opposed peace, and the United States was unwilling to take the responsibility of advising Poland one way or the other.[24]

[19] *Ibid.*, p. 549. [20] Weygand, *Mirages et réalité*, p. 84.

[21] Gibson reported in Feb. that the Poles were prepared to make peace with Russia. *SDNA*, 860c.00/104.

[22] General Tadeusz Kutrzeba, *Wyprawa kijowska 1920 roku* (Warsaw, 1937), p. 74.

[23] Lord D'Abernon, *The Eighteenth Decisive Battle of the World* (London, 1931), p. 73.

[24] See Gibson's dispatches from Warsaw, published in *FR 1920*, III, 370ff, and unpublished in *SDNA*, 760c.61/7–16.

The crucial attitude, however, was that of Paris — the principal Polish ally. The Polish minister in Paris, Count Maurycy Zamoyski, informed Millerand shortly after receiving the Soviet peace offer that "My Government is decided not to pronounce on the merit of the proposal of the government of the Soviets until a prior entente with the governments of the Allied powers." [25] After a talk with Millerand the minister reported to Warsaw that the French premier "warned me strongly not to trust the Soviet words and assured me that in the case of a Bolshevik aggression we could count on full French support." [26]

Millerand used almost the same words in the Chamber of Deputies on February 6, when the deputies of the Left demanded explanations of the French policy of "barbed wire" and criticized Paris for putting pressure on war-weary Poland to continue the struggle in the east. The premier, calling Poland an especially dear ally, stated that "we have notified Poland and Rumania that if either one or the other would be attacked by the Bolshevik armies, they would count on the most complete support of the Allied powers." [27] The reference to other powers was probably meant to stress Allied solidarity, but it did not reflect their attitudes with any accuracy, and the Allied council which met on February 24 spoke only of aid to Poland if attacked within her "legitimate frontiers." The council made it clear that it could not recommend Polish continuation of the war against Russia, still less an all-out offensive. It declared, on the other hand, that the Allies could not establish diplomatic relations with the Bolsheviks which signified exclusion of any possibility of a general peace conference with the Soviets.

The French had warned Piłsudski against the dangers of peace, and together with the other Allies excluded the chance of a general settlement. How did France react to Piłsudski's second alternative, an all-out war? Here there were differences between the government, parties in the Chamber, Foch, and the general staff.

According to a secret American report, Foch believed that "the only guarantee of Polish security and defense, as well as the maintenance of a barrier between Europe and Bolshevism," lay "in the establishment of a new front upon the Dwina-Dnieper line." He also "advised the Polish authorities to insist that the Bolsheviks retire beyond this river line be-

[25] Zamoyski to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Feb. 12, 1920, *AGND*, 21/2574/T2. The above formula dictated by Warsaw was used by all ministers abroad. See the circular to all missions of Feb. 2, 1920, *CD*, "Rosja sowiecka 1919–21."

[26] *Ibid.* Gibson probably referred to this and other similar French statements when he reported that the French had brought pressure on Poland against making peace. See *SDNA*, 860c.00/104.

[27] *Débats*, 1920, Session ordinaire, 106. The Left reiterated its criticism and counseled Poland to make peace some three weeks later. See Louis Barthou's remarks on March 25 and Marcel Cachin's speech on March 26, *ibid.*, 561ff, 574.

fore any negotiations be entered into." [28] If the report were trustworthy Foch then favored Piłsudski's offensive plan, and his ideas on strategy were in perfect agreement with those of the Polish marshal. There is no evidence that Millerand or any members of his government shared this viewpoint.[29] The Quai d'Orsay still thought mainly in terms of Russia one and indivisible, manifested active interest in the last of the White generals, Wrangel, and could hardly show enthusiasm for Piłsudski's plan of breaking up the Russian state.[30] As for the Chamber, at least one of the deputies echoed Piłsudski's ideas. This was M. de Gailhard-Baucel, who on February 6 appealed to the French government to recognize the Ukraine, to "reinforce the actual anti-Bolshevik barrier," and to "push this barrier to the Dnieper." [31] He returned to the same theme on March 27 and demanded that plebiscites be instituted in the eastern borderlands.[32] His voice, however, was a cry in the wilderness, and as for plebiscites Millerand informed Warsaw on March 10 that the Allied council could not permit Poland to hold any, and that her eastern border would be decided upon by the great powers.[33]

News of the stand taken by the Allied council on February 24, which gave no support to either of the Polish alternatives, brought bitter comments even from the Rightist press, and the Socialists spoke openly of the bankruptcy of the pro-French trend in Poland.[34] Piłsudski in a series of interviews accorded to the representatives of the great Parisian papers *L'Écho de Paris* on February 12, *Le Matin* on February 15, and *Le Petit Parisien* on February 28 condemned the French and Allied policy of "zigzags," and urged adoption of a more definite line. "One cannot allow," he said in the *Le Matin* interview, "that fear of Bolshevism should become a pretext for doing nothing." Ripault in *Le Radical* greeted Piłsudski's criticism with approval and suggested that Marshal Foch should go to Poland.[35] But this proposal had no sequel, and Patek's assurances to the representatives of the Polish press that Millerand's government "nourished with regard to Poland the most cordial sentiments" were merely a screen to hide the impossibility of agreement. The Ameri-

[28] Report of Major H. S. Howland, U. S. attaché with the Polish military and diplomatic mission in Paris, Feb. 17, 1920, *SDNA*, 760c.61/29.

[29] General Henrys, who went to Paris in the winter of 1919–20, encountered in government circles great opposition to his ideas which probably reflected those of Piłsudski. See General Henri Mordacq, *Les Légendes de la grande guerre* (Paris, 1935), p. 223.

[30] See Komarnicki, *Rebirth of the Polish Republic*, p. 534.

[31] *Débats*, 1920, Session ordinaire, 109.

[32] *Ibid.*, 593ff.

[33] On the whole question of proposed plebiscites see Tommasini, *Odrodzenie Polski*, pp. 116–117; Komarnicki, *Rebirth of the Polish Republic*, p. 455; *DBFP*, 1st series, III, 788; Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs to legation in Washington, May 24, 1922, *CD*, "Galicja Wschodnia 1922."

[34] *BPPP*, Feb. 19–March 7, 1920, No. 84, p. 5.

[35] Ripault, *Pendant la tourmente*, pp. 157ff.

can minister in Warsaw summed up the situation on March 22 when he wrote that "Poland has been cast adrift politically and must shift for herself."[36] Piłsudski was now determined to go on alone.

2

Warsaw could not ignore completely the Soviet peace offer of January 28, 1920, and the Socialists together with other groups demanded that the Polish government prepare counterproposals. Consequently the foreign affairs committee of the *Sejm* adopted on February 24 a resolution outlining three main principles to serve as guides in dealing with the Russian proposal. First, Bolshevik peace demands could not be rejected outright; second, Russia must renounce the Polish territories annexed during the partitions; and third, frontiers between Poland proper and the Ukraine and Byelorussia (within the borders of 1772) must be drawn in accord with the will of the local population expressed through a plebiscite. This was certainly a big program, and both the Polish Left and Right had certain doubts about it. The National Democrats openly criticized Piłsudski's policy, which they felt would isolate Poland politically — neither Paris nor London had ever approved of the federalist conception. The National Democrats felt furthermore that the policy would create the impression that Poland was pursuing imperialist aims.[37] Fears of the Right were largely justified, and when these general principles were elaborated in a note handed to the Allied ministers in Warsaw on March 13, the reaction was not favorable.[38]

The demand that Russia renounce the territories west of the prepartition borders raised fears of Polish imperialism in Paris, and both Millerand and Paléologue voiced them to Zamoyski.[39] Even if the Poles said that they merely demanded that the Bolsheviks apply in practice their own repudiation of the partition treaties of August 29, 1918, this argument was not likely to impress the French. The Polish liaison officer to Marshal Foch's staff reported to Warsaw that the "attitude of France with regard to our eastern borders is not favorable to us,"[40] and explained it largely by Russian influence in Paris. There is little doubt that

[36] *FR 1920*, III, 382.

[37] *BPPP*, March 8–March 29, 1920, No. 85, pp. 3ff.

[38] A copy of the note sent to the Polish legation in Washington is in *CD*, "Rosja Sowiecka 1919, 1920, 1921." The note was badly phrased, and according to the Italian minister in Warsaw, it was drawn up by Patek without consultation with other members of the cabinet. Its propagandistic value was against the Poles. See Tommasini, *Odrodzenie Polski*, pp. 118–119, 130–131.

[39] Jan Starzewski, *Zarys dziejów polskiej polityki zagranicznej* (London, 1944), p. 68. This work exists only in mimeographed form for private circulation.

[40] Captain Morstin to General Rozwadowski, *Akta Generała Rozwadowskiego*, II/1, Józef Piłsudski Institute of America, New York (hereafter cited as *AR*).

Piłsudski's bold plan to reduce Russia to its ethnic territory, and in a sense undo the work of Peter the Great and Catherine II, was unacceptable to the Russians,[41] and even the representatives of the more radical wing of the emigration, like Boris Savinkov and T. Tchaikovsky, who came to Warsaw in January 1920, could not find a common language with Piłsudski. The British and French cabinets were equally opposed to it, and as for the Ukrainians and Byelorussians, their attitudes will be discussed later in this chapter.

The Polish government informed Chicherin on March 27, 1920, that it was ready to talk with the Bolsheviks. It proposed the little town of Borisov on the front line as an appropriate meeting place, and offered a local cease fire in the area but not a general armistice during the negotiations. A lengthy exchange of notes followed; Chicherin in opposing Borisov suggested several other localities, and demanded also a general instead of a local armistice. The Polish side in turn rejected this proposal.

Did the Poles insist on Borisov and a cease fire because they knew that these were unacceptable conditions and they did not want to make peace? This point has been made,[42] but it could also be said that the Poles distrusted the Bolsheviks and intended those conditions as a test of Soviet intentions. If the main Bolshevik motives for peace negotiations were to prolong them so as to change the military balance, then favorable to the Poles; to carry on intense Communist propaganda; and to go on with a military build-up with which the Poles (bound by the armistice) could not interfere — then the seat of the conference and a general armistice would be of primary importance. If the Soviet desire for peace overshadowed other considerations, then the Polish conditions would have been of far less significance.[43] Neither side wishing to compromise, a deadlock was reached on April 8, 1920, and the Polish-Soviet exchange of notes came to an end.

Piłsudski now put his military plans against Soviet Russia into operation. He knew that he had to strike quickly "in order to forestall the Soviet offensive."[44] News of the concentration of Bolshevik troops had reached the Polish general staff, and "they must have been blind in Warsaw not to understand that a large scale [Russian] offensive was under way sooner or later."[45]

[41] See the memorandum prepared by the Russian *émigré* centers opposing dismemberment of Russia and transmitted to the State Department from Paris on June 21, 1920, *SDNA*, 760c.60e/16.

[42] Among others by Fischer, *The Soviets in World Affairs*, I, 243.

[43] Compare Tommasini, *Odrodzenie Polski*, pp. 118–119; Komarnicki, *Rebirth of the Polish Republic*, pp. 568ff.

[44] *Grazhdanskaya voyna* (an official Soviet history), III, 318, quoted by Komarnicki, *Rebirth of the Polish Republic*, p. 560. Weygand called Piłsudski's campaign a "preventive offensive." *Mirages et réalité*, p. 85.

[45] General Fouville in *La France Militaire*, May 12, 1920. For similar views see Church-

Polish military preparations went hand in hand with political activities. By virtue of an agreement with a Byelorussian group a small Byelorussian unit led by General Bulak-Bulakhovich joined the Polish forces against the Bolsheviks.[46] Negotiations with the Ukrainian leader Semon Petliura, who had been forced out of Kiev, led to the signing of a political treaty on April 21, followed five days later by a military convention. The treaty recognized an independent Ukraine within the 1772 border, without Eastern Galicia which Petliura renounced. The Polish army was to evacuate the Ukraine after the end of hostilities. While the pact raised strong objections on the Ukrainian side and some opposition in Poland, it is unfair to view it merely as a screen for Polish imperialism.[47] It represented Piłsudski's policy of opposing the pro-Polish Ukraine of Petliura against the Soviet-dominated Ukraine of the Bulgarian-born Communist Khristian Rakovsky.

The Polish army, assisted by Petliura's Ukrainian divisions, began an offensive on April 26, and proclamations by Piłsudski and Petliura were read to the Ukrainian people. The Polish and Ukrainian troops entered Kiev on May 8 and were "received with the greatest enthusiasm by the population." [48] Piłsudski's great plan was working so far, and the shape of things in eastern Europe was changing rapidly.

How did France view the Polish offensive and its early successes? Lenin commented on the Polish campaign by saying that "evidently the influence of the imperialists in France prevailed within the Polish Government," [49] and the Left in France and all over Europe echoed this accusation. Chamberlin wrote that France "probably made no effort to restrain" the Poles,[50] but the French were not enthusiastic over the Piłsudski-Petliura pact, and the French minister in Warsaw stressed the fact that Paris did not trust the Ukrainian leader.[51] France had ended her contacts with Petliura by recalling her military mission from his headquarters in August 1919, as a result of the clash between the French-

ill, *The Aftermath*, pp. 275ff; Curzon's speech in the House of Lords on July 22; Seeckt and Ironside cited in Komarnicki, *Rebirth of the Polish Republic*, pp. 516, 553ff; and Tommasini, *Odrodzenie Polski*, p. 131.

[46] For a discussion from the Byelorussian point of view see Nicholas P. Vakar, *Belorussia: The Making of a Nation* (Cambridge, Mass., 1956), pp. 109ff.

[47] For the Ukrainian position see Reshetar, *The Ukrainian Revolution*, pp. 229ff; for the Polish viewpoint see Komarnicki, *Rebirth of the Polish Republic*, pp. 567ff.

[48] According to the correspondent of the London *Times*, May 13, 1920.

[49] Lenin on April 29, 1920, quoted in Komarnicki, *Rebirth of the Polish Republic*, p. 587.

[50] William H. Chamberlin, *History of the Russian Revolution 1917–1921* (2 vols., London, 1935), II, 316. He also rightly points out that if Piłsudski had been "a mere puppet" of France he would have launched his drive in 1919 to save Denikin.

[51] Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs in circular of May 5, 1920, *AGND*, 24/3708/T2. Compare with Kutrzeba, *Wyprawa kijowska*, p. 314, and M. K. Dziewanowski, "Pilsudski's Federal Policy, 1919–1921," *Journal of Central European Affairs*, X (1950), 128.

supported Denikin and the Ukrainians, and she continued to assist Denikin's successor Wrangel which of course precluded collaboration with Petliura.

French reaction to the Polish offensive comes out clearly in the dispatches of the American envoys in Paris and Warsaw to the State Department in Washington. According to the American chargé d'affaires in Warsaw, the Polish minister formally denied that the French had "in any way pledged themselves to give support in connection with the recent Polish advance." Paris still favored the policy of a "barbed wire" barrier, and the Poles had told Millerand that since Paris had declined to take a determined stand, Warsaw would "follow a Polish policy." The American diplomat reported that the Polish government had not kept the French *au courant*, and he expressed serious doubts about the rumors circulating of sinister French designs on Odessa and the Ukraine.[52] His colleague from Paris wrote that he did not believe that France was "formally committed to assist Poland if the military situation in the Ukraine should become adverse." He thought, however, that the offensive had been encouraged by certain French circles, and he reported that according to reliable information the Polish plan had been "laid before Marshal Foch and approved by him." [53]

It seemed, so Hugh Gibson wrote, that there was "a considerable difference of opinion among the French themselves, especially between the government and the army. He added that the head of the French military mission in Poland, General Paul Henrys, while "officially disapproving this operation" in fact "actively encouraged it." [54]

This last point deserves a more careful examination. It is true that Henrys and the large French military mission [55] he led cooperated actively during the offensive, and Henrys at one point suggested that Piłsudski invite high-ranking officers from Paris with General Noël Castelnau at their head to see conditions in the Ukraine.[56] On the other hand, Henrys, who had been in Poland since the spring of 1919 in accord with a resolution of the Supreme Council,[57] was far from being the real

[52] White to Secretary of State, June 3, 1920, *SDNA*, 760c.60e/12.

[53] Harrison to Secretary of State, June 10, 1920, *SDNA*, 760c.60e/14.

[54] Gibson to Secretary of State, Dec. 1, 1921, *SDNA*, 860c.00/104. Tommasini expressed a similar opinion in *Odrodzenie Polski*, p. 132, A. L. Kennedy felt that the French generally encouraged the Polish offensive; *Old Diplomacy and New: 1876–1922* (London, 1922), p. 331.

[55] According to an American report it included nine generals, twenty-nine colonels and lieutenant colonels, sixty-three majors, one hundred and ninety-six captains, and four hundred and thirty-five lieutenants, *SDNA*, 851.00/223.

[56] Sosnkowski to Piłsudski, May 12, 1920, *AGND*, 8/3698.

[57] The resolution asked the Polish government "to accept General Henrys as military adviser and Chief of the Staff to the President and Commander-in-Chief of the Polish Republic to organize the Polish forces in Poland." *FR Peace Conference*, IV, 316.

commander of the Polish army as Clemenceau imagined.[58] On the contrary, Henrys was strongly under the influence of the Polish marshal. Lord D'Abernon called him a "devotee" of Piłsudski,[59] and the marshal praised him as a loyal soldier and collaborator.[60] Thus it is more likely that Henrys followed Piłsudski's lead, rather than the other way around. Paris was a little alarmed about it and ordered Henrys to return with all his officers to Warsaw.[61] The order was not revoked until July.

News of the Polish successes was received favorably in Paris. Patek on a visit to France reported to the Polish premier on April 28 that news from the front and even "the news about the treaty with the Ukraine are received sympathetically in [French] government circles."[62] The Polish minister in Paris commented that people in the French government and especially the military "do not hide their satisfaction."[63] The new French minister in Warsaw, Hector de Panafieu, congratulated the Polish minister of war, General Kazimierz Sosnkowski, on the Polish victories in the Ukraine, and brought up some economic questions connected with them. Panafieu considered that it lay in the interests of both Poland and France that "Poland should extend an economic protection over Russia and become in a sense an agent of French [economic] penetration into Russia."[64] Paris was showing unmistakable signs of wanting a share in the Polish victories, and began to emphasize that subsequent deliveries of arms and munitions to Poland would have to be paid for by trade concessions.[65]

Thus French reactions were not uniform. The government, which had not encouraged the Polish offensive, was sympathetic and interested in economic advantages, but hardly willing to commit itself to the support of Poland. Millerand, for instance, counseled prudence to the Poles on May 25, and complained later that they did not listen to him.[66] The army which had apparently cooperated more closely with the Poles showed its satisfaction, and *La France Militaire* published an enthusiastic account of the capture of Kiev and called Piłsudski "this admirable man." The political parties differed in their appraisal of the Polish campaign. The Socialists opposed it strongly, and some papers of the Right

[58] See Clemenceau's remarks in the Council on Sept. 15, 1919, *ibid.*, VIII, 220.

[59] *The Eighteenth Battle*, p. 40; compare Weygand, *Mirages et réalité*, pp. 102ff.

[60] Piłsudski, *Pisma zbiorowe*, VII, 152; Baranowski, *Rozmowy z Piłsudskim*, p. 143.

[61] Mordacq, *Légendes*, p. 224.

[62] Excerpts from the letter of April 28, 1920, *AGND*, 24/3708/T2.

[63] Cited in a circular of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, May 5, 1920, *AGND*, 24/3708/T2.

[64] Circular of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, May 5, 1920, *AGND*, 24/3708/T2. Compare Sosnkowski to Piłsudski, May 3, 1920, *AGND*, 8/3697.

[65] France particularly wanted wood, coal, oil, corn, and sugar. Sosnkowski to Piłsudski, May 12, 1920, *AGND*, 8/3698.

[66] *DBFP*, 1st series, VIII, 504.

criticized the Poles, who instead of working for Russia one and indivisible were following a policy which could be justified by neither Ukrainian aspirations nor Polish territorial ambitions.[67] This trend reflected the French annoyance with the Polish lack of cooperation with Wrangel, who had been the last symbol of the great Russia.

3

The Czechoslovak attitude toward Poland in the winter and early spring of 1920 was conditioned largely by the situation in Teschen and by the vicissitudes of the Russian-Polish crisis. The situation in Teschen was undoubtedly tense. On February 3 the plebiscite commission presided over by Count Gustave de Manneville and composed of new people replaced the old Allied commission which had antagonized the Czechs by its recommendation on the division of Teschen.[68] The new body included among its members J. E. Pichon, at that time professor at Prague, and Captain Flipo, the editor of *La République Tchéco-Slovaque*. It had thus a pro-Czech tinge, and possessing neither sufficient troops nor administrators, it left the Czechoslovak police and administration in a position of control.[69]

Prague having won the plebiscite decision displayed confidence, and Beneš stressed in November 1919 that "the Poles are in such a situation that they need peaceful relations with us far more than we do." [70] When acts of violence in Teschen and rumors about a new Czechoslovak-Polish clash alarmed Warsaw,[71] the Polish envoy in Prague approached General Pellé, who assured him in his double capacity as a French general and the commander-in-chief of the Czechoslovak army that Prague had neither wanted nor prepared a war against Poland.[72] Pellé, however, voiced his objections to the tone of the Polish press with regard to Czechoslovakia.

The Poles were certainly bitter and excited about Teschen, as both the press and a number of debates in the Polish *Sejm* indicated. The *Sejm* passed a resolution on February 18, 1920, calling on the ministry "to draw the attention of the French government to the anxiety of the Polish people," [73] and Foreign Minister Patek, stressing the importance

[67] The Rightist *La Victoire*, May 24; the independent *L'Oeuvre*, May 23.

[68] See above pp. 94–95.

[69] See Sarah Wambaugh, *Plebiscites since the World War with a Collection of Official Documents* (2 vols., Washington, 1931), I, 142ff; Tommasini, *Odrodzenie Polski*, p. 238; Starzewski, *Zarys dziejów*, p. 64; *CD*, "Śląsk Cieszyński 1920, II."

[70] *Problémy nové Evropy*, p. 30.

[71] Polish military reports of Aug. 13, 1919, and Sept. 1, 1919, *AGND*, 18/1361/T2 and 18/1385/T2.

[72] Report of L. Malczewski, Sept. 13, 1919, *AGND*, 20/1637/T2.

[73] *Sprawozdania stenograficzne*, 1920, CXX/55.

of good Franco-Polish relations, said that things would certainly be clarified. Two days later Manneville came to Warsaw to discuss matters with the French minister and Patek, but no *détente* followed. In mid-March the parliaments of Warsaw and Prague waged a verbal duel,[74] and in Teschen itself violence increased and the Polish legation in Prague reported again that there was talk of war.[75]

Beneš talking to the Polish chargé d'affaires regretted that anyone could suspect Prague fomenting unrest in Teschen, and told him that such action would be "base or stupid or even both." [76] He opposed the proposal to send an impartial commission to Teschen to investigate, and suggested instead direct Czechoslovak-Polish talks at the top level as a means of reaching a solution. The Polish diplomat felt that Beneš would be conciliatory, and he remarked that the most violent anti-Polish group in Czechoslovakia was the National Democratic party.

Analyzing the Teschen situation, the Poles admitted privately that Polish tactics of local self-defense were bad and led to confusion,[77] and also that the Polish delegation in Teschen was doing a poor job and was becoming a "laughing stock." [78] Moreover, a change in the delegation did not help, since General Latinik was not much of an improvement on Jan Zamorski.

In May 1920 the situation became worse, and reports from Teschen dwelt on clashes and riots.[79] In mid-May the former Polish delegate Zamorski publicly accused Manneville of being partial to the Czechs and demanded that Paris be asked whether it approved of his activities in Teschen.[80] This accusation was a grave affair because Zamorski had always been pro-French and had stayed with Dmowski in Paris during the war. Manneville confessed that he was at a loss to understand the Polish antagonism to the plebiscite commission, but while criticizing "Polish methods of intimidation," the French diplomat admitted "that the Czech methods of terrorizing, if less elemental, were more cold-blooded and effective." Manneville denied that France was working for the Czechs, and asserted that Paris had "already lost all interest in this area." [81] This last was highly inaccurate because at that time French industrial circles were obtaining important concessions in Teschen.

[74] *Těsnopisecké zprávy*, 1920, IV, 38883ff; *Sprawozdania stenograficzne*, 1920, CXXXI/47ff.

[75] Malczewski's report of March 25 and Wysocki's of March 26, 1920, *CD*, "Śląsk Cieszyński 1920, II."

[76] Malczewski's report, *ibid.*

[77] Günther to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, March 16, 1920, *AGND*, 50/5812.

[78] Pusłowski to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Feb. 23, 1920, *ibid.*, 48/2707.

[79] White to Secretary of State, May 5, and Gray to Secretary of State, May 28, 1920, *SDNA*, 760c.60f/4 and 760c.60f/5.

[80] *Sprawozdania stenograficzne*, 1920, CXLIX/52ff.

[81] White to Secretary of State, May 4, 1920, *SDNA*, 760c.60f/4.

The huge French concern of Schneider-Creusot, which had an important position in the Czech Škoda works, became interested in the metallurgical works in Třinec (in Teschen), particularly the Berg und-Hüttengesellschaft. Apparently acting through Manneville, the Creusot enterprise acquired 60 per cent of the shares in the Třinec works and some rights in a coal mine near Karvina. Alleged Polish plans for a forced loan which would have affected all foreign investors in Teschen worked against Poland and strengthened the Czechoslovak case.[82] Thus the French had now a vested interest in Teschen in addition to the previously existing political reasons in favor of Czechoslovak control of the industrial area.[83]

Increasing chaos in Teschen in late May and June made the plebiscite commission report to Paris its serious doubts whether it was possible to hold an orderly plebiscite.[84] Impartial arbitration suggested by Piltz and proposed by France seemed the only way out, and Beneš indicated his willingness to accept it. The Polish government, worried by the first defeats on the Russian front, in the throes of a cabinet crisis, and realizing its mistakes in Teschen, agreed to an arbitration presumably by King Albert of Belgium.

The decision to abandon the plebiscite indicated that Warsaw had lost its nerve, and constituted a serious mistake.[85] Prague now had the initiative, and the Czechoslovak parliamentary foreign affairs committee, believing that Teschen could be won by a plebiscite, refused to uphold Beneš. Thus the Beneš-Patek agreement of June 15 on arbitration fell through, and a deadlock ensued. To appreciate fully the subsequent evolution of the Teschen problem one needs to treat it jointly with the larger issue—the Polish military collapse on the eastern front.

The Polish-Russian crisis ran parallel to developments in Teschen, and the Czechoslovak policy toward the Bolshevik problem deserves careful examination. The strained relations between the Czechoslovaks and the Bolsheviks relaxed somewhat in the winter of 1919–1920. In February 1920 the Czechoslovak troops in Siberia concluded the Treaty of Kujtun with the Soviets and prepared for an evacuation. Kramář's interventionist policies, which led him to visit Denikin in the autumn of

[82] Zbigniew Landau, "Gospodarcze i polityczne tło kredytów francuskich," *Sprawy Międzynarodowe*, VII–VIII (1959), *passim*.

[83] On the whole operation see the brief references in Kasprzak, *Stosunek Czech do Polski*, p. 66; Soják, *O zahraniční politice*, p. 72; *Akta i dokumenty*, IV, 34; Tadeusz Reger's speech in the *Sejm*, *Sprawozdania stenograficzne*, 1920, CLXXVII/62; *Głos Narodu*, Aug. 5, 1920; and more extensive remarks in W. S. Howell's reports to Secretary of State, July 25 and 29, 1921, *SDNA*, 860f.51/99 and 860f51/101; and the Polish report of the 2nd bureau of the general staff, *AGND*, 52/7151.

[84] Report to the Conference of Ambassadors, July 5, 1920, *Recueil*, IV, 272ff.

[85] Compare Tommasini, *Odrodzenie Polski*, p. 239; Starzewski, *Zarys dziejów*, p. 65; and Piltz on Sept. 5, 1921, *CD*, "Czechosłowacja."

1919, lost ground in Prague because of defeats of the Whites and also because Kramář's cabinet fell in the summer. Czechoslovak elections in 1920 reduced the National Democratic vote to 9 per cent and gave 40 per cent to the Social Democrats. The weak coalition cabinet of the Social Democrat Tusar was clearly oriented to the Left, and radical trends in Czechoslovakia received a fresh impetus with the return of the troops from Siberia, many of which showed strong pro-Communist leanings.[86] While at opposite political poles, Czech Nationalists and Socialists shared one thing in common, namely, a basic friendliness toward Russia, and an American observer exaggerated only a little when he wrote in early 1920 that "Czecho-Slovakia looks, not toward the League of Nations, but to Russia for her safety." [87]

Chicherin proposed establishment of official diplomatic relations between Moscow and Prague on February 25, 1920, and Beneš had to maneuver skillfully between political pressure put on him by the Czechoslovak Socialists, who clamored for recognition of Soviet Russia, and French diplomacy, which pursued opposite aims.[88] He certainly did not wish to antagonize either France, the principal Czechoslovak ally, or Russia, which was important politically and economically for Czechoslovakia. Besides, Masaryk and Beneš believed that Bolshevism was there to stay and that in the long run it would shed its more extreme forms and democratize itself.[89] Beneš bid for time, but told the American minister in March 1920 that a commission would shortly be sent to Russia to "investigate conditions with the aim of resuming normal relations." [90]

At the time when the government in Prague thought in terms of achieving normal relations with Bolshevik Russia, Piłsudski began his offensive in the Ukraine. Prague was dismayed and with small exceptions adopted an openly anti-Polish stand. Beneš in talking to the Polish representative in Prague "deeply regretted the outbreak of a new war, which made peace action in Central and Eastern Europe impossible." He emphatically said that Prague "would never recognize a Ukrainian state, which sooner or later would become a mainstay of German influence." [91] The National Socialist *České Slovo* hinted that the Poles must have secretly obtained Odessa from Petliura, and Kramář's *Národní Listy* wrote on April 20 that the Czechs were "vitally interested in a joint frontier with the territory of the former Russian State enlarged by

[86] Reports of the Polish legation from Prague, June 7 and Sept. 9, 1920, *CD*, "Czechosłowacko-polskie stosunki, 1920."

[87] DuBois's memorandum for the State Department, Feb. 12, 1920, *SDNA*, 860f.00/73.

[88] See Peroutka, *Budování státu*, III, 1675ff.

[89] See Masaryk, *Sur le Bolchévisme* (Geneva, 1921).

[90] Crane to Secretary of State, March 12, 1920, *SDNA*, 760f.61/1.

[91] Political survey of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, May 24, 1920, *CD*, "Czechosłowacko-polskie stosunki, 1920."

Eastern Galicia." Kramář felt that the "Poles had become the most dangerous element for European peace." [92]

The Czechoslovak foreign minister repeated his misgivings about the Ukrainian venture to the American minister and expressed disbelief in French support for Poland.[93] The policies of Prague and Warsaw hence were miles apart, and this fact together with the Teschen situation created an inflammable state of affairs. Other issues added to the difficulties. The Poles were worried by the existence on Czechoslovak soil of a Ukrainian brigade from Eastern Galicia,[94] and the Czechs uneasily watched Hungarian machinations in Slovakia and their repercussions in Warsaw. The Hungarians in fact were preparing a large scheme to undermine the territorial settlement, and tried to enlist Polish support for it. Warsaw was approached with offers of military help against the Bolsheviks which would have involved passage of Hungarian troops through Czechoslovakia, and Budapest unfolded plans for a revolution in Slovakia and Subcarpathian Ukraine. The Polish side was noncommittal, unwilling to go beyond a secret "friendly neutrality." [95] It is hardly surprising that Prague refused to let Hungary help Poland, although such refusal augmented Polish antagonism to the Czechs. While Polish victories in the Ukraine made an impression in Prague, the timing of Beneš's reply to Chicherin in which he wished Russia "a beneficent peace in the shortest possible time" [96] made the Poles feel that Prague sided with Russia against Poland. New developments in Czechoslovakia seemed to confirm this feeling.

By the convention of March 26, 1919, Czechoslovakia was bound to allow transportation of arms and munitions to Poland. With the tension of Teschen reaching a crucial point, and with the mounting antagonism of the Czechoslovak Left to the "capitalist" invasion of the Ukraine, strikes on the railroads began to paralyze communication with Poland. All transport of war material came to a halt on the line going through Teschen, and General Pellé after investigating the situation informed Beneš that "no power on earth can make the trains go." [97] Since the bulk of French supplies bound for Poland had to pass through Czechoslovakia, the situation was serious, and the first Polish reverses in the Ukraine made it more so.

[92] Peroutka, *Budování státu*, III, 1871.

[93] Crane to Secretary of State, May 17, 1920, *SDNA*, 760c.60f/2.

[94] See Beneš's letter to the Polish minister in Prague of April 19, 1920, and the report of the 2nd bureau of the Polish general staff of May 15, *AGND*, 22/3298/T2.

[95] Sosnkowski to Piłsudski, May 12, 1920, *AGND*, 8/3698.

[96] The note of May 9, 1920, is cited in Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs to legation in Washington, May 24, 1920. *CD*, "Czechosłowacko-polskie stosunki."

[97] Pellé to Beneš, May 22, 1920. Cited in Soják, *O zahraniční politice*, p. 68, from Archiv Min. Zahr. Věci, Pařížský Archiv.

Beneš's position was uncomfortable. Having to take into account the violently anti-Polish feeling in Czechoslovakia — the Socialist *Právo Lidu* threatened that a Polish-Magyar bloc would be countered with a Czechoslovak-Russian-German alliance, and warned France not to underestimate Teschen — he hesitated to put pressure on the workers. When the American minister in Prague was instructed to remonstrate with Beneš, the Czechoslovak foreign minister alleged that attacks made in the Polish Parliament against Czechoslovakia, together with threats of war, did not permit Prague to coerce the trade unions.[98] It is probable that the difficulties were not insurmountable and that transports could have been sent through Slovakia, as they were later. But at this stage Poland's dependence on Czechoslovakia could be exploited to the full, and the question of transit could become a trump card to force Polish concessions in the matter of Teschen.[99]

4

Early in June 1920 the military situation in the Ukraine began to change to Poland's disadvantage. The cavalry corps of Semen Budenny broke through the Polish lines on June 5; five days later the Poles evacuated Kiev; and in early July the Red armies began an all-out offensive along the entire front. Simultaneously a cabinet crisis in Poland led to the fall of the Skulski ministry on June 9, and party strife and intrigues allowed the formation of a new government by Władysław Grabski only on June 23. The plans for organization of a Peasant-Socialist government failed largely because of opposition by the Right, upheld by the French who distrusted the Socialist leader Daszyński.[100] The new minister of foreign affairs was Prince Eustachy Sapieha, a nonparty man without strong support either on the Right or on the Left.

Under these conditions the Polish delegation that went to the Allied conference at Spa (called primarily to deal with German reparations) was not likely to negotiate with strength. General Tadeusz Rozwadowski had written to Warsaw on June 15 that the "fall of Kiev made a great impression [in Paris], undermined our international position, and will delay agreement with the Czechs and influence unfavorably the [Conference of] Spa."[101] The delegates coming to Spa early in July found out immediately that to raise the question of assistance to Poland would bring into the open political problems connected with Polish borders. On

[98] See *FR 1920*, I, 43ff; also Crane to Secretary of State, June 15, 1920, *SDNA*, 760c.60f/14.

[99] Compare Soják, *O zahraniční politice*, pp. 69ff.

[100] Tommasini wrote that Panafieu made a *démarche* in that connection. *Odrodzenie Polski*, p. 28.

[101] Rozwadowski's telegram of June 15, 1920, *AGND*, 24/3795/T2.

July 6 the head of the Polish delegation, Patek, spoke to Lloyd George, who in answer made only rude remarks about Polish imperialism and political inability.[102] The beginning was not encouraging, to say the least.

Foreign Minister Sapieha on the same day addressed an appeal to the president of the conference, stating that Poland was prepared to sign a peace with the Bolsheviks on reasonable terms, and asking for Allied help and support. The letter was calm and dignified.[103] The premier, Grabski, must have judged this written appeal insufficient, because shortly afterward, acting apparently against the advice of Piłsudski, he left suddenly for Spa. His task there promised to be hard and thankless. Millerand, Lloyd George, and Foch discussed the Polish situation before meeting with Grabski. Lloyd George forced Millerand to confess that no French troops could be sent to Poland, and that if the Allies allowed the Bolsheviks to crush the Poles "they would be eternally dishonoured." [104] The French clearly had no definite plan of action. General Rozwadowski summarized their attitude well when he wrote earlier that Foch was "very discouraged" and that the French politicians lacked determination.[105] All they did on July 8 was vent their spleen on the Poles, and Foch spoke with contempt of Grabski as a political figure. Rozwadowski, who was probably in constant touch with the French military, reported that there were possibilities of Allied technical assistance but none of military intervention, and that one had to expect "tough political conditions." [106]

Grabski met with the French and British leaders on July 9. He told the Allied statesmen that Poland was in a critical position largely because of her own doing, that she no longer contemplated any eastern plans, and that she would be willing to alter her policy toward her neighbors and wanted peace with the Bolsheviks. Grabski criticized Piłsudski but explained that he would have to remain in office because the main thing was to preserve national unity, and in fact Poland would shortly have a ministry fully representative of the national union. The premier asked the great powers "to help Poland to make peace," and emphasized the need for the "moral support of the Allies." [107]

Foch remarked that the military situation was serious but not desperate, to which Lloyd George objected by saying that Warsaw should not

[102] *DBFP*, 1st series, VIII, 441–443.

[103] The Polish text is in *CD*, "Liga Narodów"; the English translation is in *DBFP*, 1st series, VIII, 505–506.

[104] *DBFP*, 1st series, VIII, 490. Based on Lloyd George's own notes.

[105] Report on June 6, 1920, *AR*, II/2.

[106] July 8, 1920, *ibid.*

[107] *DBFP*, 1st series, VIII, 503. The following account is based on the British minutes of the Spa Conference and on notes taken by Weygand and included in *Mirages et réalité*, pp. 89ff.

hope for a turning of the tide. The British prime minister then launched a tirade accusing Poland of imperialism, of seizure of Lithuanian territory and of areas inhabited by twenty to thirty million Russians! Britain could only help the Poles if they agreed to purely ethnic borders and submitted controversial matters to Allied decision. Grabski expressed agreement, mentioning that he had been authorized to accept such conditions. He also referred to Sapieha's telegram of July 6, although this document certainly did not go that far. All that Millerand found to say was that the French government "entirely associated itself with the British view." [108]

Grabski confided later to an American diplomat that he was much disappointed that "neither France nor Italy had raised their voices in Poland's behalf." [109] This was the result of several factors. Since the fall of Kiev, Paris had been reserved toward the Poles.[110] The political aspects of the Polish venture in the Ukraine had always worried France, and the new turn of the situation dictated prudence.[111] Millerand was also determined not to deal with the Bolsheviks, which precluded any French mediation between Poland and Russia and gave a free hand to Lloyd George. Finally Paris was unwilling to antagonize Britain when the issue of German reparations and disarmament hung in the balance, and Middle Eastern questions provided enough food for disagreement.[112]

Lloyd George was then free to take the initiative in the Polish situation. On July 10, 1920, he proposed an agreement which Grabski would have to sign and which contained the following points: Polish withdrawal to the line of December 8, 1919; a peace conference in London bringing together Russia, Poland, the Baltic countries, and representatives of Eastern Galicia; a promise to submit the questions of Wilno, Teschen, Eastern Galicia, and Danzig to Allied decision. The French were not entirely happy with this proposal. Millerand questioned the idea of a conference which ran counter to the French policy of no peace and no relations with the Bolsheviks. He wanted to help Poland but his problem was how to "reconcile the conflicting interests of saving Poland and guaranteeing French interests" with regard to Russia.[113] Berthelot stressed that the line of December 1919 "was a minimum line, hence it should not be treated as though it were a final line." [114] The French knew that Lloyd George viewed the provisional line as the legitimate border

[108] *DBFP*, 1st series, VIII, 506.

[109] White to Secretary of State, July 18, 1920, *SDNA*, 760c.61/161.

[110] Tommasini, *Odrodzenie Polski*, p. 285.

[111] See Carlo Sforza, *Diplomatic Europe Since the Treaty of Versailles* (New Haven, 1928), p. 21; Nicolson, *Curzon*, p. 203; Tommasini, *Odrodzenie Polski*, p. 123.

[112] See B. de Jouvenel, *D'Une guerre à l'autre*, I, 155; Laroche, *Au Quai d'Orsay*, pp. 113–114.

[113] *DBFP*, 1st series, VIII, 515.

[114] *Ibid.*, 516. See Laroche, "La Question de Teschen," p. 22.

for Poland, and they considered that apart from everything else it was bad policy to intimate this to the Bolsheviks. Eventually Millerand agreed with Lloyd George, but he made it clear that France could not be associated with any communications with the Bolsheviks.

The Allied statesmen sent the text of the agreement to Grabski; the Polish premier, browbeaten and isolated, could not withstand their pressure. He questioned the wisdom of abandoning all the territory up to the December 8 line without fighting, made reservations about Wilno, and obtained an assurance from the British that the armistice line in Eastern Galicia would correspond with the line of actual fighting. Since the Allies promised full support to Poland if she accepted these conditions, Grabski inquired whether this also meant some Allied troops if the Russians rejected them, but Lloyd George and Millerand replied with an emphatic no.[115] What full support really implied was not clear and neither Foch nor Wilson knew exactly what it meant.[116] The Bolsheviks later called Lloyd George's bluff, and one must agree with Nicolson that the British premier's threats and promises "both were falsified." [117]

Grabski's remarks about "moral aid" and his criticism of Piłsudski did not help the Polish cause, and made the Allies insist again and again on political changes in Poland before help could be given.[118] Deep-rooted mistrust of Piłsudski certainly played a big role in the Allied reluctance to help Warsaw.

After Grabski signed the agreement, the British were entrusted with sending a note to the Soviet government. The note, dispatched on July 11 and bearing the signature of Lord Curzon (who played no important part in its drafting), has since become known as the Curzon Note. The document introduced a great deal of confusion with regard to the Eastern Galician problem by indicating two different armistice lines in that region. It spoke first about the line of actual hostilities, to which Grabski agreed, and then went on to describe it in such a manner that it appeared identical with the line A proposed in 1919 as the internal boundary between Eastern Galicia and the rest of Poland. This line had not yet been reached anywhere by the Bolsheviks. Whether this confusion resulted simply from a mistake by the drafter of the note,[119] or whether it repre-

[115] Foch thought sending less than 200,000 men would be useless. Harrison to Secretary of State, Aug. 7, 1920, *SDNA*, 760c.61/147. Compare Suarez, *Briand*, V. 358.

[116] Callwell, *Henry Wilson*, II, 251.

[117] *Curzon*, p. 207. Kennedy called them empty phrases; *Old Diplomacy and New*, p. 333. Compare Riddell, *Intimate Diary*, pp. 225ff, and Gordon A. Craig, "The British Foreign Office from Grey to Austen Chamberlain," in G. A. Craig and Felix Gilbert, eds., *The Diplomats: 1919–1939* (Princeton, 1953), pp. 30ff.

[118] See Callwell, *Henry Wilson*, II, 253.

[119] See Witold Sworakowski, "An Error Regarding Eastern Galicia in Curzon's Note to the Soviet Government," *Journal of Central European Affairs*, IV (1944–45), 1–26.

sented a perfidious attempt to reopen the whole Eastern Galician question in accord with British views, will perhaps never be determined.

Chicherin's reply to the Curzon Note amounted to a slap in the face. It stated that "this frontier was drawn up by the Supreme Council under the influence of counter-revolutionary elements . . . and that, for example, in the Kholm [Chełm] district . . . [it] follows the anti-Polish policy of Tsarism and of the imperialist White Russian bourgeoisie." [120] The Soviet commissar stated that Russia was prepared to grant Poland a more favorable border, but she would listen only to direct Polish overtures. The Bolsheviks scored several points with their reply. They stressed that they were more concerned with Poland's welfare than the west; they showed their contempt of Britain and France; and by insisting on direct negotiations they succeeded in isolating Warsaw. Besides, the Red army on July 24 crossed the Curzon Line, calling Lloyd George's promise of assistance to Poland a bluff. The Polish situation began to look really desperate, and to appreciate it fully one must turn to the vain concessions made by Grabski in Spa and to the events in the plebiscite area in East Prussia.

Grabski had agreed to submit the Teschen dispute to the conference for decision, and the French welcomed it eagerly. They had looked upon the dispute as a serious hindrance to sending arms and munitions to Poland, and believed that a settlement in Teschen would remove the main obstacle to a common Czechoslovak-Polish front in East Central Europe, which would strengthen significantly the eastern barrier.

Beneš had carefully prepared the ground. He made part of his journey to Spa with the chairman of the plebiscite commission, Manneville, and told him that the best way to solve the Teschen dispute would be for the powers "to impose a solution on both interested parties." [121] Manneville informed Millerand of this conversation, and added that even if a plebiscite were possible it would probably assign the railroad to Poland and thus bring no satisfaction to Prague. Manneville added that according to Beneš the British were already in agreement on a solution by the big powers, and that when he, Manneville, had told Beneš not to insist on extravagant terms which Warsaw would view as a defeat, the Czechoslovak minister agreed.

The reasons which prompted Beneš to suggest a settlement of Teschen by the Allied conference were fairly obvious. He realized that if the plebiscite — which the Parliament in Prague still insisted upon — took place, its outcome would be risky, and he learned that not only would the territory be divided in accord with the vote but also the coal output. This

[120] Degras, *Soviet Documents*, I, 196.
[121] Laroche, "La Question de Teschen," p. 20.

meant a possible loss of the coal fields of Karvina.[122] Knowing the attitude of France and Britain, Beneš was optimistic about their decision, and he only stood to gain by his eagerness to remove obstacles to Czechoslovak-Polish cooperation. His popularity might suffer temporarily among the nationalists in Prague who would view anything but a gain of the whole duchy as a defeat, but it is certainly a gross exaggeration to say that Beneš was "risking his political future and also affecting the position of President Masaryk." [123] The Czechoslovak foreign minister, if not the nationalists in Prague, knew well enough that the choice lay between territorial losses through a plebiscite and a "compromise" settlement at the conference which would preserve all the important Czech interests.

Beneš did not leave much to chance, and over a dinner table together with Laroche and Sir Eyre Crowe he helped draft the outline of the Allied decision. He knew beforehand what the decision was going to be and also that the Poles had not been consulted.[124] Beneš then approached Grabski, who was preoccupied with the Russian-Polish situation and unaware that the Czechoslovak statesman had already arranged everything. Grabski on July 10 agreed to sign with Beneš an agreement submitting the Teschen question to a decision of the Allies.[125] The Poles were naive enough to hope that "France would turn away from the Czechs," [126] and signed what amounted to a blank check.

The conference decided on the division of Teschen on July 11,[127] and passed its decision to the Conference of Ambassadors to work out the final settlement, which was announced on July 27. The conference allowed the ambassadors no latitude and confidentially instructed them to conform strictly to the proposal of Crowe and Beneš.[128] A day later the document was signed by the great powers, Poland, and Czechoslovakia.[129] According to it Teschen was divided along the Olza river which left the railroad and the Karvina coal basin to Czechoslovakia. The de-

[122] Beneš, *Problémy nové Evropy*, p. 74.

[123] That is what Crane believed. Crane to Secretary of State, July 16, 1920, *SDNA*, 760c.60f/24. It is interesting to add that W. R. Castle of the West European Division in the State Department commented on one of Crane's dispatches saying that "he probably takes as gospel anything that is said to him by the Czechs." Note attached to a telegram of June 7, 1920, *SDNA*, 760c.60f/7.

[124] See details in Laroche, *Au Quai d'Orsay*, pp. 124–126.

[125] Text in *FR 1920*, I, 50.

[126] Foreign Minister Sapieha told that to the Hungarian envoy Csekonics. Francis Deák and Dezsö Ujváry, eds., *Papers and Documents Relating to the Foreign Relations of Hungary: I, 1919–1920* (Budapest, 1939), p. 546 (Hereafter cited as *FRH*).

[127] *DBFP*, 1st series, VIII, 548–551.

[128] Laroche, *Au Quai d'Orsay*, pp. 125–126. The boundary was accepted with its details at Spa. Wallace to Secretary of State, June 19, 1920, *SDNA*, 760c.60f/26.

[129] The full text is in *FR 1920*, I, 62–65.

cision completely satisfied Czech interests,[130] although Beneš found it expedient to declare that it was a sacrifice on the Czech part and a compromise arrangement.[131] Addressing his critics in Prague, Beneš affirmed that the population of the area ceded to Poland included 2000 Czechs out of a total of 143,000 inhabitants so that the sacrifice was not really great.[132] Some 139,000 Poles found themselves under Czech rule.[133]

The decision of Spa, far from bringing a *détente* in Czechoslovak-Polish relations, brought indignation throughout Poland. Paderewski who signed the agreement of July 28 wrote to the president of the Conference of Ambassadors to protest that the ethnic principle which was so vigorously observed with regard to Polish-Russian problems, as in the Curzon Note, was being simultaneously violated in Teschen. The Polish statesman emphasized that "the noble aim" of bringing an era of good feelings between Poland and Czechoslovakia had not been achieved, and that instead "the decision taken by the Conference of Ambassadors has dug an abyss between the two nations." The Polish government, Paderewski declared, would honor its signature, but it could "never convince the [Polish] nation that justice had been done." The letter ended with an ominous note by saying that "the conscience of a nation speaks louder than governments and it lasts longer than they do." [134]

Polish bitterness voiced by all political parties and groups increased because the decision on Teschen came at a most critical moment in Polish history. The general feeling was that the Czechs had taken advantage of Poland in her most difficult hour — the Bolsheviks were in the heart of the country — and as a Polish diplomat wrote later, the Spa decision "would have had a different sequel, and would have inspired different feelings, were it not for the place and time of its birth." [135] Polish anger would possibly have been greater, had the Poles known about the machinations which preceded the decision at Spa. The Americans knew something about them, and voiced anxiety about "arbitrary boundaries" imposed by the great powers.[136] The Quai d'Orsay did its

[130] Already in September 1919 "the representatives from Těšín (Teschen) agreed with Beneš and Kramář that the Olza River represented the limit of Czechoslovakia's vital needs." Vondracek, *Foreign Policy of Czechoslovakia*, p. 154.

[131] *Journal des Débats*, July 30.

[132] Quoted in Vondracek, *Foreign Policy of Czechoslovakia*, p. 159.

[133] The figures of Paderewski are quoted in Wambaugh, *Plebiscites*, I, 160, White gave roughly the same figures; White to Secretary of State, July 31, 1920, *SDNA*, 760c.60f/45.

[134] The full English text is in Permanent Court of International Justice, *Publications: Acts and Documents*, series C, No. 4, 1923, pp. 138–140. *Publications* of the Permanent Court of International Justice will hereafter be cited as *PCIJ*, followed by the appropriate subtitle.

[135] Karol Bader, *Stosunki polsko-czeskie* (Warsaw, 1938), p. 25. For a similar view see R. W. Seton-Watson, *Twenty-five Years of Czechoslovakia* (London, 1943), p. 59, and Vondracek, *Foreign Policy of Czechoslovakia*, p. 152.

[136] Colby to Wallace, July 2, 1920, *FR 1920*, I, 51.

best to convince the Americans that the Grabski-Beneš agreement was a "spontaneous declaration" and that there was nothing arbitrary about the final decision.[137] Uneasiness continued. Even some of the French were not convinced that the solution was equitable. Manneville exclaimed that the most unfavorable plebiscite would have given better borders to Poland,[138] and Bainville, who felt strongly about the Czechs linking the Teschen issue with the problem of arms transit to Poland, wrote that a "good Czechoslovak would burn Europe in order to have Teschen."[139]

The decisions made by the conference at Spa coincided with another event, unhappy for Poland, which took place in East Prussia. Plebiscites in Allenstein (Olsztyn) and Marienwerder (Kwidzyń) were held on July 11, and the vote went heavily against union with Poland. Although a Polish victory at the polls was hardly expected, the size of the anti-Polish vote was disturbing, and Warsaw ascribed it to the general political situation, to British partiality for the Germans, and to the Allied refusal to postpone the plebiscite to a more opportune moment. Paris was depressed, especially in view of the possible repercussions the event might have on Upper Silesia where tension continued and whose fate was also to be solved by a plebiscite. French authorities in Upper Silesia consequently increased their vigilance and paid close attention to conditions in the area.

Such was the situation in mid-July 1920, and Paris watched with anxiety the developments on the eastern front where the advancing Soviet armies cast an ever-lengthening shadow over the future of Poland, East Central Europe, and possibly the whole European continent.

[137] Cambon's statements reported to Washington, *ibid.*, I, 57–58.

[138] Quoted by René Pinon, "Le Délimitation de la frontière polono-tchécoslovaque en Silésie," *Problèmes politiques de la Pologne contemporaine*, Vol. II, *La Silésie polonaise* (Paris, 1932), p. 113.

[139] *La Russie et la barrière de l'est* (Paris, 1937), p. 171.

6

FROM SPA TO RIGA

THE Polish military position deteriorated rapidly throughout July and early August 1920. The Red army penetrated deeply into the country, and on July 12 the Soviets signed a peace agreement with Lithuania, handing over to her Polish-claimed Wilno, Grodno, and Suwałki, which only three months earlier Russia had refused to recognize as Lithuanian territory. Germany proclaimed her neutrality on July 25 and adopted a distinctly unfriendly attitude toward Poland. The leading German military figure, General Hans von Seeckt, felt that even "if for the moment we cannot help Russia to re-establish her old imperial boundary we should not interfere with her doing so," and he viewed Communist westward expansion with apparent equanimity.[1] Lenin said that at "the approach of our army to Warsaw all Germany began to boil up,"[2] and the specter of German-Russian collusion appeared together with that of a Communist revolution in the heart of Europe.

The Bolsheviks called on workers all over Europe to sabotage the war effort of the "capitalist interventionists," and their appeal found a wide echo. The British Labour party was among those most vehement in their attacks against the Poles, and it organized a campaign in favor of the Soviets. Czech and German Socialists in Czechoslovakia proclaimed on August 11 that a Bolshevik victory lay "in the interest of international Socialism."[3] The extreme French Socialist press violently opposed all aid to Poland and asked the trade unions to prevent any shipments of arms to that country. *L'Humanité* published an appeal on August 11, calling for action and glorifying the defeats of the "imperialist, clerical, and feudal Poland, the last mercenary of Franco-British finance and militarism."[4] *La Bataille* and other papers followed suit.

The government of Millerand, supported in its policy by the moderate and Rightist parties in France, was fully aware of the gravity of the situation. Viewing both the ideological and political aspects of the crisis,

[1] Friedrich von Rabenau, *Seeckt. Aus seinem Leben* (Leipzig, 1940), p. 252.

[2] Speech on Sept. 22, 1920, cited in Komarnicki, *Rebirth of the Polish Republic*, p. 639.

[3] Peroutka, *Budování státu*, III, 1869.

[4] Signed by, among others, Oscar Bloch, Paul Faure, Le Troquet, Pierre Renaudel, Romain Roland, Mistral, and Frossard.

Paris knew that a Soviet victory would mean not only a European Communist revolution but a union of Russian and German forces. It was obvious that, as Lenin put it, "in advancing against Poland we were really advancing against the Entente; in destroying the Polish army we were really destroying the Versailles treaty, upon which the entire structure of present international relations rests."[5] Thus, more than the fate of Poland was being decided on the eastern battlefields, and Millerand was aware that the future of western civilization "was at stake on the banks of the Vistula."[6] Paris decided therefore on an all-out effort to redress the situation and assist Poland.

French freedom of action was, however, severely limited. By its absolute refusal to have anything to do with the Bolsheviks, Paris had allowed Lloyd George to seize all the initiative, and British views clashed with the French. Tardieu, who criticized Millerand's policy in East Central Europe and paradoxically glorified that of Clemenceau, was right when he wrote that it was London and not Paris that led "the Russian policy of the Entente."[7]

Lloyd George, while undoubtedly subjected to considerable pressure from the Left, seemed to have believed honestly that the "conquest of Poland" was "a minor matter,"[8] and that the Poles after being cured of their imperialist dreams by military defeats could make peace any time. Had not the Baltic states done it already with some British prodding? If Poland would stop pretending to be a barrier and a French outpost in eastern Europe, she "could continue within its own ethnic borders a harmless, peaceful existence"— so wrote the *New Statesman* on July 31. And a good part of the British public agreed. Since Russia had rejected the Curzon Note and indicated willingness to listen to direct Polish approaches, London encouraged Warsaw to seize this opportunity. Consequently the Polish government on July 22 expressed its desire to begin armistice negotiations.

Soviet Russia was in no hurry to negotiate in earnest, and under one pretext or another delayed the talks. The seat of armistice negotiations shifted from Baranowicze to Minsk, and the Russians made their peace terms known to England only on August 11, and seven days later to the Poles. The aims of the Soviets were perfectly clear in late July, except to those who closed their eyes to reality. A group of Polish Communists in Russia, led by Feliks Dzierżynski, Feliks Kon, and Julian Marchlewski, established on July 31 a Provisional Revolutionary Committee of Po-

[5] Quoted in Xenia J. Eudin and Harold H. Fisher, *Soviet Russia and the West, 1920–1927: A Documentary Survey* (Stanford, 1957), p. 61.

[6] Millerand, "Au secours de la Pologne," *Revue de France*, 12e année, IV (1932), 578.

[7] *L'Illustration*, Aug. 14, 1920. The article was part of a series of five.

[8] Riddell, *Intimate Diary*, pp. 229ff.

land, and declared in its manifesto that "a lasting peace" was "possible only between Socialist Russia and a Socialist Poland of workers' soviets." The committee promised establishment of "a Soviet Socialist Republic of Poland," [9] showing thereby the true objectives of Moscow.

Under these conditions what could France do to assist Poland? Divergences with London, and hesitations in Paris, were not conducive to a large-scale political offensive. There remained the practical and burning issue of keeping up Polish resistance by sending supplies of arms and munitions. But even here difficulties existed, connected partly with previous French policies, partly with attitudes displayed by England and Czechoslovakia.

During the Polish advance on Kiev, Paris had made trouble over delivery of war material to Poland and presented stiff conditions of payment. General Sosnkowski had complained about it in June 1920, asking what Poland ought to do "if in such a critical moment her faithful Friend and Ally does not stand by her side, and does not help her to break through the encirclement." [10] After the Soviet offensive assumed threatening proportions, French policy changed. Foch telegraphed General Henrys that the "French government authorizes the French military mission to give all its help to the Polish army in the defense of the Polish soil," [11] and large quantities of arms and munitions were dispatched. The bulk of these supplies unfortunately reached Poland only after the victory of Warsaw, because of obstacles put in their way by other powers.[12] The chief culprits in that respect were, apart from Germany, Britain and Czechoslovakia.

The Free City of Danzig, placed at that time under the authority of a high commissioner of the League of Nations, the British diplomat Sir Reginald Tower, was the principal Polish window to the west, and supplies could be most easily sent through that port. In accordance with the international Danzig convention Sir Reginald's duty was to see that the harbor of Danzig remained open for traffic to Poland, and that war material could be safely unloaded. Faced with the opposition of Danzig workers, Tower made no real effort to overcome it and to keep the lines of communication open. Everything seems to indicate that he did not act on his own but followed instructions from London,[13] and Lloyd

[9] Cited in Eudin and Fisher, *Soviet Russia and the West*, p. 16.

[10] Sosnkowski to Henrys, June 22, 1920, *AGND*, 9/4351.

[11] Foch to Henrys, July 10, 1920, *AR*, I/1.

[12] General Hubert Camon, *La Manoeuvre libératrice du maréchal Pilsudski contre les Bolchéviks* (Paris, 1929), p. 15.

[13] Tower took all his archives to London instead of leaving them to his successor in Danzig. See Tommasini, *Odrodzenie Polski*, p. 196. See also Millerand, "Au secours de la Pologne," pp. 583–584, and a lengthy analysis in Komarnicki, *Rebirth of the Polish Republic*, pp. 651–655.

George admitted that "we had control of the port of Danzig."[14] Appraisal of the Danzig situation by the American minister in Warsaw brings out that point very well. Gibson wrote:

"The whole matter, as usual, rests on the divergence of French and British interests. The British influence is exerted to prevent Poland from receiving war supplies . . . and the French influence is exerted to enable the Polish government to increase and improve its war equipment."[15]

London's policy stood in the way of French assistance to Poland, and Paris did not dare to risk antagonizing London by staging a naval demonstration in Danzig Bay, until after the Polish victory.

While difficulties with England were anticipated in Paris, the attitude of Czechoslovakia came as a surprise to the Quai d'Orsay. The settlement of Teschen imposed at Spa was intended "to keep Poland and Czechoslovakia friendly and united,"[16] but this settlement brought no radical change in Czechoslovak policy toward the Polish-Bolshevik war. The American minister reported from Prague that "it is a mistake to count on active Czech help for Poland,"[17] but even the question of transit was not entirely solved. Warsaw complained that trains with war material did not go through,[18] but the Czechoslovak government insisted that it was doing its best.[19] Even if there was some improvement in August, incidents continued and Paris was worried by what Millerand called the "unexpected, to say the least," Czechoslovak resistance. By telegraph the French premier instructed the chargé d'affaires in Prague to support Polish representations and put pressure on the Czechs.[20]

The attitude of Prague was due partly to the campaign of the Czech Left which favored the Soviets, and partly to a pessimistic appraisal of Polish chances. Masaryk told the American envoy that any "attempt to help Poland would promote Bolshevism in this country,"[21] and when the Franco-British mission en route to Warsaw stopped in Prague, the Czechoslovak president warned it "against organizing any military assistance to the Poles."[22] Masaryk reasoned that such aid would be ineffective militarily and would only undermine the authority of the west in subsequent peace talks with the Soviets. The Poles naturally felt bitter

[14] *DBFP*, 1st series, VIII, 685.

[15] Gibson to Secretary of State, Jan. 31, 1920, *SDNA*, 860c.00/266.

[16] Millerand in the Chamber, *Débats*, 1920, Session ordinaire, 2623.

[17] Crane to Secretary of State, July 31, 1920, *SDNA*, 760c.60f/44.

[18] Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs to legation in Washington, July 27, 1920, *CD*, "Czechosłowacko-polskie stosunki 1920."

[19] Crane to Secretary of State, July 27 and Aug. 11, 1920, *SDNA*, 760c.60f/39 and 760c.61/168. See also a retrospective report of Einstein of Aug. 16, 1922, *SDNA*, 760e.60f/2.

[20] Millerand, "Au secours de la Pologne," p. 583.

[21] Crane to Secretary of State, Aug. 12, 1920, *SDNA*, 760c.61/177.

[22] D'Abernon, *The Eighteenth Battle*, p. 20.

about the Czech attitude[23] and wholeheartedly believed together with D'Abernon that "the Czechs were violently hostile to Poland, and had only one hope, namely that the Soviet would blot them out." [24] The French-sponsored Czechoslovak-Polish barrier against communism failed to materialize, and on August 7, Prague officially announced its neutrality.

In its policy of sustaining the Polish war effort Paris felt that the material help it gave entitled it to intervene in Polish internal politics. A new cabinet of national unity emerged in Warsaw on July 24 after a prolonged ministerial crisis. It was headed by the Peasant leader Witos, and the chief Socialist figure Daszyński assumed its vice presidency. The French Right was nonplussed with the radical coloring of the ministry, and *L'Action Française* wrote that the French had "a perfect right, whatever any one may say, to occupy themselves with Poland's internal affairs. We pay enough for that." [25] On the Polish side the National Democrats, outspokenly critical of Piłsudski's leadership, encouraged French interference by openly clamoring for a French military command in Poland.[26] The government in Warsaw and the Polish general staff naturally resented these attempts at interference, and the arrival of a Franco-British mission in Poland raised delicate questions.

The mission dispatched on July 22 was the only concrete measure with regard to Poland on which Paris and London found it possible to agree. Representing the "full support" promised to the Poles by Lloyd George at Spa, the mission was in the words of the Italian minister Tommasini "a palliative to disguise the real impotence of the Allies." [27] Two diplomats, Ambassador Jules Jusserand of France and Ambassador Lord D'Abernon of Britain, led the mission, which included a British general and the right-hand man of Foch, General Maxime Weygand. Its task was to ascertain the exact nature of the military and political situation in Poland, and to advise the Poles in their forthcoming armistice talks with Russia.

British instructions to D'Abernon were laconic: study the situation and advise London on measures to be taken with respect to the armistice negotiations. The French government instructed its envoys far more fully. The French delegates were told to find out the "dispositions of the

[23] Laroche recalled that "a man as reasonable as M. Wysocki . . . told me with great bitterness and a strong resentment about the refusals with which he had met on the part of M. Beneš, when as Polish minister in Prague he insisted on the lifting of obstacles to transit [of arms] at the critical moment when the Red army stood at the gates of Warsaw." Laroche, *La Pologne de Pilsudski* (Paris, 1953), p. 18, n. 1.

[24] D'Abernon, *Diary*, I, 217. Compare Milan Hodža, *Federation in Central Europe: Reflections and Reminiscences* (London, 1942), p. 80.

[25] Bainville, *Russie et la barrière de l'est*, p. 172.

[26] *BPPP*, July 29–Aug. 25, 1920, No. 91.

[27] Tommasini, *Odrodzenie Polski*, p. 125.

[Polish] Government with regard to the armistice proposal which the Soviet government had asked it to address directly [to Russia]." If the Polish government wanted the Allies to help it effectively, it should "conform scrupulously to the Allied indications." If Warsaw did that, and Russia tried to impose its own terms and invaded "Polish territory," the Allies "would concert with the Government of Poland." According to French instructions, the mission ought also to suggest means for improving the political and military situation of the country. "If Poland does not abandon herself," the instructions said, "the support of the Allies, moral and material, will help her to concentrate her forces on the front and inside [the country] and to achieve the constitution of the Republic within borders comprising indisputably Polish territories." [28]

The French assigned an important role to the mission. It was to influence the policy of the Polish government, insist on ethnic borders for Poland, and since it included a leading French general it was to influence military matters. In exchange it brought promises of help, "material and moral," and assurances that the Allies would "concert" with the Polish government. Weygand traveling on the train eastward noted his ideas on the policy the mission ought to pursue. He felt that Piłsudski should not be head of the state and commander-in-chief at the same time, and the French general ruminated on a military leader "free from political servitude." He did not propose that an Allied general become commander-in-chief of the Polish army but rather a chief-of-staff who would serve under a nominal Polish commander.[29] His ideas seemed to conform to those held by the National Democratic opponents of Piłsudski, and reflected also the belief, shared by Foch,[30] that an armistice with the Bolsheviks was not probable. In that respect the French differed fundamentally from the British, who did not even instruct their members of the mission on what they should do in case the armistice talks failed.

Piłsudski, according to Weygand, greeted him coolly and asked how many divisions the Allies had earmarked for Poland. Upon learning that none were to be sent, he expressed skepticism as to the value of the Franco-British mission.[31] The Polish marshal was interested in practical help and not in a delegation bringing vague promises and proposing to watch over the Polish government and its army. After a few days during which D'Abernon and Jusserand put some pressure on Warsaw, Weygand received the somewhat ill-defined position of counselor to the Polish chief-of-staff, General Tadeusz Rozwadowski. It was soon apparent that the title did not correspond to any position of leadership, and that

[28] The full text is in Weygand, *Mirages et réalité*, pp. 96–97.
[29] *Ibid.*, pp. 98–99.
[30] Captain Morstin to Rozwadowski, Aug. 1, 1920, *AR*, I/56.
[31] Weygand, *Mirages et réalité*, p. 105.

Piłsudski and Rozwadowski were not prepared to let Weygand run the Polish army. Weygand's status was further complicated by the fact that there was already in Poland a French counselor to the commander-in-chief, General Henrys, who also headed the French military mission. The close relation between Piłsudski and Henrys has already been discussed, and Weygand discovered soon after his arrival in Warsaw that Henrys was disinclined to criticize the Polish supreme command or suggest sweeping changes.[32]

The mission found itself in an embarrassing position. To replace Henrys with Weygand would have implied censure of the former's activities in Poland. Besides, Jusserand felt that Weygand was dissatisfied with his status in Warsaw and might shortly return to Paris, and the risk of leaving no high-ranking French general on the scene could not be taken.[33] The only thing that D'Abernon and Jusserand could do was press the Poles to let Weygand take charge of things irrespective of his title or status. This they repeatedly did, but without too much success.[34] The relations between Weygand and Piłsudski were characterized by an aloofness that worried Paris,[35] and Weygand's cooperation with Rozwadowski, which was fairly close, was not exactly harmonious.[36] There were important differences on strategy and political matters, and the French complained that many orders were issued "without a prior consultation with the French [military] mission." [37]

The D'Abernon-Jusserand team, having studied the Polish situation, came to the conclusion that large-scale military aid to Poland was the most urgent need, and appealed for such on August 5. The Poles were hopeful and the liaison officer with Marshal Foch's staff telegraphed from Paris that such aid was being considered, and Britain was being sounded out on the subject. "We press for two divisions," he announced.[38] This was, of course, wishful thinking, and the American ambassador in

[32] *Ibid.*, pp. 102ff.

[33] Lieut. Arciszewski's report, Aug. 4, 1920, *AR*, I/20.

[34] See D'Abernon's notes on July 30, Aug. 2, and Aug. 3, in *The Eighteenth Battle*, pp. 42ff.

[35] Morstin to Rozwadowski, July 29, 1920, *AR*, I/56.

[36] Piłsudski wrote that the two generals communicated by means of notes sent from one room to another in *Pisma zbiorowe*, VII, 110, and Władysław Pobóg-Malinowski labors that point in his *Najnowsza historia polityczna Polski: 1864–1945* (3 vols., Paris, London, 1953–60), II, 339. A perusal of the notes exchanged between Weygand and Rozwadowski (in the Rozwadowski papers) does not indicate such bad relations although it shows important differences of opinion and brings out Rozwadowski's occasional impatience expressed in marginal notes. Capt. Morstin wrote from Paris that Weygand's complaints were not directed against Rozwadowski (see *AR*, I/56), and if one remembers that French officers insisted on written communications, the story of the conflict between the two may be a little exaggerated.

[37] Henrys to Rozwadowski, July 28 (?), 1920, *AR*, I/8.

[38] Morstin to Supreme Command, Aug. 5, 1920, *AR*, I/56.

Paris, while reporting that Russian victories were causing "the gravest apprehensions in France," stated that only some Rightist papers like *L'Éclair* or *L'Action Française* had come out in favor of an armed intervention in Poland.[39] The French government was most unlikely to take such a step on its own initiative. Chances of concerted action with Britain were slender indeed.

2

Lloyd George kept the upper hand in the Entente. Exchanges of notes between London and Russia, and acceptance in England of a Soviet trade mission led by Leo Kamenev and Leonid Krassin, showed plainly enough that the two western capitals did not follow the same policy. Millerand, criticized by the French press for his inactivity, attempted to influence Lloyd George at their meeting in Boulogne on July 27. His success was not unqualified. The prime minister insisted that Paris could only help Poland if it became associated in future talks with the Soviets, and he succeeded partly in entangling the French although Millerand did not sign the new note to Russia which was again dispatched by London alone. Millerand told Lloyd George that France could sit at a conference table with Russia if the latter agreed to assume full responsibility for debts, called a constituent assembly, and admitted Wrangel to the conference. He also considered that American participation in a conference was indispensable.[40] It is clear that these conditions were unacceptable to the Bolsheviks and prevented French participation in talks with the Soviets.

Entry of the Red army into what Lloyd George viewed as ethnic Poland caused him to remonstrate with the Soviets, but his threats did not sound convincing. On the whole the prime minister spoke to the Soviet delegates in a surprisingly open fashion about differences between London and Paris.[41] Marshal Wilson did not exaggerate much when he noted that he "was horrified at the almost servile way in which Lloyd George looked after Russian interests and was hostile to the Poles."[42]

To restore some semblance of Franco-British unity, Millerand went to England and spent two days, August 8 and 9, at the Lympne residence in Hythe. The D'Abernon-Jusserand mission had appealed for military aid to Poland, and Paris being completely in the dark about British-Soviet exchanges wanted to discuss a common policy. The meeting began in a tense atmosphere. Millerand and Foch were "both profoundly

[39] Wallace to Secretary of State, Aug. 5, 1920, *SDNA*, 851.00/228.

[40] *DBFP*, 1st series, VIII, 656. The Americans in Paris were informed of these conditions. See chargé d'affaires to Secretary of State, July 20, 1920, *SDNA*, 861.00/7195.

[41] *DBFP*, 1st series, VIII, 669ff.

[42] Callwell, *Henry Wilson*, II, 254.

dissatisfied and alarmed and suspicious."[43] The French premier told Lloyd George that "since the 19th July the Soviet government had been laughing at the Allies,"[44] and he expressed grave doubts about the prolonged stay of Kamenev and Krassin in London.

The French position at this time emerged clearly from a circular sent by Millerand to all French diplomatic posts. It emphasized again that Paris would deal only with a regular Russian government; linked the Bolshevik danger with the German menace; and stated that if Germany attempted to profit from Polish misfortunes, the French would stage an "action on the right bank of the Rhine."[45] As an American dispatch put it, "Millerand will go a long way to save Poland and prevent a German-Russian alliance."[46] This was largely because of the danger of a collapse of the Polish barrier between Germany and Russia and not so much out of feeling for the Poles. Curiously, Millerand and Lloyd George were competing with each other in the insults they heaped on Poland at Hythe. The Poles were blamed for everything. According to Lloyd George they were "the most dangerous enemy of the Allies";[47] Millerand was "ready to sacrifice Piłsudski to Mr. Lloyd George";[48] and the French premier, complaining of seeming Polish inactivity, went so far as to make the statement that at "the present moment there was no Polish nation."[49]

Poland seemed then to matter only as a pawn in the French political game, and Paris still looked upon a non-Bolshevik Russia as a possible ally. If such a "Russia should wish to reassert her sway over the border states France would not be opposed to this," the Americans reported from Paris.[50] This belief in the re-emergence of a non-Communist Russia led France to recognize on August 11 the government of General Wrangel, a move which Millerand tried to explain later as designed to assist Poland.[51]

In the meeting at Hythe, Millerand emphasized the Russian-German connection which endangered the settlement of Versailles, and he demanded an Allied declaration warning Germany and bringing closer together Poland's neighbors especially Rumania. Lloyd George saw no threat to the general peace settlement and felt that "the Russians were

[43] *Ibid.*, II, 258.
[44] *DBFP*, 1st series, VIII, 737.
[45] Millerand, "Au secours de la Pologne," p. 591.
[46] Harrison to Secretary of State, Aug. 10, 1920, *SDNA*, 760c.61/162.
[47] *DBFP*, 1st series, VIII, 713.
[48] *Ibid.*, p. 740.
[49] *Ibid.*, p. 711.
[50] Harrison to Secretary of State, Aug. 10, 1920, *SDNA*, 760c.61/162.
[51] It is instructive to compare Millerand's statements at Hythe with what he wrote later in his article. The pro-Wrangel policy was seemingly inspired by Paléologue. See Laroche, *Au Quai d'Orsay*, p. 127.

entitled to punish the Poles." [52] A compromise was finally reached and embodied in a telegram sent to Warsaw.

The Allies advised Poland to do her utmost to conclude an armistice on terms that would secure Polish independence within ethnographic boundaries. If the Soviets presented terms incompatible with this and Warsaw rejected them, Britain and France would assist Poland by a blockade of Russia, by supplying equipment for twenty-two Polish divisions, by sending military advisers but no troops, and finally by keeping lines of communication free.[53] In exchange Warsaw was to declare its determination to fight to the end, to appoint a commander-in-chief with no other functions, to accept Allied military advice, and to defend the line of the Vistula should the present front collapse. Some of these conditions seem strange because Poland had been showing her determination to fight for quite some time. What lay behind them was Allied distrust of Piłsudski which assumed fantastic proportions. Lloyd George considered the possibility that Piłsudski was playing a double game and was a traitor, and Millerand said that "Piłsudski had probably only one aim, to keep himself in power, and to do this he might negotiate tomorrow with the Bolsheviks." [54] How two responsible statesmen came to believe this is beyond comprehension, and it throws light on their informants — were they the mission in Poland, or some Polish enemies of Piłsudski? — who in their blind hatred used all kinds of calumnies.

Millerand wrote later that the result of the meeting in Hythe "caused me a great satisfaction," [55] but in view of the vagueness of the adopted formulas and in the absence of provisions to deter Germany from collaboration with the Bolsheviks, this statement can hardly be taken at face value. The French writer who said that during the meeting at Hythe "no security had been given, and no guarantee was envisaged" [56] was probably much closer to the real thinking in Paris at the time. The shallowness of the agreement became apparent almost immediately after Millerand departed from Hythe.

The Soviets communicated their peace terms for Poland on the day after the Franco-British conference. They provided for a frontier along the Curzon Line with small rectifications in Poland's favor near Białystok and Chełm; a reduction of the Polish army to 50,000 men, demobilization taking place within one month; handing over of all arms above those needed by the 50,000-man army; and demobilization of all war industries. Furthermore, Poland was to promise not to admit troops or war

[52] *DBFP*, 1st series, VIII, 740.
[53] *Ibid.*, pp. 754–755.
[54] *Ibid.*, p. 734.
[55] Millerand, "Au secours de la Pologne," p. 580.
[56] Jacques Bardoux, *De Paris à Spa* (Paris, 1929), p. 363.

material from abroad and to place the important Wołkowysk-Białystok-Grajewo railroad at Russian disposal. Pending the armistice negotiation Polish troops had to withdraw twenty versts (around fifteen miles) westward, which meant the evacuation of Warsaw. The Soviet note handed to Lloyd George added that certain provisions of detail could still be inserted, and these "details" as included in the Soviet terms presented to the Polish delegation on August 19 provided among others for the formation of a Polish workers' militia equipped by the Soviets, a withdrawal of fifty versts (instead of twenty), and the creation of a neutral, fifty-versts-wide zone under joint Soviet-Polish authority.[57] The Bolsheviks thus could make absolutely sure that the Polish state reduced to its narrowest borders would be a satellite of Russia, though already the note given to Lloyd George showed plainly that the Soviet conditions were incompatible with Poland's independence.

The British leader reacted favorably to the Soviet proposals, and although his initial enthusiasm was dampened by the Foreign Office,[58] London immediately advised Poland not to reject the Soviet conditions. Warsaw was shocked, Millerand furious. The French premier telegraphed London immediately that if such terms were accepted "Poland would have no means to guarantee her independence," and he accused Lloyd George of a breach of Allied solidarity.[59] Millerand instructed Jusserand to inform Sapieha that Poland "could count on full support of France." [60] The French telegram repeated that the Poles must follow the military advice of General Weygand.

The insistence on running Polish military and political affairs, shown already in the Hythe telegram which determined the Polish defense line and demanded the separation of military and civilian functions of the head of the state, was connected with the vicissitudes of the Franco-British mission in Poland. Weygand, strongly influenced by his experiences in trench warfare in the west, emphasized establishing a fixed line of defense before launching a counterattack on the model of the battle of the Marne. His strategy was opposed by General Rozwadowski who objected to a preliminary withdrawal in the south and favored an attack from both wings on the model of Cannae. Weygand's plan, which called for a counterattack on the north, clashed not only with that of Rozwadowski but also with the strategic conception of Piłsudski. The marshal, thinking in terms of a war of movement, was planning a counteroffensive from south to north, catching the enemy off balance during his advance.

[57] For a convenient comparison of the two texts printed side by side, see Komarnicki, *Rebirth of the Polish Republic*, pp. 670–673.

[58] See Riddell, *Intimate Diary*, p. 225; Craig, "The British Foreign Office," in Craig and Gilbert, *The Diplomats*, pp. 31–32.

[59] Millerand, "Au secours de la Pologne," p. 587.

[60] *Ibid.*, p. 591.

This was the plan which a French military expert described as a "Napoleonic maneuver." [61] In view of the existing divergences political pressure from Paris was intended to give support to Weygand's view.

Pressure on Piłsudski to appoint a military commander free from political duties — also stemming originally from Weygand's advice — led to a dramatic denouement on August 9. The Polish marshal offered Weygand the chance to participate in the command of the Polish army, and he later explained his reasons as follows:

"Exhausted by the absence of moral strength among us . . . I wanted to be partly relieved of the responsibility and I offered General Weygand a share in command, but he refused. He maintained very reasonably that to command armies so hastily organized as ours, unknown to him from the point of view of their value and methods of command . . . would be too difficult and [in fact] impossible for him." [62]

After consulting Paris, Weygand refused the offer which he said was made to him by Foreign Minister Sapieha [63] and remained in his role of counselor. In this capacity he continued to render important services to the Polish cause, and Piłsudski's critical remarks about him are largely unfair.[64]

The Polish marshal embodied his plan of a counteroffensive in the *ordre de bataille* of August 6. Weygand recognized that this plan was superior to his own, and the Poles began to regroup their forces. They had to weaken their defenses by withdrawing units needed for the counterattack, and foreign observers feared that Warsaw would succumb to the Soviets. On the morning of August 16 the striking force under the personal command of Piłsudski engaged the enemy. The critical battle of Warsaw had begun. The capital which the diplomatic corps had already left lived through hours of anxiety. In Upper Silesia a German paper announced the fall of Warsaw to the Bolsheviks, and the next day German crowds attacked the Poles and the French occupation troops shouting, "Siegreich wollen wir Frankreich schlagen." [65] A Polish uprising followed. In Paris extreme nervousness prevailed, and Marshal Foch realizing that the Bolshevik victory might determine the fate of Europe demanded to be kept *au courant* by radio.[66] The Polish armistice delega-

[61] For a summary of the controversial literature see my "General Weygand and the Battle of Warsaw of 1920," *Journal of Central European Affairs*, XX (1959–60), 357–365.

[62] Piłsudski, *Pisma zbiorowe*, VII, 153.

[63] Weygand, *Mirages et réalité*, pp. 143ff. Compare with the accounts of D'Abernon, *The Eighteenth Battle*, pp. 67–68, and Millerand, "Au secours de la Pologne," p. 582.

[64] Piłsudski, *Pisma zbiorowe*, VII, 153.

[65] Casimir Smogorzewski, "Le Plébiscite et le partage de la Haute Silésie," *Problèmes politiques de la Pologne contemporaine*, Vol. II, *La Silésie Polonaise*, pp. 280ff. See also Wambaugh, *Plebiscites*, I, 236ff.

[66] Morstin to Rozwadowski, Aug. 16, 1920, *AR*, I/56.

tion, still uninformed of Russian terms and isolated from the outside world in Minsk, waited and hoped.

The battle of Warsaw was a complete Polish victory. While the following campaign of Niemen led to the collapse of the Soviet armies, the military situation changed almost overnight. The "eighteenth decisive battle of the world," as D'Abernon called it, was fought and won. Paris rejoiced. In Berlin, Seeckt viewed the outcome with disappointment, but the old soldier knew what it meant and refused to listen to the indirect approaches of Trotsky, who offered a recognition of Germany's prewar borders in exchange for aid.[67] Those Englishmen who had long disapproved of the policy of their prime minister felt that "Lloyd George's contribution to this victory was advice to Poland to accept any terms the Bolsheviks would offer, and the Russian terms . . . amounted to a 'disastrous capitulation.'"[68] In Prague the atmosphere changed, and D'Abernon now heard Beneš unfold vast plans for a regional alliance in East Central Europe, including both Poland and Czechoslovakia. "What a difference victory makes," noted the British diplomat.[69]

For Piłsudski, the chief architect of the victory, and for Weygand, who had done his best to assist the Poles, the sweetness of victory had a bitter aftertaste. The Polish Right which had first opposed the Ukrainian expedition and then glorified Piłsudski's victories, only to turn against him in the period of defeats, determined to deny the Marshal all credit for the battle of Warsaw. The National Democrats with their Francophile tradition found in Weygand the man with whom they could oppose Piłsudski. They called him the savior and the "conqueror of Warsaw,"[70] and spared no pains to hurt Piłsudski and to involve Weygand in a controversy about who really deserved the victor's laurels. Weygand was highly embarrassed and declared in an interview accorded to Paul Genty of *L'Information* on August 21 that "I beg you to fix French opinion on that important point. This is a purely Polish victory. The preliminary operations were carried out in accordance with Polish plans by Polish generals."[71]

The French general explained to Foch his reasons for that statement by writing that "there were so many intrigues around my activities, which the opposition parties wanted to exploit against the head of the

[67] Georges Castellan, "Reichswehr et l'armée rouge 1920–1939," J. B. Duroselle, ed., *Les Relations germano-soviétiques de 1933 à 1939* (Paris, 1954), p. 150.

[68] Howard, *Theatre of Life*, II, 363.

[69] D'Abernon, *The Eighteenth Battle*, p. 113.

[70] See the articles of Professor Stanisław Stroński in *Rzeczpospolita*, notably that of Aug. 25, 1920.

[71] Cited in Mordacq, *Légendes*, p. 242; Pobóg-Malinowski, *Najnowsza historia*, II, 336; Baranowski, *Rozmowy z Piłsudskim*, p. 135; Komarnicki, *Rebirth of the Polish Republic*, p. 699.

state and the Polish command, that I was obliged, in order to put things in their proper place and clear up the atmosphere, to give an interview . . . in which I declared that the victory was Polish, the plan was Polish, and the army was Polish." [72] In spite of these statements, the whole incident marred the relations between Piłsudski and Weygand which had been cool even at the best of times. The marshal openly showed his displeasure by discussing military affairs in front of Weygand in Polish without paying attention to the latter.[73] The French general was offended and complained to Paris.[74] He withdrew from participation in Polish military affairs and a week later left the country. The National Democrats exploited the popular enthusiasm of the Polish crowds which saw in Weygand the symbol of French aid to their country, and organized innumerable demonstrations in his honor. Women kissed Weygand's hands, children were brought to gaze upon him — the legend of "Weygand the savior" began to grow.

While the National Democrats were creating the legend in Poland, French circles which supported Millerand's candidacy for president of the republic capitalized on it. Weygand's statements were ascribed to his soldierly modesty and were refused credence. Maurras entitled an article in *L'Action Française* on September 3 "La victoire de Weygand." Jacques Bardoux who stood close to the Quai d'Orsay described Millerand as the man who "by saving Warsaw . . . saved peace and exalted France." [75] During the Washington Naval Conference held in 1921–1922 Aristide Briand in referring to the events of 1920 called France "the soldier of order on behalf of the entire world." [76] The victory of Warsaw appeared to the French as the natural culmination of Millerand's foreign policy, and the correspondent of the London *Times* shrewdly observed that it was "a tremendous asset for M. Millerand" and Weygand "has probably been the best possible, if unconscious, Presidential election agent to an unconscious candidate M. Millerand." [77]

There is no doubt that the build-up of Weygand "cast a certain shadow" on Piłsudski's personal attitude toward the French,[78] and contributed in the long run to some of the malaise which affected Franco-Polish relations in the 1930s.

[72] Weygand, *Mirages et reálité*, p. 166.
[73] *Ibid.*, p. 151; D'Abernon, *The Eighteenth Battle*, pp. 96–97.
[74] Morstin to Rozwadowski, Aug. 19, 1920, *AR*, I/56.
[75] *De Paris à Spa*, pp. 365ff.
[76] Suarez, *Briand*, V, 275.
[77] London *Times*, Aug. 30, 1920.
[78] See General Marian Kukiel, "Dramat Generała Weyganda," *Bellona* (April–June, 1949), p. 5; Tytus Komarnicki, "Piłsudski a polityka wielkich mocarstw zachodnich," *Niepodległość*, IV (1952), 63.

The victory of Warsaw, and the successful campaign which followed it, raised again the question of the Russian-Polish border settlement. Two problems came to the fore: first, how far should the Polish army advance to complete its military victory? and second, should peace with Soviet Russia be concluded immediately and on what terms? The questions were, of course, closely related.

With regard to the military issue Piłsudski explained in an interview in the *Kurjer Poranny* on August 26 why he would not stop his armies when they reached the line of December 8, more commonly, if not accurately, referred to as the Curzon Line. "This line," he declared, "is worthless from the strategic point of view." He added that to stop there "and entrench, and to create a purely defensive position, would imply a confirmation that this illusory border in the east satisfies our aspirations." [79] The Polish leader hence opposed a halt both on military and political grounds.

The French also saw the Polish advance in terms of both strategy and politics. Zamoyski analyzed French views in an elaborate memorandum sent to Warsaw on August 23, and recommended Polish measures largely in keeping with his National Democratic outlook. The minister in Paris, after drawing Warsaw's attention to French fears arising out of the Polish eastward march, suggested a government declaration that the advance of the Polish army in no way prejudiced the question of future borders. The latter, Zamoyski wrote, should be determined "in close cooperation with the interested parties and with the Allies." The minister emphasized that the victory of Warsaw "gave for the moment the political initiative in East Central Europe to France," and this necessitated close collaboration with Paris. He added that the prevailing French attitude was that Poland must conceive her eastern policy in long-range terms and not be influenced by momentary military exigencies. As for the latter, Zamoyski pointed out, the opinion of Weygand would be of decisive importance in Paris.[80]

Weygand and the French supreme command favored a slow military advance which would not bring the Polish troops too far east and render the political settlement more complex.[81] In his article in *Le Temps* on August 27, 1920, Weygand advised a cautious advance, and as for a political border he advocated a line "far enough from the capital for the purpose of its protection but not pushing it to the point which might produce new misunderstandings with friendly Powers." [82]

[79] Piłsudski, *Pisma zbiorowe*, V, 167.

[80] Zamoyski to Foreign Minister, Aug. 23, 1920, *Archives of the Polish Government-in-exile*, "Rosja 1919–1921," Montreal (hereafter cited as *APGE*).

[81] Weygand, *Mirages et réalité*, pp. 161ff.

[82] Quoted from Komarnicki, *Rebirth of the Polish Republic*, p. 710.

What exactly did he mean? According to the Polish intelligence, Weygand though that the Curzon Line "did not provide sufficient safeguards for the Polish State,"[83] which meant that he favored a border farther east. On the other hand he opposed Piłsudski's federalist ideas or any border which would not be acceptable to England or to the anti-Bolshevik Russians, notably General Wrangel. This is probably what he meant by speaking of the "friendly powers." This also explains why some Polish circles believed that Warsaw ought to make an effort to win over England and advised Piłsudski in that direction.[84]

As for the French government, its views were similar to those of Weygand. The moderate *Le Figaro*, commenting on the first Polish declaration after the battle of Warsaw, represented fairly accurately the opinions of Millerand and his cabinet, when it wrote on August 27 that the French government which had not "spared its support [to Poland] in a particularly critical hour" desired "a strong and independent Poland within the limits which had been assigned to her by the declaration of the Supreme Council of December 8, 1919." *Le Figaro* qualified its support of that line by adding immediately that it could be rectified to Poland's advantage, but not changed to an extent which would strengthen the Soviet regime by giving it "a national reason to last" and create "ideas of revenge." According to Zamoyski's interpretation of the French attitude toward the Polish borders the main reasons for it were these: the existence of British opposition to Polish eastern plans, French preference for a homogeneous ethnic Poland, and the desire to eliminate possible Russian objections based on nationalist grounds. The Polish minister felt that Eastern Galicia (unaffected by the December 8 line, but mentioned by Curzon) could be won for Poland, largely because of French interests in the oil fields,[85] but not many other areas.

Did Paris favor a speedy Polish-Soviet peace? A few days after the victory of Warsaw the Polish government issued a declaration that the "victory of the Polish army brings no change in the attitude of the Polish government with regard to the question of peace."[86] This meant that Warsaw was willing to sign a peace treaty with the Bolsheviks right away provided conditions were satisfactory. France reacted to this move with mixed feelings. Paris considered that continuation of the war against the Bolsheviks was important insofar as it affected the fate of Wrangel, and *Le Figaro* greeted enthusiastically the rumors about coordination of the Polish offensive with operations of the Russian White general.[87] Wrangel himself made all the efforts to convince Paris that Pił-

[83] Report of the 2nd bureau of the Polish general staff, Sept. 20, 1920, *AR*, I/51.
[84] Askenazy to Piłsudski, Sept. 2, 1920, *AGND*, 10/4726.
[85] Aug. 23, 1920, *APGE*, "Rosja 1919–1921."
[86] Quoted in *Le Figaro*, Aug. 27, 1920.
[87] *Le Figaro*, Sept. 2, 1920.

sudski and Petliura ought to go on fighting,[88] and his representative General Pyotr Makhrov arrived in Warsaw to try to influence the Poles. It is likely that the French government patronized Makhrov's mission.[89]

French pressure was probably exercised on Poland to keep the war going, and a confidential German report stated that France seemed to show greater interest in Wrangel and the rebirth of a French-Russian alliance than in Poland.[90] Zamoyski reported from Paris that the Quai d'Orsay would not oppose a Polish-Soviet peace, but would prefer an arrangement half way between "an armistice and a peace."[91] French advice to the Poles was thus based on the hope of an ultimate reconciliation of Polish and Russian interests, and it was confusing. Paris advocated military advance, but not too far east, and a treaty which would not be a real peace settlement. All this made little sense to the Poles, and the French were at times aware of their own inconsistencies.

Le Figaro wrote on August 31 that Warsaw was inundated with good counsel. The paper said wittily that "at the time when she [Poland] seemed to be in her death agony, her devoted friends pressed her not to struggle too much against death; since her convalescence certain health specialists warn her against the dangers of too speedy recovery." Jacques Bainville as usual was right when he wrote in *L'Action Française* on September 9 that one should hope one day for the re-emergence of the good old ally Russia, but in the meantime France had to act "as if Russia were lost for us." He stated that we "shall never organize anything in Europe if we cannot detach ourselves from the first love of the Third Republic." Slowly and grudgingly the Quai d'Orsay was coming to the same conclusion, and the resignation of Paléologue, who had strongly supported Wrangel, as secretary general of the ministry in September 1920 had something to do with it.[92]

Polish-Soviet armistice negotiations which had begun in Minsk at the time of the Polish defeats were transferred on September 21 to the neutral city of Riga. They proceeded there in earnest, marking Poland's desire to conclude peace. Piłsudski's war aims had to be abandoned, and as the marshal put it he "was stopped in the advance by the lack of moral

[88] Peter N. Wrangel, *The Memoirs of General Wrangel* (London, 1929), pp. 274ff.

[89] Tommasini, *Odrodzenie Polski*, p. 129.

[90] "Nachrichten aus der französischen Botschaft [in Berlin]," Aug. 25 [?], 1920. *Auswärtiges Amt Archives* (microfilm), container 1328, National Archives, Washington (hereafter cited as *AANA*).

[91] Zamoyski on Aug. 23, 1920, *APGE*, "Rosja 1919–1921." Sapieha told the American chargé d'affaires in Warsaw that Paris expressed no official objection to a Polish-Russian peace. White to Secretary of State, Aug. 21, 1920, *SDNA*, 760c.61/243. Morstin reported to the Polish high command on Sept. 4, 1920, that Paris would not try to prevent peace, but if Poland combined with Wrangel and fought on, France would support her. *AGND*, 61/6251T4.

[92] Wrangel, *Memoirs*, p. 284.

strength of the [Polish] nation."[93] What he meant was that the war-weary nation was unwilling to recommence the Ukrainian venture, and the influential parties of the Right favored compromise with the Soviets. When the government suggested that the Polish delegation demand federation of the Ukraine and Byelorussia with Poland, the Council of National Defense rejected this proposal, and the delegates were instructed instead to obtain "a frontier to be determined by a just harmonization of the vital interests of both parties."[94] The National Democratic members of the peace delegation made sure that these principles were observed, and the only thing that remained of the federalist program was Polish insistence on Ukrainian and Byelorussian independence.

The Bolshevik delegation was determined to allow no one except the Communist government of the Ukraine to represent the interests of the Ukrainians, and the chairman of the Soviet representation pointedly remarked that Polish attempts to recognize Petliura revealed French machinations, because France had heavy investments in that area. The Soviets insisted that Warsaw recognize Soviet Ukraine as a partner in the peace negotiations, and the Polish delegation agreed. The position of Byelorussia was different and the Soviet chairman, Adolf Joffe, prepared to make serious territorial concessions including cession of the capital city of Minsk. The Poles had, then, the possibility of obtaining the largest part of Byelorussia and, by linking it with Wilno and the ethnic Lithuanian state, establishing a Lithuanian-Byelorussian republic federated with Poland. The National Democratic representative on the Polish delegation, wary of the federalist schemes, was unwilling to try this chance, and to the surprise of the Russians the Poles made no large demands in the north.[95]

The peace preliminaries signed on October 12, 1920, embodied a compromise settlement, and the Polish Communist leader Marchlewski admitted that in the *Komunistyczna Trybuna* on November 21, 1920. Joffe in his concluding speech declared that the treaties between Poland, Soviet Russia, and the Soviet Ukraine did not contain seeds of new wars "because none of these treaties leaves any problems unsolved." He added that they gave "satisfaction to the vital, legitimate, and essential interests of the Polish nation." Joffe praised Poland's representatives for their "practical knowledge and tact," and expressed Soviet "gratitude to the Polish delegation."[96] A year later Chicherin, referring to the Treaty of

[93] *Pisma zbiorowe*, VI, 124.

[94] Stanisław Grabski, *The Soviet-Polish Frontier* (London, 1943), p. 26.

[95] Leon Wasilewski, "Wschodnia granica Polski," *Bellona*, XVII (1925); Pobóg-Malinowski, *Najnowsza historia*, II, 371ff; see also the authoritative account of the Riga negotiations by the chairman of the Polish delegation, Jan Dąbski, *Pokój Ryski: Wspomnienia. Pertraktacje. Tajne układy z Joffem. Listy* (Warsaw, 1931).

[96] Eudin and Fisher, *Soviet Russia and the West*, pp. 60–61.

Riga stated that it settled "all questions of interest to these two States." [97] It was only much later that Soviet statesmen and historians began to speak of "Polish reactionaries who, thanks to French, British, and Italian support, succeeded in annexing Occidental regions of Soviet Ukraine and Byelorussia." [98]

The preliminaries of Riga, like all compromise arrangements, were of course far from perfect. The frontier established at the conference was neither the Curzon Line nor the frontier of 1772, and failed to satisfy entirely either side. By splitting the ethnic Byelorussian and Ukrainian territory it violated both federalist and strictly ethnic principles. The frontier corresponded roughly to the line advocated by Dmowski at the Paris Peace Conference, except that it was more favorable to the Soviets than the Dmowski boundary. The Riga frontier reposed on a careful balance of the strategic, economic, and ethnic claims of both sides, and from that point of view it was probably more equitable than many borders drawn during this period. This delicate balance was also its chief weakness, insofar as it was likely to be precarious. Piłsudski was right when he felt that Poland's security could only be achieved by a total transformation of East Central Europe and a federalist system, just as the Bolsheviks were right from their point of view when they thought that only a small ethnic Poland could become a bridge to Germany and European revolution. Seen from these angles the Riga frontiers brought no lasting solution.

France did not like the Polish-Soviet peace settlement. It meant the end of hostilities and Paris knew that it spelled the doom of Wrangel.[99] The frontiers as established in Riga were violently opposed by the Russian emigrants, and the Russian *Conférence Politique,* now presided over by Boris Savinkov, declared in a statement outlining a future Franco-Polish-Russian alliance that Poland would have to be reduced to its ethnic frontiers.[100] Paris felt that the Riga territorial settlement was likely to interfere with any policy of *rapprochement* between Poland and a future Russian, non-Bolshevik state.

Piłsudski was unhappy about having to abandon Petliura, and Moraczewski strongly criticized the peace terms in the Polish *Sejm.*[101] The preliminaries were a death blow not only to federalist plans involving the

[97] Degras, *Soviet Documents,* I, 303.

[98] Potemkin, *Histoire de la diplomatie,* III, 97. This assertion does not prevent the author from writing on the same page that France was deeply dissatisfied with the treaty of Riga.

[99] Morstin to Supreme Command, Sept. 30, 1920, *AGND,* 29/5174/T4; Tommasini, *Odrodzenie Polski,* p. 137; also contemporary French press, particularly *Le Temps.*

[100] Statement of Jan. 18, 1921, sent by Gibson to Secretary of State, Feb. 7, 1921, *SDNA,* 760c.61/460.

[101] *Sprawozdania stenograficzne,* 1920, CLXXI/19.

Ukraine and Byelorussia but to a larger scheme worked out in August 1920 at the Balduri conference.[102] The Riga settlement prevented ratification of this ambitious program which envisaged federal links between Poland, Latvia, Estonia, Byelorussia, and the Ukraine, although it opened the way for future Polish cooperation with the Baltic countries. Here, however, the problem of Lithuania loomed, and since the Lithuanian question was associated with the Riga negotiations and with the attitude of France toward the whole settlement, one must include that issue to complete the picture.

4

Polish-Lithuanian relations formed an important part of the Polish territorial settlement in the east. As mentioned, the Poles counted on recreation of the old Polish-Lithuanian union which after enduring for over four hundred years had ceased to exist with the partitions of Poland in the late eighteenth century. The Lithuanians, under the influence of a national revival that had taken place in the nineteenth century, opposed rebirth of the union which according to them would dissolve the small Lithuanian element in a Polish sea.

The Lithuanian-Polish controversy centered on Wilno (Vilnius), which was ethnically Polish and historically Lithuanian, and which the Poles were willing to abandon to Lithuania only in exchange for establishment of federal links between the two countries. The Soviet advance in the summer of 1920 led to the fall of Wilno to the Bolsheviks, and to the signing on July 12 of the Soviet-Lithuanian peace treaty which gave Wilno and its region to the Lithuanian state. Almost simultaneously Grabski agreed in Spa to leave the settlement of Polish-Lithuanian borders to the great powers. The Lithuanians, profiting from Poland's military collapse, succeeded also, on their own, in capturing Suwałki and Sejny, which according to the line of December 8 were on the Polish side. The Poles were indignant, especially because Lithuania did not maintain strict neutrality in the war between Poland and Russia. Even, according to Lithuanian accounts, the strategic Grodno-Lida-Mołodeczno railroad "remained in the occupation of the Soviets until the end of war";[103] the Russians "disregarding the Moscow Peace Pact with Lithuania" had "lingered in Vilnius" (Wilno).[104] The Polish side added several other instances of breach of neutrality which the Lithuanians denied.[105]

[102] For an analysis of the conference and its sequel see Adam Tarnowski, *Two Polish Attempts to bring about a Central-East European Organization* (London, 1943).

[103] Lithuanian Information Bureau, *The Lithuanian-Polish Dispute* (London, 1921), p. 15.

[104] C. R. Jurgela, *History of the Lithuanian Nation* (New York, 1948), p. 522.

[105] On the Polish side see Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, *Documents diplomatiques concernant les relations polono-lithuaniennes* (2 vols., Warsaw, 1921–1922); on the Lithu-

But the battle of Warsaw changed the course of the war. The Polish army in its offensive moved against the Lithuanians in Sejny and pushed them out of this region. Armed clashes multiplied. The Polish and Lithuanian foreign ministries began a voluminous correspondence.

Lithuania represented the point of view that decisions of the Paris Peace Conference, notably the line of December 8, 1919, were not binding because they had been neither communicated to nor accepted by Lithuania. The Lithuanians based their rights to all the territory they controlled on their peace treaty with Russia — who had a legal right to dispose of it. The Polish foreign minister invited the Lithuanians to withdraw to the old Foch Line which left some of the contested territory on the Polish side, and meeting with a refusal, he submitted — largely on his own initiative — the matter to the League of Nations on September 5, 1920. Consequently a commission of the League presided over by the French colonel, Pierre Chardigny, arrived in Poland and took steps to establish a demarcation line and prevent hostilities.

The French attitude to the Lithuanian-Polish problem in 1920 underwent a change. Paris recognized Lithuania *de facto* in January 1920, then looked with disfavor on Lithuanian-Bolshevik peace negotiations and attempted to induce the Lithuanians to fight the Soviets. To achieve this aim Paris had to support Lithuanian territorial ambitions. The same was true when the Polish army made its counteroffensive in August. France desirous of Lithuanian-Polish cooperation felt that such could only be achieved at the price of Wilno, which was to go to Lithuania.[106] In that respect French policy toward Wilno resembled that toward Teschen, the basic idea in both being to support the weaker party — Lithuania and Czechoslovakia — to create a united front against outside powers. Having failed to enlist Lithuanian help in the Bolshevik war, Paris began to reconsider its policy, and the Poles saw an opportunity for persuading the French of the strategic value of Wilno for the Polish campaign.[107]

In the last days of September 1920 the Polish liaison officer in Paris reported that for strategic reasons Marshal Foch's staff was beginning to recognize the usefulness of a Polish occupation of Wilno. He added that "we try now, working through the marshal's staff, to prepare the Quai d'Orsay for a possible occupation of Wilno by us." [108] In the absence of

anian side see Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, *Documents diplomatiques: conflit polono-lithuanien* (2 vols., Kaunas, 1924).

[106] See Zamoyski to Minister of Foreign Affairs, Aug. 25, 1920, *APGE*, "Rosja 1919–1921"; also *Le Temps*, Aug. 27, 1920.

[107] For a detailed and penetrating discussion of the whole issue see a memorandum of Nov. 29, 1920, prepared for the Polish general staff, entitled "Francja i Litwa" (France and Lithuania), *AGND*, 32/5930.

[108] Morstin to Supreme Command, Sept. 30, 1920, *AGND*, 29/5174/T4.

documentary evidence it is impossible to say whether the Poles made progress in their approaches in Paris, but the short time at their disposal would make it dubious. It is equally difficult to establish if the process of softening the Quai d'Orsay took place exclusively through military channels, or whether the Polish foreign ministry was involved. Finally, doubt remains whether Polish pressure in Paris was somehow coordinated with Piłsudski's preparations of a military coup against Wilno. It seems that Piłsudski had not informed the foreign ministry of his plans, so that instructions for talks in Paris must have stemmed either from him or the general staff and bypassed diplomatic channels.

The Polish marshal in preparing his Wilno expedition had in mind a broad scheme which involved setting up a Lithuanian-Byelorussian state. One part of it was to be obtained at Riga from the Soviets; the central part was to be gained by a *fait accompli* in Wilno; the third part, ethnic Lithuania, was expected to join as a result of Polish persuasion and pressure. The plan fell through. As mentioned, the peace delegates in Riga failed to insist on Minsk and Byelorussian territory, and the manner of the Wilno coup helped the Lithuanian nationalists to excite the nation and prevent any *rapprochement* with the Poles.

Negotiation between Poland and Lithuania led to a military agreement in Suwałki on October 7, which drew a demarcation line separating both armies. The line stopped short of the station of Bastuny in the east, and the agreement provided for its extension when the Soviet troops would be expelled from this area.[109] The incomplete line left Wilno open to a Polish advance from the south.[110]

The Suwałki agreement was to enter into force on October 9, but on October 8 the division commanded by General Lucjan Żeligowski, composed largely of inhabitants of the Wilno region, broke away from the Polish army and advanced on Wilno. The Polish foreign minister disavowed Żeligowski and declared, apparently with perfect sincerity, that this was a rebellious action. Sapieha was not *au courant*[111] with what had really happened. Żeligowski had not acted on his own but had been executing the orders of Piłsudski, who preferred to keep everybody in the dark. Even some officers in Żeligowski's division were doubtful about the "rebellion" and had to be discreetly informed of the state of affairs. Piłsudski admitted his full responsibility later,[112] but for the time being merely protected Żeligowski from any consequences of his action.

What part, if any, did the French play in the Wilno affair? The Lithu-

[109] See the text in *Polish-Lithuanian Dispute*, pp. 55–56.

[110] This is the opinion of several historians. See, for instance, G. Gathorne-Hardy, *A Short History of International Affairs 1919–1939* (London, 1950), p. 98.

[111] See the telegram of Sapieha to the Polish legation in Washington, dated Oct. 11, 1920, *CD*, "Rosja Sowiecka 1919–20–21."

[112] Piłsudski, *Pisma zbiorowe*, VI, 124; Tommasini, *Odrodzenie Polski*, p. 300.

anian historian who wrote that Warsaw "found a sympathetic audience in the persons of many French high officials"[113] failed to give evidence in support of his assertion. A pro-Lithuanian French writer felt that the French must have cooperated with the Poles and that "it is difficult to admit that General Weygand was not informed by Piłsudski of his plans of an attack against Lithuania."[114] This statement shows, of course, a disregard for chronology and ignorance of Weygand's position in Poland and his relation with Piłsudski. Weygand had left Poland on August 25, more than six weeks before the Wilno coup, and he had not been on speaking terms with Piłsudski since almost immediately after the battle of Warsaw. Apart from the fact that Weygand was the last person in whom Piłsudski would have confided, it is unlikely that the marshal had his Wilno operation planned at the time when he was devoting all his energy to a counteroffensive near Warsaw. Those Frenchmen who were present in Poland certainly did not cooperate with Żeligowski. Members of Colonel Chardigny's mission attempted to intervene after they learned of the Polish move,[115] and French officers tried to stop the Polish division, but suddenly no one in it could understand any French.[116]

It is difficult to comprehend, therefore, why the usually well-informed American minister in Warsaw should have suspected French-Polish collusion. He reported a few months later that "From what I have learned it seems clear that the French Military Mission was fully acquainted with the plans of General Żeligowski and that if the French did not actively encourage the seizing of Vilna they gave it at least their tacit consent."[117] There is no evidence to corroborate this story, and perhaps for once Gibson allowed himself to become a victim of the myth about the omnipotence of the French in Poland.

In reality Paris was highly displeased. Zamoyski who called on the new French premier, Georges Leygues, to disavow Żeligowski's action, informed Warsaw that "the occupation of Wilno by the Żeligowski division made the worst impression."[118] Paderewski wrote that the expedition "did us a good deal of harm."[119] All reports agree that France was annoyed, particularly because the move provided London with anti-Polish arguments and was likely to complicate the pending plebiscite in Upper Silesia where the British played a considerable role.[120] Besides, the Wilno

[113] Jurgela, *History of the Lithuanian Nation*, p. 518.

[114] Henry de Chambon, *La Lithuanie moderne* (Paris, 1933), p. 35.

[115] Even Chambon admitted that much: *Lithuanie moderne*, pp. 37ff.

[116] See Pobóg-Malinowski, *Najnowsza historia*, II, 352. For French *démarches* see a memorandum of Roman Knoll (undated), *CD*, "Wschodnia granica Polski."

[117] Gibson to Secretary of State, Dec. 1, 1921, *SDNA*, 860c.00/104.

[118] Zamoyski to Foreign Minister, Oct. 11, 1920, *AGND*, 29/5150.

[119] Paderewski to Foreign Minister, Oct. 23, 1920, *ibid.*, 30/5437.

[120] See, apart from reports quoted above, Morstin's report in Oct. 1920, *AR*, II/16; also news report of the U.S. embassy in Paris, Oct. 12–13, 1920, *SDNA*, 851.00/241.

coup, as Laroche later wrote, "rendered vain the efforts of French diplomacy to arrive at an entente between Poland and Lithuania." [121] The fiction of an independent action by Żeligowski had not helped Warsaw avoid general censure.

The affair of Wilno came three days before the signing of the preliminaries of Riga, and the French and British ministers in Warsaw were instructed to remonstrate with the Polish government. They combined western objections to the Riga settlement with misgivings about Wilno, and urged Poland not to violate "the legitimate interests of Russia in the peace negotiations" and to stick to Grabski's promises made in Spa. Emphasizing Poland's need to maintain good relations with her neighbors, the envoys declared that it was a question of "loyalty and of political wisdom to assure to Lithuania the possession of her capital Wilno," and warned the Polish government against a "hazardous policy." [122]

As it appears from the above *démarche* the British and the French linked the issue of Wilno with that of the Riga settlement. Did it mean that they still thought of Lithuania in terms of a prewar Russian province, and that in protecting Lithuania they really looked after the interests of Russia one and indivisible? Some Polish historians have reached that conclusion, and have also emphasized the pro-Russian views of Colonel Chardigny.[123] Though there may be some truth in their assertions, this point should not be overstated. Many circles in France favored at this time a Polish-Lithuanian union or alliance as a means of strengthening the eastern barrier, and they feared that Polish-Lithuanian antagonism was the surest way of making Lithuania a client of either the Soviets or of Germany. The Polish liaison officer in Paris reported in December 1920 that the French took the possibility of a Polish-Lithuanian federation quite seriously, and viewed it "as the most rational solution of our conflict with Lithuania." [124] Weygand apparently thought so too, and this view was not restricted to military circles. A leading Socialist, Paul-Boncour, would write later that without a Polish-Lithuanian federation "the question of Wilno was insoluble." [125]

Warsaw answered the Allied *démarche* by stating that England had never fulfilled her part of the Spa bargain and that the conference at Riga was already ended. As for Wilno, the Poles declared that the best

[121] Laroche, *La Pologne de Pilsudski*, p. 14.

[122] Text of the Franco-British declaration of Oct. 12, 1920, *AGND*, 29/5144. See reports of Gibson, Oct. 11 and 14, 1920, *SDNA*, 760c.61/382 and 760c.60m/48.

[123] Komarnicki, "Piłsudski a polityka wielkich mocarstw"; Władysław Wielhorski, *Polska a Litwa* (London, 1947). On the other hand, Morstin's report in April 1921 (*AGND*, 34/7078) and Colonel Dowoyno-Sołłohub's of Feb. 21, 1921 (*AR*, II/16) show that his pro-Russian views had been overstated or at least not so firmly grounded as it was believed.

[124] Morstin to Supreme Command, Dec. 14, 1920, *AGND*, 34/6442.

[125] Paul-Boncour, *Entre les deux guerres*, II, 46.

way to arrive at a solution was a plebiscite. The Polish reply ended with an appeal to the Allies not to raise "new obstacles to the reconstitution of Poland,"[126] and Piłsudski threatened to resign if the Allies applied any pressure on his country.

The Franco-British intervention had no sequel. It reflected a mistrust of Poland's actions and the feeling that Warsaw pursued adventurous policies. Despite repeated attempts on the part of the Polish government, the new eastern frontiers remained unrecognized by Paris and London until 1923, and the question of Wilno as thrashed out in the League of Nations did not bring a satisfactory solution to Polish-Lithuanian problems.

The events of late 1920 left on both the French and Polish sides a feeling of hurt susceptibilities. The Poles thought that the French had helped little in the desperate Polish struggle against the Bolsheviks, and that they had failed to appreciate Piłsudski's scheme for a real barrier between Germany and Russia. Paris had constantly subordinated Polish interests to its own incoherent and unrealistic policy toward Russia. The French on the other hand felt that the Poles were looking after their own narrow interests without trying to relate them to the larger issues of international politics; whether the Poles gained or lost their objectives, as in the cases of Wilno or Teschen, they invariably strained their relations with neighboring countries. The task of coordinating the policies of all the states between Germany and Russia was hard enough for the Quai d'Orsay, and Paris thought that Poland was not making the job easier. There was undoubtedly a modicum of truth in this view, but the vacillations in Paris were hardly calculated to produce happy results. French policy toward the whole Polish-Russian conflict was not characterized by sagacity. And during the same period, the diplomacy of the Quai d'Orsay in the Danubian region exhibited the same faults.

[126] Gibson to Secretary of State, Oct. 15, 1920, *SDNA*, 760c.61/394.

7

DANUBIAN UNION OR LITTLE ENTENTE?

THE "alert of 1920," to use Bainville's term for the Soviet-Polish war, revealed the isolation of France in international politics and the difficulty of building an eastern barrier to separate Bolshevism from the west. "After having had up to twenty-five Allies and Associates during the war," Bainville commented, France "found no one to support or even to approve her action in Poland." [1] French peacemakers had spoken of a bloc of states in East Central Europe which would have a common cause with France at the first sign of distress, but "Where was this bloc when Poland was in danger?" [2] In the face of a Soviet invasion the eastern barrier simply failed to materialize, and Paris could be at least partly blamed for this failure.

The Quai d'Orsay was not clear about what kind of a bloc it really sought to create. To French diplomats the barrier was supposed to separate Bolshevism from the west, rather than Russia from Germany. Here lay the source of the conflict between Paris and Warsaw. Piłsudski's plan of a large middle zone in East Central Europe keeping Moscow and Berlin as far apart as possible implied weakening Russia, not merely Bolshevism, and this the French diplomats could not approve. Poland, obviously, could not play the role of a barrier by herself, and Paris had striven to achieve Polish-Czechoslovak cooperation against both eastern and western threats. But to establish a common front with the two states proved an impossible task. The principal reasons for that have already been discussed: Warsaw and Prague held different views on Russia, and the Teschen controversy prevented a *rapprochement* between the two western Slav countries. French diplomacy introduced in turn new political and economic elements which added difficulties and confusion. One needs therefore to turn to French policy toward the Danubian area, in which Czechoslovakia naturally had large interests.

This policy, even today imperfectly known, constituted an interesting

[1] *Conséquences politiques de la paix*, p. 177.
[2] Bainville, *La Russie et la barrière de l'est*, p. 170.

chapter in the annals of the Quai d'Orsay.[3] Was it primarily a venture of big business into politics? Was it an "ephemeral misunderstanding," as one historian called it?[4] Or did it proceed from a well-thought-out plan for a new French orientation in East Central Europe? Until all documents, especially those in the French archives, become available, it is difficult if not impossible to pass judgment on this phase of French diplomacy. It centered on Hungary, and in that sense the policy may be described as an attempt to bring Budapest into the French sphere of influence. The result was ambiguity in Franco-Czechoslovak relations, and new and largely unforeseen developments in Prague's foreign policy.

During the First World War some French circles were averse to breaking up Austro-Hungary, which had played such an important role in the European balance of power and under favorable circumstances could provide a check on Germany. After the war, conservative and royalist groups in Paris, backed by industrial interests, thought seriously of a Danubian union centered on Hungary which would offset the disadvantages of the breakup of the Habsburg monarchy and open possibilities for French economic expansion in this area. Bainville mentioned it in some of his writings;[5] political figures such as Senator Anatole de Monzie, Deputy Saget, Charles Tisseyre,[6] J. J. Posthieux, and others voiced criticism of the settlement in the Danubian region as envisaged by the Peace Conference. Even a Socialist like Paul-Boncour, while greatly critical of the pro-Hungarian and pro-Habsburg leaning of some of the French Rightists, wrote later that a Danubian economic union could have contributed to stability in that part of Europe.[7] When the question of a joint intervention against Béla Kun's Hungary came up, a French general stated that if "France took the initiative or the direction of such a movement" she would gain credit for victory, and "one could see tomorrow all the nations of the old Danubian monarchy reconciled under her [French] leadership."[8]

In December 1919 a member of the French mission in Košice, Dr. Louis Eck, told the Hungarians that "very influential French circles are inclined to believe that it was a serious mistake to ignore the historic role

[3] Most of the documentation available is Hungarian, and French historians treat this period cautiously. See J. B. Duroselle, *Histoire diplomatique de 1919 à nos jours* (Paris, 1957), p. 36; Renouvin, *Histoire des relations internationales*, VII, 280–281. Jacques Grunewald, "L'Influence des facteurs économiques sur les décisions dans la politique étrangère de la France," J. B. Duroselle, ed., *La Politique étrangère et ses fondements* (Paris, 1954), p. 24.

[4] Albert Mousset, *La Petite entente* (Paris, 1923), pp. 18–20.

[5] *Conséquences politiques de la paix*, pp. 168–169.

[6] Author of *Une Erreur diplomatique: la Hongrie mutilée* (Paris, 1922).

[7] *Entre les deux guerres*, II, 44ff.

[8] General Hallier to Clemenceau, April 22, 1919, *DK*, 20, Hongrie, 3.

of the Hungarian nation."[9] He suggested that Paris would be willing to bring Hungary closer to the Czechs and the Rumanians, and suggested confidential French-Hungarian exchange of views. Talks began and they ran parallel to the official negotiations between Hungary and the Allies concerning the signing of the peace treaty. The latter were conducted by Count Albert Apponyi and the Hungarian delegation which arrived in France on January 7; the former were primarily in the hands of a Hungarian lawyer with connections in the French business world, Charles Halmos.[10] Given the weakness of the Hungarian position in the peace negotiations, Budapest eagerly seized the chance for secret talks with the French, and hoped thereby to improve the final clauses of the peace treaty.

The new Hungarian policy of the Quai d'Orsay resulted from the political changes which had taken place in France in early 1920. If one believes the Hungarian reports, Millerand was "publicly committed to a policy friendly to Hungary," and he would "win or lose on this issue."[11] This was perhaps an exaggeration, and it was Paléologue, the secretary general of the Quai d'Orsay — rather than Millerand — who was the prime mover of the Hungarian policy. Paléologue was supported by his *chef de cabinet*, Lazare de Montille, and strongly opposed by Berthelot and Laroche, who viewed the new course as a dangerous departure from the pro-Czechoslovak and anti-Hungarian policy which had prevailed thus far.

Paléologue, it appears, nurtured a grand design which consisted of "the formation of a Danubian Confederation favorable to the economic and political interests of France," in which Hungary would "be called upon to play an important role."[12] The French diplomat apparently told the Hungarians that his pro-Hungarian line "constituted the foundation stone of France's future policy in Central and Southeastern Europe,"[13] and the Hungarians assumed that the "ultimate objective" of Paris was "a Danubian federation built on a unified railroad system."[14]

In the course of the long negotiations between the Quai d'Orsay and the Hungarian representatives, the position of both sides was clarified. Budapest strove for revision of the territorial settlement, mainly at the expense of Rumania and to a lesser extent Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. In exchange it was prepared to lease the Hungarian state railroads to the French concern of Schneider-Creusot, give the French rights in

[9] Semsey to Somssich, Dec. 23, 1919, *FRH*, I, 94.

[10] On the French side Count Armand de Saint-Sauveur, director of Schneider-Creusot, and Louis Loucheur took an important part in the negotiations.

[11] Csáky to Teleki, June 3, 1920, *FRH*, I, 323.

[12] *L'Éclair*, Sept. 6, 1920.

[13] Csáky to Csekonics, Oct. 5, 1920, *FRH*, I, 669.

[14] Teleki to Csáky, June 5, 1920, *ibid.*, I, 327.

the river harbor of Budapest, and cede large shares of the Hungarian General Credit Bank. The Hungarian diplomat Count Emeric Csáky put it this way: "As against an option granted by us to a certain group of French capitalists, the French Government would conclude with us a political agreement recognizing the justification of our political claims."[15]

The Hungarian side submitted on April 13 a memorandum outlining the minimum frontier changes. They included, as far as Czechoslovakia was concerned, cession to Hungary of the Grosse Schütt, Bratislava, and the counties east of it, Košice, and Subcarpathian Ukraine or at least a plebiscite in it.[16] Two days later Paléologue handed in a counterproposal which indicated French willingness to consider frontier alterations, but only through a joint commission including representatives from the interested states and presided over by a French chairman.[17] At the same time Paris hinted at the advisability of some political cooperation between France and Hungary.

Secret negotiations continued through April and May, while simultaneously the great powers and the Hungarian peace delegation exchanged notes on a final peace settlement. The Hungarians in their dealings with the French reduced their claims to a demand for the Grosse Schütt, smaller strips of Slovakia without Bratislava, and Subcarpathian Ukraine, but even so Paris was not in a position to go beyond its promise of a joint commission. The French high commissioner in Budapest, Maurice Fouchet, called on Admiral Nicholas Horthy on May 18 and read to him a declaration stating that Paris was prepared "to facilitate all efforts and conversations between the Governments of Rumania, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia on the one hand, and the Hungarian Government on the other" to find a basis for cooperation among them, which was the only thing that could ensure a just peace. The French declaration added that Paris would be willing to "offer its good offices" to help in the correction of any "ethnic or economic injustices of the peace conditions."[18] The Quai d'Orsay, however, made it clear that it expected Budapest to sign the peace treaty first. Thus no agreement was possible. France could not promise to promote revision of the Hungarian borders on the eve of the peace treaty without reversing its previous stand and antagonizing its wartime allies in East Central Europe. Hungary could not commit herself to France without securing more concrete promises. Budapest thought that French influence would alleviate the final peace terms.

Hungarian hopes in that respect were largely disappointed. Allied replies to Hungarian notes bore the imprint of a joint memorandum which

[15] Csáky to Teleki, May 3, 1920, *ibid.*, 271.
[16] *Ibid.*, pp. 274–275; Deák, *Hungary at the Peace Conference*, pp. 266–268.
[17] *FRH*, I, 235–238; Deák, *Hungary at the Peace Conference*, pp. 235–238.
[18] *FRH*, I, 311.

Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Yugoslavia submitted in Paris. The memorandum apparently pointed out that Hungary's borders had been definitely established in June 1919, and that "any alteration of these would be regarded as betrayal." [19] Consequently the Allies rejected the Hungarian demands for frontier changes and plebiscites. The glimmer of hope that remained was the so-called Covering Letter which mentioned the possibility of a frontier delimitation commission, and which the Hungarians ascribed to French influence. Taking it together with French statements to Horthy about their "good offices," Budapest hoped that chances of future revision were not quite dead.

Hungary signed the Treaty of Trianon on June 4, 1920, but direct exchanges between Paris and Budapest continued. The French were as intent as ever on securing economic concessions; the Hungarians insisted on more concrete evidence of French support for border revisions. Given the scarcity of documentation on this phase of the negotiations, it is impossible to say whether the French ever made any promises to support Hungarian revisionism. The Quai d'Orsay denied it in talks with foreign diplomats,[20] and there is no evidence to the contrary. The Polish minister of foreign affairs informed his envoys abroad that "an important French-Hungarian *rapprochement* resulting from economic interests had taken place" and that "Hungary tries also to move closer to Rumania and uses Poland as an intermediary." [21] The Czechoslovak legation in Vienna reported to Prague that France and Hungary had signed a secret convention in Gödöllö,[22] and suspicions in Prague must have been aroused.

But if Prague was alarmed, she was not showing it openly. When the French spoke to the Czechoslovak and Yugoslav leaders about the usefulness of negotiations with Hungary "under French auspices," Beneš and Milenko Vesnič were apparently "enthusiastic about the idea." Even the French had "not hoped for such a favorable reception." [23] The Czechoslovak foreign minister assured Crane, the American envoy in Prague, that the Franco-Hungarian talks were purely economic and there was no cause for alarm.[24] Was Beneš so sure of it himself, and did he trust Paris not to encroach on Czechoslovak interests? This appears improbable in view of the later events, and there is little doubt that all

[19] Temperley, *A History of the Peace Conference*, IV, 421. I have not been able to locate the original text of the memorandum.

[20] Harrison to Secretary of State, Aug. 10, 1920, and Wallace to Secretary of State, Sept. 8, 1920, *SDNA*, 751.64/3 and 751.64/7. The Polish minister in Paris felt that Paléologue "had never seriously thought about a territorial revision of the treaty of Trianon." Zamoyski to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Oct. 12, 1920, *AGND*, 61/6369T4.

[21] Sapieha to missions, July 11, 1920, *CD*, copy to Washington, No. 55208, GM, 435.

[22] Soják, *O zahraniční politice*, p. 79; quoting from Archiv Min. Zahr. Věci, Videň, 1920, č.89.

[23] Praznovszky to Teleki, July 3, 1920, *FRH*, I, 426.

[24] Crane to Secretary of State, Aug. 13, 1920, *SDNA*, 760c.61/176.

these developments constituted a threat for the Czechoslovak Republic. This was especially true because the climax of the Soviet-Polish war had played into the hands of Hungarian diplomacy.

The traditional ties between Hungary and Poland, and the prevailing Polish-Czech friction, made Budapest look upon Warsaw as a possible ally. During the negotiations in Paris which preceded the signing of the Treaty of Trianon, the Hungarians attempted to enlist Polish support for their claims to Subcarpathian Ukraine. Patek assured the Hungarian envoy that "he argued for hours at the Peace Conference in favour of a common [Polish-Hungarian] border,"[25] and Piłsudski also favored it. The Polish marshal said, however, that Poland could not openly support Hungary "as long as her [own] eastern frontiers" were "not determined," but she "would never, not even under Allied pressure, turn against Hungary."[26]

From March to May 1920 the Hungarians intensified their exchanges with the Poles. First, they sounded out Warsaw on the Polish attitude toward Hungarian plans for organizing a revolt in Slovakia and Subcarpathian Ukraine,[27] and they suggested forming a Polish-Hungarian alliance directed against Czechoslovakia.[28] Warsaw adopted a cautious and evasive but not completely negative attitude.[29] Second, Budapest began to explore the possibility of aiding Poland militarily in the war against the Bolsheviks, which could open new political vistas. Hungarian association with Poland in the eastern war would make it necessary to remove restrictions on Hungarian armament industries and on the size of her army. It would go a long way toward a common French-Polish-Hungarian front and create favorable circumstances for a common border at Czechoslovakia's expense. Poland and Hungary, rather than Poland and Czechoslovakia, would become the pivotal states of the eastern barrier, and this could be fitted into the new policy that had been inaugurated by Paléologue.

The first move for rearmament ostensibly linked with Hungarian aid to Poland was made in May 1920 when the Hungarians intimated to Paléologue their desire to rearm, and the French diplomat referred them

[25] Csekonics to Somssich, Feb. 13, 1920, *FRH*, I, 149.

[26] Csekonics to Somssich, Feb. 20, 1920, *ibid.*, I, 163.

[27] See the political survey of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs of March 15, 1920, which stated that Warsaw was not interested in a Polish-Slovak federation and had no objection to Hungary's moves in that area, *CD*, "Czechosłowacko-polskie stosunki 1920"; Sosnkowski's letter to Piłsudski of May 12, 1920, reporting a visit of a Hungarian envoy, Baron Sijutinis (?), a leader of Subcarpathian Ukrainians, Stepan, and a Slovak representative, Bobola (Jan Bobula?), who presented plans of an anti-Czech revolution, *AGND*, 8/3698.

[28] Piltz informed the American chargé d'affaires in Belgrade about it.

[29] Sosnkowski to Piłsudski, May 12, 1920, *AGND*, 8/3698; Starzewski, *Zarys dziejów*, p. 62.

to Patek who could more conveniently bring this question into the open.[30] In June Budapest instructed Csekonics to talk to Piłsudski about rearmament and military cooperation and to emphasize the "geographical obstacle" between the two counties—a clear allusion to Subcarpathian Ukraine.[31] The Hungarian government also approached the western Allies and advanced arguments in favor of a large Hungarian army. Warsaw and Paris reacted favorably. Sosnkowski promised "to help as much as possible Hungary's rearmament," [32] and Paléologue, together with the acting chief of the French general staff, General Pierre Desticker, showed interest. The Hungarian envoy in Paris reported that the French were "earnestly occupied with the question of our rearmament" and did "not regard Czech opposition as important; they are even willing to drop the Czechs if that should appear inevitable." [33] To understand this last remark one must remember that it was probably made on the eve of the battle of Warsaw, and the critical situation in Poland forced the French to think in terms of extreme measures.

Effective Hungarian aid to Poland never materialized, due to the opposition of Czechoslovakia, which on August 7 declared her neutrality and could be neither cajoled nor forced to change her attitude. Many Poles who condemned Prague for this stand and praised Hungary for her offers should have realized that however sincere Hungarian pro-Polish feelings were, offers of aid were largely dictated by the general policy of revisionism. The Yugoslav statesman Ante Trumbič believed that the offer of Budapest was a political trick by which the Hungarians hoped to get a large army and cross into Czechoslovak territory.[34] Prague thought so too, and Czechoslovak determination to prevent Hungarian armed aid to Poland was to a large extent due to distrust of Hungary.[35]

There were other facets of Hungarian-Polish cooperation which might well have alarmed far-seeing statesmen in Paris and even in Warsaw. A Hungarian journalist, Géza Feleky, explained in an article entitled "Berlin and Moscow" that a united front of Poland and Hungary would benefit not only Budapest but Berlin. Such a front directed against Russia, but not against Germany, would increase Polish-Czech friction and weaken Slav cooperation which Hungary and Berlin found equally dangerous.[36] If the article represented the thinking in Budapest, Hungarian policy could well have undermined the foundations of the barrier which

[30] Csáky to Teleki, May 3, 1920, *FRH*, I, 272.
[31] Teleki to Csekonics, June 6, 1920, *ibid.*, I, 334.
[32] Csekonics to Teleki, June 26, 1920, *ibid.*, I, 400.
[33] Csáky to Teleki, Aug. 18, 1920, *ibid.*, I, 589.
[34] Wallace to Secretary of State, Sept. 8, 1920, *SDNA*, 751.64/7.
[35] See Deák, *Hungary at the Peace Conference*, p. 310, n. 63.
[36] *Világ*, Aug. 18, 1920. Translated by the American mission in Budapest, *SDNA*, 760c. 61/306.

was to serve against Germany and Russia alike.[37] This was certainly not what Paléologue was trying to achieve with his pro-Hungarian course, but his diplomacy could have led to such developments. As it was, the line pursued by the Quai d'Orsay produced a reaction which Paris had neither foreseen nor bargained for. This reaction took the form of the Little Entente.

2

The idea of close cooperation between the successor states of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy had been alive well before the autumn of 1920. Plans for a regional entente were discussed during the war, and the Mid-European Democratic Union, organized under Masaryk's sponsorship in the United States, promoted them. During the conflict between Béla Kun's Hungary on the one side and Czechoslovakia and Rumania on the other, in June 1919 the *České Slovo* wrote about the need for a Czechoslovak-Polish-Rumanian-Yugoslav alliance.[38] While differences between Poland and Czechoslovakia prevented a systematic collaboration of the two countries at the Paris Peace Conference, there were instances of joint action on the part of the four states, as in the case of the presentation of peace terms to Austria.[39]

When there were delays in signing a peace treaty with Hungary, Prague, Bucharest, and Belgrade felt the need for closer ties. A military convention on November 2, 1919, between Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia witnessed their hope for cooperation in defense. Beneš's talks with Trumbič in December 1919 in Paris attested to the wish for political links. When the Treaty of Trianon came under discussion, Beneš urged his partners to coordinated action "in view of the situation in Hungary." He added, perhaps already aware of direct French-Hungarian exchanges, that "we shall have a rather hard task to defend ourselves in Paris."[40] Talks between Prague, Belgrade, and Bucharest began.

The Treaty of Trianon did not injure any Czechoslovak interests or those of their friends, but the continuing negotiations between France and Hungary, the critical Polish situation, the Kapp Putsch in Germany, and the intense Hungarian revisionist campaign, together with

[37] Berthelot for one believed that Hungary could not be persuaded by France to join any anti-German bloc. Zamoyski to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Oct. 12, 1920, *AGND*, 61/6369T4.

[38] *BPPT*, June 1–Aug. 30, 1919, Nos. 1–3, p. 3.

[39] See above pp. 59–60.

[40] Beneš to Vaida Voevod, Jan. 5, 1920. République Tchécoslovaque, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, *Documents diplomatiques relatifs aux conventions d'alliance conclues par la République Tchécoslovaque avec le Royaume des Serbes, Croates et Slovènes et le Royaume de Roumanie: Déc. 1919–Août 1921* (Prague, 1923), p. 15 (hereafter cited as *Conventions d'alliance*).

rumors that Hungarian divisions would relieve Poland by crossing Czechoslovak territory, influenced Prague to take immediate steps to safeguard her international position. Beneš hastened to Belgrade, and on August 14 on the eve of the battle of Warsaw the foreign ministers of Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia signed a defensive alliance. The convention was a short document which referred in its preamble to the need of maintaining the Treaty of Trianon, and pointed in Article 1 to Hungary as a possible aggressor.[41]

Three days later Beneš journeyed to Bucharest to induce Rumania to join the alliance. The Rumanian foreign minister Take Ionescu did not see the situation in the same light as Beneš, and the two ministers made only oral promises to help each other in case of Hungarian aggression. The joint Bucharest communiqué spoke of the need for a general alliance in East Central Europe open to all victor countries and designed to uphold and guarantee the peace treaties in that area. But even if Rumania was not yet fully committed, the system known later as the Little Entente was born, having appeared as an unexpected by-product of Paléologue's Hungarian policy. Foreign diplomats noted this fact almost immediately and commented on it.

The Polish military attaché reported from Vienna that "it is precisely the improvement of the position of the Hungarians and their negotiations with France . . . that prompted Beneš" to form the new group.[42] An interpellation tabled in the French Chamber of Deputies inquired whether the Little Entente was not "an attempt at defense against that reaction" which had set in at the Quai d'Orsay under Paléologue's leadership.[43] The American chargé d'affaires reported from Prague that Beneš had told him that "one reason for the formation of the Little Entente was to give immediate and convincing proof to the Allies that a Danube Confederation was totally unnecessary."[44] The Czechoslovak foreign minister developed this point by stating that the idea of a Danubian confederation "can be quietly abandoned once and for all, because we can get together ourselves, and establish order and close collaboration without the creation of political and economic units harmful to the interests of various [successor] states."[45]

Beneš pointed out in private that the French-Hungarian negotiations had already done harm by enabling Germany to fish in troubled Danubian waters. The American mission in Budapest wrote that Beneš had shown the French minister a copy of an alleged agreement between Paris

[41] See the English text in Robert Machray, *The Little Entente* (London, 1929), pp. 363–364.

[42] Report of Nov. 11, 1920, *AGND*, 50/5808.

[43] *Débats*, 1920, Session extraordinaire, 6.

[44] Castle to Secretary of State, Nov. 6, 1920, *SDNA*, 860f.00/218.

[45] *Le Matin*, Aug. 30, 1920.

and Budapest which provided for dismemberment of Czechoslovakia, and described it as manufactured in Germany.[46] Almost simultaneously Beneš told Crane that Budapest had been circulating "a copy of a treaty with France by which in return for Hungarian assistance to Poland Hungary would be rewarded with territory at expense of Czechoslovakia and Jugo-Slavia."[47] The American minister added that although Prague considered the document false, an economic agreement existed, and this alone permitted Budapest to make political capital.

The Czechoslovak government was careful not to accuse France of disloyalty and was guarded in criticism of French foreign policy, but Czech newspapers such as the National Democratic *Národní Listy* and the Agrarian *Venkov* complained openly on August 14, 1920, of Paléologue's pro-Hungarian line and expressed concern over the machinations of French capitalists.

Beneš did his best to present the Little Entente as something positive and lasting, an organization called into existence to do more than counter Hungarian revisionism or check Paléologue's game in the Danubian basin. He emphasized its ideological foundation and spoke in Masarykian terms about its being an important element in the struggle between democracy and reaction. The minister commented on the usefulness of the Little Entente in fostering economic ties between the successor states, and generally represented the new group as a first step in the direction of postwar European reconstruction.[48] Although Beneš spoke, of course, of the Hungarian threat to the new order in the Danubian area, he mentioned the Kapp Putsch in Germany, which the French at least may have considered a more valid reason for closing Allied ranks.

There is little doubt that formation of the Little Entente in August 1920 came as an unpleasant surprise to Paris, or that it ran counter to Paléologue's policy in East Central Europe. The announcement of Czechoslovak neutrality on August 7 had already been a shock for France, and Paris called in the French minister in Prague, Joseph Couget, and the commander-in-chief of the Czechoslovak army, General Pellé, to explain why they had been unable to prevent it. The Czech move created a bad impression, especially because according to French reports from Czechoslovakia "Czech troops would have been well suited for a defensive action in the Carpathians."[49] Creation of the Little Entente made matters worse; Jacques Bainville called the new group a

[46] American mission to Secretary of State, Aug. 30, 1920, *SDNA*, 751.64/6.

[47] Crane to Secretary of State, Aug. 31, 1920, *SDNA*, 760f.65/1.

[48] See Beneš's speeches of Sept. 1 and 15, 1920, in *Problémy nové Evropy*, pp. 81–99 and 136ff; his long analysis in *Five Years of Czechoslovak Foreign Policy* (Prague, 1924); his interview in *Le Journal des Débats*, Aug. 15, 1920; and his article, "The Little Entente," *Foreign Affairs*, I (1922–23), 66–72.

[49] Report of the Polish military attaché from Vienna, Nov. 11, 1920, *AGND*, 50/5808.

"league of neutrals" and declared that in spite of all the Czech promises of solidarity with France they set up an organization which favored Russia "and along with Russia, Germany." [50] The Rightist *L'Éclair* wrote that France could not properly be accused of taking the side of Hungary against Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, while "Czechoslovakia did not cease to pursue a policy exactly contrary to ours." The paper added that the Little Entente was set up by Beneš, who "profited from the Polish defeats," and that France would be justified in taking offense.[51]

A writer close to French diplomatic circles recalled that the rapid organization of the Little Entente seemed "to have thrown the Quai d'Orsay into a kind of stupor." [52] According to Hungarian sources Beneš and Pasič had informed the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs of their project, and Paléologue "warned Beneš as well as the Yugoslavs against these plans." [53] The director of the political section at the Quai d'Orsay, Count Emmanuel Peretti de la Rocca, told the Hungarian envoy in Paris that "the Little Entente may almost be regarded as directed against France." [54] When Beneš and Pasič approached Paléologue a little later he apparently told them that "the French Government does not approve of this alliance." [55] The Hungarian diplomat could only conclude that "the present leaders of French foreign policy are in general in opposition to the Little Entente," and he reported that several statesmen and a good part of the press continued "to attack the Little Entente and particularly the Czechs." [56]

In appraising the negative reaction of Paris one can see two different though related sets of reasons which conditioned it. They were respectively of a military-political and of an economic-political nature.

The convention of Belgrade, and Beneš's attempts to draw in Rumania, undermined the efforts of the French diplomacy to strengthen Poland in her way by establishing a common anti-Bolshevik front in East Central Europe. Paris and Warsaw looking for allies against the Soviet threat were trying at this time to bring Hungary and Rumania — the latter nation naturally feared Soviet Russia most — closer to one another. It was hoped that Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia would be persuaded to join.[57] This was not an easy thing to accomplish, and one cannot say with cer-

[50] *Conséquences politiques de la paix*, p. 124; compare with *Russie et la barrière de l'est*, p. 171.

[51] *L'Éclair*, Sept. 6, 1920.

[52] Bardoux, *De Paris à Spa*, p. 387.

[53] Praznovszky to Teleki, Aug. 20, 1920, *FRH*, I, 593.

[54] Praznovszky to Teleki, Sept. 4, 1920, *ibid.*, I, 516.

[55] Csáky to Csekonics, Oct. 5, 1920, *ibid.*, I, 669.

[56] Praznovszky to Teleki, Sept. 13, 1920, *ibid.*, I, 631.

[57] See Praznovszky to Teleki, Aug. 18, 1920, *ibid.*, I, 589, and 606–607; also Szarota to Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sept. 20, 1920, *CD*, "Czechosłowacko-polskie stosunki 1920."

tainty whether the plan would have worked under the most favorable circumstances. The Poles were aware that it was difficult to overcome Hungarian-Rumanian animosities and bring them together. Sapieha felt that Paris was not pursuing the right way of breaking Czechoslovak resistance, and he told the Hungarian envoy that the French "have not lost their illusions about the Czechs." [58] Whatever chances the French-sponsored block ever had, formation of the Little Entente clearly cut the ground from under its feet. Paris felt therefore that Prague's action might have produced dire consequences for the military and political situation of East Central Europe, and the French could well consider the sponsors of the Little Entente myopic in noticing only the Hungarian danger and not seeing the Soviet threat to the European order.

Viewed from the economic angle the Little Entente appeared as a menace to the French scheme for economic expansion and integration in the Danubian area. The Italian press noted with satisfaction that the Little Entente "constituted an effort to escape the economic monopoly of French finance, and to destroy the French dream of a Danubian confederation." [59] Economic considerations went hand in hand with political motives, and the Polish diplomat Piltz noted interesting French reactions in that respect. Piltz reported a long conversation with Couget in Prague in which the French minister criticized the Little Entente for its anti-Hungarian character. But Piltz remarked:

"I have the feeling that something much more important is at stake here. It is the fear that the Czech-Yugoslav-Rumanian bloc exploiting internal dissensions among the [great] Allies could emancipate itself from their influence and particularly from the influence of France. In such a case [the Little Entente] instead of strengthening the power of France could weaken it vis-à-vis England." [60]

Thus the new group could seriously interfere with both the economic and political interests of France, and naturally this made it suspect in Paris.

The French-Czechoslovak relations cooled visibly. Piltz commented on the fact while in Prague,[61] and the Americans also observed instances of anti-French feeling in Czechoslovakia. The Czech press complained that the French military mission was costing Czechoslovakia thirteen million Czech crowns annually, and Beneš had to make promises about cutting the mission's size.[62] Czech officers in the ministry of national de-

[58] Csekonics to Teleki, July 10, 1920, *FRH*, I, 447.

[59] Bardoux, *De Paris à Spa*, p. 387.

[60] Piltz to Minister of Foreign Affairs, Aug. 30, 1920, *CD*, "Czechosłowacko-polskie stosunki 1920."

[61] *Ibid.*

[62] Crane to Secretary of State, Nov. 16, 1920, *SDNA*, 860f.00/139. According to this report the mission numbered at this time eight generals, thirteen colonels, and twenty lieu-

fense were jealous of the highly paid and self-assured Frenchmen and animosity prevailed.[63] The Czechs also complained occasionally about the methods of French businessmen coming to Czechoslovakia. Even Beneš, despite his determination to gain French support by offering economic concessions, was forced to remark in an interview with Marcel Mareau of the *Agence Économique et Financière* that "The politicians, financiers, and merchants of the Allies must not come to our state as if it were a colony or a state which has no national economic tradition at all." [64] Pro-French feelings in Prague had declined, so the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs commented in its internal bulletin.[65]

Neither Prague nor Paris could in the long run indulge in the luxury of mutual recrimination. Polish victory in the Bolshevik war lessened the urgency of an anti-Soviet bloc, and even Paléologue changed his views on the need for Hungarian rearmament.[66] Untiring Czech efforts to expose Hungarian revisionism began to tell. Paléologue's *chef de cabinet*, Montille, assured the Hungarians that France would never permit the Little Entente "to attack us," but he "warned at the same time Hungary against making any warlike action against these states." [67] Rumors circulated about Hungarian plans for an invasion of Slovakia, and the government in Budapest admitted that "some irresponsible persons" had been preparing such a coup.[68] News of contacts between Horthy and Ludendorff aroused suspicion in Paris, and Czechoslovak propaganda played them up. The Hungarians on their side complained to Laroche that the Franco-Hungarian *rapprochement* "was conditioned on some easing of the pressure on Hungary," but that on the French side "nothing had been done about it." [69]

The big Parisian newspapers of the Center and the Right began to question openly the wisdom of Paléologue's diplomacy. Pertinax, writing in *L'Echo de Paris* on September 8, warned against the policy of heavy

tenant colonels. The total figures of French officers in Czechoslovakia were 135 in Jan. 1920 and 85 in Jan. 1921. See Mission Militaire Française, "Rapport de Fin de Mission."

[63] DuBois' report, Jan. 13, 1921, *SDNA*, 751.60f/1. Also Soják, *O zahraniční politice*, who writes on page 44 that the annual budget of the French mission totaled twenty million crowns. Compare Peroutka, *Budování státu* II/II, 1074–1076.

[64] The English translation from *Národní Politika*, Dec. 7, 1919, is included in Crane's dispatch to Secretary of State, Dec. 12, *SDNA*, 860f.50/1.

[65] Przegląd Polityczny nr. 20, May 24, 1920, *CD*, "Czechosłowacko-polskie stosunki 1920."

[66] Praznovszky to Teleki, Aug. 27, 1920, *FRH*, I, 603. Horthy recalled that France made "half-promises and vague assurances concerning the relaxation of the terms of the Treaty of Trianon . . . when it was likely that Hungary would have to lend support to Poland" and "promptly lost interest in Hungary" after the battle of Warsaw. Nicholas Horthy, *Memoirs* (London, 1956), p. 120.

[67] Praznovszky to Teleki, Sept. 2, 1920, *FRH*, I, 614.

[68] Teleki to Tahy, Dec. 24, 1920, *ibid.*, I, 829.

[69] Praznovszky to Teleki, Sept. 21, 1920, *FRH*, I, 638.

investments in Hungary, which was bound to alarm the friends of France in the Danubian area. *Le Petit Parisien* had come out two days earlier with an article in which it spoke about Hungarian intrigues in France and linked them to French-Hungarian negotiations. Bardoux in his book which appeared in 1921 commented that the Little Entente could be useful as an "intermediary between France and Russia," [70] and this thought may well have crossed the minds of other people in Paris. The stage was prepared for abandonment of the pro-Hungarian policy.

Business circles were probably the most reluctant to see this happen, and *Le Matin* which stood close to them wrote with pride on September 2, 1920, about French economic expansion in East Central Europe and enumerated French-controlled enterprises in Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Poland, and Yugoslavia. The paper spoke also of Hungary which clearly fitted this general scheme, and assured its readers that the pro-Hungarian policy did not run against the Little Entente and was merely part of the great design for economic integration of East Central Europe. But if big business regretted the loss of Hungarian opportunities, there were many possibilities for further penetration of the Little Entente countries.

The Czechoslovak government had long been aware of the usefulness of economic concessions for achieving political ends. Toward the end of 1919 Beneš had insisted, and won the point, that French groups be given special privileges for sugar purchases in Czechoslovakia — below the world prices — and he viewed the matter in political rather than economic terms.[71] In late 1919 and in the course of 1920, French capital obtained concessions in Czechoslovakia. The Prague Credit Bank sold many shares to the *Société Générale*, the *Banque de Paris et des Pays Bas*, and to *Crédit Mobilier Français*, to mention only the leading banks.[72] The influential French diplomat Charles Kammerer represented French interests on the administrative board of the Credit Bank. The concern of Schneider-Creusot purchased in September 1920 the majority of stock of the Škoda works, and E. Schneider, Henry Weyl, and Victor Champignol joined the board of directors.[73] The United Machine Works in Prague came under control of the same French concern, which also acquired interests in Teschen under circumstances already discussed. The French invested capital in the textile industry, notably in Trenčin, in paper factories, and the *Živnostenská* bank established relations with *Crédit Lyonnais*.

In the autumn of 1920 Czechoslovakia and France negotiated a trade

[70] *De Paris à Spa*, p. 389.

[71] British report from Vienna, Oct. 17, 1919, *DBFP*, 1st series, VI, 298. See also Peroutka, *Budování statu*, II/II, 1338.

[72] American mission from Prague to Secretary of State, Sept. 5, 1919, *SDNA*, 860f.51/45.

[73] Howell to Secretary of State, July 29, 1921, *ibid.*, 860f.51/101.

agreement, which was signed on November 4. It was not a perfect arrangement and did not fully satisfy either side. The French were unwilling to grant the most-favored-nation clause, and in fact one reason for their expansion in the direction of the "new" states was that they did not need to worry about prorogation clauses which made their trade with their prewar partners less lucrative. Even so, Prague got as close to a most-favored-nation treatment as possible, and were it not for the raising of French tariffs in March 1921, the commercial convention would have been decidedly advantageous to her.[74] It is true that in spite of mutual efforts the volume of trade between France and Czechoslovakia remained small, and French products were only in twelfth place on the Czechoslovak list of imports for the first nine months of 1921.[75] Nevertheless French economic stakes in Czechoslovakia were important enough to influence the course of policy and to help remove temporary misunderstandings between Paris and Prague.

The decisive element in the return of France to its pro-Czechoslovak policy was probably the resignation of Paléologue from the secretaryship at the Quai d'Orsay. The Hungarians reported that a small Czechoslovak mission came to Paris to find out about the French-Hungarian dealings, and it was rumored that "Paléologue's resignation" was "partly due to Czech intrigues." [76] Be that as it may,[77] one thing is evident, namely that Paléologue's successor, Philippe Berthelot, was from the Czechoslovak point of view the ideal man to assume direction of the Quai d'Orsay. The Czechs were convinced that French pro-Hungarian policy prevailed only "because Berthelot's will could not have asserted itself at that time," [78] and Berthelot working under the weak and colorless Leygues, who was premier and foreign minister, could be counted upon to reverse the trend and pursue a policy friendly to Prague. The Hungarian envoy in Paris reported that "there can no longer be any doubt that the policy adopted by the new personnel of the Quai d'Orsay is the support of the Little Entente." [79] Thus the idea of the Little Entente was clearly triumphing

[74] See Howell to Secretary of State, July 29, 1921, *ibid.*, 860f.51/58; Henri de Jouvenel *et al.*, *Notre diplomatie économique* (Paris, 1925), *passim*; and Zygmunt Rawita-Gawroński, *Konwencja handlowa polsko-francuska* (Warsaw, 1923), p. 2, which compares the French-Polish and the Czechoslovak-French commercial conventions.

[75] *Zahraniční Politika*, I, (1922), 3.

[76] Praznovszky to Csáky, Oct. 8, 1920, *FRH*, I, 677.

[77] Laroche writes that Paléologue's resignation was connected with Millerand's election to the presidency of the republic and the nomination of Leygues as premier and foreign minister. Paléologue told Laroche that he had accepted the position of secretary general "only out of his friendship for Millerand." *Au Quai d'Orsay*, p. 128. The Polish minister in Paris reported that Paléologue's policy had always been considered "vague" and the officials at the Quai d'Orsay pursued it reluctantly. Zamoyski to Minister of Foreign Affairs, Oct. 12, 1920, *AGND*, 61/6369T4.

[78] *Zahraniční Politika*, I (1922), 92.

[79] Praznovszky to Csáky, Oct. 17, 1920, *FRH*, I, 696.

over that of a Danubian confederation, but in view of the attitude of Bucharest and of Warsaw its ultimate form and structure remained an open question.

3

The policy of Rumania and Poland during the summer and autumn of 1920 was of great importance for the future of the East Central European area. In its appraisal of the international situation Bucharest stood halfway between Poland and Czechoslovakia. It shared with Poland the apprehension of Soviet Russia and favored an international organization that would provide safeguards against renewed Bolshevik expansion. At the same time Bucharest was conscious of the dangers stemming from Hungarian revisionism, and this brought it closer to Prague. If Rumanian and Hungarian interests could have been reconciled, Rumania would probably have shown little enthusiasm for the Little Entente, which proved to be no security against Soviet Russia, but the question of Transylvania constituted an insurmountable obstacle to harmony.[80] The efforts of Paris and Warsaw to create a Polish-Hungarian-Rumanian bloc were therefore unlikely to succeed, and creation of the first link in the Little Entente system offered limited but real possibilities. The able and resourceful Rumanian foreign minister, Take Ionescu, had to think in terms of realities, not of vague and illusory conceptions, and the best he could do was to bring the form and structure of the Little Entente closer to the Rumanian point of view. In October 1920 Ionescu set out on a journey to the western capitals to ascertain their views and to expose his ideas on cooperation in East Central Europe. The Rumanian minister favored a plan which would enlarge the Little Entente and transform it from a restricted anti-Hungarian combination into a vast security system in the area between Germany, Italy, and Russia.

Ionescu elaborated his program in an interview accorded to the French newspaper *L'Éclair* on September 13, 1920. He said that the Little Entente ought to include Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Rumania, and Greece, and ought to become a pro-French group blocking German expansion to the east. He emphasized the significance of Rumania having common borders with Poland and Czechoslovakia, taking thereby an anti-Hungarian and anti-Russian attitude at the same time. The Bucharest press backed him, and articles appeared advocating a bloc extending

[80] The maneuvering of the Rumanians is illustrated by a rumor picked up by Polish diplomats, according to which Prague had offered Subcarpathian Ukraine to Rumania to induce her to cooperate. Rumania apparently thought of ceding in turn this province to Hungary to gain the friendship of the latter which, of course, alarmed Prague and put an end to the whole transaction. Szarota to the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sept. 20, 1920, *CD*, "Czechosłowacko-polskie stosunki 1920."

from the Baltic to the Aegean, opposing both Bolshevism and imperialism.[81] Ionescu's clearest statement came a little later when he declared that

"My personal desire would be to arrive at a formula which would also include the indirect and general interests of the victorious peoples. The Little Entente could then become the alliance of all the victors in Central and Eastern Europe with the object of upholding *all the treaties against any attack*." [82]

Paris reacted favorably to the Ionescu plan. Berthelot considered Paléologue's idea of a Rumanian-Polish-Hungarian bloc not only unrealistic (given the impossibility of a Hungarian-Rumanian entente) but dangerous because it could push Czechoslovakia into the arms of Germany. Millerand assured the Rumanian statesman during the latter's visit in Paris that France no longer contemplated any French-Hungarian treaties and that she would look with favor upon an enlarged Little Entente.[83] These assurances were echoed in a joint communiqué by Take Ionescu and Beneš in Prague on October 31. The relevant passage stated that "all misunderstandings on the subject of the Little Entente have been dissipated" and "all the combinations relating to the Hungarian affair are definitely dead." [84]

It is obvious that the Rumanian plan could have well satisfied French desires for the establishment of a true barrier in East Central Europe,[85] and its scope would have removed the anti-Hungarian tinge of the original group. The Hungarian envoy reported from Paris that France having been unable to prevent creation of the Little Entente "has endeavoured to take away its specifically anti-Hungarian character by broadening the alliance so that Hungary's position in relation to the Little Entente would be less pronounced." [86] A vast regional alliance in East Central Europe hinged, however, on the ability of Czechoslovakia and Poland to cooperate closely with each other. Both Paris and Bucharest believed firmly in the need of including Poland in the enlarged Little Entente,[87] and as the Hungarian envoy wrote from France, "Every effort is being made to bring together the Czechs and the Poles." [88]

The task of convincing Warsaw and Prague proved, however, to be hard and thankless. The Polish government had taken a strongly nega-

[81] See Mousset, *La Petite entente*, pp. 28–29.

[82] Quoted in *Survey of International Affairs 1920–1923*, p. 209. Italics added.

[83] Machray, *The Little Entente*, p. 135.

[84] *Conventions d'alliance*, p. 77.

[85] See Starzewski, *Zarys dziejów*, p. 85.

[86] Praznovszky to Teleki, Sept. 13, 1920, *FRH*, I, 630.

[87] Soják, *O zahraniční politice*, pp. 81–82. Soják mentions a report by the Czechoslovak minister in Paris, Štefan Osuský, of Oct. 27, 1920.

[88] Praznovszky to Csáky, Oct. 17, 1920, *FRH*, I, 696.

tive attitude toward the Little Entente. The timing of the Czechoslovak-Yugoslav convention, the fact that the scheme originated in Prague, and the feeling that it undermined a Polish-Hungarian-Rumanian anti-Bolshevik bloc provided sufficient reasons for Warsaw to suspect the character of the group. Paderewski in an interview in *L'Intransigeant* on September 14 stated that the Little Entente "would seem to be formed against us." The Polish minister of finance, Leon Biliński, in a letter addressed to the vice-premier, Daszyński, wrote that the Little Entente was directed not only against Hungary but against Poland. Biliński advocated a union of states in East Central Europe which together with France could free everybody "from the brutality and territorial ambitions of the Czecho-Slovak state." [89] Memory of the Teschen settlement in Spa, and Czechoslovak obstruction of Polish-bound war material, was hardly conducive to calm analysis of the international situation. Piłsudski and Sapieha favored an entente between Warsaw, Budapest, and Bucharest, and attempted to put some pressure on France to help in its realization.[90] But France was now working in the opposite direction, which came as a surprise to the Poles.

The French minister in Warsaw, Panafieu, "astounded" Sapieha by informing him that Paris, "contrary to the attitude heretofore adopted, is now sympathetic to the Little Entente; moreover it would be glad to see the establishment of friendly relations between Poland and Czechoslovakia." Sapieha relating this conversation to the Hungarian envoy felt that this new French policy would not last long and assured him that "he would continue to ignore the Little Entente." [91]

To judge by the Hungarian diplomatic dispatches there existed at this time two different Polish conceptions of an international organization in East Central Europe. Sapieha apparently favored a system called by the Hungarians the "transversal bloc," which would include Finland, the Baltic states, Poland, Hungary, and Rumania.[92] Whether he promoted it consistently is hard to determine, and the American minister in Warsaw, for one, thought that Sapieha was not really enthusiastic about this idea. He also reported that Sapieha wanted to diminish the tension between Poland and Czechoslovakia, but generally Warsaw believed that "in time the Czecho-Slovakian state must fall apart and when that time comes Poland will have a common frontier with Hungary." [93]

Piltz represented the second conception, the creation of a union of the five victor states plus Hungary and Bulgaria, or in other words Take

[89] Biliński, *Wspomnienia i dokumenty*, II, 471.
[90] Praznovszky to Csáky, Sept. 24, 1920, *FRH*, I, 644.
[91] Csekonics to Teleki, Oct. 2, 1920, *ibid.*, I, 665.
[92] Csekonics to Csáky, Oct. 23, 1920, *FRH*, I, 707–708.
[93] Gibson to Secretary of State, Nov. 17, 1920, *SDNA*, 860c.00/75.

Ionescu's union with the addition of the former enemy states. Piltz whom the Hungarian envoy considered "thoroughly pro-French" made it clear to the latter that he considered Czechoslovakia the most important state, besides Poland, in East Central Europe, and this was consistent with the pro-Czech feelings[94] which Piltz had demonstrated during the war. The Hungarians noticed also that the National Democrats, of whom Piltz was one, together with their press, used a far more moderate tone when speaking about the Czechs than the rest of the Polish political groups, who often recalled Czech unfriendliness toward Poland and attacked Prague violently.

There is no doubt that public opinion in Poland in the autumn of 1920 was unfriendly toward the Czechs, and those Polish statesmen who favored any *rapprochement* between the two countries had to admit that Prague did not really come out with any concrete offers of collaboration. It is true that the Czechoslovak government made gestures toward Poland, but these did not show that the two states narrowed in any way the gap between their views on essential matters of foreign policy.

In late August, Beneš told D'Abernon that "if we can form a group between Czecho-Slovakia, Serbia and Rumania, and add Poland to this, we can be indifferent to any attack from the Soviets or from Russia, and we can also keep Hungary quiet."[95] Shortly afterward Jusserand and Weygand talked to Piltz and asked him to work for Czechoslovak-Polish understanding, which Masaryk and Beneš "sincerely desire."[96] Such an understanding appeared to the two Frenchmen "necessary from the point of view of both French and Polish interests." Piltz talked also to Masaryk and Beneš who expressed a wish to establish a genuine modus vivendi between the two countries.

What were the motives behind the Czechoslovak overtures? Piltz felt that the Czech approaches were a result of Prague's anxiety "about the future of the Czechoslovak state, which despite all the appearances is an artificial state agglomerate and may be shaken in its foundations by the first major storm."[97] It is also likely that Prague wanted to detach Poland from Hungary and bury once and for all the Danubian schemes. There is little indication that Beneš seriously promoted inclusion of Poland in the Little Entente to strengthen anti-Soviet defenses, as he told D'Abernon. On the contrary Prague unlike Rumania did not feel endangered from the east, and an alliance with Poland would have compromised her neutral position.

Masaryk told Piltz that the Poles showed "too much hatred of Rus-

[94] Csekonics to Csáky, Oct. 13, 1920, *FRH*, I, 707.
[95] D'Abernon, *The Eighteenth Battle*, p. 112.
[96] Report of Piltz, Aug. 30, 1920, *CD*, "Czechosłowacko-polskie stosunki 1920."
[97] *Ibid.*

sia,"[98] and Beneš expressed his point of view much more clearly to the American envoy in Prague. He explained that it would be difficult for Czechoslovakia to become closely associated with a Poland led by such men as Piłsudski and Sapieha, who both came from Wilno and wanted to annex this province. Furthermore "Czecho-Slovakia would not be inclined to an alliance with Poland which involves Russian territory."[99] The *Čas,* generally regarded as Beneš's mouthpiece, wrote in late October 1920 that Czechoslovakia did not care to become mixed up in Polish-Russian controversies,[100] and it is hardly surprising that Prague showed little enthusiasm for Ionescu's scheme which would involve guarantee of all treaties in East Central Europe, including the Riga settlement.

The Czechs knew well that it was the Russian question rather than resentment over Teschen which prevented cooperation between the two countries. A Czechoslovak assistant commissioner on the Czechoslovak-Polish boundary commission told an American diplomat that if Prague would support the Poles "in their East Galician policy" and cede Subcarpathian Ukraine to Hungary, "they would be willing to give up the whole of Teschen in return for these concessions."[101] Be that as it may, the eastern question constituted the main obstacle to Polish-Czechoslovak reconciliation. Paderewski saw it too and wrote that

"The Czechs would like to have influence in Russia, and they still think secretly about a common border with Russia, and give support to the Ukrainians from Galicia. They would like to be the representatives of the League [of Nations] in the east, and we stand clearly in their way."[102]

Under these conditions the presence in Prague of a representation of the "Western Ukrainian Republic," which issued passports, honored by Czechoslovakia,[103] added to the tension.

The willingness expressed by Masaryk and Beneš to eliminate Czechoslovak-Polish friction did not signify desire for an alliance or intimate political association. Prague could use admirably the Little Entente as it was — an instrument for the limited purpose of keeping Hungary in check — and had no interest in bringing in Poland and transforming the group into a big bloc opposed not only by Germany and Russia but also by Britain.[104] By making overtures to the Poles Beneš behaved as a good

[98] *Ibid.*

[99] Crane to Secretary of State, Aug. 31, 1920, *SDNA*, 760f.65/1.

[100] Reported by Crane, Nov. 3, 1920, *ibid.*, 860f.00/135.

[101] DuBois to Secretary of State, Dec. 16, 1920, *ibid.*, 760c.60f/83.

[102] Report from Geneva, Dec. 6, 1920, *CD*, "Liga Narodów."

[103] Soják, *O zahraniční politice*, p. 83.

[104] Lloyd George strongly advised Ionescu against including Poland in the Little Entente, and said that it would amount to placing the fate of the whole group in the hands of Piłsudski who was "a mere adventurer." *DBFP*, 1st series, VIII, 797. Piltz recalled that Prague was careful not to make the Little Entente appear as a French-oriented scheme,

diplomat, offering no concessions but preserving the appearance of reasonableness and showing his concern for neighborly relations. Polish diplomacy, on the other hand, was incapable of it, and gained little credit by insisting on close collaboration or nothing at all.

Warsaw and Prague clearly stood in opposition to each other. Warsaw disliked the Little Entente, was vocal in its criticism of the Czechs, was unwilling to consider the Little Entente's transformation, and attempted instead to bring Rumania closer to Poland. Prague while far more discreet — Beneš in fact said in an interview in *Le Matin* that he would be glad to welcome Poland in the Little Entente — was interested only in bringing Bucharest into the anti-Hungarian combination. Without documentary evidence one cannot say what pressure, if any, Paris applied on Prague to make it change its mind, but one can assume that the French and the Czechoslovaks saw the Russian question in a similar fashion, which differed however from the Polish point of view. This probably made any pressure less effective.

Under these conditions Ionescu went to Warsaw at the beginning of November 1920 and attempted to reconcile two irreconcilable positions, and the result was futile. At the official dinner given in his honor at the Bristol Hotel, Sapieha spoke at length about Polish-Rumanian *rapprochement* without reference to the Little Entente. Ionescu in turn talked about a league of victor states in East Central Europe.[105] The *Naród*, which stood close to Piłsudski, wrote emphatically on November 2, during Ionescu's stay in Warsaw, that "French diplomacy will not approve the creation of the Little Entente without Poland . . . nor will she allow this new coalition to be oriented against Hungary," because it would only push Hungary and Austria into the arms of Germany. Therefore, the article went on, the only sensible alternative was a union of all nations between the Baltic and the Black Sea, who "like Rumania and Poland are interested in combating the German and Bolshevik trends."[106] Warsaw's stand was crystal clear, and no way out was possible. The Polish negative attitude emerged a month later when Paderewski wrote from Geneva that he had been approached by Take Ionescu with a proposal of a bloc within the League composed of four states (Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Rumania) for gaining permanent representation on the Council. Paderewski refused in accordance with Sapieha's instructions "not to engage ourselves with the Little Entente," and he began to work instead against Beneš's candidacy for membership on the Council of the League.[107]

and showed anxiety lest Britain would consider it as such. Piltz to Minister of Foreign Affairs, Aug. 30, 1920, *CD*, "Czechosłowacko-polskie stosunki 1920."

[105] *BPPP*, Oct. 24–Nov. 9, 1920, No. 9, p. 2.

[106] *Ibid.*, p. 1.

[107] Paderewski to Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dec. 6, 1920, *CD*, "Liga Narodów."

The attempt to establish in East Central Europe a large union of victor states intimately connected with France foundered on the rocks of Czechoslovak-Polish disunity. Rumania solved her problems by joining the Little Entente in April–June 1921, and by signing an alliance with Poland in March 1921.[108] Poland remained outside any multilateral arrangement. The immediate winner — in the long run this victory appears Pyrrhic — was Beneš who maintained and consolidated his group as originally designed. The Little Entente was a poor substitute for an eastern barrier since it provided no protection against either Germany or Russia, but Paris accepted it as it stood. Aristide Briand, shortly after becoming premier and taking over the Quai d'Orsay in January 1921, expressed full approval of Beneš's policy in the Danubian area. In his telegram to the Czechoslovak foreign minister he stated that France "follows with special sympathy the activity which you attempt to pursue in grouping within a close union the allied states of Central Europe, signatories, together with France, of treaties on which the general peace is resting . . . ."[109]

Prague must have greeted this telegram with profound satisfaction. Here was a complete vindication of Beneš's policy which had led to the formation of the Little Entente, and also ample amends for the French attitude of early 1920.

But if Prague had cause to rejoice, Paris could hardly claim that the total balance of its Danubian policy in 1920 was really favorable. The Quai d'Orsay, acting largely on the initiative of Paléologue but with the approval and endorsement of Millerand, had engaged in tortuous and hesitant policies in East Central Europe. The Hungarian episode did not result in gaining Hungary and it worsened relations with Prague. It contributed to the creation of the Little Entente. Ambitious plans for a barrier to serve against Bolshevism and Germany had to give way for a small group against a defeated and defenseless Hungary. The Little Entente in the long run was bound to restrict French political maneuvering in the Danubian area, and this gave rise to later accusations that Prague rather than Paris, and Beneš more than any French foreign minister, directed French policy in that region.[110] Czechoslovak-Polish understanding and collaboration, which offered the key to an effective security system in East Central Europe, was as remote as ever.

[108] The Polish-Rumanian alliance contained a secret protocol which opened the door for *rapprochement* between Poland and the Little Entente. See Starzewski, *Zarys dziejów*, p. 90.

[109] Cited in Georges Picot, "La Politique extérieure de la République Tchéco-Slovaque," *Revue des Sciences Politiques*, XLIV (1921), 242.

[110] See Flandin, *La Politique française*, p. 114. The assertion by Potemkin that the Little Entente was French inspired and directed against the Soviet Union is typical of this work. *Histoire de la diplomatie*, III, 97–98.

8

FRENCH-POLISH ALLIANCE

DURING the winter of 1920–1921 Paris had good cause to reappraise the situation in East Central Europe and to adapt its policies accordingly. The Little Entente though set up against French wishes was there to stay, and the Quai d'Orsay decided to endorse it. The *Revue des Deux Mondes* voiced the general satisfaction that France had broken "with the strange policy which we had practised last year in Central Europe, and which would have ended by displeasing all our friends there." [1] As for Poland, Paris noted that although the position of that country became more stable after the Polish-Soviet war, multiple problems remained which required undivided attention.

If the French government was not fully satisfied with the Riga settlement, because of the character of the new borders and the isolation of Wrangel, it was impressed because Poland had demonstrated greater force and vitality than expected. The Polish intelligence service reported from Paris that the French showed more interest in Piłsudski, and in the Witos government, than ever before,[2] and the Polish liaison officer reported a change of attitude at the Quai d'Orsay in favor of the head of the Polish state.[3]

Poland obviously needed assistance. The preliminaries at Riga in October 1920 had ended the fighting, but lasting peace was not yet certain, and rumors circulated about resumption of hostilities in the spring. The question of Wilno was far from settled and the Polish-Lithuanian controversy continued. While France adopted on the whole a friendly attitude toward Polish eastern problems, and refused to recognize Lithuania *de jure* until a final settlement was made,[4] she did not commit herself on the frontiers as traced in Riga. And there was also Upper Silesia, where the pending plebiscite worried Paris and Warsaw, and constituted indeed the crucial problem of this period.

Tension in Upper Silesia mounted through the summer and autumn

[1] *La Revue des Deux Mondes*, 6th series, Vol. 61 (1921), 667.
[2] Report of the 2nd bureau, Nov. 30, 1920, *AGND*, 10/5933.
[3] Morstin to Supreme Command, Sept. 30, 1920, *ibid.*, 29/5174/T4.
[4] See Zamoyski to Minister of Foreign Affairs, June 14, 1921, *ibid.*, 39/7904.

of 1920, and the Poles struggled to achieve an equal position there with the Germans. At the time of the battle of Warsaw, the Germans provoked a Polish uprising which lasted until a German-Polish agreement was signed at the headquarters of the Allied plebiscite commission on October 2, 1920. The agreement improved the status of the Polish population, but other tensions remained, such as the split within the plebiscite commission between the French and British. The former favored the Polish side, the latter, supported by the Italians, backed the Germans. The Germans complained about French partiality to the Poles, but as the British general Carton de Wiart later recalled, "Our own mission in Upper Silesia was so pro-German that I kept away from them." [5] This division within the Allied ranks often assisted the Germans.[6]

The president of the commission, Le Rond, soon became the object of British and Italian attacks. The French general was not always tactful, and he antagonized his colleagues by his authoritarian methods.[7] His behavior provided them with an excuse for trying to get rid of him. In October 1920 three British plebiscite officials wrote a report blaming Le Rond for the tension in Upper Silesia, and consequently the general was called to Paris for consultation. The incident led to a British-French showdown. The British wanted "the head of General Le Rond"; [8] Paris made the rejection of the demand for his recall a matter of honor. *L'Echo de Paris* wrote that for France to give in "would destroy French prestige and authority not only in Poland but throughout Eastern Europe." [9] Le Rond eventually returned, fully exonerated, to his post.

The Le Rond affair provided an apt illustration of British antagonism toward the French in Upper Silesia. There certainly was a good deal of it. The Polish minister in London believed that large issues lay behind these local incidents. According to him the British wanted to take revenge on France "for not having co-ordinated her Russian policy with that of England," and they also desired to gain "control over the coal." The Polish diplomat supposed that

"if Poland obtains Silesia her influence on France will increase because of the coal which will allow France to become more independent of the imports of English coal. England, because of her coal can now exercise political pressure on France and Italy." [10]

[5] *Happy Odyssey*, p. 95.

[6] Rabenau, *Seeckt*, p. 298. "Günstig für die Deutschen wirkte sich auch der offenkündige Gegensatz der Franzosen einerseits, der Engländer und der Italiener anderseits aus."

[7] Political report of the Polish consulate in Opole, based on a talk with Le Rond's deputy, M. Ponsot, Oct. 11, 1920, *CD*, "Górny Śląsk 1919–1920."

[8] That is what Sforza told Skirmunt. Skirmunt to Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sept. 24, 1920, *CD*, "Górny Sląsk 1919–1920."

[9] Cited in Wallace to Secretary of State, Nov. 5, 1920, *SDNA*, 741.52/2.

[10] Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Polish legation in Washington, Oct. 7, 1920, *CD*, "Górny Śląsk 1919–1920."

The French on their side were adamant, feeling that the Upper Silesian plebiscite was primarily their responsibility, France having supplied the largest contingent of troops to this area and a majority of the officials on the inter-Allied plebiscite commission.[11]

It was fear of German action in Upper Silesia condoned by the British that brought France and Poland closer together,[12] and contributed to negotiations which in February 1921 resulted in a formal alliance between the two countries.

The Poles were greatly interested in an alliance with France. As early as March 1919 the foreign affairs commission in the *Sejm* appealed to the government to conclude alliances with the Entente powers,[13] but Warsaw was then hardly in a position to make any such overtures. In December 1920 many articles appeared in the Polish press asking for an alliance with France. The National Democratic *Kurjer Poznański* criticized the government for pursuing policies which might antagonize Paris and diminish chances for a *rapprochement*; the *Rzeczpospolita* came out with a vehement appeal for an alliance with France; and the *Naród* discussed the issue carefully. This last newspaper reflected the attitude of Piłsudski, who wanted an alliance but was not prepared to pay an exorbitant price for it, and emphasized that a Polish-French entente could not mean subordination of "our policy exclusively to the interests of France." [14]

On the government level, the foreign minister, Sapieha, sounded out the French envoy in Warsaw on the possibility of an alliance, but soon "found the Quai d'Orsay very reserved." [15] On November 25, 1920, the Polish general staff submitted a plan for a military convention to the new chief of the French military mission, General Henry Niessel, and met with a similar reception. It appears that Paris had sent instructions to Panafieu outlining its views on political and military cooperation, which showed some unwillingness to become deeply committed.[16] In spite of this cautious attitude the French chargé d'affaires in Warsaw, Baron de Barante, officially invited Marshal Piłsudski on December 28 to pay a formal visit to Paris. The aim was to exchange views between the heads

[11] The French garrison consisted of the 46th infantry division composed of 12 battalions of chasseurs, one artillery regiment, and a tank unit. See Smogorzewski, "Le Plébiscite," p. 288. Within the commission the French headed the departments of internal affairs, external affairs, military affairs, and the treasury, and had 11 out of 21 district officers. See Tadeusz Jędruszczak, *Polityka Polski w sprawie Górnego Śląska 1918–1922* (Warsaw, 1958), p. 173.

[12] As early as March 1920 the French inquired if in a case of emergency Polish divisions could support Le Rond in Upper Silesia. Morstin to Rozwadowski, March 17, 1920, *AR*, II/1.

[13] *Sprawozdania stenograficzne*, 1919, II–III, 1051ff.

[14] *BPPP*, Nov. 28–Dec. 16, 1920, No. 97, pp. 5–6.

[15] Laroche, *La Pologne de Pilsudski*, p. 13.

[16] *Ibid.*, p. 14. Laroche says that these instructions, dated Nov. 17, came from Premier Briand which is impossible because Briand did not form his cabinet until Jan. 1921.

of state and to begin negotiations on a "political and economic understanding between Poland and France." [17]

The majority of the Polish press enthusiastically greeted the French invitation, but the Socialist papers and the *Naród* gave a more sober appraisal of Franco-Polish relations. The Socialist *Robotnik* recalled on January 9, 11, 13, and 15 the mistakes that Paris had committed with regard to Poland. France, the paper wrote, had long been pro-Russian; she had deprived the Poles of Teschen; she had tried to use Poland as a tool for intervention, and still seemed to favor the Curzon Line. There was an undoubted solidarity between the two countries vis-à-vis Germany, but Poland had to be careful lest an alliance with France make her "a colony of Allied imperialism." [18] The Leftist *Nowa Reforma* commented on January 4, 1921, that the Quai d'Orsay wanted "an effective *rapprochement* with Poland," but only "when the dream of old Russia was abandoned in Paris." [19] The *Naród* pointed out on January 11 that if France became Poland's ally she must promise not to support any more Russian non-Bolshevik plans for revision of the Polish-Russian borders.

While the Polish Left emphasized complete French solidarity with Poland and recognition of Polish vital interests, influential French military and political circles opposed the very idea of a close alliance with Warsaw.

Marshal Foch believed that it was imprudent to contract a military alliance with Poland in early 1921, and he was "definitely hostile" to far-reaching military commitments. Weygand seemed to share his views.[20] Foch explained his reasons in two notes of January 4 and 14, 1921: Poland, the marshal felt, "would only constitute a force when she would have an established policy, traced frontiers, an organized army, and finances in order." These were the essential requisites, and Paris ought to be satisfied that the Polish government was at least "resolved" to carry them out.[21] Foch's objections as summarized by a French diplomat amounted to saying that Poland had as yet "neither frontiers, nor a government, nor an army." [22]

In speaking of frontiers Foch meant the eastern borders rather than Upper Silesia, and he tried to find out exactly what the Polish policy was in that respect.[23] His remark about internal political conditions referred

[17] See Sprawozdanie o sytuacji wewnętrznej, No. 28 of the press section of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *CD*, "Wewnętrzne sprawy"; compare Zamoyski's letter to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Jan. 1, 1921, *AGND*, 61/6505T4, and Tommasini, *Odrodzenie Polski*, p. 288. It is likely that the initiative for this invitation came from Millerand.

[18] *BPPP*, Jan. 1–23, 1921, No. 99, pp. 2–3. [19] *Ibid.*

[20] Noël, *L'Agression allemande*, p. 101.

[21] Weygand, *Mirages et réalité*, p. 179.

[22] Noël, *L'Agression allemande*, p. 100.

[23] Morstin to Supreme Command, Dec. 2 and Dec. 24, 1920, *AGND*, 61/6169T4 and 6341T4.

doubtless to the fact that Poland had so far only a provisional constitution, and that the cabinet of Witos was losing power every day. The critical comment about the Polish army — which had just won a war — reflected the bias of a professional soldier against hastily improvised forces and against Piłsudski, whom the French military had always considered an "amateur."

The Quai d'Orsay in turn advanced objections which took into consideration the differences between French and Polish views on Russia, and it emphasized that the exposed position of Poland made her a risky ally, a liability rather than an asset. Berthelot especially opposed the alliance. The secretary of the Quai d'Orsay had apparently little more sympathy for Poland than Lloyd George, and he considered, not unlike the British premier, that Piłsudski had "an adventurous character." Berthelot also had ideological misgivings and mistrusted Polish Catholicism.[24]

The proponents of the Polish alliance in France were, however, powerful. They included the president of the republic, Millerand, who by then must have changed his opinion of Piłsudski; the minister of war, Louis Barthou; the chief of the general staff, General Edmond Buat; and the new premier and foreign minister, Aristide Briand. This last statesman, it seems, was more cautious than the others,[25] and it was chiefly due to the determination of Millerand that the Polish-French alliance was eventually signed.

Piłsudski delayed his departure for Paris until the beginning of February 1921, partly because of the state of his health and partly because of the cabinet crisis in France which defeated Leygues and brought Briand to power. In January the Polish marshal sent his trusted aide-de-camp, Colonel Bolesław Wieniewa-Długoszewski, to prepare the ground for his visit. Długoszewski talked to, among other persons, Laroche, who explained to him the French misgivings about the Wilno coup and made attempts to dissipate Piłsudski's suspicions about the French attitude toward him.

The head of the Polish state set out for France on February 2, 1921, and as he told one of his followers, he went to Paris "with real pleasure and not without a certain curiosity." [26] Millerand was not present at the station to greet him, however this was perhaps not a calculated slight but a result of poor preparations by the Polish legation in Paris.[27] On the day

[24] Laroche, *Au Quai d'Orsay*, p. 137. The Polish liaison officer in Paris reported at length about the mistrust of the Polish high command which prevailed at the Quai d'Orsay. Morstin to Supreme Command, Dec. 22, 1920, *AGND*, 61/6484T4.

[25] See Weygand, *Mirages et réalité*, p. 179; Noël, *L'Agression allemande*, p. 100; Laroche, *La Pologne de Pilsudski*, p. 14.

[26] Baranowski, *Rozmowy z Piłsudskim*, p. 144.

[27] *Ibid.*, pp. 152–154. Compare Tommasini, *Odrodzenie Polski*, p. 290, and Jan Drohojowski, *Wspomnienia dyplomatyczne* (Warsaw, 1959), pp. 37–38.

of his arrival Piłsudski was guest of honor at a dinner given by Millerand, and both statesmen made formal speeches. Apart from the usual things said at such a reception, Piłsudski declared that "Poland is conscious of her peaceful and civilizing mission in Eastern Europe, which corresponds to the mission of France in the west. Poland will fulfill her mission with determination, and in an increasingly close contact with France." [28] These were not empty phrases, and for many Poles the first visit of the head of their independent state to France was a solemn moment. A thrice repeated cry of "Vive la France!" resounded in the Warsaw *Sejm* on the day Piłsudski feasted in Paris, and all speakers paid tribute to the sister republic.

Piłsudski found Millerand, the former Socialist whom he had known from prewar international meetings, well disposed, and he later praised the Frenchman's understanding of the Polish situation and his "healthy nationalism." The marshal was far less enthusiastic about Briand. Talks began in which Foreign Minister Sapieha and the minister of war, General Sosnkowski, played an important part. The crucial meeting took place on February 5, when Millerand entertained Piłsudski at a dinner in the Élysée. After the dinner the two statesmen accompanied by their collaborators, who included neither Foch nor Weygand, withdrew to Millerand's study, and agreed there on the basic points of a political and military understanding. A joint communiqué issued after the meeting stressed the equal determination of France and Poland to safeguard peace and security in Europe, and affirmed their community of interests. It ended with a statement on future close collaboration for "the defense of superior interests." [29]

The French and the Poles had reached a basic agreement rapidly, and this achievement was due largely to the determination of Millerand and Piłsudski. The marshal recalled later that "Millerand was very pleased, Berthelot smiled in a somewhat forced manner, that old cynic Barthou had tears in his eyes." [30] According to a French view, Millerand, Briand, and Barthou saw the agreement as a large step toward reconstructing the eastern barrier, and they looked upon French-Polish cooperation vis-à-vis Bolshevik Russia and Germany as "an essential element of European stability." [31] Piłsudski was satisfied with his visit, and in an interview accorded a French journalist he expressed his conviction that the final Franco-Polish treaties would be signed in a short time.[32]

Upon his departure from Paris, Piłsudski left negotiation of the eco-

[28] Piłsudski, *Pisma zbiorowe*, V, 186.

[29] See below, Appendix I.

[30] Colonel Joseph Beck, *Dernier rapport: politique polonaise 1926–1939* (Neuchâtel, 1951), p. 58.

[31] Noël, *L'Agression allemande*, p. 100.

[32] Piłsudski, *Pisma zbiorowe*, V, 192.

nomic treaty to Sapieha and entrusted Sosnkowski with working out the military convention. Signing of the text of the political alliance took place on February 19, and of the secret military convention, completed by an annex, two days later. As for the economic agreement, the signing of a final text was delayed for nearly a year.

2

The political alliance [33] consisted of a preamble and five articles. They provided for an engagement to concert on questions of international policy (Art. 1); economic cooperation (Art. 2); concerted action in case of an unprovoked aggression against the territory of the two parties (Art. 3); consultation before the conclusion of agreements relating to East Central Europe (Art. 4); and a provision to the effect that the present treaty would become operative after the signing of the economic agreements (Art. 5). The term "to concert" (*se concerter*), which occurred throughout the text, was used to allow Paris some freedom of movement. As Laroche remarked, "If the basis of political engagements was broad, their character was not strictly imperative." [34] Article 3 which spoke of an "unprovoked aggression" meant that France would not support any "adventurous Polish policy" in the east,[35] and it stemmed from the suspicions of Piłsudski's statecraft which the Quai d'Orsay still harbored. Briand told the American ambassador that France had "no intention of supporting Poland in any act of aggression against the Bolshevists." [36] Use of the term aggression against their "territory" was probably designed to restrict French obligations to Poland by leaving out the Upper Silesian situation.

The political alliance can be fully appraised only when treated in conjunction with the secret military convention concluded on the same day. The character of the latter was largely due to Piłsudski's insistence on concrete military arrangements, and it testified to General Sosnkowski's negotiating abilities. The convention [37] consisted of eight articles, supplemented two days later by a special annex. Article 1 provided for mutual aid in case of German aggression, defining the latter as an aggression "starting from a territory dependent on the German Government." Article 2 provided for the eventuality of a Russian-Polish war, and it con-

[33] See below, Appendix II.

[34] *La Pologne de Pilsudski*, p. 15.

[35] *Ibid.*

[36] Wallace to Secretary of State, Feb. 7, 1921, *SDNA*, 760c.61/451.

[37] See Appendix III. A general description of the convention may be found in General Gamelin, *Servir: II: Le prologue de drame* (Paris, 1946), 466; *Polskie siły zbrojne w drugiej wojnie światowej* (London, 1951), I, 88; Colonel Gustaw Łowczowski, "Przymierze polsko-francuskie widziane z attachatu paryskiego," *Bellona*, XXX (1951); and in the above cited works of Noël and Laroche.

tained French engagements to keep Germany in check on land and on sea and to help Poland in her defense against the Soviets. Article 3 defined the French aid which included keeping lines of communication free but excluded sending troops to fight in Poland. Article 4 stipulated that Poland maintain an army of thirty infantry divisions, nine brigades of cavalry, and other services,[38] organized on the French model. Article 5 dealt with French assistance in development of Polish war industry. Article 6 provided for cooperation between the general staffs. Article 7 contained specific arrangements regarding the status of the French military mission in Poland and of Polish officers in France. Article 8 was identical with the final clause of the political alliance, making the convention dependent on the signing of Franco-Polish commercial treaties. The annex finally stipulated that France would make a loan to Warsaw of four hundred million francs for arming the Polish forces.

Both Marshal Foch and the Quai d'Orsay had misgivings about the military convention. Foch after studying the Polish proposal had submitted his own version to President Millerand on February 11. The marshal retained only a certain number of articles of Sosnkowski's project, and in his draft insisted on limitations on French aid to Poland and "as rapid as possible organization of a strong Polish army."[39] His point of view did not prevail with regard to French aid,[40] though the provision for thirty divisions may have been due to Foch's insistence on a large Polish army.[41]

While the French marshal and his associates felt that the military convention imposed too extensive and far-reaching obligations on France, the Quai d'Orsay objected to it on other grounds. Laroche wrote later that the text of the convention contained articles "that should not have been put into a document of a technical nature."[42] He thought here primarily of Article 1, which not only defined German aggression — a political rather than a military question — but went beyond the political treaty by stating that any attack from a territory "dependent on the German Government" constituted an act of aggression. The military convention thus clearly covered the Upper Silesian case and left Paris no freedom of action in that matter. Article 3 also extended French military obligations engaging France to keep lines of communication with Poland free and secure, which could involve intervention in Danzig and

[38] Gamelin, *Prologue de drame*, p. 466. It seems that fourteen of these divisions were to be deployed along the German border. Gibson to Secretary of State, Dec. 1, 1921, *SNDA*, 860c.00/104.

[39] Weygand, *Mirages et réalité*, p. 181.

[40] He complained to Noël in 1929 that "we were linked to Poland by engagements that were by far too large." *L'Agression allemande*, p. 101.

[41] The Polish general staff planned at this time for twenty-six divisions only. Gibson to Secretary of State, Dec. 1, 1921, *SDNA*, 860c.00/104.

[42] *La Pologne de Pilsudski*, p. 15.

Pomerania if German paramilitary organizations, acting with the tacit consent of Berlin, attempted to seize the area.[43]

The annex concerning a French loan for armament purposes stemmed from the initiative of General Sosnkowski, who discussed the matter at length with the French minister of finance, Paul Doumer, and with the representatives of French finance and banking.[44] According to Italian and American sources the Polish side asked originally for a much bigger loan, but Paris agreed only to 400,000,000 francs,[45] with the provision that Poland would purchase her war material exclusively in France. The annex raised certain technical difficulties. Linked as it was with the secret convention it could not have been submitted to the French Parliament for approval in its original form. Consequently there was some delay until the matter was satisfactorily settled.[46]

The Quai d'Orsay inserted the articles making both the political alliance and the secret military convention dependent on the signing of economic agreements, because Sapieha did not find it possible to sign the economic treaties simultaneously with the other accords. In spite of pressure by Paris, Sapieha declared that he first had to consult the Polish Parliament where he feared opposition especially from Socialist quarters. It should perhaps also be remembered that Sapieha's position at that time was weak. While the parties of the Right which had originally opposed him became more conciliatory, the Left chose him as the main object of its attacks. Furthermore, Paris was out for a sharp bargain and wanted to be well compensated for the far-reaching political and military commitments.

To understand fully Polish hesitations about French economic demands — these hesitations were not overcome until February 6, 1922 — one must survey briefly the operation of French capital in Poland and the nature of Franco-Polish trade relations.[47] Before 1914 France already had considerable investments in Russian Poland and in Galicia. The biggest textile factory in Żyrardów belonged to a M. Boussac; French capital in Eastern Galician oil amounted to forty-four million francs; and as a result of expropriation of German, Russian, and Austrian state-owned

[43] Polish intelligence viewed this as quite possible at that time, and Polish negotiators in Paris wanted to include such a contingency in the text of the convention. I hold this information from General Sosnkowski, who kindly commented on the convention in a letter to me of Nov. 15, 1958.

[44] Information derived from General Sosnkowski. The Poles had already signed one convention providing for a French loan (Klotz-Olszowski convention) on Jan. 17, 1920, but the loan never materialized. See Landau, "Tło kredytów francuskich," pp. 43ff.

[45] Tommasini speaks of 685,000,000, *Odrodzenie Polski*, p. 291. The American military attaché quotes 900,000,000 in his report of Feb. 24, 1921, *SDNA*, 751.60c/3.

[46] Laroche, *La Pologne de Pilsudski*, p. 16.

[47] See Ferdynand Zweig, *Poland Between Two Wars: A Critical Study of Social and Economic Changes* (London, 1944), pp. 122ff; Casimir Smogorzewski, *La Pologne restaurée* (Paris, 1927), p. 281; Jean B. Barbier, *Un frac de Nessus* (Rome, 1951), pp. 235ff.

enterprises, French capital after the war occupied first place in Poland among all foreign investments. The French capitalists interested mainly in realizing quick profits (the fate of capital lost in Russia served as an object lesson) insisted on preferential treatment, and Paris usually backed them to the hilt. The Poles found the way in which it was done harsh and disquieting, as can be seen in the Bastid episode and in the behavior of the first French minister in Poland, Pralon.

M. Bastid, a French financier and a friend of the foreign minister Pichon, had suffered heavy financial losses in the autumn of 1919 due to inflation in Poland, and Pralon demanded compensations from the Polish treasury not only to him but to all French investors who might in the future lose capital in Poland. The Polish minister of finance, Biliński, considered this a demand for "an unlimited guarantee on the part of the Polish treasury for unknown losses of unknown French citizens."[48] When Pralon announced that France had delayed sending winter clothing for the Polish army until the matter was settled, Biliński exclaimed that he loved the French "but feared the commercial France."[49] The Polish Right, and even more the Left, shared this fear, and the Socialist leader Moraczewski declared: "I love France and the Frenchmen, but things look different [when one has to deal] with French capitalism."[50]

As for the activities of Pralon in Poland, the American minister in Warsaw passed severe judgment. Gibson wrote that the French envoy "has sought to advance French trade in Poland to the virtual exclusion of his other functions. He has encouraged the excessive importation into Poland of various luxuries of French manufacture until the market is now flooded with perfumes, toilet soaps and similar articles. It appears that he has also encouraged French merchants to profit by the favorable rate of exchange to ransack Poland of its furs, laces, jewels, and artistic treasures. . . . he has clearly given the impression by his actions and public utterances that Poland is a new field to be exploited for the benefit of French business and that he considers it his principal function to direct the exploitation."[51]

At the time of the French-Polish negotiations for an alliance, French industry was going through a period of depression. There was an unfavorable balance of trade, for France in 1921 had exported only 21,553,000 francs worth of goods, and imported 23,553,000. Export of manufactured goods had declined, and while the French had exported 16,963,000 francs worth in 1920, the corresponding figure for 1921 was 12,808,000.[52] The

[48] Biliński, *Wspomnienia i dokumenty*, II, 238.

[49] *Ibid.*, p. 239.

[50] Moraczewski's interview was printed in the New York *Call* and cited in Polish Minister in Washington to Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sept. 10, 1922, *CD*, No. 1181/T.

[51] Gibson to Secretary of State, Feb. 13, 1920, *SDNA*, 701.5160c/1.

[52] Rawita-Gawroński, *Konwencja handlowa*, p. 3.

French government, intent on helping the industrial development of the country and determined to improve its balance of trade, found it expedient to link the question of Franco-Polish alliance with demands in the economic sphere. The experience of the commercial convention with Czechoslovakia in November 1920, which had not proved quite satisfactory for the French, made Paris insist on stiff conditions. The Poles knew about that even before Piłsudski came to Paris, and his envoys reported on the French desire to see the Polish minister of finance included in the delegation.[53]

The French government was interested in three distinct though related agreements. They were a bilateral convention,[54] a commercial convention, and an oil convention. The commercial convention foresaw that Poland would grant France the most-favored-nation clause, and in addition would accord special tariff reductions ranging from 25 to 30 per cent on 103 French articles, including manufactured products, luxury goods, and wines. France in exchange agreed to facilitate importation of Polish products, but since Paris did not generally accord the most-favored-nation clause, it consented only to reductions in relation to its maximum and minimum tariffs. Fifty Polish items, mainly raw materials and agricultural products, were subject to the minimum tariff; 49 articles were given tariff reductions ranging from 25 to 30 per cent, and a few from 50 to 75 per cent, the percentage being calculated on the difference between maximum and minimum tariffs.[55]

It is fairly obvious that the commercial convention gave far greater advantages to France than to Poland, especially because the French goods which received preferential treatment were luxury goods and wines not greatly needed by the Polish economy. The *rapporteur* in the Warsaw Parliament who proposed ratification of the convention on May 12, 1922, admitted that "we give France more than France gives to us," and justified his stand by the "advantages which [Poland] obtained in another field," by contracting a "close alliance with France." [56]

As for the oil convention, its first draft appeared "quite unacceptable" to the Polish government.[57] Even when Warsaw agreed to the convention together with the commercial accord, the *rapporteur* in Parliament

[53] Gutowski's and Baranowski's reports from Paris, *AGND*, 61/6645 and 6646.

[54] This convention dealt with *droits, biens et intérêts*, and referred principally to concessions to French companies in Poland.

[55] See the exposition of the *rapporteur* of the foreign affairs committee of the Polish Parliament, *Sprawozdania stenograficzne*, 1922, CCCVIII/37ff; report of H. B. Smith, the U.S. trade commissioner to department of commerce, July 25, 1921, *SDNA*, 651.60c.31/19; *Zahraniční Politika*, I (1922), 460ff, and (1923), II, 1129ff. Also Rawita-Gawroński, *Konwencja handlowa, passim.*

[56] *Sprawozdania stenograficzne*, 1922, CCCVIII/38–39; compare Tommasini, *Odrodzenie Polski*, pp. 293ff.

[57] Gibson to Secretary of State, April 8, 1921, *SDNA*, 860c.6363/9.

did not try to conceal that it was "almost completely one-sided" except for a welcome influx of French capital in the Polish oil industry.[58] The provisions of the oil convention gave French-controlled companies a right of free export of oil and its by-products, beyond a quota needed for home consumption (which the Polish government fixed annually), and preferential treatment with regard to taxation.

The French felt that their share in the oil industry entitled them to such a privileged status,[59] but Warsaw found their demands embarrassing because they antagonized the British and Americans. In fact Britain made a point of asking Warsaw about the grounds "upon which the Polish Government feels warranted in granting concession for the exploitation of oil resources" in Eastern Galicia, recalling thus that the province had not been officially recognized as part of the Polish state.[60] The *Manchester Guardian* wrote after the final ratification of the convention that Poland had conquered Eastern Galicia with French help, and now "subjects Galicia, or what is its main attraction, to the good will of the French Government." [61]

Many circles in Poland resented linking political alliance with the economic agreements. Gibson reported that members of the government in Warsaw felt "very bitterly over what they term the effort of the French Government to blackmail Poland." He added that Paris had even used the argument that it would try to "secure a favorable decision of the Upper Silesian question," if Poland granted sufficient concessions to French industrialists and commercial interests.[62] The Polish Left was incensed, and the Socialist spokesman Feliks Perl declared that to make the political alliance dependent on economic conditions was to treat Poland like a colony.[63] Joy and satisfaction over the Franco-Polish alliance mingled with some annoyance.

The alliance was greeted favorably by the National Democratic press, and enthusiastically by *Rzeczpospolita* which represented the Christian Democrats. Independent, Catholic, and the generally progressive press favored it, and so did *Naród*. Only the Socialist newspapers, like the *Naprzód* on February 23, spoke with reserve.[64]

On the French side the alliance received a sympathetic but by no means unqualified approval. Jacques Bainville summarized the views of many Frenchmen, especially the Right. Having welcomed the alliance

[58] *Sprawozdania stenograficzne*, 1922, CCCVIII, 39.

[59] That is what Peretti de la Rocca told Ambassador Wallace; Wallace to Secretary of State, Feb. 20, 1921, *SDNA*, 751.60c/1.

[60] Gibson to Secretary of State, Sept. 9, 1921, *SDNA*, 860c.6363/28.

[61] *Manchester Guardian*, Nov. 12, 1923.

[62] Gibson to Secretary of State, May 5, 1921, *SDNA*, 860c.6363/12.

[63] *Sprawozdania stenograficzne*, 1922, CCCVIII/43ff.

[64] *BPPP*, Feb. 11–27, 1921, No. 101.

he cautioned his countrymen against undue optimism. The alliance, he wrote, belongs to those "which complicate fatally our foreign policy." [65] France in virtue of the agreement became "associated with and engaged toward a country which is nonorganic, and in a state of latent anarchy." [66] Bainville believed that the alliance was necessary, but emphasized that it would not suffice to solve the problem "of European equilibrium, of our security, or even of our tranquility." [67]

Many French circles were anxious lest the alliance complicate matters with Russia; many may still have believed that "Poland cannot live except on one condition: it is if she contracts an intimate alliance with Russia." [68]

The French statesman Pierre Flandin, analyzing in retrospect the French-Polish alliance, wrote that the French policy of eastern alliances was "imprudent," and in the case of Poland "France assumed obligations which made her guarantee borders that became endangered shortly after they were established." [69]

But this criticism hardly applied to the Polish-Soviet frontiers, and throughout the Paris negotiations the Quai d'Orsay was careful not to commit itself to official recognition of these boundaries. Take Ionescu instructed the Rumanian envoy in Paris to bring the matter of recognition to Millerand's attention, and the Poles were grateful and hopeful,[70] although this intervention failed to produce any result. The White Russian circles in Paris, displeased as they were with the Franco-Polish alliance, noted this point with satisfaction.[71] Léon Noël summed up neatly the French dilemma of trying to satisfy Polish and Russian interests at the same time:

"How to proceed so that Russia would continue to believe, and Poland to place her hope in us? The eternal problem — and the eternal foundering rock — of French diplomacy each time it tries to contract or to maintain parallel alliances with rival nations in order to re-create the '*barrière de l'est.*' " [72]

The eastern barrier designed to serve against Germany and Bolshevism but not against Russia was not only difficult to erect because of the deep Polish-Russian antagonism, but its success or failure was intimately connected with Czechoslovak-Polish relations and the Little Entente.

[65] *La Russie et la barrière de l'est*, p. 174.
[66] Bainville, *Conséquences politiques de la paix*, p. 134.
[67] *La Russie et la barrière de l'est*, p. 175.
[68] As put by M. de Chappedelaine on Aug. 26, 1919, *Débats*, 1919, Session ordinaire, 3611.
[69] Flandin, *Politique française*, p. 29.
[70] Skrzyński to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Jan. 21, 1921, *AGND*, 38/7544.
[71] Report of military attaché to 2nd bureau, March 8, 1921, *AGND*, 36/6445.
[72] Noël, *L'Agression allemande*, p. 97.

France tried therefore to use the Paris negotiations in a renewed effort to bring Warsaw and Prague closer together.

A few days before Piłsudski's journey to Paris, Beneš made a speech in the Prague Parliament in which he dealt with the Little Entente and Poland. He reiterated Czechoslovak opposition to all plans for a Danubian federation, and he assured his listeners that under no circumstances would the Czechoslovak republic "surrender its absolute sovereignty, political and economical." [73] Beneš remarked that the French no longer had anything to do with the Danubian plans and that "it was a pleasure for me to realize how genuine was our agreement and unity [with France] on international questions." [74]

The foreign minister tried to show some good will toward the Poles. Speaking of extension of the Little Entente he mentioned the possibility of links between Poland and Rumania, and perhaps Czechoslovakia and Poland, and he said that an "evolution toward a common co-operation of us all would proceed of itself in a normal manner." [75] Beneš deplored Czechoslovak-Polish prejudices and warned against underestimating Poland. He declared that "it is the vital interest of this country that Poland be not threatened." He recalled, however, that two issues stood in the way of close cooperation between Warsaw and Prague: they were the Hungarian problem and the Russian question. The Czechoslovak statesman welcomed Polish-Soviet peace but observed that other powers had not yet recognized the settlement. Therefore it could still be revised, and "who knows whether the Poles themselves will not be the first to wish to carry out this revision at a future date." [76]

Beneš's speech though friendly in tone did not introduce new elements into Czechoslovak-Polish relations. The foreign minister, probably acting under the French influence, mentioned that Piłsudski would be welcome to stop in Prague on his way home, and both France and Rumania showed interest in the idea of Polish-Czechoslovak talks. Take Ionescu arranged a meeting in Paris between Beneš and Sapieha, but under the existing conditions the exchange of views failed to produce any results. The Polish press voiced dissatisfaction over the attitude of the Czechoslovak foreign minister. *Czas* alleged that Beneš had shown interest in economic concessions for Czechoslovakia in Eastern Galicia and had demanded confirmation of Polish renunciation of Teschen. But Beneš was unwilling to offer anything in return. *Czas* concluded that "if French diplomacy has not succeeded in convincing the Czechs of the legitimacy of our demands," or if the Quai d'Orsay considered them exaggerated,

[73] *The Foreign Policy of Czechoslovakia: Speech of Dr. E. Beneš . . . in the House of Deputies*, Jan. 27, 1921 (Prague, 1921), p. 9.

[74] *Ibid.*, pp. 7–8.

[75] *Ibid.*, p. 33. [76] *Ibid.*, p. 26.

"then Poland will have no choice but to put off any political accord with the Czechs." [77] Hence the initiative of Take Ionescu proved of no avail, and the pressure of the French government did not induce Piłsudski to stop in Prague on his way back.[78] While it is fairly evident that, given the basic differences of approach between Czechoslovakia and Poland, Piłsudski's talks in Prague could hardly have yielded tangible results, the Polish government may have made a tactical error by refusing to discuss matters further.

On his return from Paris, Beneš addressed the foreign affairs committee of the House of Deputies. He told them that he approved of the Franco-Polish alliance because Paris, fully committed to the Little Entente, would not use this alliance in any manner prejudicial to the interests of Prague. The foreign minister informed the deputies that "economic reciprocity between Czecho-Slovakia and Poland and a political *rapprochement*" between them were "furthered by France," but he assured his listeners that he had assumed "no obligations in the eventuality of a Russian attack on Poland or an adverse result of the plebiscite in Upper Silesia." [79]

Czechoslovak unwillingness at this stage to cooperate with Poland, even on the Upper Silesian issue, was rather surprising, and the American envoy from Prague reported that

"French influence is being exercised to smooth the way for an understanding, and Chéradame . . . advances the view that *the award of Upper Silesia* to Poland is in the vital interest of Czecho-Slovakia. This view, however, is not in accord with Czech convictions." [80]

But the Czechoslovak attitude of indifference changed, as the Upper Silesian issue loomed large on the international scene. The issue became a test case of the French-Polish alliance, and in the course of its development it began to contribute also to a *rapprochement* between Warsaw and Prague.

3

In the spring and summer of 1921 the plebiscite in Upper Silesia became the focal point of Franco-Polish and indeed of European politics. As the date of the vote approached, tension increased and Warsaw made an effort to retain its *sang-froid*. Foch sent a special envoy to Poland to reassure the government about the alleged concentration of German

[77] *BPPP*, Feb. 11–27, 1921, No. 101, p. 4.

[78] Tommasini, *Odrodzenie Polski*, p. 254.

[79] Crane to Secretary of State, March 10, 1921, *SDNA*, 860f.00/160.

[80] Crane to Secretary of State, May 26, 1921, *ibid.*, 860f.00/174. Italics added. André Chéradame, with whom the Czech leaders had cooperated closely during the war, was one of the leading French experts on Slav problems.

troops in the vicinity of Upper Silesia and in East Prussia. The French marshal told the Poles that "France keeps Germany well covered," and he pressed them to avoid demonstrations that might get out of hand.[81] The Polish minister in Paris wrote Sapieha to ask the government to impress the Upper Silesians with the need for absolute calm.[82] France wanted to prevent disturbances that could prejudice the plebiscite and give rise to the accusation that the French troops did not discharge their duty. Paris also warned Germany on March 17 against trying to make military moves, and the Conference of Ambassadors repeated the warning two days later.

Under these conditions the voting in Upper Silesia on March 20 took place in complete tranquillity, and nearly 98 per cent of those entitled to vote deposited their ballots. While the official recording of votes by commune — no over-all figure was ever formally announced — appeared only on May 7, 1921, the results were known almost immediately. According to the official figures the Germans carried 844 communes (54 per cent), and the Poles 678 (42.5 per cent). The total of those who voted for Germany equalled 707,605 (56 per cent), and those for Poland 479,359 (40.3 per cent).[83] If one remembers that the German vote was considerably swelled by "outvoters" (16 per cent of the total) and by inclusion in the plebiscite area of the districts of Neustadt and Leobschutz, which Poland had never claimed, the result was hardly "an overwhelming vote" in Germany's favor, as Lloyd George wished to believe.[84]

The French press greeted with gloom the first results which showed a German lead,[85] but when on March 22 the industrial area showed a general Polish majority Paris was jubilant. *Le Matin* wrote that every German effort to retain this region had been in vain; *Le Petit Parisien* spoke enthusiastically about the richness of districts won by the Poles; and *L'Action Française* called on the government to watch carefully over Polish interests.[86] *Le Temps* summed up the prevailing opinion by saying that Upper Silesia "divided itself naturally into two regions" and must accordingly be split between Poland and Germany.[87]

Germany and Britain opposed this solution on the grounds that the German majority entitled Germany to the whole area. Although the Treaty of Versailles provided for division according to majorities in each

[81] Message transmitted by the ministry of war to General Szeptycki in Kraków, March 16, 1921. *Archiwum Powstań Śląskich*, Józef Piłsudski Institute of America, New York.

[82] Zamoyski to Minister of Foreign Affairs, Feb. 21 and Feb. 26, 1921, *AGND*, 52/7302.

[83] These figures are taken from Wambaugh, *Plebiscites*, I, 250. Those in Smogorzewski, "Le Plébiscite," differ slightly and so do those in Jędruszczak, *Polityka Polski*, p. 287.

[84] *The Truth about the Peace Treaties*, I, 722.

[85] See Smogorzewski, "Le Plébiscite," p. 320.

[86] Brief News Reports of the U.S. embassy, Paris, March 1921, *SDNA*, 851.00/270.

[87] Smogorzewski, "Le Plébiscite," p. 320.

commune (qualified by geographical and economic factors), Berlin and London declared that Upper Silesia was "indivisible" for economic reasons. The Poles naturally contested this claim and demanded partition along the so-called Korfanty Line — so named after the Polish plebiscite commissioner — which line, taking geography into account, assigned to Poland 662 communes with Polish majorities and 226 with German.[88]

France came out strongly against the alleged indivisibility of Upper Silesia. *Le Temps*, *Le Figaro*, and *L'Echo de Paris* rejected it as contrary to the Treaty of Versailles; the executive committee of the Radical Socialist party demanded that the industrial areas be included in Poland, and called on the French government "to exercise the greatest vigilance so that these regions be rendered to Poland in accord with the Treaty of Versailles and the plebiscite itself."[89] The foreign affairs committee of the French Chamber of Deputies adopted on March 24, 1921, a resolution asking the government to take steps about immediate division in accord with local majorities.[90]

What were the reasons for the determined French stand on the question of Upper Silesia? There is no doubt that political, strategic, and economic elements entered the picture, and the difficulty lies in assigning each its place and weight. Already at the Peace Conference the French had indicated that they looked upon this area as an arsenal, and as a perpetual menace to French security if it remained a part of Germany. Paris realized equally well the importance of this region for Poland. Pertinax in *L'Echo de Paris* stated on March 21 that "the fate of Upper Silesia will decide the fate of Poland," because without the industrial basin Poland would fall into the German sphere. Gustave Hervé in an article in *La Victoire* compared Poland without Upper Silesia to France without the departments of Nord and Pas-de-Calais.[91] The strategic value of Upper Silesia for Germany consisted in the region being a salient between Poland and Czechoslovakia which could disrupt their western defenses. A Polish military report arguing in favor of the Korfanty Line pointed out that the railroad from Koźle to Bohumín was indispensable to a Czechoslovak-Polish front against Germany.[92] Politically, economically, and strategically the loss of Upper Silesia endangered Poland, France, and to a lesser extent Czechoslovakia, and *Le Matin* did not hesitate to write on March 27 that to separate Upper Silesia from Poland could be a cause of war.[93]

[88] Wambaugh, *Plebiscites*, I, 251.
[89] Smogorzewski, "Le Plébiscite," p. 324.
[90] *Ibid.*, p. 321.
[91] *Ibid.*, pp. 319–320.
[92] Report of Major Firich to Minister of Foreign Affairs, March 22, 1921, *CD*, "Górny Śląsk 1921."
[93] Brief News Reports of the U.S. embassy, Paris, March 1921, *SDNA*, 851.00/270.

The Poles while aware of the French-Polish community of interest in the case of Upper Silesia, which they did their best to promote,[94] feared nevertheless that other influences and pressures, from Britain and even Germany, might undermine French support for Poland. An intelligence report pointed out that while the French government supported the Polish side, the big financiers were indifferent, and as long "as the Polish government did not create an interest for the French capital in the Silesian coal mines, the question might be solved to our disadvantage." [95] The *Naród* published four articles in January 1921 to draw the attention of the public to the fact that only if and when Poland succeeded in making Upper Silesia attractive to financiers and merchants would she achieve anything.[96] Remembering the role of big business in the Danubian scheme and the Teschen affair, Warsaw resolved to create an economic stake for France in Upper Silesia and thus gain the backing of financial and economic circles.

The Polish government embarked upon its action in Paris in December 1920, and a Polish economic expert, Dr. Artur Benis, went to France with full negotiating powers. He submitted a memorandum to the Quai d'Orsay which contained the following propositions: Poland would lease 10 per cent of all state-owned coal mines and coal fields to a French financial group; she would grant this group concession for trade and export of coal; she would also grant concessions for a bank of Silesia; finally Poland would cede the income from the above three operations to the French government "as a security for part of the German reparations." [97]

At the time of the Polish proposals several French financial groups were showing interest in Upper Silesia. Although prior to the war only one French corporation was involved in that area — that of the Duke de Grammont which had shares in Oberschlesische Zinkhütten A.G.— in December 1920 a large group [98] was negotiating with German industrialists in Upper Silesia [99] for shares valued at 400,000,000 German marks. Negotiations seem to have been far advanced when the Polish initiative intervened.[100] For a time the Poles made slow progress and the Polish

[94] In late 1920 and early 1921 a special Polish mission headed by Kazimierz Rakowski was active in Paris, and it helped to create the group called "Les Amis de la Pologne."

[95] Report of the 2nd bureau, No. 29, *AGND*, 52/7151.

[96] *BPPP*, Jan. 1–23, 1921, No. 99, p. 4.

[97] Ministry of Foreign Affairs to legation in Washington, Jan. 15, 1921, *CD*, "Górny Śląsk 1921."

[98] It consisted of the representatives of *Comité des Houillières, Comité des Forges, L'Union Européenne, Banque de l'Union Parisienne, Banque de Paris et des Pays Bas, Crédit Industriel et Commercial, Banque pour le Commerce Éxterieur*, and others.

[99] Notably *Fürst v. Donnersmarcksche Verwaltung, Oberschlesische Zinkhütten A.G., Verein Königs u. Laura Hütte, and Hohenlohe Werke A.G.*

[100] The above is based on a report of the Polish military mission in France, signed by General Pomiankowski, to the 2nd bureau, May 3, 1921, *AGND*, 52/7292, and on a general analysis of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Jan. 15, 1921, *CD*, "Górny Śląsk 1921."

commissioner in Upper Silesia, Wojciech Korfanty, complained about Benis's activity and criticized aspects of it. Advising simultaneous approaches to the Italians, Korfanty emphasized that the main effort must be made in Paris, because France "is absolutely devoted to us and defends our interests as if they were her own." [101]

Contacts between French businessmen and the German metallurgical concerns were interrupted in March 1921, and on March 1 Benis signed an agreement with Peretti de la Rocca, followed on March 23 by an accord with Briand. As a result of these agreements there emerged a corporation called *Société Fermière des Charbonages de l'État Polonais*, in which several French concerns participated with a capital of fifty to seventy-five million marks; [102] the *Banque de Silésie* representing several banks with shares of fifty to one hundred and fifty million marks; [103] and several months later the *Société Fermière des Mines Fiscales de l'État Polonais en Haute Silésie* (Skarboferm). In 1922 the last of the big French-controlled companies was established, namely the *Fonderie Fiscale Polonaise de Strzybnica, Société Fermière de Tarnowitz* (Tarnoferm).[104] By acquiring important economic stakes in Upper Silesia these companies notably strengthened Paris's interest in seeing the industrial area attributed to Poland.

It is hard to say, of course, if the Franco-Polish economic agreements had a decisive influence on French policy toward Upper Silesia or indicated a primacy of capitalist motives in the diplomacy of the Quai d'Orsay.[105] The French Socialists and Communists seemed to think so, and the deputy Moutet criticized the secret machinations by which France obtained "certain interests in Upper Silesia" which led to conflicts "aggravated [and] poisoned by these capitalist avidities." [106] While the Polish appeal to big business interests appeared large in the general picture, one must not forget that the Germans also tried to attract French capital, and that Berlin supported by London used yet another economic argument to break French support for Poland, namely the question of reparations.[107]

[101] Korfanty to Sapieha, Jan. 7, 1921, *CD*, "Górny Śląsk 1921." For a summary of Benis's note to Warsaw of Feb. 2, 1921, see Jędruszczak, *Polityka Polski*, pp. 279–280.

[102] Notably *Comité des Houillières, L'Union Européenne, Banque de l'Union Parisienne, Banque de Paris et des Pays Bas*, and *Crédit Industriel et Commercial.*

[103] Among others: *Société Générale, Banque de Paris et des Pays Bas, Crédit Industriel et Commercial, Crédit Lyonnais, Comptoir d'Escompte, Banque de la Seine*, and *Banque Franco-Polonaise.*

[104] See *AGND*, 52/7292; also Smogorzewski, "Le Plébiscite," pp. 326–327.

[105] The latter is stressed by Franciszek Ryszka in "Kulisy decyzji w sprawie Górnego Śląska w R. 1921," *Kwartalnik Historyczny*, No. 1 (1953), 127–167.

[106] *Débats*, 1921, Session ordinaire, 93.

[107] See Grunewald, "L'Influence des facteurs économiques," in Duroselle, *La Politique étrangère*, p. 25.

The mighty German organization in Upper Silesia *Der Bund der Oberschlesier* launched a campaign for an autonomous Upper Silesian state, and intimated that an undivided economic unit could better satisfy French interests. This move found some response in French financial circles. *Le Journal* wrote on March 30 that certain "powerful French financiers" were interested in the idea of an Upper Silesian state which would grant them economic concessions.[108] *L'Information* spoke on April 13 of an Upper Silesian "nation" which supposedly existed like a Saxon or a Bavarian nation, and the paper came out in support of an independent Upper Silesian state.[109]

Along with feelers for creation of an independent Upper Silesia came the argument linking the Upper Silesian question with the whole matter of German reparations. Germany had claimed at the Spa Conference in July 1920 that she would not be able to pay reparations unless she retained Upper Silesia. The foreign minister of Germany accepted Allied reparation figures on March 27, 1921, on the condition that the area remain German. The British quickly took a pro-German stand. Nicolson in his biography of Curzon later wrote that "It has been suggested even that Lloyd George at the time of the occupation of Duisburg [by the French, along with Ruhrort and Düsseldorf], promised the Germans our definite support in the Silesian question."[110] The way in which British diplomacy related Silesia to the reparations problem suggested that London was less concerned with payment of reparations — using this as an argument to impress the French — than with the general economic and political stability of Europe. Keynes had opposed the transfer of Upper Silesia to Poland on the ground that it would inflict great harm on the German economy.[111] His reasoning was even taken up by a lesser man S. Osborne, who wrote a highly partisan and propagandistic work on Upper Silesia.[112]

Even under these circumstances, with Poland, Germany, and Britain all appealing to French economic interests, the position of Paris was not based solely on economic grounds. French stakes in Upper Silesia, acquired through Warsaw, were of large significance, but their influence on French policy was effective only because Paris also had political and strategic interests in the area.

France rejected British and German attempts to connect the fate of Upper Silesia with reparations. In the course of a debate on April 6 in the

[108] Smogorzewski, "Le Plébiscite," p. 325. Smogorzewski believed that M. Weyl of *L'Union Industrielle et Financière* was among those financiers.

[109] *Ibid.*, p. 326. [110] *Curzon*, pp. 210–211.

[111] For a Polish answer to Keynes, see A. Wierzbicki, *Le Problème de la Haute Silésie tel qu'il se pose en réalité et les erreurs de Keynes* (Warsaw, 1921). For a devastating criticism of Keynes, see E. Mantoux, *Carthaginian Peace*, pp. 75ff.

[112] *The Upper Silesian Question and Germany's Coal Problem* (London, 1920).

Senate, several speakers stressed this point and urged the government to proceed with a division of Upper Silesia. Briand assured the senators that France would stand by her principles and that the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles would be carried out. He dismissed the reparations argument by saying that Upper Silesian mines would continue to deliver coal to Germany for a period of fifteen years, and that it was quite inaccurate to pretend that if the mines of Silesia were attributed to Poland, Germany's ability to pay would diminish. Certain French circles went further and asserted that even if a partition of Upper Silesia were to affect reparations, "We in France would prefer to lose some milliards than to expose ourselves to a new war by leaving the vast arsenal of Upper Silesia to Germany." [113] And Poincaré recalled that the Germans had recognized during the war that without the industries of Upper Silesia they "would have been forced to lay down arms much earlier." [114] Military and political reasons were paramount in French thinking.

4

The task of proposing a line of division in Upper Silesia fell upon the Allied plebiscite commission, which was divided on the issue. The French chairman, Le Rond, felt that since the commission could not agree on a joint report it would be better not to present any recommendations. The British and Italians did not share this view, and lack of cooperation within the commission prevented any agreement.[115] Consequently two separate recommendations were made: a report by Le Rond which advocated a boundary close to the Korfanty Line; and the Percival-de Marinis report which supported a division leaving the entire industrial area to Germany and assigning only 25 per cent of the Polish voting communes to Poland. Although the reports were not made public, news leaked out and the Poles in Upper Silesia fearing that the great powers would make a compromise at their expense proclaimed a general strike in the coal mines on May 2, 1921. A day later a full-fledged uprising began, and the insurgents seized almost all the territory up to the Korfanty Line. Korfanty resigned his post, assumed the leadership of the movement, and declared that this was the only way of preventing the movement from getting out of hand. He voiced the demand of the insurrection by stating: "I beg for an immediate demarcation of the frontier." [116]

[113] G. Hervé in *La Victoire* on March 29, cited in Smogorzewski, "Le Plébiscite," p. 311.

[114] *Le Matin*, June 6, cited in *ibid.*, p. 323.

[115] Tommasini, *Odrodzenie Polski*, p. 174. The Italian diplomat while critical of Le Rond considered that the British commissioner H. F. P. Percival did everything to spite the French, and that there were pro-German sentiments among the Italians.

[116] The text of Korfanty's speech is in "Upper Silesia," *Contemporary Review*, CXX (1921), 117ff.

Did the French encourage the uprising? The Germans, British, and Italians thought so, and blamed Le Rond, who had departed to Paris on the eve of the outbreak, allegedly because he knew what was coming. Criticism was also made of the French troops for not fighting the insurgents.[117]

If Le Rond knew that an outburst was imminent and preferred to leave the scene rather than order wholesale shooting of the insurgents, which would have been contrary to French interests, he could hardly be blamed. Nor could the French troops whose sympathies lay with the Poles, their allies, be expected to use drastic measures against them.[118] There has never been any indication, however, of direct French inspiration of the uprising which Paris found highly embarrassing. The French tried to calm the Poles, and Foch expressed the opinion that the uprising may not have been a mistake — it had the merit of showing the popular feeling — but that it ought to be stopped immediately.[119]

Panafieu intervened at the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs to insist that the insurrection be halted and Polish methods drastically altered. The French objected particularly to the Polish threat to flood the coal mines and thought that Warsaw had unnecessarily provoked the British. The French minister assured Warsaw of French support but blamed the Polish statesmen for "lack of tact and patience" and voiced criticism of the Polish supreme command.[120]

Zamoyski reported from Paris that Briand and Berthelot had assured him that France would stand by Poland,[121] but other reports mentioned French conditions which Poland ought to fulfill if she was to gain Upper Silesia. Paris actually did demand that the Witos government remain in power but that a more energetic statesman, possibly Adam Tarnowski, replace Foreign Minister Sapieha; that Polish diplomats instead of engaging in party politics get a better picture of the French and British positions; and finally that Poland maintain complete neutrality in the Upper Silesian conflict and provide France with the details of German provocations. The French thought that the uprising took place too early, doing more harm than good, and wondered if the outburst had not been provoked on purpose to discredit the Polish cause.[122]

[117] Wambaugh, *Plebiscites*, I, 255; Tommasini, *Odrodzenie Polski*, p. 176.

[118] The Polish 2nd bureau reported on May 11, 1921, that "the behavior of French troops in the towns they occupy is loyal toward the insurgent detachments." *Archiwum Powstań Śląskich*.

[119] Military attaché from Paris to Supreme Command, May 7, 1921, *AGND*, 52/7378T3.

[120] Report of 2nd bureau, May 13, 1921, *AGND*, 52/7235.

[121] Zamoyski to Minister of Foreign Affairs, June 15, 1921, *AGND*, 52/7901; for an earlier French assurance to Sapieha see Wallace to Secretary of State, May 19, 1921, *SDNA*, 851.00/229.

[122] Report of 2nd bureau, May 17, 1921, *AGND*, 52/7295.

The international repercussions of the insurrection in Upper Silesia were immediately apparent. The Conference of Ambassadors met on May 7, 1921, under the presidency of Jules Cambon and with the participation of Marshal Foch. It issued a statement condemning the uprising and notified Zamoyski that Poland might be held responsible "for the origins and the developments" of the whole affair.[123] Zamoyski strongly protested this accusation four days later.

Meanwhile the German government offered its troops to suppress the uprising. Briand in reply to the German foreign minister stated categorically that there "can be no question of any assistance whatever to be given the Inter-Allied Commission from outside Upper Silesia," and the French ambassador in Berlin accused Germany of allowing armed bands to slip across the border into the area.[124] The Germans made counter-accusations. Lloyd George openly took the German side, and stated in Parliament that if the Allies could not uphold the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles "they ought to allow the Germans to do it." [125] Paris in turn declared in a note to Britain on May 14 that if Berlin tried to intervene, "France could in no case stand by passively." [126] A heated exchange between London and Paris followed.

On May 13 Lloyd George launched in the House of Commons a tirade against Polish claims to Upper Silesia, which showed his utter disregard for facts, history, and justice. J. M. Kenworthy, a Labour M. P., seconded him by openly advocating cession of all of Upper Silesia to Germany "because if these coal fields go to Poland it really means that French capitalists and French experts will have to work them," and this "will give the French control of yet one more coal field in Europe." [127] Lloyd George confided to D'Abernon that he was anxious "to save for Germany as much of the industrial area as possible," but the difficulty was that "the French are heavily pledged to Poland." [128]

Witos replied to Lloyd George in a speech to the Polish Parliament and assured the deputies that Poland could count on France; [129] the Parisian papers joined the attack on the British leader; Briand finally gave a press conference to deal with the British arguments. After repeating that Paris would stand by the provisions of Versailles, the French statesman declared that "The treaty does not say that a different treatment is to be applied to such and such a region because it happens to contain more or

[123] Smogorzewski, "Le Plébiscite," p. 341.
[124] The text is in *Contemporary Review*, CXX (1921), 119ff.
[125] *H. C. Deb.*, 141, 5th series, col. 2385.
[126] Smogorzewski, "Le Plébiscite," p. 342.
[127] *H. C. Deb.*, 141, 5th series, col. 2360.
[128] D'Abernon, *Diary*, I, 193.
[129] *Sprawozdania stenograficzne*, 1921, CCXXVII/32–42.

less of coal. It does not say that the votes of workers are less valid than those of the great German industrialists." [130] Briand said that he agreed with Lloyd George that Poland ought not to be a judge in her own case but neither ought Germany.

The British prime minister riposted in a statement to the Reuter agency, which Marshal Wilson described as "another rotten statement about Silesia accusing the French press." [131] Lloyd George said that the fate of Upper Silesia had to be determined by the great powers and not by Korfanty and the insurgents. British-French recriminations continued unabated, each country trying to bring Italy to her side.[132]

The Chamber of Deputies dealt with the Upper Silesian situation in a debate which lasted from May 24 to May 26.[133] Briand stated that Poland desperately needed economic riches, without which she would either collapse or fall under the domination of her powerful neighbors. France could not remain indifferent to either of these alternatives and was determined to prevent them. The deputy Henri Lorin, speaking on the last day of the debate, summed up, amid applause, the French attitude toward the whole problem: "Yes, gentlemen. This Upper Silesia is today a test case, and we intend to have it said in this Chamber that Poland will have all that is due to her, in accord with the plebiscite, and in accord with the Treaty." [134] The deputies endorsed the stand of the government in a resolution adopted by 419 votes against 171, which declared that the Chamber "puts its trust in the government to insure, in Upper Silesia, strict and loyal application of the spirit just as of the letter of the Treaty of Versailles."

Those voting against the motion represented mainly the extreme Left, which had so far adopted a rather pro-German attitude. Even the Socialist *Populaire* printed, besides objective articles, attacks against "Polish imperialism" and asked the Upper Silesian workers to compare their position and status under Germany with the miserable living conditions in Poland.[135] The leading Socialist Paul-Boncour writing in *L'Ère Nouvelle* on May 13, sharply criticized the "disconcerting attitude" of some French Socialists who could see Poland only as a "reactionary and docile instrument of Allied diplomacy," and who forgot that the struggle was waged by Polish workers against German capitalists.[136] But if the French Left

[130] Smogorzewski, "Le Plébiscite," p. 345.

[131] Callwell, *Henry Wilson*, II, 291.

[132] See Report of Ciechanowski from London, April 24, 1921, *CD*, "Górny Śląsk"; Sapieha to Skirmunt, Sept. 23, 1921, *AGND*, 50/5415; also Smogorzewski, "Le Plébiscite," p. 345; D'Abernon, *Diary*, I, 196; Sforza, *Diplomatic Europe*, p. 20.

[133] *Débats*, 1921, Session ordinaire, 40ff.

[134] *Ibid.*, 81–82.

[135] Smogorzewski, "Le Plébiscite," pp. 319–320.

[136] *Ibid.*, p. 432.

wavered, the opinion of the majority in France was distinctly pro-Polish, and Poincaré expressed it succinctly in *Le Matin* on June 9, when he wrote that "Everything orders us to support Poland: the Treaty, the plebiscite, loyalty, present and future interests of France, and the permanent interest of peace." [137]

The fighting between the Germans and the Poles in Upper Silesia was meanwhile coming to an end, the well-armed and equipped units of the *Selbstschutz* and *Freikorps* getting the better of the Silesian insurgents. Paris demanded that pressure be put on Germany to evacuate these paramilitary organizations and that the problem be settled. France was more successful in her demands than before, her position having decidedly improved with regard to England because London needed French cooperation in the turbulent affairs of the Middle East. After a Franco-British conference in Paris, order was reintroduced in Upper Silesia, and by early July 1921 the plebiscite commission was able to exercise authority again. Briand voiced his satisfaction in the Chamber of Deputies on July 11 and hoped that a lasting settlement would be achieved.

President Millerand did not seem to share this optimism, and pressed for military measures to make German resistance impossible. It was probably under his and Barthou's influence that demands were made for reinforcing the French garrison in Upper Silesia and that other military preparations took place. The American ambassador reported from Paris that if disorder in Upper Silesia continued, France would "advance into the Ruhr, hence into Westphalia, and would, if necessary, penetrate further into German territory." [138] Under French guidance the Czechoslovak general staff prepared plan "N," a military advance into Germany aiming at a junction with the French in Bavaria.[139]

Negotiation between France, Britain, and Italy still ran into difficulties. A new British-Italian plan proposed immediate incorporation of the districts adjoining Poland and Germany, and restricting deliberation to the central bloc of territory. Paris and Warsaw opposed this solution because by eliminating neighboring districts the central core would have had a general German majority. This was the main reason why the British singled out the central area which contained the "industrial triangle." The British considered the latter indivisible and favored its inclusion in Germany. France insisted that even the industrial center could be divided along the national lines. Had the British succeeded in imposing their solution, Poland would have received only 30 per cent of all those people who voted for her; the French solution on the other hand would have given the Poles 80 per cent of their voters. A deadlock ensued, and

[137] *Ibid.*, p. 348.
[138] Wallace to Secretary of State, June 9, 1921, *SDNA*, 851.00/281.
[139] Soják, *O zahraniční politice*, p. 86.

the Poles made new approaches to Foch and Weygand, who promised to stiffen the French government against giving in to the English.[140]

The Supreme Council which met in Paris in early August 1921 grappled unsuccessfully with the entire problem, until an Italian proposal to submit Upper Silesia to the League of Nations provided a way out of the dilemma. Lloyd George and Briand agreed to the solution on August 12, neither quite happy with it, but each expecting to see his respective point of view prevail in Geneva. The British and French leaders still exchanged a few ripostes after the Paris settlement, but the end of the whole affair was clearly in sight.

The League of Nations set up a committee composed of representatives of neutral nations to deal with the Upper Silesian settlement, and cordial cooperation between British and French officials in Geneva facilitated its labors.[141] The final report, submitted to the Council of the League on October 12, 1921, gained unanimous acceptance. The Conference of Ambassadors pronounced its decision on October 20.[142] Upper Silesia was so divided that the new border cut through the "industrial triangle," giving the major part of it to Poland, which received 58.84 per cent of those persons who had voted for her, while Germany obtained 61.13 per cent of her voters.[143] The decision was a compromise, and Warsaw accepted the verdict, though not without complaints about the mode of the plebiscite. Berlin, of course, protested the entire decision.

The final division of Upper Silesia though not as favorable to Poland as Warsaw and Paris wanted it to be — the new frontier fell short of the Korfanty Line and of the Le Rond project — represented undoubtedly a Franco-Polish success. Given the determination of Lloyd George to deprive Poland of the industrial area, the Quai d'Orsay did as well as it could under the difficult circumstances. While such deputies as Maurice Barrès, Georges Mandel, and André Tardieu criticized the French premier and foreign minister for his excessive flexibility, there was much truth in Briand's rejoinder that he had prevented Germany from invading Upper Silesia and obtained a verdict which was in the main satisfactory. By referring Upper Silesia to the League of Nations he avoided an open Franco-British breach and executed a clever move, characteristic of his diplomacy. The Upper Silesian crisis confirmed the identity of French and Polish interests vis-à-vis Germany and showed the value of

[140] Polish military mission to 2nd bureau, Aug. 3, 1921, *AGND*, 52/7795.

[141] Léon Bourgeois, *L'Oeuvre de la Société des Nations* (Paris, 1924), p. 287; Laroche, *Au Quai d'Orsay*, p. 143.

[142] It was followed by a convention establishing the regime of Upper Silesia on May 15, 1922. The Poles took over their area on June 20, and the plebiscite commission ceased to exist on July 4, 1922.

[143] Wambaugh, *Plebiscites*, I, 267.

French assistance to Poland. The alliance between the two countries was tested, and the result was satisfactory. What was more, there emerged out of the Silesian crisis a possibility of *rapprochement* between Czechoslovakia and Poland, and the diplomats in Paris, Warsaw, and Prague turned their attention to that issue.

9

THE BENEŠ-SKIRMUNT PACT

In November 1921 Prague witnessed an unusual event in the hitherto troubled and tense course of Czechoslovak-Polish affairs. The foreign ministers of both countries signed a political pact that represented an attempt to break with the past and to begin a new era in the history of relations between Czechoslovakia and Poland. The Beneš-Skirmunt pact was the result of several developments in the course of the year. Adoption by Prague of a pro-Polish attitude toward Upper Silesia had created a more friendly atmosphere; important changes in Polish diplomacy were an incentive toward reconciliation. The two attempts at a Habsburg restoration in Hungary made Prague aware of the usefulness of better relations with Warsaw. French influence, finally, in the direction of a *rapprochement* between the two West Slav states, played an important though less easily definable part.

Beneš had adopted an attitude of some caution in the early phases of the Upper Silesian crisis. He stated in a speech on January 27, 1921, that "We shall do our plain duty as imposed upon us by the peace treaties," and added that "In the spirit of our democratic policy we heartily desire that what is Slav shall remain Slav." [1] Such a statement sounded vague and, as mentioned, Paris and Warsaw were disappointed with Czechoslovak reluctance to assume full solidarity with Poland vis-à-vis Germany. Beneš continued to be prudent after the plebiscite, and he told the American envoy in Prague that he would rather avoid sanctions against Germany because this would impose a great deal of hardship on the Czechoslovak economy.[2] The Czech press was more outspoken. It described the plebiscite as a Polish defeat, and the *Národní Listy* as well as Beneš's mouthpiece *Čas* spoke of giving Poland only the immediately adjoining districts.[3]

News of the uprising brought an even less friendly reaction. The American minister wrote from Prague that almost the entire "Czech press is

[1] Beneš, *Foreign Policy of Czechoslovakia*, p. 16.
[2] Crane to Secretary of State, April 21, 1921, *SDNA*, 462.00.r.29/752.
[3] Morstin from Prague to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, March 23, 1921, *AGND*, 51/6968.

without disguise against the Polish action in Upper Silesia." [4] The Polish military attaché also reported on the violent tone of Czech newspapers.[5] Both observers ascribed this hostility to a fear of the Polish policy of *faits accomplis*. Violence in Upper Silesia, if crowned with success, could encourage the Poles to try the same method in Teschen, and the Czechs viewed Upper Silesia, Teschen, Eastern Galicia, and Wilno as interconnected instances of Polish expansionism that constantly upset Prague's work for peace and stability in East Central Europe.

At this stage Beneš showed more foresight than the majority of his countrymen. Believing that if Polish interests in Upper Silesia were satisfied then Warsaw would be more easily reconciled to the loss of Teschen, the Czechoslovak foreign minister took a pro-Polish stand,[6] which he embodied in a circular sent to Czechoslovak missions abroad.[7] He explained his attitude at length to the American minister and "expressed the hope that Poland would receive a large piece of territory on the right bank of the Oder to which she was rightly entitled." [8] The minister reported also that the Polish chargé d'affaires was acquainted with Beneš's position and had expressed satisfaction with it. A few days later Crane added that Prague's attitude made an "excellent impression in Poland." [9]

This favorable impression was increased by Beneš's intervention in London. The Czechoslovak statesman undertook it at the instigation of Briand, and the Polish minister in Britain reported on it with approval.[10] The French ambassador in London attached much importance to Beneš's conversations at 10 Downing Street. He felt that the Czechoslovak minister had "more authority than I [to deal with] Lloyd George" because he could "not be suspected of partiality toward Poland" and had excellent contacts in the important free masonic circles.[11] Although Beneš failed to change Lloyd George's opposition to the Poles, he continued his advocacy more successfully in Geneva when the Upper Silesian question came before the League of Nations.[12]

The Czechoslovak foreign minister certainly handled the matter well. By lending discreet but firm support to Poland he made several gains. To

[4] Crane to Secretary of State, May 18, 1921, *SDNA*, 860f.00/173.

[5] Telegram of Lt. Col. Ścieżyński, May 7, 1921, *AGND*, 52/7351.

[6] Crane to Secretary of State, May 24, 1921, *SDNA*, 760c.6215/67.

[7] Circular of June 19, 1921. Soják, *O zahraniční politice*, p. 95, quoting from Archiv Min. Zahr. Věci, tel. od. č. 5695.

[8] Crane to Secretary of State, June 10, 1921, *SDNA*, 760f.00/1.

[9] *Ibid.*, June 24, 1921, 760f.64/20.

[10] Wróblewski to Foreign Minister, June 9, 1921; also Skrzyński from Bucharest, June 24, 1921, *AGND*, 52/7699 and 7827. Compare Starzewski, *Zarys dziejów*, p. 103.

[11] Saint Aulaire, *Confession*, p. 558. He called Beneš "haut dignitaire de la franc-maçonnerie, et apologiste de la révolution russe."

[12] Wambaugh, *Plebiscites*, I, 257; Francis P. Walters, *A History of the League of Nations* (2 vols., Oxford, 1952), I, 155; Harold W. V. Temperley, *The Second Year of the League* (London, 1922), p. 118.

France he demonstrated Czechoslovak solidarity with Warsaw and Paris; he helped Poland obtain important coal deposits, thus undermining her economic claims to Teschen; finally he emphasized his determination to stand by the Treaty of Versailles and the entire postwar settlement. This last point[13] was important, especially because events in Hungary had raised again the specter of revisionism.

Agitation in favor of a Habsburg restoration in Hungary had been going on since the end of the war, and it found some support in France. A Yugoslav diplomat spoke of "one of the great powers" interested in this scheme, and both Prague and Belgrade were disturbed.[14] After the failure of Paléologue's Hungarian project, a plan for Habsburg restoration seemed to offer the chance of creating a center of political attraction for the smaller states in the Danubian area. Such a restoration attracted France because the French feared that Austria might be drawn toward Germany. Thus though the restoration plan was ostensibly aimed at Hungary it had a pro-Austrian rather than a pro-Hungarian flavor.[15]

Briand showed interest in this scheme which could eventually lead to another version of a Danubian confederation,[16] and it was said that French supporters of the Habsburgs included two marshals, Louis Lyautey and Franchet d'Esperey, together with Prince Sixtus Bourbon-Parma, Paléologue, and some French royalists such as Charles Maurras.[17] Berthelot, seemingly perturbed by the possibility of a union between Germany and Austria, but at the same time opposed to Danubian confederation, "played an ambiguous part" in the whole affair.[18]

It was in March 1921, at the time of the Upper Silesian plebiscite, that Charles Habsburg appeared on Hungarian soil to claim his crown. Charles informed Horthy that he came "with the knowledge and approval of the Entente" and "he mentioned the name of Briand."[19] He assured the regent that "he had guarantees from a great power (France) that the 'fait accompli' would be recognized."[20] The role played by Horthy in the restoration attempt lies beyond the scope of this study;

[13] Beneš emphasized his respect for postwar treaties on November 16, 1921. See Beneš, *Problémy nové Evropy*, pp. 152–153.

[14] Conversation at the State Department, Dec. 23, 1920, *SDNA*, 760f.60h/13. See also Věra Olivová, "Československá zahraniční politika a pokus o restauraci Habsburků v roce 1921," *Československý Časopis Historický*, VII (1959), 681–682.

[15] Praznovszky to Csáky, Oct. 17 and Oct. 19, 1920, *FRH*, I, 695, 699ff.

[16] Suarez, *Briand*, V, 238. Renouvin wrote that Briand saw in the old dynasty "the only center of attraction capable of co-ordinating the various nations, and of creating an effective bulwark against German expansion." *Histoire des relations internationales*, VII, 282.

[17] Crane to Secretary of State, April 7, 1921, *SDNA*, 860f.00/165; Horthy, *Memoirs*, p. 121.

[18] Horthy, *Memoirs*, p. 121.

[19] *Ibid.*, p. 119.

[20] E. Ashmead-Bartlett, *The Tragedy of Central Europe* (London, 1923), p. 254.

suffice to say that the regent demanded French confirmation, which obviously could not be given. The French envoy in Budapest "categorically denied" that Charles had the support of Briand,[21] and Horthy prevailed on the former emperor to withdraw from Budapest to Szombathely. The chance of a swift restoration was ruined at the start, and Czechoslovakia could mobilize the neighboring states to put pressure on Hungary and request the immediate departure of Charles. The great powers willy-nilly made a similar demand.

Under this combined pressure Charles Habsburg left the country. His first attempt had ended in a dismal failure. Assuming that Paris had encouraged the whole scheme, it had clearly miscalculated and placed itself in an embarrassing position.[22] Even the Rightist French press was taken aback by the attempt and did not know how to react to it. Instead of creating a Habsburg center of interest in the Danubian area, the expedition of Charles played into the hands of Czechoslovak diplomacy. Beneš emerged as the uncontested leader of the anti-Habsburg crusade, and Rumania, which he had not been able to bring thus far into the Little Entente, now joined the group.

The Czechoslovak-Rumanian alliance of April 24, 1921, contained two secret protocols respectively recognizing the Rumanian-Polish alliance and providing for armaments to Rumania should she become involved in conflict with another power (presumably Russia).[23] Warsaw therefore received the impression that although Prague was averse to broadening the aims of the Little Entente, she was willing to recognize Rumanian anti-Soviet interests — an encouraging sign from the point of view of future cooperation between Warsaw and Prague.

The story of the Habsburg restoration did not end with the first attempt in March 1921, and the former emperor tried his chance again in October. The reaction of Prague and the Little Entente was even swifter and more decisive than before. Beneš demanded not only that Charles depart immediately but also that Hungary observe the Treaty of Trianon, disarm, exclude the Habsburgs from the throne once and for all, and compensate Czechoslovakia for the cost of mobilizing her army. As the Czechoslovak foreign minister put it: "The Habsburg problem is not and was not the question of a person or of a dynasty, but a matter of war or peace in Europe." [24] Beneš made this point crystal clear to the French premier in a note dispatched on October 28. He also appealed personally

[21] Horthy, *Memoirs*, pp. 120–121; Szembek to Foreign Minister, March 28, 1921, *AR*, II/20.

[22] Charles Maurras accused Briand in *L'Action Française* of abandoning Charles. See Charles Maurras, *Le Mauvais traité; de la Victoire à Locarno* (2 vols., Paris, 1928), I, 210ff.

[23] A photograph of the two protocols is in Soják, *O zahraniční politice*, Annexes 1 and 2.

[24] Beneš, *Problémy nové Evropy*, p. 147.

to Berthelot, invoking their wartime friendship,[25] and put pressure on the Conference of Ambassadors, which was showing little determination. Although it seems that France was not so much involved in the second attempt of Charles as she had been in the first, she manifested little enthusiasm for Beneš's extreme position. Prague, however, held all the trumps, and Horthy was reluctant to risk a showdown over the issue of the Habsburgs. The Conference of Ambassadors endorsed therefore the stand of the Little Entente, except for indemnity to Czechoslovakia, and the Hungarian Parliament pronounced on November 3, 1921, the formal exclusion of the Habsburg dynasty from the throne of Hungary.

Beneš's determination had triumphed over French hesitation, and the foreign minister of Czechoslovakia went on to show France that Austria could be drawn away from Germany by other means than the problematical Habsburg appeal. In December 1921, Prague and Vienna signed the Treaty of Lány which opened possibilities for close cooperation between the two countries. Beneš's prestige was enhanced.

The attitude of Poland with regard to the attempted Habsburg restoration was more friendly to the Little Entente than to Hungary. During the first attempt in March, the Polish press had adopted either a neutral or an anti-Habsburg position, and the Warsaw government counseled Budapest to oppose the restoration of Charles.[26] The Poles went further in October and made representations in Budapest which strengthened the case of Czechoslovakia and her allies. The Polish minister was instructed "to declare to the Hungarian Government that Poland sees in the attempt of Charles a serious danger for Europe and considers it her friendly duty to warn the Hungarian government against the incalculable consequences of his possible restoration to power."[27] The Polish foreign minister recalled later that he "spoke out plainly against the return of Charles,"[28] and if one remembers that Poland was traditionally pro-Hungarian, had not ratified the Treaty of Trianon, and showed interest in a common border with Hungary, this *démarche* indicated important new trends in Warsaw's diplomacy.

The Polish stand could partly be explained by appreciation of the Czechoslovak role in the Upper Silesian crisis, partly by the anxiety caused by German-Hungarian relations.[29] The most important factor, however, was the change in leadership of the Polish Foreign Ministry. Konstanty Skirmunt had replaced Sapieha on June 11, and Erazm Piltz

[25] Olivová, "Pokus o restauraci Habsburků," pp. 693–694.

[26] *BPPP*, March 18–April 10, 1921, No. 103, pp. 6ff.

[27] Memorandum of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Oct. 31, 1921, *CD*, "Sytuacja międzynarodowa."

[28] Skirmunt to Czechoslovak journalists on Nov. 8, 1921. Summary of the Polish text in *Monitor Polski*, Nov. 9, 1921, Annex II.

[29] Report of the 2nd bureau, June 22, 1921, *AGND*, 52/7724.

became the new Polish minister in Prague on July 3, 1921. These appointments foreshadowed a new course in Polish policy toward Czechoslovakia.

2

Konstanty Skirmunt had been a member of Dmowski's National Committee in Paris during the war. He had participated in the congress of nationalities in Rome in 1918 and had long-standing connections with the Czech leaders. While representing by and large the National Democratic trend in Polish foreign policy, and favoring close relations with Paris and Prague, Skirmunt could not be identified with that party, and the National Democrats voiced criticism over his appointment.[30] He was, above all, a professional diplomat and had been recalled to Warsaw from his post in Rome.

Skirmunt's ideas on foreign policy emerge clearly from a circular note which he sent to all Polish missions on August 2, 1921. He began by stating that Poland had acquired an imperialist reputation in Europe and was looked upon as a disturber of peace. Such a reputation might have been unavoidable during the first three postwar years of struggle for frontiers, but this phase was over and the sooner such issues as Upper Silesia, Wilno, and Eastern Galicia were solved the better. Polish foreign policy, Skirmunt asserted, ought to be based on two principles: respect for postwar treaties, and maintenance of a wide system of alliances with states having common interests, above all with France. Respect for treaties must extend even to the settlement of Trianon, notwithstanding Poland's desire for a common border with Hungary, because any attempt to upset this treaty would trouble Polish-Czechoslovak relations and undermine the "security and order of the whole political organism of Central Europe." As for alliances, France was Poland's principal spokesman among the great powers, and the Franco-Polish alliance "corresponds to basic traditions, is grounded in national feeling, constitutes important and sure guarantees of invulnerability of our western borders, and is in that sense a completion of the Treaty of Versailles." Poland's second alliance, with Rumania, was satisfactory but it should, he thought, be completed by a *rapprochement* with Czechoslovakia.

Skirmunt enumerated the advantages of cooperation with Prague. It would secure permanent communications with the west, deprive the Ukrainian separatists of their operational basis in Czechoslovakia, and "establish a successful barrier" against the Pan-Slavist flood. The Polish minister was prepared to offer Prague transit facilities for reaching east-

[30] Their press caustically remarked that "not everyone who had been a member of the National Committee must necessarily be a candidate for the post of minister of foreign affairs." Tommasini, *Odrodzenie Polski*, p. 33.

ern markets and to give assurances that Slovak irredentism would find no support in Poland. He explained that a *rapprochement* with Czechoslovakia would not be the same as joining the Little Entente—which suffered from the weakness of being exclusively anti-Hungarian. Skirmunt ended his lengthy circular by stressing that Poland was endangered by "national hatred" of the Germans and by "class hatred" stemming from Russia. Her principal objective, therefore, ought to be maintenance of peace and perpetuation of the existing balance of power.[31]

Erazm Piltz, Dmowski's right-hand man in the National Committee and at the Peace Conference, and a prominent figure in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs after the war, was the leading Polish Czechophile, liked and respected by Beneš.[32] He seemed the ideal man to carry out in Prague the revolutionary mission of reversing the trend of Czechoslovak-Polish relations. He was assisted "with tremendous energy" by the Czechoslovak minister in Warsaw, Prokop Maxa.[33]

Piltz outlined his views on foreign policy in general and Czechoslovak-Polish *rapprochement* in particular in a memorandum to Skirmunt on September 5, 1921. This document completed and elaborated Skirmunt's circular note, and its importance can be gauged from the fact that copies of it were sent to all principal Polish missions abroad. Piltz's memorandum scrutinized first the difficult position of Poland and drew attention to the fact that practically all her borders were the object of revisionist ambitions of her neighbors. In this situation, Piltz wrote, Poland had the choice between two policies: either continue to rely on a large army "basing peace and security of the state on its bayonets" or begin a policy of reconciliation. Analyzing the internal weakness of Poland resulting from inflation, social tensions, poverty, and absence of strong government and efficient administration, Piltz concluded that a policy of reconciliation and concession was far more realistic than maintenance of the present armed peace. Turning to Czechoslovakia, the Polish diplomat developed his ideas on cooperation with that country, stating that such cooperation would be based not on sentiment but on mutual interests and therefore would have "vitality and chances of permanence."

Piltz painted the successes of Czechoslovak diplomacy in glowing colors. He spoke of Prague's advantageous position in the League of Nations and at the Conference of Ambassadors, of her excellent relations with both England and France, and of the realization of all claims by the Czechoslovak state at the Peace Conference and after. Why should

[31] "Polens Aussenpolitik zwischen Versailles und Locarno: Runderlass des polnischen Aussenministers Skirmunt an alle Missionen," *Berliner Monatshefte*, XVIII (1940), 18–23. None of the archives which I consulted contained the Polish text of this important circular note.

[32] Beneš, *Světová válka*, II, 100.

[33] Bader, *Stosunki polsko-czeskie*, p. 23.

Prague wish to cooperate with Warsaw? Piltz answered by pointing to the problems of a multinational state, a dangerous geographical configuration, and a powerful Socialist pressure. To solve her internal problems Czechoslovakia needed a high standard of living, which could be secured only by economic expansion. She was likely to face dangerous German economic competition in the Balkan area, and she needed Polish cooperation and transit facilities to reach the vast Russian market.

A Czechoslovak-Polish entente could, according to Piltz, open the way for political and economic organization of East Central Europe. While critical of the narrowly conceived Little Entente, the Polish diplomat favored creation of a big bloc including Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Rumania, with possible additions later. Such a bloc would be "the only logical completion of our alliance with France," and if politically and economically united it would represent a counterweight to Germany. Piltz had in mind an organization assuring protection against both Germany and Russia, radically different from the Little Entente, whose solidarity extended only to the Hungarian question. He was aware of the difficulties, and in the last part of his memorandum returned to the more concrete question of *rapprochement* with Prague. Its immediate advantage would be a *détente* along the entire Czechoslovak-Polish border and regularization of the status of the Poles in the Teschen area. Piltz stressed that Polish complaints from Teschen led to constant friction and made Czech-Polish cooperation difficult. They complicated indirectly the relations with Paris. Similarly, Czech intrigues in Eastern Galicia were a source of misunderstanding and uneasiness.

Piltz warned Skirmunt that numerous groups in Poland including the people from Teschen would dislike the policy he advocated. He recalled that the Polish emotional and nationalist approach had been responsible for many diplomatic defeats in the past, and even when crowned with success had often led to antagonism and tension. Reviewing the Polish-Czech controversy from 1918 onward, Piltz emphasized that the Polish side had been guilty of mistakes and miscalculations. He ended his memorandum with a powerful appeal for a new attitude toward foreign policy, and declared that "The only way out of this vicious circle of isolation and struggle is at present an understanding with Czechoslovakia."[34]

The Skirmunt-Piltz team undertook what was to be the most serious and sincere effort in the interwar period to arrive at a *rapprochement* with Czechoslovakia. The new foreign minister gave an indication of his intention on his way from Rome to Warsaw. In an interview with the *Neue Freie Presse* Skirmunt declared that the "Principal object of Polish

[34] Piltz to Foreign Minister, Sept. 5, 1921, *CD*, "Czechosłowacko-polskie stosunki 1920." I have published lengthy excerpts from Piltz's memorandum in "U źródeł paktu Skirmunt-Benesz," *Kultura*, No. 11/135 (1958), 119–126.

diplomacy is to create a parallelism of interests between Poland and the Czech people" and "to take a clear position with regard to what is called the Little Entente."[35] On assuming office Skirmunt sent a friendly telegram to Beneš, and he may also have been responsible for a pro-Czechoslovak statement on June 16 by Prime Minister Witos.[36]

How did Prague react to these Polish overtures? Beneš early in July 1921 explained his point of view to the counselor of the Polish legation in Prague. He declared that although Germany would not be a major military threat for the next fifteen years, she would become a dangerous economic rival much earlier. Hence Czechoslovak-Polish economic cooperation would be highly desirable. Speaking of Russia, Beneš expressed the opinion that Moscow would not play an important role for a decade or so and that consequently this period ought to be used for a consolidation of East Central Europe. Regarding Polish-Czechoslovak relations, the thing to do was to find a "form of coexistence and co-operation." Beneš assured the Polish diplomat that neither he nor Masaryk favored an eastern (pro-Russian) orientation but that there were many Slavophiles in the country. The counselor in reporting this conversation to Warsaw remarked that Beneš's views were of great importance insofar as he was "the disciple, the exponent of the thoughts, and the executor of Masaryk." Nevertheless he was not "a complete master" of the situation and had to move cautiously between the pacifist Left and the highly nationalist Right.[37]

The Czechoslovak foreign minister spoke at roughly the same time to the American chargé in Prague, confirming his intention of working for an economic agreement with Poland to be followed by political understanding. The main objective of these agreements was to show that Polish-Czechoslovak difficulties were definitely over, and that friendly relations would prevail from then on. The American diplomat wrote that Beneš "emphasized that he would allow nothing in the treaty which would in any way involve Czecho-Slovakia by reason of further trouble between Poland and Russia,"[38] thus defining the limits of the proposed collaboration.

Preliminary exchanges between the diplomats found an immediate echo in the press. The American minister reported an improvement of tenor in the references to Czechoslovakia in Polish newspapers,[39] and he drew attention to a Czech article which spoke of "the prospects of a

[35] *BPPP*, June 9–July 2, 1921, No. 106, p. 2.

[36] Published in *Rzeczpospolita*. See Zygmunt J. Gasiorowski, "Polish-Czechoslovak Relations 1918–1922," *Slavonic and East European Review*, XXXV (1956), 100.

[37] Talk between Beneš and Karol Bader on July 8. Piltz to Foreign Minister, July 8, 1921, *CD*, "Czechosłowacja 1921."

[38] Einstein to Secretary of State, July 23, 1921, *SDNA*, 760c.60f/101.

[39] Crane to Secretary of State, June 16, 1921, *SDNA*, 860f.00/174.

French-Polish-Czecho-Slovak military alliance mustering 82 million men against Germany's 60 million."[40] Crane emphasized that an improvement in Czechoslovak-Polish relations was evident, but he could not help wondering how far it would go. There were serious obstacles in the way, and the Polish public was not enthusiastic over the prospects of a *rapprochement* with Prague. The Left attacked Skirmunt in the *Sejm;* the Socialist spokesman Feliks Perl declared that Czechoslovakia would reap all the advantages from cooperation with Poland and would become neither more friendly with regard to the Eastern Galician question nor more reliable with regard to Germany.[41]

The allusion to Eastern Galicia referred to the long-standing advocacy by Prague of a common Czechoslovak-Russian border, which undermined Poland's efforts to secure an international recognition of the Riga settlement. As mentioned earlier, an Eastern Galician representation was active in Prague, and the Poles learned that there had been tendencies in the west to entrust Czechoslovakia with a mandate over Eastern Galicia. Piltz had inquired about it in August 1920, and Masaryk and Beneš confirmed that Paris and London had played with this idea. They declared however that Prague would never accept such a mandate which in Masaryk's words would amount to "a political adventure" and impose financial strains on Czechoslovakia.[42] Warsaw's anxieties were not completely dispelled and the Polish chargé d'affaires confided to the American minister in Prague in June 1921 that "Polish and Czech misunderstanding can be removed by mutual efforts including an upright abandonment by Czecho-Slovakia of all endeavors to gain territorial contact with Ukraine at Poland's expense." This, Crane commented, "refers to Czecho-Slovakia's alleged endeavors to create a semi-independent state unit in Eastern Galicia."[43]

Apart from Eastern Galicia the absence of strong pro-Czech feelings in Poland could also be explained by the recent memory of Teschen, and in this respect the new census in Czechoslovakia reopened old wounds. The number of Poles in the formerly contested areas had dwindled in an incredible fashion. Bohumín had 4977 Poles compared with 18,118 in 1910; in Frištat the number had fallen from 57,344 to 29,130.[44] Indignation at what was considered a manufactured census flared in Poland.

[40] *Ibid.*, July 30, 1921, 860f.00/184. He must have referred to the article by Lev Borský in *Národní Politika* of July 24, 1921.

[41] *Sprawozdania stenograficzne*, 1921, CCXXXIX/57–58.

[42] Piltz to Foreign Minister, August 30, 1920, *CD*, "Czechosłowacko-polskie stosunki 1920."

[43] Crane to Secretary of State, June 10, 1921, *SDNA*, 760f.00/1. Compare J. Łukasiewicz, "Stosunek do Czechosłowacji w polskiej polityce zagranicznej," *Przegląd Polityczny*, I (1924), 99, and Soják, *O zahraniční politice*, p. 96.

[44] Witt, *Die Teschner Frage*, pp. 199–200.

While obstacles to Czechoslovak-Polish cooperation on the Polish side were mainly of a political and emotional nature, anti-Polish feelings in Czechoslovakia resulted from more general considerations. The Czechs suspected Poland of imperialism, of fanning discontent in Teschen, and of plotting with Hungary against the territorial integrity of the republic. The existence of a Slovak council in Cracow which carried on separatist propaganda was certainly a thorn in Prague's side, and Skirmunt realized it well enough when he dissolved this organization.[45] While the policy of Skirmunt and Piltz promised to overcome Czech suspicions of Poland, could it eliminate popular Polish grievances against the Czechs? Here a friendly and imaginative policy on the part of Prague could obviously have been of the greatest assistance.

3

Czechoslovak-Polish negotiations, in which Beneš and Piltz played the leading part, occupied the period from July to October 1921, and were crowned first by a commercial and then a political agreement. The Polish side treated the economic treaty largely as an inducement for a political alliance, and Piltz as early as August had held long meetings with Beneš in Mariánské Lázně debating the Eastern Galician question. Beneš agreed to a pro-Polish attitude in that matter, but emphasized the need for granting autonomy to Eastern Galicia.[46] As for the Polish stand toward the Little Entente, Piltz manifested Warsaw solidarity with that group by attending its meeting on August 25. Still, it was clear that neither the members of this organization nor Warsaw was genuinely interested in including Poland in the Little Entente.[47] As for a harmonization of Polish and Czechoslovak views on Russia, this proved more difficult. The usually well-informed British ambassador in Berlin noted that although the Poles pressed for a Czechoslovak recognition of their territory as laid down by the Treaty of Riga, "This was naturally rejected in Prague, for . . . every party and every class in Czecho-Slovakia is at heart pan-Slav and pro-Moscovite. It is asserted that nothing Czecho-Slovakia signs or promises will ever make them reliable against Russian influence."[48]

This conclusion was largely true, but a formula was eventually found

[45] Crane to Secretary of State, June 16, 1921, *SDNA*, 860f.00/177; Soják, *O zahraniční politice*, pp. 82, 95.

[46] Soják, *O zahraniční politice*, p. 95.

[47] Skirmunt felt that Poland could not join this organization because it did not provide protection either against Russia or against Germany. Skirmunt's instructions of Oct. 7, 1921, in Starzewski, *Zarys dziejów*, p. 106. Also Gibson to Secretary of State, Oct. 27, 1921, *SDNA*, 860c.00/98.

[48] D'Abernon, *Diary*, I, 218.

for mutual guarantees of territory, and the Czechoslovaks promised not to hinder Polish interests vis-à-vis Russia.

While the Czechoslovak-Polish talks approached their end, government changes occurred in both countries which proved of some importance. In Prague, Beneš headed a new ministry based on a coalition of the five big parties (*pětka*), and though he retained the portfolio of foreign affairs he became necessarily involved in internal politics. The premiership in a coalition government dictated prudence and moderation in foreign policy, and Beneš in his first speech before the Chamber stressed that he was not directing the negotiations with Poland against anyone. The forthcoming agreements, he said, would mark the end of the first stage in Czechoslovak foreign policy which aimed at the creation of a secure and tranquil political system in Central Europe.[49]

The new Polish cabinet in which Skirmunt remained foreign minister was a nonparty government which came to power after a protracted internal crisis. Presided over by Antoni Ponikowski, it was hardly a strong ministry and was not expected to last long. Its uncertain future endangered the continuity of Polish foreign policy, even though the new premier emphasized in his opening address the value of the French alliance and the need for a settlement with Czechoslovakia.[50]

But, if the inherent weaknesses of the Czechoslovak coalition cabinet and of the Polish nonparty ministry boded ill for the future, the road lay open for final agreements between Warsaw and Prague. The commercial treaty was signed in Warsaw on October 20, 1921, by the Polish undersecretary of state, Henryk Strasburger, the Czechoslovak minister in Warsaw, Prokop Maxa, and the chief of the economic section of the Prague ministry, Jan Dvořaček. It completed and partly superseded the more limited accords of the past (of August 21, 1919, and of March 12, September 24 and 26, 1920). Both countries obtained the most-favored-nation clause and transit facilities that were especially important from the Czechoslovak point of view.[51] Two weeks after signing the commercial treaty, Skirmunt came to Prague, and there together with Beneš concluded on November 6 the final political agreement.

The Beneš-Skirmunt pact consisted of three parts—a main accord containing nine articles, an annex, and a secret protocol. The main accord[52] provided for mutual territorial guarantees, for concerted action on the application of treaties signed in common (Art. 1), and for benevo-

[49] *Le programme du nouveau cabinet tchécoslovaque. Exposé fait par M. Beneš, président du Conseil* (Prague, 1921).

[50] *Sprawozdania stenograficzne*, 1921, CCXLVII/6–23.

[51] Gibson to Secretary of State, Oct. 26, 1921, including the report of the American consul from Prague, *SDNA*, 660c.60f.31/1. Also Vondracek, *Foreign Policy of Czechoslovakia*, pp. 178–179.

[52] See Appendix IV.

lent neutrality in case of war and transit of war material (Art. 2). Czechoslovakia expressed disinterest in Eastern Galicia and promised to dissolve Ukrainian organizations working against Poland. Warsaw promised to reciprocate for this measure (Art. 3). Both governments took cognizance of the treaties of the Little Entente and of Poland's alliances with France and Rumania (Art. 4). They agreed on a commercial convention (Art. 5) and on arbitration (Art. 6). Czechoslovakia and Poland agreed not to sign treaties conflicting with the accord (Art. 7). The duration of the pact was set at five years, with provision for an earlier termination (Art. 8); it was to be ratified as soon as possible (Art. 9).

The annex to the political accord[53] referred to the formerly disputed areas of Teschen, Spiš, and Orava. Controversial matters in the districts under Czechoslovak rule were to be studied by a mixed delegation to establish "a state of legality, equity, and justice, and thereby to contribute to the appeasement in relations between the Czechoslovaks and the Poles." The two governments further agreed to settle within the next six months the fate of the border commune of Javořina in Orava. The annex, unlike the main accord, was not subject to ratification and became binding immediately after its signature.

Although Beneš carefully denied that the treaty with Poland contained any secret arrangements,[54] there was a secret protocol attached to the political accord. This protocol contained three main provisions: first, Czechoslovakia promised to support Warsaw "within the limit of her possibilities" on the question of Eastern Galicia; second, Czechoslovakia agreed not to do anything that could harm the eastern frontier settlement of Riga; third, Poland promised not to recognize attempts of the Habsburgs to regain the throne of Austria or Hungary, though she made it clear that, not being a member of the Little Entente, she could not actively intervene.[55]

The Beneš-Skirmunt pact showed the extent of Czechoslovak-Polish cooperation possible in late 1921. Prague was willing to have normal relations with Poland and begin an era of good neighborly collaboration. She was unwilling to sign military clauses directed against either Germany or Russia. More delicate commitments such as support to Polish eastern policy in the matters of the Treaty of Riga and of Eastern Ga-

[53] See Appendix V.

[54] In his speech to the Parliament on Nov. 16, 1921. Beneš, *Problémy nové Evropy*, p. 151.

[55] Starzewski, *Zarys dziejów*, pp. 105–106; Soják, *O zahraniční politice*, p. 96, quoting from Archiv Min. Zahr. Věci, Archiv Státních Smluv, L. 100. Also Gasiorowski, "Polish-Czechoslovak Relations 1918–1922," p. 192. Einstein reported to the secretary of state about alleged secret clauses relating to transportation of war material, but in the above accounts there is no confirmation of their existence. *SDNA*, 760c.60f.15/43.

licia were relegated to the secret protocol, and even here the Czechoslovak promises were not extensive or concrete.

Poland showed no inclination to be identified with the Little Entente, but that did not worry Czechoslovakia as long as Warsaw drew away from Budapest. Skirmunt realized clearly enough that the pact would encounter opposition in Poland on the ground that Prague had not made concessions in Teschen or proclaimed far-reaching changes in her general policy. The Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs therefore attached great importance to the annex dealing with Teschen, Spiš, and Orava. As a confidential commentary of the ministry expressed it, "Settlement of [Teschen] Silesian relations and a solution of the question of Javořina are to prepare a favorable atmosphere at home for reception of the whole pact."[56] That is why the annex was to become operative at once.

The pact met with favor in Czechoslovakia. Beneš pointed out that it did not involve a change of Czechoslovak policy toward any third power, and that it left Prague full freedom to negotiate an economic agreement with Russia. By providing transit facilities the commercial treaty, in fact, made such an agreement possible. The Czechoslovak statesman described the treaty as "required by the logic of events, historical development, international political relations . . . and most powerful economic interests." [57] The periodical *Zahraniční Politika*, which reflected the views of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, stressed in several articles the mutual advantages of the pact. It destroyed "the myth in Europe about Polish imperialism spread by Poland's enemies"; [58] it showed that assertions about Poland's inability to cooperate with her neighbors were not true.[59] The journal affirmed that Poland was "an element of peace in Europe" and that it constituted "a link between two blocs of states: between the Little Entente and the Baltic States," desiring to play "an important role in Eastern Europe on the basis of a close association with France." [60]

While praising Poland's statesmanship and stressing her importance, Prague also capitalized on the pact by representing it as a successful extension of the Little Entente. Beneš referred to the pact with Poland by calling it "an important part of the new Central European system,"[61] and he added that to the Little Entente "is due the merit of having created the system; it is its center and driving force." [62]

Numerous circles in Poland, underestimating how much the treaty

[56] Circular of Dec. 2, 1921, *CD*, "Czechosłowacko-polskie stosunki 1920."
[57] Speech on Nov. 16, 1921. Beneš, *Problémy nové Evropy*, p. 149.
[58] *Zahraniční Politika*, I (1922), 596.
[59] *Ibid.*, I, 132.
[60] *Ibid.*, II, 597.
[61] *Ibid.*, I, 56.
[62] Beneš, "The Little Entente," *Foreign Affairs*, I (1922–23), 70.

with Czechoslovakia improved Poland's standing in the eyes of the international public, noted that the pact was much exploited by Czech propaganda. They were irritated and believed that Czechoslovakia rather than Poland derived credit from the agreement. The Socialists were critical, and at the first opportunity Perl accused Skirmunt of having signed the pact without consulting the *Sejm*'s foreign affairs committee.[63] He stated that the pact brought no advantages to Warsaw and therefore all parties opposed it. A representative of the Catholic-Peasant group declared that it only mentioned the question of Javořina without settling the issue, and he asserted that the Czechs had always outmaneuvered the Poles.[64] While the Christian Democratic *Rzeczpospolita* congratulated Skirmunt, and the National Democratic *Kurjer Poznański* wrote that the minister "understood the necessity of a new orientation of Polish policy with regard to the Czechs,"[65] the Right could not remain indifferent to the outcry of those who thought that the Beneš-Skirmunt pact confirmed Polish renunciation of Teschen without getting anything in return.

The future of the pact, which Skirmunt for the time being did not submit to Parliament for ratification, depended on two factors. One was maintenance of the Skirmunt-Piltz team in charge of Polish foreign policy—a fact the Czechs fully appreciated.[66] The second was settlement of local grievances in Teschen and, above all, a solution of the question of Javořina, which the Poles regarded as a test of Czech good will. This latter view, however, Prague failed completely to understand.

As for the French role in the Czechoslovak-Polish agreement, the conservative and anti-Czech paper *Czas* wrote that "The signing of the political accord took place under an unheard of pressure of France."[67] But Beneš denied that any great power influenced the pact, and he asserted that "we were never asked by any member of the Alliance to pursue any special policy in that respect."[68] Neither of these two statements sounds convincing. One can hardly imagine Paris adopting a completely disinterested attitude toward a Polish-Czechoslovak *rapprochement*, but on the other hand could it really dictate policies to the two countries? It is probable that the French exerted greater pressure on Warsaw than on Prague, and to that extent *Czas* may have been partly correct. The American envoy in Prague reported that Czechoslovak-Polish negotiations received "powerful backing from France."[69] An announce-

[63] *Sprawozdania stenograficzne*, 1922, CCCVIII/47.
[64] *Ibid.*, CCCIII/4–7.
[65] *BPPP*, Oct. 23–Nov. 13, 1921, No. 111, pp. 3–4.
[66] *Zahraniční Politika*, I (1922), 132.
[67] *BPPP*, Oct. 23–Nov. 13, No. 111, p. 3.
[68] Beneš, *Problémy nové Evropy*, p. 151.
[69] Crane to Secretary of State, July 30, 1921, *SDNA*, 860f.00/184. Compare a later ap-

ment made in July 1921 that Briand would visit the Czech capital in the near future may have been intended as a stimulus to speed up the talks. Crane reported that the object of this visit was to consolidate the French diplomatic and military position in Central Europe.[70] The French army, which played a role in drafting the military conventions between the Little Entente members in late 1921 and early 1922,[71] was keenly interested in the prospects of Czechoslovak-Polish cooperation, and it indicated this interest to Warsaw and Prague.[72]

Lord D'Abernon, in his analysis of the last stages of the negotiation which preceded signing of the Beneš-Skirmunt pact, commented that Czechoslovakia by her recognition of "the French treaty with Poland" became "virtually a party to it." He concluded that the "network of French influence is thus considerably strengthened and extended."[73] Little doubt remains that the French encouraged this pact which contributed to stability in East Central Europe, and only lack of fuller documentation prevents an extensive analysis of the means employed by Paris to attain its object.

4

French interest in consolidation of the area east of Germany was natural at a time when the position of France in international politics was insecure and isolated. Since the repudiation of the Anglo-American guarantees, Paris maneuvered uneasily in a world which sadly lacked the prospect of stability. While the French government successfully resisted proposals for disarmament on land made at the Washington Conference (begun in November 1921), it was obliged to make concessions on the limitation of naval forces. Faint hopes for a *rapprochement* with the United States were dashed, and the Quai d'Orsay was fully aware of the need to improve its international position. The necessity of reaching some modus vivendi with Britain became imperative, and in December 1921 the French ambassador in London began discussions with Lord Curzon on a French-British mutual guarantee pact.

Ambassador de Saint Aulaire made it clear to the British that a simple revival of the one-sided guarantee, as planned during the Peace Confer-

praisal of the German minister in Prague. Koch to Auswärtiges Amt, April 2, 1925, *AANA*, Container 1510.

[70] July 25, *SDNA*, 860f.00/182.

[71] Czechoslovak-Rumanian, July 2, 1921; Czechoslovak-Yugoslav, Aug. 1, 1921; Rumanian-Yugoslav, Jan. 23, 1922. See Soják, *O zahraniční politice*, p. 89.

[72] The Polish military attaché reported from Paris that the French pressed for a Polish-Czechoslovak alliance. Major Beck to High Command, March 6, 1922, *AGND*, 61/8529T4. In a private letter to Świtalski, Beck wrote: "I maneuver so as not to appear anti-Czech." *Ibid.*, Jan. 18, 1922.

[73] D'Abernon, *Diary*, I, 226.

ence, would not be satisfactory because it covered only direct aggression against France and excluded indirect attack on French allies in the east. The French diplomat explained that if Germany attacked Poland, France "would not tolerate it, and would take up arms to defend Poland and the European equilibrium." A "Polish Sadowa," Saint Aulaire said, "would be the best preparation for Germany for a new Sedan."[74] The ambassador submitted a plan which showed the kind of arrangement Paris had in mind. It involved a British guarantee not only of French territory but also of the Rhineland zones; it gave France sufficient freedom to maintain links with Poland and the Little Entente; it provided for British assistance through the League of Nations to France's eastern allies; and it included a secret Franco-British military convention.[75]

Lloyd George was most reluctant to commit England to such far-reaching engagements. He opposed any guarantees beyond those against a direct German aggression and formulated demands for French concessions on submarines, Tangier, and the Middle East.[76] Prolonged negotiations ensued during which Briand and Lloyd George attempted to find a measure of common agreement.

The French foreign minister, true to his flexible tactics, tried to transform the projected French-British pact into a general security scheme into which guarantees for Poland and Czechoslovakia could be fitted. Briand assured the British prime minister that he understood London was not prepared "to support unconditionally the countries of Eastern Europe";[77] he searched, however, for a formula which would reconcile French obligations to Poland with the need for a British alliance.

When the Cannes Conference met on January 6, 1922, to discuss the question of reparations, British and French views were far apart, but Briand hoped that some compromise was possible. London was intent on calling a large conference on economic reconstruction of Europe, in which Germany and Soviet Russia could participate, and Briand felt that French agreement to such a conference could be used to overcome British opposition to more extensive guarantees. At Cannes, Lloyd George submitted a draft treaty of guarantee which provided for British help in case of an unprovoked aggression against France; for concert should there be a breach of the Rhineland status; and for consultation in the case of infringement of military, naval, or air clauses of the Treaty of Versailles. The proposed pact was to be of ten years' duration.

The draft as it stood was clearly unsatisfactory. It anticipated no mili-

[74] *Documents relatifs aux garanties*, p. 92.

[75] Saint Aulaire, *Confession*, pp. 384–385.

[76] D'Abernon, *Diary*, I, 258.

[77] Note dictated by Briand after his talk with Lloyd George on Dec. 21, 1921. Suarez, *Briand*, V, 358. Compare Laroche, *Au Quai d'Orsay*, p. 147.

tary convention, it added nothing to security in East Central Europe, and the ten-year period was too short because France was likely to need British support after evacuation of the Rhineland (which was to take place at a later date). Briand communicated the British proposal to Paris and informed Warsaw of it; he adopted the attitude that Lloyd George's proposal though not satisfactory represented a step in the right direction. As he said later, "It remained only to protect Eastern and Central Europe. I have not neglected this and I have begun conversations to realize a similar entente with our Italian friends and the Little Entente." [78]

Did Briand believe that he could have achieved his object or was he prepared to compromise on Polish and eastern European interests and cover it by a general formula?[79] The question is not easy to answer. Poincaré, for one, viewed a Franco-British treaty involving serious French concessions as a dangerous procedure because "it could give the country the illusion of complete security" which in reality it did not establish.[80] On the other hand, a Franco-British pact providing for automatic British assistance to France and for consultation in case of a German-Polish conflict would have been more conducive to security than the arrangement which was made three years later at Locarno.

Whatever the outcome of the Cannes talks might have been, they were not destined to be finished. Briand's policy, which included an agreement to Lloyd George's proposal for the international conference on European economic reconstruction, antagonized powerful interests in Paris. Millerand, who once said that he had made Briand premier so that he could be more easily controlled than if he were outside of the government,[81] now mobilized the cabinet against him. In the political campaign which developed against Briand a photograph showing him on the links of Cannes taking a lesson in golf from Lloyd George gave rise to pointed questions in the press whether Briand had become Lloyd George's disciple in golf alone. Attacks on the premier led to his recall to Paris where he was expected to explain his position.

Briand, interrupting his talks with the British, rushed to Paris. After delivering a passionate speech in the Chamber of Deputies which swayed most of his opponents, the premier simply walked out of the government. His archenemy Poincaré assumed the presidency of the cabinet and took over the Quai d'Orsay.

[78] Briand's speech in Nantes on June 2, 1922. Suarez, *Briand*, V, 424.

[79] Arnold Toynbee and J. W. Wheeler-Bennett expressed the opinion that Briand did not intend to drop French allies in East Central Europe. See respectively *Survey of International Relations, 1924*, pp. 10–11, and *Information on the Problem of Security 1917–1926* (London, 1927), p. 51.

[80] *Documents relatifs aux garanties*, pp. 253–254.

[81] Saint Aulaire, *Confession*, p. 576.

The fall of Briand was a turning point in French foreign policy, and both Warsaw and Prague showed signs of uneasiness and confusion. The *Zahraniční Politika* blamed the British for their failure to understand French psychology, therefore putting Briand into a position which led to his resignation;[82] Beneš also "criticized the action of Mr. Lloyd George in bringing about M. Briand's fall."[83] Prague was anxious lest a Franco-British rift be exploited by the revisionist powers and endanger European security.

Warsaw watched the developments in Cannes with growing concern. Government circles worried because Poincaré had failed to mention Poland in his first speech before the Chamber of Deputies. The Socialist press remarked that while Briand's policy carried with it the danger of abandoning Poland, Poincaré would try to chain Warsaw to the internationally isolated Paris. Within a short time, however, the tone of the Polish press changed in Poincaré's favor, and even the Socialists adopted a friendlier attitude.[84] This change probably resulted from explanations by Panafieu about the nature of the new French foreign policy and remarks of the premier to Zamoyski about signing economic agreements and making the Franco-Polish alliance operative.[85]

Poincaré took up the negotiations with Britain at the point where they had been interrupted by Briand's fall, and he made preparations for the forthcoming conference on economic reconstruction to be held in Genoa. Still he showed little enthusiasm for either. In the exchanges with London the French premier obtained an extension of the pact to twenty years, but he made little progress otherwise. Poincaré suggested that if Britain were unwilling to guarantee Poland she might perhaps agree to defend the clauses of the Treaty of Versailles referring to Danzig or Upper Silesia,[86] but he met with an unfavorable response.

The Franco-British rift widened, and since this was dangerous for East Central Europe, Beneš tried his luck at bringing the two powers together. Partly as a result of his initiative Poincaré and Lloyd George met in Boulogne on February 25 and 26, 1922, and attempted to coordinate their countries' policies with regard to the approaching Genoa Conference. The moment may have been right for an imaginative French move in the matter of the Franco-British pact of guarantee, but if it was, Poincaré let it pass. The issue came up at the last moment, and the French statesman excused himself by saying that he had to catch

[82] *Zahraniční Politika*, I (1922), 87–88.

[83] Einstein to Secretary of State, Jan. 13, 1922, *SDNA*, 760f.61/11.

[84] *BPPP*, Dec. 25, 1921–Jan. 18, 1922, No. 114, pp. 5–6. Also Tommasini, *Odrodzenie Polski*, pp. 297ff.

[85] Józef Lipski, "Przyczynki do polsko-niemieckiej deklaracji o nieagresji," *Bellona*, XXXI (1951), 21.

[86] *Documents relatifs aux garanties*, p. 121.

the train to Paris. Although Beneš voiced satisfaction over bringing France and England closer together, and some French papers echoed his remarks, the result was disappointing. Beneš probably succeeded in one thing, namely ingratiating himself in both capitals, which from the Czechoslovak point of view was no mean achievement.

As for possible British guarantees for East Central Europe, Beneš's view was hardly calculated to strengthen the French or Polish positions. The Czechoslovak statesman confided to the American minister in Prague that "he was the first to recognize that it was impossible to include in this [guarantee] the Little Entente without Poland, and that the guarantee of Poland was both unfeasible and a greater danger than a pledge of peace."[87] This attitude accorded well with Beneš's policy of keeping the Little Entente out of big bloc divisions, but one can doubt whether it was helpful to Poland and, if voiced in London, did much to soften British opposition to extensive guarantees.

The Genoa Conference now came to the foreground. As seen by Lloyd George and big business, its object was to open the way for trading and investment in Russia through an international capitalist consortium, and to avoid western economic competition for the Russian market which would lead to one group undercutting another. This latter development was precisely what Lenin had hoped for, and he meant to exploit the capitalist competition to strengthen his recently initiated New Economic Policy (NEP).

The attitude of the French government, supported by a large section of the public, was negative toward the Genoa scheme. It could offer little economic advantage to France unless the Bolsheviks agreed to settle the tsarist debt which was a prerequisite for resumption of economic relations between France and Russia. Politically the participation of Germany and Russia in an international conference raised the danger of collusion between the two anti-Versailles powers, which the British-French rift was bound to facilitate. Poincaré viewed Genoa as a necessary evil, and although Warsaw and Prague did not entirely share his point of view they also had reasons for anxiety and doubt.

Skirmunt voiced his hopes for and fears of the Genoa Conference on January 19, 1922, saying that Poland considered the Versailles settlement immutable, and he assured his listeners that no questions related to territorial matters would be raised at this international gathering. He pointed out that all states interested in Russian trade must be treated on a basis of equality, and that the economic independence of every country ought to be respected.[88] The Polish government felt that "the alliance with France and all that it implies" would "inevitably be af-

[87] Einstein to Secretary of State, Feb. 28, 1922, *SDNA*, 550e.1/124.
[88] Summary of the speech in *Zahraniční Politika*, I (1922), 461.

fected in one way or the other by the course of events in Genoa," and they were shocked to learn that Paris had failed in its attempt "to make the integrity of Poland a condition in Franco-British relations."[89] Poland's position in France was weak, and the Quai d'Orsay did not consult Warsaw about the forthcoming conference.[90] Hence it was imperative to strengthen bonds with France, to effect a *rapprochement* with the Little Entente, and to achieve full solidarity with those powers at the meeting.[91]

Moved by these considerations Poland on February 6, 1922, signed a revised version of the 1921 economic treaties with France, and Skirmunt made another attempt to gain French recognition of the eastern borders. Here he failed utterly. Poincaré received his advances coolly and showed no inclination to consider the matter; the question of border recognition had to be dropped.[92] Did Paris reject the Polish request because recognition of the Treaty of Riga implied indirect recognition of the Soviet Union, or did the French want to avoid commitments on the border question because they might prejudice direct contacts between Paris and Moscow? It seems that both considerations influenced the French attitude.

French-Soviet contacts were undoubtedly established. Franklin-Bouillon sounded out Krassin on the general policy of Russia.[93] And Karl Radek, visiting Berlin in February 1922 to advocate a German-Soviet alliance, made revealing statements about French overtures. He said that Paris had offered credits and a recognition *de jure* if Moscow exercised its right to claim reparations from Germany under Article 16 of the Treaty of Versailles, and thereby recognized the postwar territorial settlement. He added, however, that the French were not unanimous, and while Poincaré favored a French-Russian *rapprochement*, Millerand was against it. D'Abernon had heard the same story from Rakovsky,[94] and along with the German interlocutors of Radek he suspected a Soviet stratagem, but the German secret service confirmed Radek's assertions. According to German intelligence, "the French had hinted that they were even prepared to drop Poland if Russia in exchange adopted a definitely anti-German position."[95]

[89] Thaw to Secretary of State, March 2, 1922, *SDNA*, 550e.1/152.

[90] Łukasiewicz's retrospective report to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, April 15, 1922, *AGND*, 61/8633T4.

[91] See Ponikowski's speech on March 21, 1922, *Sprawozdania stenograficzne*, CCXC/7–24.

[92] J. Łukasiewicz, *Z doświadczeń przeszłości* (Rome, 1944), p. 6.

[93] B. de Jouvenel, *D'Une guerre à l'autre*, I, 272ff.

[94] D'Abernon, *Diary*, I, 264, 273.

[95] Wipert von Blücher, *Deutschlands Weg nach Rapallo* (Wiesbaden, 1951), p. 155. This account by a high official of the German Foreign Ministry seems to be accepted by J. Grunewald, "L'Influence des facteurs économiques," in Duroselle, *La Politique étrangère*

Neither French overtures to Russia nor Radek's efforts in Berlin produced immediate results, but they showed the complexity of the international situation on the eve of Genoa. French reluctance to recognize Polish eastern borders stemmed partly from this general instability. Although the Poles had only a vague notion of the French-Russian exchanges,[96] they increased their effort to consolidate Poland's position.

Skirmunt approached the Little Entente to gain support against revisionism. This was a logical sequel to his policy of *rapprochement* with Czechoslovakia, and the Polish representatives discussed immutability of frontiers at the conferences in Bucharest and Belgrade. At the former the Little Entente agreed with Poland to exclude border questions from the agenda at Genoa, but at the latter they balked at a Polish request for formal recognition of the Riga frontier.[97] Thus Prague and her allies were pursuing a policy similar to that of France and were willing to concert with Poland on territorial matters, but were not prepared to take specific engagements on the Riga frontiers. The Polish Left again criticized Skirmunt for being in tow of Beneš,[98] but government circles expressed appreciation of collaboration with the Little Entente.[99]

The Quai d'Orsay also favored this cooperation which promised a solid front of France and her eastern allies at Genoa. Paris, however, was far less enthusiastic about Skirmunt's attempted *rapprochement* with the Baltic countries. The French felt that the projected Polish-Finnish alliance would be disliked by Britain and would antagonize the Soviets.[100] The Polish-sponsored Riga Conference of the Baltic states and Russia on March 30, 1922, also aroused French suspicions, and Paris feared that Moscow might exploit the conference to its own advantage, as a sign of the weakening eastern barrier.[101]

On the eve of Genoa both Poland and Czechoslovakia attempted to play the role of a mediator, especially in economic matters, between France, Britain, and Russia. Skirmunt felt that if the west saw in Poland an important channel for economic penetration of Russia this would enhance the Polish position in international affairs. In February 1922 Radek

et ses fondements; and by G. Freund, *Unholy Alliance* (London, 1957), pp. 110ff. According to other German accounts, the French envoy in Warsaw told Skirmunt previously (on January 9, 1922) that Poland must become reconciled with Russia. See Heinrich Euler, *Die Aussenpolitik der Weimarer Republik 1918–1923* (Aschaffenburg Pattloch, 1957), p. 323.

[96] Memorandum of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Dec. 14, 1921, *CD*, "Sytuacja międzynarodowa."

[97] Dodge to Secretary of State, March 18, 1922, *SDNA*, 550e.1/162.

[98] *BPPP*, Feb. 13–March 11, 1922, No. 116, pp. 2–3.

[99] Thaw to Secretary of State, March 2, 1922, *SDNA*, 550e.1/152.

[100] Zamoyski to Foreign Minister, March 15, 1922, *AGND*, 43/8570; Beck to 2nd bureau, April 4, 1922, *AGND*, 44/8615.

[101] Survey of the French press prepared by the Polish Foreign Ministry, *CD*, "Konferencja w Genui"; Tommasini, *Odrodzenie Polski*, p. 145.

and Nicholai Krestinsky stopped in Warsaw, and two high officials of the Foreign Ministry, August Zaleski and Juliusz Łukasiewicz, talked to them about the possibility of reconciling French and Russian views on economic cooperation. There was no concrete result.[102] Beneš's efforts were on the whole more successful. The American chargé in Prague reported on his attempts to become a middleman between the west and Russia and noted that Beneš could speak on the subject "with unrivalled competence."[103] The *Manchester Guardian* commented on the importance of the views of the Czechoslovak foreign minister, stating that "by the intimate connection which exists between his country and Russia, he will be able to interpret Russian needs with an authority which may be less readily accorded to the Russians themselves."[104] But if Prague's international position was notably better than that of Poland, Beneš "could not hide his fears caused by the unclear program" of the forthcoming meeting."[105]

5

France, Poland, and Czechoslovakia went to the Genoa Conference with serious misgivings which created a strong bond among them. Their fears were justified at the start when in spite of the efforts of Paris the Polish and Czechoslovak delegates were not invited to the preliminary session on April 9, 1922. Then Lloyd George raised the territorial questions of Wilno and Eastern Galicia; and France, Poland, and the Little Entente united in opposing introduction of these matters. Their cooperation throughout the conference became highly effective. Warsaw praised the Czechoslovak attitude toward Eastern Galicia,[106] and Prague in turn favorably commented on Skirmunt's policy of close collaboration.[107] While loyal to the French, Skirmunt tried not to become identified with their rigid views on economic matters, and Beneš followed a similar policy.[108] Poland's position was obviously difficult, and her foreign minister played a cautious game which won him general recognition and esteem.[109] He adroitly related the recognition of Poland's eastern boundaries to the general issue of European stabilization, and thus he prepared the ground for future decision by the great powers.[110]

[102] J. Łukasiewicz, *Z doświadczeń przeszłości*, p. 5.
[103] Einstein to Secretary of State, Feb. 28, 1922, *SDNA*, 550e.1/124.
[104] Cited in Machray, *The Little Entente*, p. 192.
[105] *Zahraniční Politika*, I (1922), 352. His critical attitude was reflected in a circular to Czechoslovak missions abroad. Soják, *O zahraniční politice*, p. 102.
[106] Circular to Missions, June 22, 1922, *CD*, "Galicja Wschodnia."
[107] Einstein to Secretary of State, April 14, 1922, *SDNA*, 550e.1/240.
[108] Beneš to Masaryk on May 11, 1922, cited in Soják, *O zahraniční politice*, p. 108.
[109] Tommasini, *Odrodzenie Polski*, pp. 259, 298.
[110] *Zahraniční Politika*, I (1922), 859ff; Tommasini, *Odrodzenie Polski*, p. 146.

While the French-Polish alliance and the Beneš-Skirmunt pact were successfully passing their test, developments at the conference showed little progress. Finally a political bomb exploded on April 16—Germany and Russia had signed an agreement at Rapallo providing for mutual liquidation of war reparations and for a trade convention. The conference was stunned to see that its only result thus far had been a *rapprochement* between the two revisionist powers. Poincaré described Rapallo as "a threat to peace" which showed the tendency of Germany and Russia to work out "a common scheme of hostility against the signatory powers of the Treaty of Versailles."[111] Speaking at Bar-le-Duc on April 24, the French premier declared that this *rapprochement* "may become tomorrow a direct threat to Poland and an indirect threat to us."[112] *Zahraniční Politika* wrote that there was no doubt that Rapallo "was an attack against France just as it was against Poland."[113] All diplomats suspected that the agreement contained secret clauses providing for a German-Russian military alliance. In reality no military convention had been signed, but this made little difference because supersecret military collaboration between Germany and Russia already existed.[114]

The Polish government affirmed that the Treaty of Rapallo "did not take it by surprise"[115] and that Poland would not alter its foreign policy.[116] It was obvious, however, that Warsaw saw the treaty as a sword of Damocles suspended over Poland's head. From the Polish point of view Rapallo could have had only one advantage. It alarmed France and provided impetus to the closing of allied ranks endangered by a German-Soviet threat to the *status quo* in Europe.

Paris reacted by again taking up the question of a Franco-British treaty of guarantee and insisted on security for East Central Europe. Poincaré argued that Rapallo showed conclusively "that it is not on the Rhine that a German offensive, destined to ruin the edifice of peace set up at Versailles, will take place," and he pressed Britain to agree to "the necessity to concert in case of a threat to peace."[117] In Genoa, Barthou spoke to Skirmunt about the Franco-British pact and stressed the need for including in it provisions for the eventuality of an attack against Poland and Czechoslovakia. He also brought up the question of French

[111] *Documents relatifs aux garanties*, p. 141.

[112] Cited in B. de Jouvenel, *D'Une guerre à l'autre*, I, 281.

[113] *Zahraniční Politika*, I (1922), 862.

[114] "Le traité de Rapallo ne fût pas le point de départ de la collusion germano-russe sur le plan militaire"; Castellan, "Reichswehr et Armée Rouge," in Duroselle, *Les Relations germano-soviétiques*, p. 147.

[115] Ministry of Foreign Affairs to legation in Washington, April 24, 1922, *CD*, "Konferencja w Genui."

[116] Skirmunt in *Sejm* on May 31, *Sprawozdania stenograficzne*, 1922, CCXV/19.

[117] *Documents relatifs aux garanties*, p. 143.

credits for Polish armaments.[118] Beneš advocated a guarantee pact between London and Paris "which should afterwards be extended to become an inter-allied pact." He remarked that his plan failed "because it was based upon a respect for existing international obligations," and added that Lloyd George's counterproposals fell through because they "took no account of this principle."[119]

The British reaction to French overtures after Rapallo was typical of Lloyd George's limited outlook on continental problems. He suggested a general pact of security in which Germany and Russia would participate,[120] and ignored the appeals of the Conservative press for a French-British alliance. Saint Aulaire aptly described Lloyd George's attitude by saying that "After condemning Rapallo formally . . . Lloyd George deplored it but only in order to make out of it a new grievance against France to whom the responsibility [for Rapallo] was attributed."[121] Thus instead of countering the effects of Rapallo with a Franco-British pact providing guarantees against an upheaval in East Central Europe, the British leader contented himself with putting the blame for the event on French rigidity toward Germany and Russia.

How did Rapallo, and the Genoa Conference which ultimately ended in failure, affect French-Polish-Czechoslovak relations? The conference showed the effectiveness of cooperation among the three states, and Skirmunt was justified in praising the French and Czechoslovak attitudes toward Poland.[122] His policy "gained in the estimation of all, and especially of France and the Little Entente,"[123] and foreign observers could have assumed that a period of close Czechoslovak-Polish-French collaboration lay ahead. This, however, did not prove to be the case, and the impact of Genoa and Rapallo on Warsaw and Prague proved to be very different indeed.

Beneš's position in Prague became stronger,[124] and Rapallo being a direct threat to Poland did not seem to have bothered the Czechs too much. In spite of the general fiasco of Genoa, Beneš could claim that his country at least negotiated a trade agreement with Russia, which was finally signed in Prague on June 5, 1922. The Czechoslovak statesman asserted in his speech to Parliament that he desired to see Russia "cooperate as quickly as possible in the political and economic reconstruc-

[118] Starzewski, *Zarys dziejów*, p. 114.

[119] Beneš, *Five Years of Czechoslovak Foreign Policy*, p. 32.

[120] *Documents relatifs aux garanties*, p. 141.

[121] *Confession*, p. 620.

[122] Skirmunt in *Sejm* on May 31, 1922. *Sprawozdania stenograficzne*, 1922, CCCXV/13–33.

[123] Gibson to Secretary of State, May 11, 1922, *SDNA*, 860c.00/124.

[124] Einstein to Secretary of State, May 11 and 26, 1922, *SDNA*, 550e.1/324 and 770.00/45.

tion of Europe."[125] Beneš had little difficulty in disposing of his critics — some of whom demanded a more strongly pro-French policy and extension of the Little Entente, while others blamed the minister for overestimating France and underestimating Russia. Faced with such conflicting demands, Beneš could point out that his middle-of-the-road policy was the most suitable for the country.

In Poland the fear of a combined Russian-German threat coupled with inflation at home and bitter party strife produced a state of high tension. While the Polish press appraised Skirmunt's efforts at Genoa favorably,[126] his policy in general was criticized in Parliament, especially by the Left. The conciliatory policy toward Russia and the *rapprochement* with Czechoslovakia, both unpopular in Poland, were thrown at Skirmunt, and he was reproached for being weak and making concessions. Piłsudski, who had long disliked Skirmunt, whom the Rightist groups tried to play against the head of the state, sharply accused the government of ignoring the seriousness of Poland's position. Premier Ponikowski in reply handed in the resignation of the cabinet on June 7, 1922. A political crisis ensued during which the parliamentary majority contested Piłsudski's right to dissolve the ministry.

The succeeding premiers, Artur Śliwiński and Jan Nowak, made explicit statements that the basis of Poland's foreign policy was still friendship with France and good relations with Czechoslovakia and the Little Entente. The pro-Piłsudski *Kurjer Poranny* asserted that the fall of the Ponikowski-Skirmunt cabinet did not signify changes in foreign outlook.[127] Still, the impression abroad was unfavorable, and Prague, calling Piłsudski's dismissal of the ministry "an extraordinary step,"[128] thought that the ministerial crisis would have far-reaching repercussions in the diplomatic sphere.

The successor to Skirmunt, Gabriel Narutowicz, was a man renowned for his integrity and talents. A scientist by profession, he was a friend of Piłsudski but by no means his docile follower. Though less enthusiastic about the *rapprochement* with Czechoslovakia than Skirmunt, the new foreign minister favored continuation of friendly relations with Prague.[129] But the Czechs put less trust in him than in their tried friend Skirmunt, and Polish political instability contributed toward making Prague more reserved than before. Kramář indulged in a series of violently anti-Polish lectures,[130] and the traditional distrust of the Czechs toward their north-

[125] *Zahraniční Politika*, I (1922), 805.
[126] *BPPP*, May 8–June 9, 1922, No. 119, p. 3.
[127] *Ibid.*, p. 9.
[128] *Zahraniční Politika*, II (1922), 979–980.
[129] Tommasini, *Odrodzenie Polski*, pp. 260ff.
[130] See Kramář, *Pět přednášek*.

ern neighbor, not fully overcome during the brief period of cooperation, again received impetus.

Narutowicz realized this clearly enough and instructed Polish missions abroad to try to explain why Polish internal politics were so unstable, and to obliterate as far as possible the bad impression in Europe.[131] This effort proved of little avail.

The era of *rapprochement* during the foreign ministry of Skirmunt marked a high point in postwar Polish-Czech relations. After the fall of Skirmunt things were no longer the same. When Beneš went on to strengthen the Little Entente, he expressed grave doubts to an American diplomat as to whether Poland could ever be brought into this group.[132] On the Polish side an article in *Polityka* criticized Beneš and the Czechoslovak tendency to dominate Yugoslavia and Rumania.[133] Although Piltz attended the meeting of the Little Entente in Prague on August 25, the bonds between Poland and Czechoslovakia continued to weaken. If Polish instability — as exemplified by the fall of Skirmunt — and the external dangers to Poland stemming from Rapallo contributed to Czechoslovak coolness, Prague on its side did not try to understand the Polish mentality or to help Warsaw in her difficulties. Entrenched in a feeling of security and confidence, the Czechs sapped the slender bases of the still-unratified Beneš-Skirmunt pact and then delivered the main blow in the tragicomedy of Javořina.

[131] Narutowicz's circular to missions, July 29, 1922, *CD*, "Wewnętrzne sprawy 1922."
[132] Dodge to Secretary of State, June 14 and Sept. 6, 1922, *SDNA*, 770/48 and 770/55.
[133] Quoted in *Zahraniční Politika*, II (1922), 1660–1668.

10

RUHR AND JAVORINA

THE question of Javořina (Jaworzyna, in Polish), which so grievously affected Polish-Czechoslovak relations in late 1922 and throughout 1923, was connected with the old issue of Teschen, Spiš, and Orava. This tiny commune high up in the Tatra Mountains, inhabited by a few hundred people, came into the limelight when the final boundary was drawn between Czechoslovakia and Poland by an Allied delimitation commission. The members of this commission while investigating conditions on the spot felt that the frontier established by the Conference of Ambassadors on July 28, 1920, was "a monstrosity" and that the local population was "laboring under an injustice." [1] They therefore took it upon themselves to improve it by making small changes required by the everyday needs of the inhabitants. Thus the Polish member of the commission agreed on April 23, 1921, to minor modifications in Orava favoring Czechoslovakia and made it clear that he expected a Czechoslovak *quid pro quo* in the case of Javořina (in Spiš).[2]

When Skirmunt and Piltz began their *rapprochement* with Prague they used Javořina to convince the Polish public of a Czechoslovak spirit of conciliation and good will. The cession of Javořina to Poland was to obliterate the resentment at the Teschen defeat,[3] and so Warsaw purposely inflated the importance of the tiny commune. As the American chargé in Prague correctly estimated, the issue of Javořina "had been almost invented by the late Polish Minister, Mr. Piltz, with a view to its satisfactory settlement in the interest of friendly relations" between the two countries.[4]

The annex to the Beneš-Skirmunt pact of November 1921 singled out the case of Javořina for direct negotiation, and the Conference of Ambas-

[1] Du Bois' Memorandum for the State Department, March 5, 1921, *SDNA*, 760c.60f/91.

[2] See *PCIJ*, series C, No. 4, p. 382. Also Poland, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, *Recueil des documents diplomatiques concernant la question de Jaworzyna: décembre 1918–août 1923* (Warsaw, 1923), p. 45.

[3] That is what the Polish chargé d'affaires in Prague told the Americans. Einstein to Secretary of State, May 28, 1923, *SDNA*, 760c.60f.15/45.

[4] *Ibid.*, June 26, 1923, 760c.60f/111.

sadors agreed to suspend work of the delimitation commission for a couple of months to allow Warsaw and Prague to solve the issue. Everything seemed to indicate a smooth settlement. Since then the Slovaks, in whose territory Javořina lay, had expressed some annoyance that the Czechs after gaining Teschen now proposed to sacrifice Slovak land,[5] but the Polish side agreed to compensate them with the villages of Niedzica and Kacvin (Felsztyn was sometimes named in place of Kacvin). Apparently the Slovaks found this course satisfactory, and Slovak Catholic deputies came out strongly in June 1921 in favor of such an exchange.[6] Beneš had also been won over to the Polish proposal, and he told the American chargé in Prague as late as June 1922 that an agreement had been reached "assigning the village of Javořina with its 400 inhabitants to Poland, and the villages of Nedca [Niedzica] and Fulzteyn [Felsztyn] with about 2,000 inhabitants to Czecho-Slovakia." The Czechoslovak minister added that to prevent the question from becoming inflammable he had entrusted it to technical experts, and appointed National Democrats on the delegation "to allay their criticism." [7]

The issue, however, was far from settled. The Czechoslovak-Polish delegation established in accord with the annex to the Beneš-Skirmunt pact met once on April 8, 1922, and then ceased to function because of difficulties raised by the Czechoslovak members.[8] Several letters from Piltz to Beneš pressing for a speedy settlement failed to produce any result,[9] though the Polish diplomat emphasized that Javořina "weighs still on the fate of the Accord concluded between Poland and Czechoslovakia." [10] The only outcome of Piltz's interventions was a joint request by Warsaw and Prague to the Conference of Ambassadors for extension of the period for direct settlement. This extension the conference readily granted. But no progress was made and Piltz formally protested to the Czechoslovak government on August 7, 1922, about nonfulfillment of the annex to the Beneš-Skirmunt pact.[11] The Polish minister received no reply and the affair was at an impasse.

Beneš originally had favored the compromise settlement proposed by the Poles, but he began to change his position under pressure from the National Democrats who objected to concessions to Poland. Their party organ, *Národní Listy*, was right when it boasted in December 1923 that the National Democrats had prevented settlement of the Javořina is-

[5] Crane to Secretary of State, Nov. 1, 1920, *SDNA*, 760c.60f/69.

[6] *Ibid.*, June 10, 1921, 860f.00/176.

[7] Einstein to Secretary of State, June 3, 1922, *SDNA*, 760c.60f.15/31.

[8] See Witold Sworakowski, *Polacy na Śląsku za Olzą* (Warsaw, 1937), p. 197.

[9] See letters of Dec. 19, 1921; Jan. 13, March 7, March 29, August 7, 1922, in *PCIJ*, series C, No. 4, pp. 204–205, 207–213, 218–220, 234–236. Also *Recueil concernant la question de Jaworzyna*, pp. 64–65, 134.

[10] *PCIJ*, series C, No. 4, p. 218. [11] *Ibid.*, p. 236.

sue,[12] and under their influence other groups began to vie with each other in ultrapatriotic pronouncements. The National Socialist *České Slovo* attacked the Slovak deputies who favored the settlement, and spoke of strategic dangers to the republic should Javořina become Polish.[13] Beneš, premier of a coalition government, was aware of his weakness and feared antagonizing Czech nationalists. As the Polish chargé in Prague wrote later, "Beneš, enmeshed in the net of intrigues spread by his opponents in the Javořina question, did not want to and did not know how to cut or disentangle it." Masaryk, on the other hand, apparently "cut himself off completely from the Javořina question" and declared that "he would never occupy himself with this silly trifle." [14] The president thus either failed to appreciate the effect of the Javořina deadlock on Polish public opinion, or perhaps both he and Beneš did not care too much about it. The fall of Skirmunt, and the weakened Polish position after Rapallo, did not make *rapprochement* with Warsaw seem very attractive, and Beneš may have concluded that Polish friendship was not worth the risk of a domestic crisis over Javořina. At any rate he adopted a rigid attitude to any concessions.

In the absence of a direct Czechoslovak-Polish settlement the delimitation commission resumed work, and the French president of the commission, Lieutenant Colonel Uffler, informed the Conference of Ambassadors on September 12, 1922, of his proposal for the final boundary which left Kacvin and Niedzica to Czechoslovakia and Javořina to Poland.[15] Two weeks later, on September 25, the commission agreed — except for the Czechoslovak member — to accept this border and submit it to the Conference of Ambassadors for final approval. The protest of the Czech member against this procedure[16] was immediately backed by Beneš, who declared that the commission had overstepped its prerogatives. Beneš maintained that even the Conference of Ambassadors had no right to impose territorial changes.

The conference now faced a "tempest in a teapot," as the American chargé in Prague described it. It was somewhat ludicrous that the great powers had to step in between Poland and Czechoslovakia to decide the fate of four hundred highlanders in a remote Tatra village. But Javořina had by then liberated passions which were not in proportion to the significance of the issue. Diplomats from Prague warned the western capitals that a decision unfavorable to Czechoslovakia might topple Beneš's cabinet and produce far-reaching consequences. While the conference was at first inclined to override Czech objections — all representatives

[12] *BPPT*, Oct. 1, 1923–Jan. 31, 1924, No. 4, p. 2.
[13] Crane to Secretary of State, June 10, 1921, *SDNA*, 860f.00/176.
[14] Bader, *Stosunki polsko-czeskie*, p. 24.
[15] *PCIJ*, series C, No. 4, pp. 237–238. [16] *Ibid.*, p. 404.

except the French wanted to impose a speedy solution — the intractability of Beneš, who "in order to increase his prestige took an absolutely adamant position," made them hesitate.[17] No immediate decision was reached.

In October 1922 Beneš's cabinet fell, largely because of internal difficulties. The premier had been anxious to resign, realizing that while his prestige abroad was high he continued to be of little account in domestic politics.[18] He needed, however, diplomatic success to strengthen his position as foreign minister in the new cabinet presided over by Antonín Švehla. Beneš's isolation in the new ministry was reported from Prague,[19] and the Conference of Ambassadors was loath to weaken him further. Besides, Paris stood steadfastly by Beneš, and the Czech foreign minister went to France in November 1922, ostensibly to receive an honorary degree from the University of Strasbourg but probably to influence the Quai d'Orsay and the Conference of Ambassadors.

The situation as it developed slightly resembled the Teschen dispute of 1919–1920. France supported Prague and used the argument that the resignation of Beneš would hurt Polish-Czech relations because his successor would certainly be much more nationalistically minded. The Polish claims seemed to command support on general grounds both in the delimitation commission and at the Conference of Ambassadors. The Polish argument, already used in 1919–1920, that a pro-Czechoslovak decision would deepen the animosity between the two countries, was again treated lightly.

Zamoyski did not fail to point out to the president of the conference that a disregard of Polish rights was bound to have bad effects on the situation in Poland and on the relations between Warsaw and Prague,[20] but no Polish foreign minister had prestige comparable to that of Beneš, and the argument failed to convince the great powers. The conference could reason that Polish diplomacy was erratic anyway, and *Zahraniční Politika* did not forget to stress that Warsaw's foreign policy was "characterized by frequent changes of directives that could hardly help to improve and stabilize the Polish international position." [21] Poland, with unrecognized eastern frontiers, endangered by German-Russian hostility, had no chance of bargaining with the Conference of Ambassadors, and was largely dependent on the good will of the great powers. Besides, if her international standing was weak, her domestic affairs hardly inspired confidence in Polish statecraft.

[17] Tommasini, *Odrodzenie Polski*, p. 268.
[18] Einstein to Secretary of State, Aug. 1, 1922, *SDNA*, 860f.002/24.
[19] *Ibid.*, Dec. 11, 1922, 860f.00/203.
[20] *Recueil . . . concernant la question de Jaworzyna*, pp. 111–113, 115–116, 117–118.
[21] *Zahraniční Politika*, II (1922), 1638.

General elections in Poland in November 1922 led to a stalemate between the rival parties of the Right and the Left. Piłsudski's refusal to be a candidate for the presidency of the republic — under the new constitution of 1921 which greatly limited presidential powers — left the field wide open for nominees supported exclusively by the Left or the Right; and the election of Gabriel Narutowicz (the former foreign minister), a candidate of the Left, produced high tension and added to the bitter party strife, which by then bordered on political irresponsibility. Seven days after his installation as president of the Polish republic, Narutowicz was assassinated by a nationalist fanatic. Poland stood on the verge of civil war.

The murder of Narutowicz on December 16, 1922, shook and horrified the country and in a sense helped it to recover from its state of political aberration. The new president, also largely supported by the Left, Stanisław Wojciechowski, was accepted without violent opposition, and the new government headed by General Władysław Sikorski established a firm grip on the internal situation. The post of foreign minister went to an experienced diplomat, who had begun his service in Imperial Austria, Count Aleksander Skrzyński.

The political turmoil in Poland did not help Warsaw make its case at the Conference of Ambassadors, and the solution of the Javořina dispute was put off again. The Polish government indicated its displeasure by recalling Piltz from Prague and leaving the legation in the hands of a chargé d'affaires. Thus at the end of 1922 Polish politics were characterized by instability, Czechoslovak-Polish relations were tense, and the unsettled Javořina question remained a source of contention between Warsaw and Prague. This was most unfortunate at a time when Poincaré had decided on a firm course vis-à-vis Germany and embarked on occupation of the Ruhr.

2

The rise of Poincaré to power in early 1922 marked a change in French diplomacy from a policy of reconciliation with England to that of seeking a showdown. The fall of Lloyd George's cabinet in October 1922 was regarded in France as a victory for Poincaré in the duel between Paris and London, and French political circles rejoiced in the resignation of the "abimeur de la victoire." The Quai d'Orsay found out, however, that the new British prime minister, Andrew Bonar Law, also opposed French policy on reparations, and a serious situation began to develop. In December 1922 the majority of the Reparations Commission, led by France and opposed by Britain, declared Germany in default in her deliveries in kind. France insisted on sanctions, and on January 11, 1923, French and

Belgian troops advanced into the Ruhr. Germany replied by passive resistance.

What did France hope to accomplish by this show of force, and what were her principal objectives? A detailed analysis of French motives lies beyond the scope of this study, and the controversial question whether political or economic considerations were of decisive importance can only be touched upon. The German ambassador in Paris, Leopold von Hoesch, believed that both considerations played important roles. The French army favored action for reasons of security, and it wanted to impress the Germans with France's determination to maintain all provisions of the Treaty of Versailles. The powerful *Comité des Forges* wanted control of the German coal mines. The chief French objectives, however, were to hit Germany at its most vulnerable point, solve the question of reparations without British participation, and make sure that Germany stood no chance in an attempted return to *Reichtum und Macht*.[22]

Hoesch's analysis oversimplified some aspects of the Ruhr action. While certain industrial interests pushed the Quai d'Orsay toward occupation of the Ruhr, heavy industry was not unanimously in favor. Schneider-Creusot supported the venture but the Lorraine metallurgical concerns, afraid of being deprived of coke, were against it. The *Comité des Forges* thus split on the issue.[23]

The French public was far from united. The Socialists and Communists were on the whole unfavorably disposed toward a tough policy, and the Radical Socialists were divided. Public opinion supported Poincaré after the move but did not agitate for it beforehand. Hence responsibility for the Ruhr offensive rested solely with the government, principally with Poincaré himself.

The question then arises as to whether Poincaré had a clear notion of what he was after. Was he really occupied with financial rather than political aspects of the German question,[24] or did he consider the financial problem as political in nature? In other words, was not German refusal to pay reparations due to Germany's unwillingness to recognize defeat rather than to economic difficulties?[25]

A German industrialist thought that the reparations issue was an excuse rather than the cause of French intervention. He added that "German heavy industry's negotiations with Russia and most particularly the Rapallo Treaty provoked the French to occupy the Ruhr."[26] If this interpretation is correct, and there is a good deal in it, the occupation

[22] Hoesch to Auswärtiges Amt, Feb. 27, 1923, *AANA*, container 1329.

[23] See Renouvin, *Histoire des relations internationales*, VII, 251.

[24] This is the opinion of B. de Jouvenel in *D'Une guerre à l'autre*, I, 305–306.

[25] Flandin wrote retrospectively that "Germany systematically organized her monetary bankruptcy." *Politique française*, p. 34.

[26] The industrialist was Arnold Rechberg. See Freund, *The Unholy Alliance*, p. 151.

was a notice served on Germany and Russia not to infringe in any way the postwar settlement. Moscow seemed to understand it that way, and *Izvestia* wrote on January 24 that the Soviet Union could not permit "subjugation and destruction of Germany by an alliance of France and her vassals, of which Poland is the first." The paper added that a "Polish attack on Germany at the present moment is a direct blow at the Soviet Union." [27] In fact, while the German government adopted passive resistance, Seeckt thought of defense and believed that if Poland and Czechoslovakia began any action coordinated with France, Germany ought to fight and Russia would join her.[28]

Irrespective of whether Poincaré intended the occupation of the Ruhr to be a limited act designed to secure Germany reparations, or whether he saw it as a large-scale political showdown, its repercussions were far-reaching. First, they affected relations between Paris and London, and though Bonar Law, Stanley Baldwin, and most Conservatives did not condemn outright the French move, Britain opposed this unilateral action. Second, the problem of collusion between Germany and Russia appeared. This issue was complicated by the double objectives pursued by the Soviets in Germany: on the one hand, support to the German government whose cooperation the Kremlin needed; on the other, preparations for a Communist revolution in Germany. Under these conditions it is evident that the eastern neighbors of Germany — Czechoslovakia and Poland — were directly affected by the French action in the Ruhr. Though divided over the Javořina issue, they had to take a stand on the new international crisis.

The American minister in Warsaw reported that Polish public opinion was "at first vociferous in its accord with French action in Germany but more sober reflection has brought out clearly the possible consequences to Poland should the occupation become more militant." [29] The Poles had so far looked upon the Franco-Polish alliance as purely defensive, and they grew uneasy realizing that Paris might want to invoke it in connection with events in the Ruhr. Skrzyński attempted to make it clear that such a contingency was most unlikely. He assured the foreign affairs committee of the *Sejm* that nobody had asked Poland to join in any anti-German moves. He stressed full solidarity between Poland and France but stated also that no *casus foederis* had arisen.[30] The German minister in Warsaw reported that Skrzyński told him that Poland would maintain a passive attitude toward events in the Ruhr,[31] and the Ger-

[27] *Ibid.*, p. 153.

[28] Castellan, "Reichswehr et Armée Rouge," in Duroselle, *Les Relations germano-soviétiques*, pp. 161ff.

[29] Gibson to Secretary of State, Jan. 25, 1923, *SDNA*, 860c.00/174.

[30] Benndorft to Auswärtiges Amt, Jan. 19, 1923, *AANA*, container 1425.

[31] Rauscher to Auswärtiges Amt, Jan. 22, 1923, *AANA*, container 1425.

man ambassador in Paris confirmed that so far no one had said anything about the possibility of intervention by either Poland or the Little Entente.

The Polish government was determined to be cautious, and Premier Sikorski while speaking about the need to strengthen the Franco-Polish alliance devoted a special passage to French-British collaboration which Warsaw considered of special importance.[32] Skrzyński, in his turn, addressing the Parliament on February 6, 1923, made guarded remarks about the French right to occupy the Ruhr.[33] In the course of the debate which followed, deputies declared themselves in favor of the French action though their support ranged from the uncritical pro-French stand of Stroński to the moderate approval voiced by Perl. Warsaw maintained its cautious attitude during the first three months of the occupation of the Ruhr. It collaborated with Paris insofar as it gave moral support to France, but seemingly resisted French pressure to stop coal deliveries from Upper Silesia to Germany.[34] The Poles were thus trying to avoid becoming involved in a situation which could lead to unforeseen developments.

A Polish diplomat in Germany, Rozwadowski, explained some of the reasons for Poland's attitude in a private talk with Konrad Adenauer, then *Oberbürgermeister* of Cologne. As reported by Adenauer, Rozwadowski felt that French policy was far from clear and the situation was such that "Poland who after all is France's friend would not dare to intervene." Warsaw was anxious lest French action drive Germany into the arms of Russia and make Berlin seek compensation in eastern Europe for its losses in the Ruhr. Rozwadowski assured Adenauer that Poland wanted to follow a more independent policy than in the past and did not want to "appear simply as a satellite [Anhängsel] of France."[35] This attitude was due largely to Skrzyński's belief that Poland could afford more independence in her diplomacy and could come closer to Britain, who at this time showed an interest in Polish affairs. Skrzyński expressed this idea somewhat crudely to the marshal (speaker) of the *Sejm*, Maciej Rataj, when he said that he wanted "to discount the friendship with France in London, and make Paris pay well for it."[36]

In this troubled situation Poland renewed its request for recognition of its eastern borders. The Polish minister in Paris wrote Poincaré that

[32] Tommasini, *Odrodzenie Polski*, p. 229.

[33] *Sprawozdania stenograficzne*, 1923, XII/7–16.

[34] Frank to Auswärtiges Amt, Feb. 5, 1923, *AANA*, container 1425. The French apparently renewed their pressure in Aug. during the visit of the Polish minister of industry and commerce, Władysław Kucharski, in Paris, but to no avail. Benndorf to Auswärtiges Amt, Aug. 23, 1923, *ibid.*

[35] Adenauer to Cuno, Feb. 14 and March 31, 1923, *AANA*, containers 1329 and 1425.

[36] Landau, "Tło kredytów francuskich," p. 53.

"The occupation of the Ruhr, and multiple complications . . . having retained all the attention of the Allies, did not allow them to pay sufficient heed to developments which are taking place on the eastern borders of Germany." [37] Skillfully exploiting the sudden Lithuanian incorporation of Memel, Zamoyski emphasized that this *fait accompli* coupled with German propaganda against Poland, and with the nonrecognition of Polish eastern boundaries was bound to weaken Warsaw at a time when Paris needed her most. The Poles demanded that their rights in Memel (Klaipeda) be safeguarded, that the Polish-Lithuanian border be finally settled, and that the great powers recognize officially the eastern frontiers as established by the Treaty of Riga. The moment for this request was well chosen, and prior Polish moves had prepared the ground for it.[38]

In February 1923 the Poles exercised pressure in both Paris and Rome, and though Mussolini was eager to take the initiative, Italian moves at the Conference of Ambassadors confused rather than helped the Polish border settlement.[39] As for the French, Poincaré was hesitant at first, fearing complications with Lithuania and above all with Russia. In his reply to the Polish request the French statesman assured Zamoyski that France had the best intentions toward Poland, and was willing "if the Polish government desires, to take the initiative" and submit the whole question before the Conference of Ambassadors "in the shortest possible time." [40] This sounded a bit too vague to Warsaw, and Sikorski thought that Paris showed "a rather reserved attitude." [41] The Polish premier wrote personal letters to Poincaré and to Foch, and Zamoyski drew the attention of the French government to the fact that "any new delay . . . might cause grave complications and invalidate the efforts of the Polish Government to maintain peace and equilibrium in that part of Europe." [42]

The French then decided to take action. Minister Panafieu on February 22 handed a favorable reply to Warsaw, and personal notes from Poincaré and Foch to Sikorski confirmed the determination of Paris to

[37] Zamoyski to Poincaré, Feb. 8, 1923, *APGE*, "Polska granica wschodnia 1923."

[38] Apart from Skirmunt's *démarches* in 1922, mentioned earlier in this book, Polish diplomacy had interested Italy in the border question in early 1922, and Narutowicz further advanced the whole matter by presenting a proposed status of autonomy for Eastern Galicia in Oct. 1922. See Tommasini, *Odrodzenie Polski*, pp. 150ff, 264; also exchanges of letters among Tommasini, Avezzano, and Mussolini in Ministero degli Esteri, *I Documenti diplomatici Italiani*, 7th series (1922–1935), I, 398, 401, 439.

[39] See the letters of Zaleski to the Foreign Ministry on his negotiations with Undersecretary of State Vassallo, Feb. 23 and Feb. 28, 1923, *APGE*, "Polska granica wschodnia 1923."

[40] Poincaré to Zamoyski, Feb. 12, 1923, *ibid.*

[41] Władysław Sikorski, *Le Problème de la paix. Le jeu des forces politiques en Europe orientale et l'alliance franco-polonaise* (Paris, 1931), p. 124.

[42] Zamoyski to Poincaré, Feb. 16, 1923, *APGE*, "Polska granica wschodnia 1923."

see the matter through the Conference of Ambassadors.[43] Jules Cambon introduced the issue of recognition of Polish eastern borders before the conference, and a committee headed by Laroche prepared the report. Things moved swiftly, and as the *Zahraniční Politika* put it, "France constantly endangered by the development of the German situation used all her power among the Allies to push through the definite recognition of Polish frontiers."[44] The conference pronounced its final recognition on March 15, 1923, and the Polish Parliament responded with a pro-French demonstration the next day.[45] The recognition was an important success from Warsaw's point of view, and the French were fully determined to capitalize on it. "France seems willing to take the lion's share of the credit in securing it for Poland," wrote the American minister from Warsaw.[46]

Thus the Ruhr crisis affected Franco-Polish relations right from the start. While creating misgivings and mutual hesitations it eventually strengthened Poland territorially, and added new bonds between the two countries.

While Poland at first showed signs of enthusiasm, which turned later into a more cautious appraisal of French policy in the Ruhr, the Czechoslovak government viewed the course of events with a strongly critical eye. It is true that Prague did her best to maintain officially a correct if somewhat reserved attitude. In a speech on January 30, 1923, Beneš explained that the French action was necessary, but he immediately went on to express the Czech desire for a speedy settlement, and remarked that "only an entente between France and Germany can bring about international co-operation and assure lasting peace in Europe."[47] The Czechs were more outspokenly critical in private conversations. The Czechoslovak minister in Berlin told D'Abernon in December 1922 that Prague had been making "energetic protests at Paris against any policy of adventure, such as the Ruhr."[48] The American minister in Prague reported that "The French policy of reparations has for some time past been watched here with a very critical eye. Already last winter President Masaryk in private conversation with me referred to the occupation of the left bank of the Rhine as a mistake, and Dr. Beneš has often criticized the French policy toward Germany as lacking in magnanimity."[49] The Polish chargé also wrote that "the Czechoslovak government and public

[43] Sikorski, *Le Problème de la paix*, p. 124.
[44] *Zahraniční Politika*, I (1923), 404.
[45] See *Sprawozdania stenograficzne*, 1923, XXV/4ff.
[46] Gibson to Secretary of State, March 22, 1923, *SDNA*, 860c.00/178.
[47] *Zahraniční Politika*, I (1923), 177.
[48] D'Abernon, *Diary*, II, 142.
[49] Einstein to Secretary of State, Jan. 23, 1923, *SDNA*, 751.60.f/3.

opinion did not view favorably French action in the matter of reparations, and especially the occupation of the Ruhr basin." [50]

What lay behind this negative attitude is not difficult to explain. Beneš seems to have feared the effects of French occupation on German internal politics, and he envisaged the possibility of a monarchist coup in Bavaria which could in turn lead to untoward developments in Hungary.[51] The Czech statesman explained to Einstein that Germany might disintegrate, which "would not be to anyone's advantage," [52] and the American diplomat believed that Czechoslovakia feared a conflict with Germany because of her own large German minority. There were other reasons. Paris put pressure on Czechoslovakia not to export coal to Germany so as to break the passive resistance there, and though Prague complied,[53] she feared the effects of this move on her economy. It must not be forgotten that Germany at this time occupied first place among Czechoslovak customers, and that conflict between the two countries was bound to have economic consequences. Finally there were fears of an armed clash, and Prague probably realized that the German army had plans for throwing Hungary against Czechoslovakia in case the latter joined France in an all-out offensive.[54]

These reasons were quite sufficient to make the Czechoslovak government feel alarmed and uneasy. Beneš did his best to dispel suspicion that Prague wanted to cooperate actively with France, or had aggressive designs against Germany. The American envoy in Prague felt that the Czechoslovak foreign minister went out of his way when he declared that he regarded "the French army as being far too large," [55] and when he expressed his worries about a French march on Berlin. Unlike the Polish diplomat Rozwadowski, who hinted to Adenauer that Poland would not follow French dictates blindly, Beneš spoke confidentially to the German minister in Prague, Jurgenies, and regretfully informed him that Prague was unable to pursue a completely independent policy vis-à-vis Germany.[56] This could only mean that Beneš would have gladly adopted a policy different from the French, and Berlin seems to have understood it in this vein. Consequently the Germans suggested that Prague mediate

[50] Bader to Foreign Minister, Jan. 15, 1923, *CD*, "Czechosłowacja 1923."

[51] He mentioned this possibility to Bader.

[52] Einstein to Secretary of State, Feb. 3, 1923, *SDNA*, 462.00r.29/2510.

[53] Věra Olivová, "Československá diplomacie v době rurské krise roku 1923," *Československý Časopis Historický*, VI (1958), 61. The author quotes Beneš's dispatch to Osuský of Jan. 20, 1923, from Archiv Min. Zahr. Věci, Paříž, 1923, č.42.

[54] See Rabenau, *Seeckt*, p. 330.

[55] Einstein to Secretary of State, April 4, 1923, *SDNA*, 550.e1/209.

[56] "Nach Bericht Prager Gesandten Jurgenies habe diesem Benesch im Vertrauen zugestanden, dass Tschechoslowakei in völliger Hörigkeit Frankreichs und zu selbständiger Politik ausserstande." Maltzan to Principal Missions, April 19, 1923, *AANA*, container 1329.

between Germany and France, and Beneš agreed to transmit Berlin's overtures to Paris.[57] They produced no noticeable result.

In sum, Czechoslovakia viewed the occupation of the Ruhr far more critically than Poland, and her attitude came closer to the negative British approach. At the same time Prague, like Warsaw, displayed outward solidarity with Paris, and on the whole followed French diplomatic leadership.

3

The Ruhr crisis, accompanied by the general strain in Europe, failed to bring the two eastern allies of France closer to one another. Czechoslovak political circles carefully watched Polish internal developments, and generally took a dim view of Poland's politics. In December 1922 the Czechoslovak minister in Berlin, Vlastimil Tusar, characterized the contest in Poland, somewhat naively, as "rivalry between two military cliques — the Pilsudski clique and the Haller-Korfanty clique."[58] The withdrawal of Piłsudski from political life in late 1922 pleased Foreign Ministry circles in Prague. *Zahraniční Politika*, having previously referred to the Polish marshal as "the factor of unrest and continuous tension," described him now as a man who may have had merits as a soldier but none as a statesman.[59] Skrzyński, the new foreign minister in Sikorski's cabinet, found little favor in Czech eyes. The journal described him as a follower of Piłsudski's "federalist trend" in Polish foreign policy which aimed "to destroy the Little Entente and weaken Czechoslovakia."[60]

It is true that the omission of all reference to Czechoslovakia in Skrzyński's speech on February 6, 1923, did not increase Prague's liking for him. The ensuing debate in the *Sejm* showed, however, that many groups in Poland sincerely desired an improvement in Czechoslovak-Polish relations. National and Christian Democrats like Marian Seyda or Wojciech Korfanty upbraided the foreign minister for neglecting Prague, and called for a more positive approach. The representatives of the Left such as Perl or Jan Dąbski showed less concern, and declared that Skrzyński's reticence might yet produce better results than the uncautious zeal previously displayed by Skirmunt.[61]

In March 1923 signs appeared that people in both countries were worried about the negative attitude of Warsaw and Prague toward one

[57] Einstein to Secretary of State, Feb. 23, March 5, April 13, 1923, *SDNA*, 462.00r.29/2502, 2526, 2624. Also Olivová, "V době rurské krise," p. 62.

[58] D'Abernon, *Diary*, II, 142.

[59] *Zahraniční Politika*, I (1922), 110.

[60] *Ibid.*, I (1923), 251.

[61] *Sprawozdania stenograficzne*, 1923, XV/18-62. Also *BPPP*, Dec. 18, 1922-Jan. 17, 1923, No. 127, p. 6.

another. The continuing Ruhr crisis may well have contributed to this feeling. Although there were still many unfriendly utterances — some Czech newspapers commented critically on the recognition of Polish eastern borders, and the Polish Leftist press and the conservative *Czas* attacked Prague's pro-Russian leanings—the atmosphere began to clear. Seyda came out for a Czechoslovak-Polish alliance in a forceful speech in Cracow on April 4, 1923; Beneš mentioned the need for cooperation on March 23 at Brno. The Paris correspondents of *Gazeta Warszawska* and *Národní Listy* wrote a joint article on April 4 favoring a Czechoslovak-Polish *rapprochement. Kurjer Warszawski* printed an interview with Beneš on March 26, in which the Czechoslovak statesman affirmed that the best guarantees of peace were "Polish-Czechoslovak friendship, Polish-Russian agreement, both under the care of allied France."[62] Skrzyński in turn made pro-Czech statements. But one thing was clear: no genuine *rapprochement* between Prague and Warsaw was possible before a solution of the Javořina dispute.

The Polish public considered the Javořina affair a test of Czechoslovak good will, and in that respect the enthusiastically pro-Czech Right did not differ substantially from the cool and skeptical Left. The feeling prevailed that Czechoslovakia had taken advantage of Polish weakness by obtaining Teschen in 1920, and now had a chance to make up for it by fulfilling the Skirmunt-Beneš pact, which provided for settlement of Javořina. What is more, the delimitation commission had also recommended a solution with which Poland agreed, and it was felt that all Prague had to do was withdraw its veto and allow the Conference of Ambassadors to impose a decision. This feeling was so strong that anyone in Czechoslovakia who sincerely desired cooperation with Poland was bound to take it into consideration. Prague steadfastly refused to do so, making reconciliation and collaboration virtually impossible.

The question of Javořina came up in the Polish *Sejm* on April 23, 1923, and the Parliament unanimously demanded that the commune be given to Poland. The next day the foreign affairs committee of the Czechoslovak Parliament replied with a declaration that the border matter had been settled once and for all by the Conference of Ambassadors in 1920. Czech deputies blamed Beneš for reopening the matter in the annex to the pact with Skirmunt, and they were clearly in no mood for making the slightest concession. What was worse, each side refused to understand the national psychology of the other and did everything to hurt the feelings of the other. The Czechs were perhaps more to blame in this respect than the Poles, as exemplified by the polemic of the *Zahraniční Politika*

[62] See Gasiorowski, "Polish-Czechoslovak Relations 1922–1926," *Slavonic and East European Review*, XXV (1957), 478. *Zahraniční Politika*, I (1923), 534.

over a book on Polish foreign policy written by Professor Kutrzeba of the Jagellonian University.[63]

It was Kutrzeba's thesis that the Javořina question was a test case for Poland and should therefore be treated as transcending the narrow limits of a dispute about a commune with a few hundred inhabitants. The Czechoslovak journal refused to take this argument seriously. It commented ironically on Kutrzeba's remark about the Polish interest in Javořina as a center of Tatra climbing, and said that it failed to see why Prague should be held responsible for the growth of Polish mountaineering. Since Kutrzeba's book was critical of the broad lines of Polish foreign policy, *Zahraniční Politika* seized on this to discuss Poland's shortcomings. "What ideal," it asked, "what mission does the reborn Poland represent in Europe? What are the main lines of her internal and external politics and how do they conform to this ideal?"[64] The journal stated that Kutrzeba's work did not answer these basic questions, and that this constituted the main weakness not only of his book but of Poland's diplomacy, which contrasted so forcibly with the clear and democratic principles of the Czechoslovak foreign policy aimed at building a new Europe. Given Polish ambitions and susceptibilities, the patronizing tone of the article was hardly calculated to improve relations between Warsaw and Prague.

France viewed the friction between her eastern friends with dissatisfaction. The continuing Ruhr crisis clearly demanded that France and her allies close ranks, coordinate policies, and prepare to meet any emergency in common. This was especially important in the military sphere, and consequently Marshal Foch was dispatched in early May to Warsaw and Prague.

The reception of the French marshal in Warsaw and other Polish cities was enthusiastic and even spectacular. The Polish government and local authorities did everything to charm the visitor. Foch received the two highest Polish orders, the White Eagle and the *Virtuti Militari*. Universities awarded him honorary degrees. In Warsaw he witnessed the unveiling of the statue of Poniatowski who had been a marshal of France under Napoleon, and Piłsudski presented his guest with the baton of a Polish marshal. Military parades, gala dinners, and public demonstrations emphasized the importance Poland attached to this visit. Huge crowds shouting "Vive la France!" testified to pro-French feeling in the country.[65] Foch's earlier misgivings about the Franco-Polish alliance were momentarily overcome.

[63] Stanisław Kutrzeba, *Nasza polityka zagraniczna* (Cracow, 1923).

[64] *Zahraniční Politika*, II (1923), 942ff.

[65] See R. Vaucher, "Avec le maréchal Foch en Pologne et en Tchécoslovaquie," *Revue des Deux Mondes*, 7th series, XV (1923), 856–867. Also Tommasini, *Odrodzenie Polski*, p. 300.

The principal object of the marshal's visit was to discuss military coordination of the Polish and French armies, but he also mentioned the Javořina dispute and tried to effect a reconciliation between Warsaw and Prague. He found the Polish government in a conciliatory mood, but as the Poles told Foch, the difficulty lay in Beneš's defiant attitude toward the Conference of Ambassadors. Warsaw asserted that at this stage the conflict was not between Poland and Czechoslovakia but between the latter and the conference itself.[66]

Military talks between Foch, Piłsudski, and the general staff were inconclusive. The Polish side believed that a war against Germany could be successful only if there were a coordinated Polish-French offensive. A defensive war would be difficult for Poland, given the length of her borders and the existence of two strategic German advance positions in East Prussia and Silesia. Both sides agreed in general on the need for a synchronized march on Berlin, but here again Piłsudski insisted on the prior liquidation of the East Prussian salient. Further differences arose over the organization of the Polish army; Piłsudski stressed the need for large mobile units essential in case of a Polish-Russian war, and Foch tried to make the Poles adopt French organization as best suited against Germany.[67] A compromise was eventually worked out,[68] but the difficulties encountered in the course of discussions may well have influenced Foch against the Polish commander. The French marshal made critical remarks about Piłsudski, and hinted that "it would be a good thing to replace him by a professional general." [69] This sounded like a repetition of the French arguments used in the summer of 1920, and had some repercussions on the Polish domestic political scene. Notably it strengthened the traditionally and uncritically pro-French National Democrats, who enjoyed the confidence of the French Right.[70]

Foch went from Warsaw to Prague and his reception there was far less spectacular than in Poland. There were many reasons for that. In the first place the death of Masaryk's wife had led to national mourning which precluded large-scale receptions and entertaining. Second, the Czechs were a little annoyed that Foch's visit to Prague seemed incidental to his Polish tour,[71] and they were apprehensive lest the French marshal should represent the Polish viewpoint in the question of Javořina.[72] The military parade held in Foch's honor in Prague was "remark-

[66] Tommasini, *Odrodzenie Polski*, pp. 300–301.

[67] See *Polskie siły zbrojne*, Vol. I, Pt. I, pp. 88–113.

[68] It dealt especially with the progressive build-up of the Polish army. See Jan Ciałowicz, "Polskie przygotowania do wojny," *Tygodnik Powszechny*, Sept. 13, 1959.

[69] Tommasini, *Odrodzenie Polski*, p. 301.

[70] *Ibid.*, pp. 70, 301–302.

[71] Polish Foreign Ministry to Legation in London, April 21, 1923, *APGE*, "Anglia 1923."

[72] Einstein to Secretary of State, May 17, 1923, *SDNA*, 751.60f/4.

able for the absence of enthusiasm on the part of the crowd,"[73] but otherwise the Czechs tried to be hospitable and friendly.

In Prague as in Poland, Foch talked about military coordination, and he also raised the question of Javořina. With regard to the latter question, Beneš told Foch that he was "perfectly willing to settle the question and to cede Javořina but demanded as a preliminary that the original decision given a year and a half ago [by the Conference of Ambassadors] be sustained and not disavowed now under the pretext that it had not included a portion of the proposed boundary line." Beneš felt that the prevalent attitude of the Conference of Ambassadors toward Javořina resulted from the Polish argument that the Czechoslovak government could not compromise unless it had its hand forced, and he strongly objected to it.[74]

Beneš's reasoning was strange indeed. It seemed clear that only the pressure of nationalist elements had prevented him from agreeing to the Javořina settlement, and that the conference could have taken it upon itself to override his stand. Yet Beneš opposed this solution, considering probably that to follow it would lower his prestige at home. He simultaneously declared that he would give up Javořina, though how he could do it in the teeth of Czech opposition is incomprehensible. The most charitable explanation is that he did not know how to solve the problem, the least that he was engaging in delaying tactics and made promises which he knew he could not fulfill.

In an interview accorded to *Le Petit Parisien,* Beneš asserted that "an alliance between us and Poland is necessary," and he predicted that it would eventually be achieved. He added that all "those who are against it are politicians of little insight." At the same time the Czechoslovak statesman declared that it was possible to arrive at an understanding with Austria despite three hundred years of animosity, "but with Poland we did not manage to solve a problem dealing with 450 people." Beneš remarked pointedly that certain countries ought "to give up a policy of prestige and solve conflicts in accord with political realism." Asked about Foch's visit, he denied that the marshal had discussed matters of military cooperation with him, and recalled that Prague unlike Warsaw had no military alliance with France. He explained that Foch merely studied the work of the French military mission in Czechoslovakia.[75]

In these remarks Beneš tried to draw a fine distinction indeed between military cooperation and work of the French military mission. In fact, Foch was engaged in coordinating the Czechoslovak Plan "N"—an of-

[73] *Ibid.*
[74] *Ibid.*, May 28, 1923, 760c.60f.15/45.
[75] See *Zahraniční Politika*, I (1923), 685.

fensive against Bavaria—and the head of the French mission was also chief-of-staff of the Czechoslovak army.[76] Furthermore, Foch, feeling that the Franco-Polish alliance ought to be completed by a military convention between Paris and Prague, had raised this matter with Beneš. According to the French minister in Prague, the Czech statesman expressed polite surprise that such an alliance needed to be mentioned at all because Czechoslovakia was on the French side anyway, but he promised to think it over.[77] The American envoy in Prague reported that Foch's overtures met with no definite response, and he explained it by saying that the "value of Czechoslovakia in Central Europe lies not a little in this unwillingness to adopt wholeheartedly the policy of any other nation."[78]

There is no doubt that Prague was unwilling to be identified with France at this critical point. The Czechs were probably aware of the rumors circulating in Berlin and Moscow about plans for a coordinated action by France and her eastern allies against Germany,[79] and they did their best to disprove them. Besides, Prague was critical of French policy, and Masaryk apparently gave Foch his frank opinion by terming the action in the Ruhr a work of "little men."[80]

Foch's visit to Poland and Czechoslovakia was thus no unqualified success. He encountered serious differences of opinion in Poland and ran into difficulties in Czechoslovakia. As the American minister in Prague shrewdly observed, "France has failed in its attempt to create a Polish-Czech bloc which would be permanently hostile to Germany." Analyzing the Czechoslovak political scene, Einstein noted Czech-French friction, which led to the withdrawal of French commanding officers from Subcarpathian Ukraine and Bratislava and their replacement by Czech generals. The American minister remarked that Paris ought to realize that "the chief utility of Czechoslovakia to them is as an element of stability and peace, and in the event of future war, in removing a large economic unit from German influence and acting as a counterpoise to Hungary."[81] This characterized accurately the bases of French-Czechoslovak cooperation as seen from Prague, and in the months to come Paris would reconcile itself to this relationship. For the time being, little was achieved in the sphere of coordination; and the French had also proved unable to

[76] See Soják, *O zahraniční politice*, p. 116. Also the report of German minister from Prague who gave details on the coordinated Franco-Czechoslovak offensive along the Mainz-Cheb line. Koch to Auswärtiges Amt, Dec. 10, 1923, *AANA*, container 1329.

[77] Laroche, *Au Quai d'Orsay*, pp. 185–186.

[78] Einstein to Secretary of State, May 31, 1923, *SDNA*, 751.60f/5.

[79] Brockdorff-Rantzau to Auswärtiges Amt, May 13, 1923, *AANA*, container 1329. Also Rabenau, *Seeckt*, p. 328.

[80] Einstein to Secretary of State, July 10, 1923, *SDNA*, 760c.60f.15/46.

[81] *Ibid.*, June 26, 1923, 760c.60f/111.

arrange a Czechoslovak-Polish *rapprochement* or arrive at a compromise on the Javořina dispute.

4

Despite Beneš's assurances to Foch that he would have been glad to settle the Javořina affair, Prague did nothing to facilitate a solution of this problem. A high official of the State Department in Washington, analyzing the situation, remarked that it "would be agreeable to have their [Czech] deeds more clearly conform to their assertions."[82] The Polish chargé d'affaires in Prague felt utterly frustrated; he confessed that "he would prefer to deal with a Minister for Foreign Affairs whom he knew was an enemy rather than with Dr. Beneš who as a friend of Poland had to fear the resentment of the Nationalists in his negotiations."[83]

The hopelessness of any Czechoslovak-Polish agreement was apparent, and when a member of the Polish Right, Grabski, appealed on May 12, 1923, for "a strong barrier [in East Central Europe] between the two most dangerous elements of unrest in Europe,"[84] he was voicing a pious wish that was utterly unrealistic. His party, however, was soon given a chance to apply its general ideas in the test of practical politics. Possibly influenced by Foch's visit, the parties of the Right and Center formed a coalition in Lanckorona, and succeeded in overthrowing the government. A new cabinet of strong National Democratic and Peasant coloring came into power on May 28, 1923. Witos became premier again, and the National Democrat Marian Seyda took the portfolio of foreign affairs. Piłsudski, finding it impossible to continue his command of the army under the new government, resigned and retired to private life.

The new Polish ministry was one of the most pro-French cabinets the country had ever seen, and Seyda, a close collaborator of Dmowski, was outspoken in his desire for cooperation with Czechoslovakia. In a speech on June 1, Witos underscored the alliance with France and a normalization of relations with Prague, and a week later Seyda, who had already sent a friendly telegram to Beneš, developed his ideas at a session of the foreign affairs committee.

Seyda declared himself in full and complete sympathy with French policy in the Ruhr, and Dmowski supported him by eulogizing the entire policy of Poincaré.[85] The foreign minister stated that he was for full cooperation with Czechoslovakia, but it was necessary first to settle the Javořina affair. He pointed out that Poland could not always be expected to make sacrifices, remarked that one could not tax Polish public opinion

[82] W. R. Castle's memorandum, *SDNA*, 860f.00/198.
[83] Einstein to Secretary of State, May 28, 1923, *SDNA*, 760c.60f.15/45.
[84] *Sprawozdania stenograficzne*, 1923, CCCVIII/42.
[85] Tommasini, *Odrodzenie Polski*, pp. 187–189.

unduly, and called for a settlement along the lines proposed by the delimitation commission.[86]

Prague responded with coolness. *Zahraniční Politika* declared that the attitude of Seyda did not differ greatly from that of his predecessor Skrzyński, and that apparently the Center-Rightist cabinet continued the foreign policy of the Left. The most puzzling attitude was that of Beneš. The Czechoslovak minister explained to the American envoy on May 28 that he was willing "to negotiate the matter [of Javořina] directly with Poland or to allow it to be arbitrated" but he would "refuse to submit to any dictation from the great Powers," presumably meaning the Conference of Ambassadors. He added that it might be difficult to bypass the conference because of the French opposition, but that he was "ready to accept from the Poles what he could not accept from the Western Powers." Beneš minimized the opposition of the Czech National Democrats to Poland, and the American diplomat could only conclude that Beneš "rightly attaches more consequence to Polish friendship than to the possession of a village."[87] The Czechoslovak foreign minister seemed to have changed his mind rapidly when confronted with overtures from Seyda. A month after the first conversation, Einstein reported that "Dr. Beneš spoke to me with great bitterness . . . of Poland holding up Javořina as the price of her friendship. The village, he declared, was of no value to either but if such trifle was to be set as a preliminary condition, it meant that Polish amity was not worth possessing and he preferred to remain without it."[88]

Beneš's gymnastics cast doubt on his good will ever to settle the Javořina affair, except on Czechoslovak terms, and this alone should have made Seyda more cautious. But the Polish foreign minister, sincerely bent on effecting a settlement and full of good will toward Prague, became annoyed and emotional about the whole affair. As the Italian minister, who disliked Seyda, put it, "instead of following the wise example of his predecessor he decided on a fight to the finish and not only in the limited diplomatic sphere but before the general public."[89] The results were disastrous.

Seyda addressed the parliamentary foreign affairs committee on June 21, 1923, and after expressing regrets that his program of *rapprochement* with Czechoslovakia was not being realized, he remarked bitterly that if the difficulties could not be removed, "the responsibility would not rest either with the [Polish] Government nor with the Polish State."[90]

[86] Pearson to Secretary of State, June 7, 1923, *SDNA*, 860c.01/393.
[87] Einstein to Secretary of State, May 26, 1923, *SDNA*, 760c.60f.15/45.
[88] *Ibid.*, June 26, 1923, 760c.60f/111.
[89] Tommasini, *Odrodzenie Polski*, p. 71.
[90] Pearson to Secretary of State, June 30, 1923, *SDNA*, 860c.01/395.

The violence of the Czechoslovak reaction surpassed all expectation. On June 26 the officious *České Slovo* and *Prager Presse* launched an attack on Polish foreign policy, and told Warsaw to stop making all this fuss and noise. The papers reminded Poland that it was risky for her to insist on territorial changes through the Conference of Ambassadors because a time might come when her own eastern borders would be submitted for a revision, and Czechoslovakia would then have a say in the matter.[91] Beneš told the American minister that he had "begged" Seyda not to "make any unfriendly declarations, warning him that should he do so he would be obliged to retort." The Czechoslovak minister described Seyda's speech "as prompted by political cowardice, megalomania and madness."[92]

The Czech riposte stunned the Rightist groups in Poland which were committed to a policy of collaboration with Prague. The *Gazeta Warszawska* voiced concern on June 28, and the *Kurjer Warszawski*, which had printed on June 26 a strongly pro-Beneš article, was clearly at a loss. Seyda himself tried to explain that "the sharp tone of the article in *České Slovo* . . . resulted from the fact that the Czechs did not expect such categorical reservations in the Javořina matter from a protagonist of the Polish-Czech entente."[93] The Polish Left triumphed, and the Socialist *Robotnik* sneered on June 26 that "The Czechophile Mr. Seyda who had made the entente with Czechoslovakia the central point of his political program, received from Czechoslovakia, a peremptory reply."[94]

It is difficult to explain Beneš's policy and what made him undermine a cabinet in Poland which was vocal in its pro-Czech sentiments. The American envoy in Prague felt that it was not unlikely "that the violence of Dr. Beneš' counter attack on Mr. Seyda whom he had before regarded as a personal friend, is due to his anticipation that the latter's term of office will be of short duration."[95] This may well have been the case, but it does not explain why Beneš should have wanted to weaken further the traditionally pro-Czech Polish Right. Prague made much out of Polish preoccupations with prestige, and passed severe judgment on them. But, however irritating these preoccupations, surely Beneš's own stand in the whole Javořina affair was also largely affected by considerations of prestige. The Italian minister in Warsaw considered that Beneš's criticism of the Poles on this ground "was ironic in the mouth of a man who, with cast-iron determination and undoubted skill, brought the *policy of prestige* to its summit."[96]

[91] See Gasiorowski, "Polish-Czechoslovak Relations 1922–1926," p. 484.
[92] Einstein to Secretary of State, June 26, 1923, *SDNA*, 760c.60f/111.
[93] Quoted in *Zahraniční Politika*, II (1923), 1062.
[94] *BPPP*, June 17–July 15, 1923, No. 134, p. 2.
[95] Einstein to Secretary of State, June 26, 1923, *SDNA*, 760c.60f/111.
[96] Tommasini, *Odrodzenie Polski*, p. 274. Italics in original.

The pressure of Czech nationalists on Beneš explains, of course, a good deal, and the main responsibility rested on those extremists "who had brought about this unnecessary dispute with Poland to strengthen their party and to undermine the position of the person in authority." Such was the opinion voiced by Professor Jaroslav Bidlo in *Tribuna* on June 17, and he warned the extremists "that in this way they harm the Czech and Slav cause for whole generations."[97] The voice of Bidlo, a sincere advocate of friendship with Poland, was isolated. But the nationalist pressure does not explain everything. Beneš's position was stronger at this time than before; he had become a member of the National Socialist party and generally commanded respect. Was it necessary for him to maintain a perfect record of diplomatic victories even at the price of leaving a scar on Czechoslovak-Polish relations? A satisfactory explanation is indeed hard to find.

In mid-July 1923 Beneš went to Paris and London, the main purpose of this journey being to discuss such important issues as commercial treaties with both countries, reparations, Javořina, and finally the forthcoming conference of the Little Entente. Moreover, Beneš expected the French to bring up the matter of a military alliance between Paris and Prague, which Foch had already mentioned during his visit in May. The Polish minister in Paris reported that the Quai d'Orsay was annoyed by Beneš's attempts to mediate between England and France, but the Polish diplomat warned Seyda not to expect a change in the French attitude toward Javořina. Paris, he wrote, was intent on bringing about an alliance with Czechoslovakia and would therefore be as accommodating to Beneš as possible.[98]

This was perfectly true. French interest in an alliance was very strong at this time, and Poincaré instructed Laroche to prepare a treaty aimed at mutual defense against Germany.[99] Beneš, on the other hand, was evasive and noncommittal. He told Foch that although he was "le plus français des Tchéques," he needed time to prepare the public in his country.[100] While Czechoslovak reluctance to conclude a military pact with France was genuine enough—Prague feared that such a commitment would antagonize other great powers—it served also to obtain concessions from the French. Although Beneš did not secure a French loan, his conversations were on the whole fruitful, and he prepared the ground for closer future cooperation.[101] The Poles suspected also that the Czechoslovak statesman gained the full support of Paris in the Javořina dispute.

[97] Quoted in Gasiorowski, "Polish-Czechoslovak Relations 1922–1926," p. 485.
[98] Zamoyski to Seyda, July 13, 1923, *CD*, "Raporty polityczne: Paryż."
[99] Laroche, *Au Quai d'Orsay*, pp. 185–186.
[100] *Ibid.*
[101] See Beneš's report to Masaryk and Švehla in Olivová, "V době rurské krise," pp. 64–65.

To counter Beneš's influence in Paris the Polish minister in London tried to persuade a leading French diplomat, Ambassador Jusserand—on the eve of the latter's departure for France—to favor the Polish side of the Javořina affair. Minister Wróblewski emphasized the Czech inability to understand that "Poland having lost the Teschen case . . . could under no circumstances allow a second defeat in Javořina," and Jusserand agreed to present the Polish viewpoint in Paris. The Frenchman declared that "good relations between Czechoslovakia and Poland are of fundamental importance for France, and . . . are also of tremendous interest for Poland." He underscored the need for a Polish link with the Little Entente, and added that "if this grouping is to have real value from a general European and French point of view, it ought to lean on Poland as its strongest pillar."[102]

However reassuring Jusserand's statements were to the Polish envoy, the reality was far less so. The Conference of Ambassadors washed its hands of the Javořina dispute on July 27, 1923, by referring it to the League of Nations. This move apparently resulted from French unwillingness to pass an anti-Czech verdict,[103] and Seyda instructed the Polish minister in Paris to express regrets that the conference had proved incapable of enforcing the recommendation of its delimitation commission.[104] As for the Little Entente, the slender Polish chances of *rapprochement* with that group were largely spoiled by a series of clumsy moves by Seyda whose policy became completely entangled in its own inadequacies.

The friction between Poland and Czechoslovakia worried not only France but also Rumania, who was allied with both Warsaw and Prague. Seyda maintained that the Rumanian premier Ion Duca had offered to introduce Poland into the Little Entente, and though Bucharest denied having made a formal invitation, it was apparently willing to work for a *rapprochement* between Poland and the Entente.[105] Seyda, however, refused all advances and decided not to send a Polish delegate to the Little Entente conference in Sinaia. This decision was clearly imprudent. The Polish public, already aroused by Javořina, was excited about the forthcoming elections to the Council of the League of Nations, which were to be discussed in Sinaia, and the weak cabinet of Witos-Seyda desperately needed a diplomatic success. Seyda then concocted a scheme which was as naive as it was unrealistic. He suddenly decided to send Piltz to Sinaia to talk with Beneš and persuade him to support a Polish candidate, Skir-

[102] Wróblewski to Foreign Minister, July 20, 1923, *CD*, "Raporty polityczne."

[103] Tommasini, *Odrodzenie Polski*, p. 277.

[104] Seyda to Zamoyski, Aug. 11, 1923, *CD*, "Czechosłowacja 1923."

[105] Tommasini, *Odrodzenie Polski*, pp. 271–272. Also Jay to Secretary of State, Aug. 1, 1923, *SDNA*, 700.00/62.

munt, for the League Council in exchange for Poland's renunciation of Javořina.

When the Czechoslovak minister was confronted with this proposal, he naturally refused. He knew by then that the Javořina case had already been referred to the League of Nations, and he saw no valid reason — being himself a candidate of the Little Entente to the Council — to step down in favor of a Polish rival. The whole thing became a fiasco. Piltz, the most fervent supporter of collaboration with Prague, and at this time an old man, had to endure the humiliating and vain journey to Sinaia, which he did not forget; Skirmunt, coauthor of the pact with Czechoslovakia in 1921, had to go through the elections in Geneva despite the pleading of the Foreign Ministry in Warsaw with Seyda to withdraw his candidacy. As Tommasini wrote, Seyda "was bound to know that in this situation neither England nor France would support him, though the person of Skirmunt inspired everywhere respect and sympathy."[106] In the actual vote France supported Beneš against Skirmunt, and the latter lost with seventeen ballots to Beneš's thirty. *Zahraniční Politika* gloated again over the Polish policy of prestige and rivalry, and extolled Beneš's moderation and wisdom.[107]

There is no doubt that Czechoslovak achievements contrasted forcibly with Polish failures. Beneš had capitalized on them at the conference at Sinaia to block any suggestions about Poland's participation in the Little Entente. He declared that Poland's entry was "out of the question," and explained that unless reasonable people gained power in Warsaw he saw no way for cooperation with the Poles.[108] The agrarian *Venkov* wrote that the "character of the Little Entente would not be well served by the atmosphere surrounding the over ambitious policy of Poland."[109] Polish participation also met with opposition because of possible entanglements with Russia. If Paris regretted that no links were established between Poland and the Little Entente, Beneš could point to the cohesion of this group, increased in Sinaia by the signing of a tripartite military convention. This achievement could not be dismissed lightly, and the French realized it too.

Beneš could now afford to show his broadmindedness in a speech to the Parliament on October 30, 1923. In it he dealt extensively with the negotiations for an alliance with France, but he also made a number of statements referring to Poland. Beneš predicted that the relations between Prague and Warsaw would soon go beyond the stage of "emotional tensions and unnecessary controversies." Both states, he said, had

[106] Tommasini, *Odrodzenie Polski*, p. 273.
[107] *Zahraniční Politika*, II (1923), 1295, 1445ff.
[108] Dodge to Secretary of State, Aug. 18, 1923, *SDNA*, 770.00/67.
[109] Quoted in Machray, *The Little Entente*, pp. 224–225.

common interests but unfortunately mutual trust was lacking. Since "the existence of one is a necessary prerequisite for the existence of the other," there was need for a calm analysis of their common interests as well as their different outlooks. Beneš asserted that public opinion had fanned the existing difficulties which should be left to the dispassionate deliberation of statesmen, and declared that the tense international situation "cries out" for a Czechoslovak-Polish entente.[110]

At the time when Beneš addressed the Prague Parliament, Seyda had already resigned as Poland's foreign minister. After his defeats in the matter of Javořina and the elections in Geneva, Seyda had still attempted to cooperate with Prague, and he appealed on October 5, 1923, for a *rapprochement*. The Czechs treated these overtures with contempt. The American chargé reported that while Prague welcomed Seyda's speech, political circles were disposed "to attribute the same to the difficult internal economic situation in Poland."[111] *Zahraniční Politika* remarked that Warsaw showed more realism and reasonableness as the international scene darkened and Polish difficulties increased.[112]

The international situation was undoubtedly fraught with danger in late 1923, and Seyda, whose record had been one of political defeats and diplomatic blunders,[113] stepped down in favor of Roman Dmowski, the acknowledged leader of the National Democrats and a man of strong personality. Wojciech Korfanty also accepted a post to strengthen the cabinet which, in Tommasini's words, was "the worst Poland had in the first five years of her re-created statehood."[114]

Dmowski outlined his political program in a speech on November 16, 1923. He declared that the recognition of Poland's boundaries closed the first phase of Polish diplomacy. The aims of the country in the coming period were respect and maintenance of treaties and an attitude of noninterference in the affairs of other countries. "Our policy must be exclusively a policy of peace," Dmowski declared, and alluding to the catastrophic economic situation of Poland, he appealed for expanded commercial relations with all powers. These generalities could not hide the fact that the Polish Right had so far failed dismally in its conduct of foreign policy during a crucial period in international relations.

France under Poincaré's leadership had hardly done any better. Passive resistance in Germany came to an end in September 1923, and Paris seemed to have triumphed. But the question arose of how to exploit the

[110] *La Situation internationale: Exposé présenté par M. Beneš le 30 octobre 1923 devant la Chambre tchécoslovaque* (Prague, 1923).

[111] White to Secretary of State, Oct. 13, 1923, *SDNA*, 760c.60f/112.

[112] *Zahraniční Politika*, II (1923), 1445–1446.

[113] For a devastating criticism of Seyda's foreign policy see Tommasini, *Odrodzenie Polski*, p. 76.

[114] *Ibid.*

Ruhr victory. Millerand and Foch apparently favored direct negotiations and a settlement with Germany,[115] but Poincaré was against such a course. Separatism appeared in the Rhineland—a Rhineland republic was proclaimed on October 29, and a republic of the Palatinate on November 5, 1923—but Poincaré hesitated. He did not exploit the movement for dominating the Rhineland or for making it a bridge between France and Germany, though Germany might have been willing, at this point, to work out a reasonable settlement. Paris made a halfhearted attempt to split southern Germany from the north, which alarmed Beneš on the ground that it would lead to utter chaos in the heart of Europe. Prague attempted to persuade Paris to adopt a consistent policy and stick to it, but in vain.[116]

While the Rhineland seethed with separatist movements, while Saxony and Thuringia showed revolutionary activity, while Hitler organized a National Socialist *Putsch* in Munich, the Soviet Union attempted to fish in the troubled German waters. This alarmed Poland, and General Sikorski went to Paris to hold military talks with the French general staff.

Simultaneously Zamoyski undertook several *démarches* at the Quai d'Orsay. The Polish minister presented an *aide-mémoire* on October 27, 1923, and informed Peretti de la Rocca of the Soviet overtures to Warsaw. The Russians hinted that in case of a Communist uprising in Germany they would like Poland to let transports of foodstuffs through to the Germans (this may have been a polite way of referring to arms and munitions), and also to let Germany have all the coal from Upper Silesia that she might need. In exchange Moscow was prepared "to assure the integrity of Polish frontiers" and, furthermore, to give Poland a free hand in Danzig and East Prussia if Warsaw agreed to Soviet compensations "in the Baltic." Russia warned on the other hand that any Polish intervention in German Silesia would be treated as *casus belli.*

Zamoyski told Peretti that Warsaw "did not take these suggestions into consideration." According to the Treaty of Versailles Poland had to supply Germany with Upper Silesian coal anyway, and she had to let goods destined for Germany go through Polish territory. It was the suggestion about Silesia and the Baltic which seemed menacing. Peretti expressed his surprise over Soviet overtures, and when asked by Zamoyski for a French naval demonstration in the Baltic, he promised to refer the whole matter to Poincaré.[117]

[115] See Raoul Persil, *Alexandre Millerand 1859–1943* (Paris, 1949), p. 152.

[116] See Olivová, "V době rurské krise," pp. 66–67; Soják, *O zahraniční politice,* pp. 117–118; Saint Aulaire, *Confession,* pp. 680ff.

[117] Zamoyski to Foreign Minister, Oct. 31, 1923, *CD,* "Raporty polityczne z Paryża." See also J. Lipski, "Przyczynki do polsko-niemieckiej deklaracji o nieagresji," p. 21. Soviet

Poincaré wrote Zamoyski two weeks later to reassure him that no danger of a Soviet offensive existed. He advised Warsaw to refuse "all negotiations or even all semblance of conversations about Russian efforts tending to obtain the agreement of the Polish government to territorial changes which the Soviets seemed to envisage in Eastern Europe." The French statesman recalled that Latvia and Estonia had signed a mutual defensive alliance, and that the French government wished Poland and Finland to adhere to it.[118] The Polish request for a French naval demonstration in the Baltic was apparently ignored.

The nature of Russian diplomatic moves at this time is difficult to ascertain. The Germans suspected that some Franco-Soviet negotiation was going on, and the ambassador in Moscow reported to Berlin that he heard rumors about an understanding between Paris and Moscow which entailed the desertion of Poland by France.[119] A few days later he spoke to Chicherin and the latter declared that France would never sacrifice her "Polish vassal."[120] The Germans remained suspicious, and two months later Brockdorff-Rantzau again tried to find out if France and Russia were trying to get together at the expense of Germany and Poland. He again met with a denial.[121]

Soviet proposals to Poland, and the alleged Franco-Russian exchanges showed clearly enough that the chaotic situation in Germany needed to be ended because of the danger of ever-widening repercussions. But if Poincaré realized this he took no measures to end the crisis, and he allowed the initiative to slip from his hands. No constructive program for the solution of the twin issues of reparations and security came from the Quai d'Orsay, and Poincaré's political enemies coined the nickname "Poincaré-la-guerre" to show that he was incapable of going beyond a tough and bellicose policy.[122]

What lay behind Poincaré's inertia after his success in breaking down German passive resistance? It seems that the key to the whole problem was in the sphere of economics. Poincaré began the go-it-alone policy in the Ruhr without assuring himself of a financial basis, and was led into the paradoxical situation in which French policy became dependent on Anglo-Saxon finance. Naturally, neither Britain nor America, who opposed Poincaré's occupation of the Ruhr, was going to rescue France from her economic plight unless she changed her policy to please London

advances may have been made by Victor Kopp, who spoke at this time with Seyda. See Tommasini, *Odrodzenie Polski*, pp. 155–156.

[118] Poincaré to Zamoyski, Nov. 12, 1923, *APGE*, "Rosja 1923."

[119] Brockdorff-Rantzau to Auswärtiges Amt, Dec. 1, 1923, *AANA*, container 1329.

[120] *Ibid.*, Dec. 4, 1923.

[121] *Ibid.*, Feb. 3, 1923, container 1330.

[122] On the above, see interesting comments in André François-Poncet, *De Versailles à Potsdam* (Paris, 1948), pp. 116–117.

and Washington, or perhaps one should say, the City and Wall Street.[123] The French Parliament failed to support Poincaré by refusing to vote an increase in taxes, and loans floated by the government received a half-hearted backing from the public. A loan of four million francs from the *Crédit National* had been expected but only half a million was received, and the public debt mounted from 283 millions in March 1922 to 305 millions by August 1923.[124] The value of the franc continued to fall, and while 98 francs equaled a dollar in January 1924, a dollar bought 117 francs in March.[125]

Britain exploited this situation and proposed a comprehensive scheme of reparations, and Paris, seemingly victorious in the Ruhr, agreed to do what it had always in the past refused, namely to submit the entire issue of reparations to an international body without security guarantees in return. Thus the Dawes Plan was born.

The year 1923 ended on a note of defeat for both the French and the Polish governments of the Right. The Witos-Dmowski ministry fell in December 1923, and the days of Poincaré's cabinet were numbered. The record of both governments was highly disappointing. Poincaré gambled and won in the Ruhr, but he lost the fruits of his victory. What was more serious, he unwillingly prepared the ground for the important shift in French foreign policy in 1924 which led ultimately to Locarno. As for the strongly pro-French and pro-Czech cabinet in Poland, it failed to achieve a *rapprochement* with Prague, and it gambled and lost in Javořina. The consequences were far-reaching and not fully apparent until the 1930s.

Beneš seemingly triumphed all along the line. He made no concessions to the Poles, secured his election to the Council of the League of Nations, and improved his standing with both France and England.

While the Javořina dispute dragged on in the League and before the Permanent Court of International Justice—it was finally solved in 1924—it was no more than a mild irritant after the turbulent autumn of 1923. A *détente*, though no real friendship, again marked the relations between Warsaw and Prague. Beneš felt certain that Poland's vulnerable position would not allow the Polish government to indulge in hostility against Czechoslovakia, but he underestimated the long-range effect of the quarrel. In late 1923 he completed negotiations for an alliance with France, and made sure that this alliance would not basically alter the principles of his country's foreign policy. Prague could look confidently into the future, reasonably certain that the new year would bring new diplomatic successes.

[123] Suarez even speaks of an "international plot" against the franc, engineered by the Anglo-Saxon bankers. See his *Briand*, VI, 14–15, and compare it with Renouvin, *Histoire des relations internationales*, VII, 253–255.

[124] Edouard Herriot, *Jadis: D'Une guerre à l'autre* (2 vols., Paris, 1952), II, 131, 194.

[125] Suarez, *Briand*, VI, 14–15.

11

FRENCH-CZECHOSLOVAK ALLIANCE

THE most signal development in relations between France and East Central Europe in late 1923 and early 1924 was undoubtedly the negotiations which produced the Franco-Czechoslovak alliance of January 25, 1924. Foch had first suggested this alliance during his Prague visit in May 1923, but the Czechoslovak government had shown little eagerness for it. In time, however, Beneš saw advantages if the alliance should take a form which accorded with the prevailing trend of Czechoslovak foreign policy. Hence to understand the pact between Paris and Prague one must treat it within the general framework of Czech diplomatic objectives, both regional—in the Danubian basin—and European, the latter being intimately connected with the League of Nations.

Czechoslovak policy in East Central Europe in 1923 was characterized by the strengthening of the Little Entente at Sinaia, and a slow *détente* in relations with Poland. Prague's attitude toward the Ruhr crisis, as well as Poincaré's, has been mentioned. It is important now to review briefly Czechoslovak policy toward the twin problems of security and disarmament which at that time occupied the League of Nations.

Prague considered the League important to European stability, and Beneš wrote on at least one occasion that the League was in fact the most important element after the peace treaties.[1] This did not mean that he took an uncritical view of the possibilities of the League or looked upon the Covenant as a perfect document. From the inception of the Geneva organization most statesmen felt that its character needed change to correspond more closely to international realities, and Beneš shared this feeling. There nonetheless existed important differences of approach to this problem between France and her allies on the one hand, and Britain and some of her Dominions on the other. The French had fought a losing battle during the Peace Conference to put teeth into the Covenant, and Léon Bourgeois had tried to amend Articles 8 and 9, to provide for a permanent organization to administer sanctions and set up control of

[1] *Revue de Genève*, Sept. 15, 1921.

armament.[2] The French believed that security had to come before disarmament, that strict preservation of the *status quo* was imperative, and that the road to general security led through regional arrangements. The British, and especially the Canadians, put disarmament first, and assumed that security would follow. To them regional arrangements meant a return to the prewar alliances which bred conflict; they felt that since international society was dynamic and not static, loopholes in the Covenant would provide for peaceful change. In accord with this attitude Canada tried to undermine Article 10, which spoke of territorial integrity of member states, and the British favored a stronger wording of Article 19, which opened the door to revision of borders. The French had, during the Peace Conference, strongly objected to these changes, feeling that such revisions would "undermine Poland and Czechoslovakia," [3] but the issue was not settled.

The views of the Poles and the Czechoslovaks were naturally more akin to the French than the British, since both countries were opposed to revisionism and had to defend the *status quo*. There was, however, a noticeable difference between the Polish and the Czechoslovak positions within the League of Nations. In the early years the Poles constantly appeared in Geneva as defendants, and the League sat in judgment over them. They were a party in the Upper Silesian dispute, in the Wilno question, in the Javořina case, and in matters pertaining to Danzig and the national minorities. All these issues were referred to Geneva for solution, and the Polish delegate, Szymon Askenazy, could hardly pretend to have a position of equality with representatives of other member states.[4] It is not surprising that this development produced in Poland a feeling of dislike for the League and the atmosphere in which it operated; it also explained later Polish preoccupation with matters of prestige. As a result, Polish participation in the general discussion at Geneva was limited, and the Poles were usually on the defensive. In 1921 they protested, for instance, proposals to enlarge the League's authority in matters pertaining to protection of national minorities; they saw here

[2] As proposed by France, Article 8 read: "The High Contracting Parties, determined to interchange full and frank information as to the scale of armaments, their military and naval programmes, and the conditions of such of their industries as are adaptable to warlike purposes, have appointed a Committee for the purpose of ascertaining as far as possible the above information." Article 9 read: "A permanent organization shall be constituted for the purpose of considering and providing for naval and military measures to enforce the obligations incumbent on the High Contracting Parties under this Covenant, and of making them immediately operative in all cases of emergency." Miller, *My Diary*, XX, 116–117.

[3] Renouvin, *Histoire des relations internationales*, VII, 187.

[4] Askenazy left in the summer of 1923 and his place was not filled until Aleksander Skrzyński became Poland's permanent delegate on June 6, 1924. During the interim, Skirmunt represented Poland in Geneva.

an attempt to establish tutelage over states which had signed the minority treaties. In making this protest they found allies in the Czechoslovaks, who likewise objected to the proposals. Jointly they made their point of view prevail.

The position of the Czechoslovaks was incomparably stronger than that of the Poles. As at the Peace Conference in Paris, so in the councils of the League, Czech diplomacy had a friendly reception from other states. Creation of the Little Entente strengthened Prague by the support it gained from Rumania and Yugoslavia, and the grouping achieved some prominence as a step toward general European security. Prague attempted to strengthen Article 21 of the Covenant, which spoke of regional organizations, and her representative in Geneva, Štefan Osuský, gained a moral victory though not a formal approval. The election of Beneš to the Council in 1923 opened new opportunities for his diplomatic and negotiating talents. The star of the Czechoslovak minister began to shine in the firmament of Geneva, and the League's special atmosphere eminently suited Beneš's kind of diplomacy. The statesman of the Little Entente became now the statesman of the League, and there was some truth in Lord Curzon's flattery that "there is no man in Europe at present who exercises a more vital influence on foreign affairs than the Foreign Minister of Czechoslovakia." [5]

Briefly what were the main developments in Geneva on disarmament and security from 1921 to 1923? During the Second Assembly of the League, in 1921, all states were asked to submit their views on national security with relation to disarmament, and France replied in June 1922, explaining that she would not disarm because of the threats to her own security and to that of her friends in the east. She emphasized the German menace to Upper Silesia and the German-Russian enmity to Poland.[6] The Third Assembly, after analyzing all the replies, produced a general report which stated that reduction of armaments ought to be compatible with the national security, international obligation, geographic position, and specific conditions of each member state. The report became a point of departure for Resolution XIV of September 27, 1922, which clearly connected reduction of armaments with guarantees for national security.

The Fourth Assembly of the League concentrated on the problem of security and disarmament as outlined by Resolution XIV. In the discussions two plans emerged: the British, sponsored by Lord Robert Cecil, and the French, proposed by Colonel E. Requin. The former sought to achieve security by a general arrangement in which all members of the

[5] *President Masaryk in Paris, Brussels, and London in October 1923* (Prague, 1924), p. 100.

[6] *Documents relatifs aux garanties*, pp. 159–165.

League would participate. The latter strove to build security through regional treaties. Both Poland and Czechoslovakia favored the French approach, as evidenced in their respective statements of May 30 and June 23, 1923.[7] When the two plans were referred to a special committee —the Third Commission of the League—presided over by Skirmunt with Beneš as its *rapporteur,* the Czechoslovaks and the Poles had a great opportunity to play important roles at Geneva. This was especially true for Beneš. He dominated the discussions at the Third Commission, and was primarily responsible for the final draft of the Treaty of Mutual Assistance which skillfully combined the Cecil and Requin projects.

The draft showed Beneš's predilection for compromise and his anxiety for bringing France and England closer together. Explaining the document to the Assembly in September 1923, the Czechoslovak statesman pointed out that the value of the Treaty of Mutual Assistance lay in its linking disarmament with general security, and linking general security with regional pacts and arrangements provided they were in keeping with the spirit of the League. Skirmunt and the French delegate Lebrun strongly supported the treaty, and a French writer called it "the most effective instrument Franco-Polish-Czech diplomacy could have dreamed of to maintain Europe on its foundations of 1919." [8] Impressed by Beneš's arguments and the ingenuity of the scheme, the Assembly of the League unanimously accepted the proposed text.

Although the Treaty of Mutual Assistance was clearly a compromise, and both Beneš and Skirmunt were aware that the definition of an aggressor was not fully satisfactory, it was the best document that could have been produced under the circumstances. But the British government supported by others was unwilling to accept the formula, and British opposition was primarily responsible for torpedoing the whole scheme.

The Geneva experiences doubtless exercised a considerable effect on Beneš's thinking about an alliance with France. The Czech statesman felt that the League was a long way from providing a realistic solution to the problem of security. While the Treaty of Mutual Assistance indicated the direction in which efforts should proceed, the weakness of the League as shown by the Corfu incident in the summer of 1923 was incontestable. The chief pillars of the League, France and England, could not agree on a common policy in Geneva or elsewhere, and chances of a Franco-British alliance, which Prague could eventually join, were slender and remote. Events in Germany still looked threatening, and Beneš felt that a closer *rapprochement* between Paris and Prague would notably

[7] See Jouvenel, *D'Une guerre à l'autre,* I, 371, and Alexandre Bregman, *La Politique de la Pologne dans la Société des Nations* (Paris, 1932), p. 182.

[8] Jouvenel, *D'Une guerre à l'autre,* I, 372.

increase Czechoslovak security. On the other hand, Beneš was determined not to commit Prague too deeply to Paris or identify her with French foreign policy. A Franco-Czech alliance was thus to be in keeping with hitherto pursued policies and fit into the regional arrangement scheme as discussed in Geneva. These considerations largely determined the attitude of the Czechoslovak government toward the French alliance.

Beneš explained to the Czechoslovak Parliament—after the treaty of alliance was signed—why Prague and Paris had not concluded such a pact earlier. He declared that one reason was Czechoslovakia's hope for creation of a larger system based on a French-English entente which did not materialize; another, Prague's desire to complete first a workable regional system in East Central Europe so that an alliance with France could not be construed as putting pressure on Czechoslovakia's neighbors.[9] What Beneš meant was that during the first five years of her existence, the Czechoslovak republic had cooperated with France without officially assuming any political charges or obligations, and had succeeded in maintaining a free hand in international relations which was to her advantage.

The nature of Franco-Czechoslovak cooperation has been discussed in preceding chapters. It may be useful, however, to mention at this point some developments in the military and economic spheres. In the former the French general Mittelhauser remained until 1926 chief-of-staff of the Czechoslovak army,[10] and several of his countrymen continued to occupy leading military positions in the country. The French military mission still had the function of a "mission de commandement."[11] All this resulted from what Beneš termed "a simple technical agreement without political characteristics."[12]

Collaboration in the economic sphere was far less pronounced, and trade between the two countries continued to decrease. Czechoslovak exports to France in 1921 represented 8.61 per cent of that nation's total exports; they fell in 1922 to 4.78 per cent, and dwindled in the first half of 1923 to 3.51 per cent.[13] Until 1925 Czech exports to France were larger than French exports to Czechoslovakia. This picture was not encouraging, and on August 17, 1923, the two countries signed a trade agreement to promote commercial growth. Prague offered tariff reductions for one hundred and fifty French products, and agreed to treat all other imports from France in accord with the most-favored-nation clause. France in return set up a minimum tariff for one hundred and fifty Czech products

[9] Beneš, *Five Years of Czechoslovak Foreign Policy*, pp. 27–28.
[10] The first Czech to occupy this position was General Jan Syrový in 1926.
[11] Mission Militaire Française, "Rapport de fin de mission."
[12] Beneš on Feb. 6, 1924. See *Zahraniční Politika*, I/a (1924), 269.
[13] *Ibid.*, II (1923), 1131.

and offered a special reduction for three hundred other items. Should France ever accord more far-reaching advantages to Austrian or Hungarian imports, Czechoslovakia had the right to be treated on an equal footing, in exchange for some compensation to France.[14] The commercial treaty signified in Beneš's words the opening of a new path toward lower tariffs,[15] and represented a renewed French effort to extend its economic influence in East Central Europe. It heralded a new phase of close French-Czechoslovak relations, and marked a step in the direction of full-fledged alliance.

2

During his brief stay in Prague in May 1923, Marshal Foch had not only suggested a Franco-Czechoslovak alliance but had extended an invitation from the French government to President Masaryk to visit Paris. Masaryk accepted the invitation and made the necessary preparations, although he was not at all eager to go, and confided to the American minister in Prague his "aversion" to the trip.[16] The president's feeling resulted from his highly critical attitude toward Poincaré's policy in the Ruhr, and from his reluctance to being in any way identified with it. Taking this into consideration, Prague decided that Masaryk should not confine his visit to France alone and that the president and Beneš would go also to London and Brussels. Beneš especially was eager to play the role of an intermediary between the British and the French, and during his stay in London he submitted a memorandum dealing with the general situation, which he asked to be treated as "strictly confidential" because of "the criticism of Poincaré's policy." [17]

The Czechoslovak president and the foreign minister came to Paris in the middle of October 1923. Their stay developed into a great manifestation of Czechoslovak-French amity.[18] But negotiations between the two governments revealed serious differences of opinion. The chief topic of conversation was the signing of a Franco-Czechoslovak political alliance accompanied by a military convention. Poincaré had previously instructed Laroche to prepare appropriate texts; they were now confronted with a much more general and vague draft brought by the Czechs.[19]

The military convention, especially, raised immediate objections on the Czechoslovak side. Beneš felt that a military alliance "meant that the smaller country would be dominated by the greater, in the way that

[14] *Ibid.*, 1130.
[15] Beneš's speech on Oct. 30, 1923. See *Problémy nové Evropy*, p. 271.
[16] Einstein to Secretary of State, July 10, 1923, *SDNA*, 760c.60f.5/45.
[17] Olivová, "V době rurské krise," p. 66.
[18] See *President Masaryk in Paris, Brussels, and London, passim.*
[19] Laroche, *Au Quai d'Orsay*, pp. 185–186.

Poland was by France." Moreover, if some "madman like Maginot" were ever to become French premier, "he might embark on any crazy adventure across the Rhine," compromise international peace, and drag the Czechoslovaks into a general turmoil.[20] A military alliance, Masaryk and Beneš thought, would appear as a move to encircle Germany, and would notably strengthen French policy on the Rhine, which was the last thing the Czechs wanted to do. During the Paris talks Masaryk urged Poincaré to adopt a more moderate policy vis-à-vis Germany, and he also tried to explain the dire consequences for Czechoslovakia of a chaotic situation in Germany. Prague feared the economic effects of German disintegration, and was anxious lest Bavarian separatists join hands with Austria and Hungary, thus encircling the Czechoslovak state.[21]

There were other reasons for the Czechoslovak dislike of a formal alliance. Masaryk and Beneš feared the reaction not only of Germany but of England, and the Czechoslovak minister in Rome, Vlastimil Kybal, reported that the Italians were equally apprehensive that "Czechoslovakia might become a vassal of France."[22] Then there was the question of relations between Warsaw and Prague, and the American chargé d'affaires in Paris gathered from "various reliable sources" that "one of the stumbling blocks in the way of the conclusion of any political and military convention is the bitterness which the Czechs feel for the Poles and which apparently they [Masaryk and Beneš] made no attempt to disguise."[23] So, despite strong pressure on Czechoslovak statesmen by Millerand and Foch, the negotiations in Paris failed to bring about immediate signing of a treaty of alliance. The Czechoslovak stand annoyed the French, and according to the American ambassador in London accounted for the chilly farewell given to Masaryk and Beneš on their departure from Paris.

What kind of Franco-Czechoslovak alliance did Prague desire? Upon his return to Czechoslovakia, Beneš addressed Parliament on October 30 and analyzed the way in which negotiations with Paris were proceeding. He told the deputies that Masaryk assured the French that "we can be depended upon in good times as well as in bad. That means that we are faithful friends and shall remain such."[24] Beneš emphatically denied that either Paris or Prague was pursuing imperialist or militarist policies, and this remark may have been directed to Millerand and Foch no less than to the listening deputies. The foreign minister declared that

[20] Einstein to Secretary of State, Jan. 4, 1924, *SDNA*, 751.60f.11/5.

[21] Harvey to Secretary of State, Oct. 25 and 26, 1923, *SDNA*, 751.60f/7 and 751.60f/8.

[22] Vlastimil Kybal, "Czechoslovakia and Italy: My Negotiations with Mussolini I: 1922–1923," *Journal of Central European Affairs*, XIII (1953–54), 362.

[23] Whitehouse to Secretary of State, Oct. 23, 1923, *SDNA*, 751.60f.11/2.

[24] Beneš, *Situation internationale*, p. 13.

close links between the two countries—which had already existed *de facto* for some years—would only contribute to peace and the cause of democracy. New forms of political collaboration would systematize and fortify existing relations but bring no innovations. Beneš harped on the ideological theme, saying that peace was possible only among democracies, and since neither Germany nor Hungary was as yet truly democratic, it was natural that Czechoslovakia would be more attracted to the French democracy.

The mouthpiece of the Foreign Ministry, *Zahraniční Politika,* commenting on Beneš's address, reiterated that the French-Czechoslovak agreement would not be against anybody. Its merit was that it would strengthen the League of Nations, the guardian of the peace treaties, and generally contribute to international security.[25]

Beneš's speech and the comments of *Zahraniční Politika* made it fairly evident that the Czechoslovak government aimed at an alliance which would bring maximum security to Prague without committing it to follow blindly French foreign policy. The character of the treaty was to be in keeping with the spirit of the Covenant so that it could advance rather than hinder Czechoslovak activity in Geneva. Finally, the alliance was not to antagonize London or arouse suspicion in Italy or Germany. In a sense Beneš strove to achieve a treaty which would assure him of great independence and bind France to Czech policy rather than vice versa. The objectives of Paris were obviously very different, and hard bargaining still lay ahead.

In December 1923 the American envoy reported from Prague that Beneš in spite of a "very strong French pressure" to sign a military convention still "refuses to do so."[26] But at this point, a compromise presented itself. The Czechoslovaks apparently convinced Foch that a military convention could only produce a counterreaction and would therefore be unwise. The Czech minister in Berlin told D'Abernon that Foch began to see "that one military convention immediately creates another on the opposite side," and he added that Foch was "not too well pleased with the result of the Military Agreement with Poland."[27] On the other hand the Czechoslovaks became more tractable because France began to use an effective economic weapon, namely a promise to get the Czechs out of their financial difficulties connected with reparations.[28]

It was Laroche who first suggested that since Prague was adamant about a military convention, the only way out was to add to the treaty of alliance "interpretative letters [of both foreign ministers] pertaining

[25] *Zahraniční Politika,* I/a (1924), 1–4.
[26] Einstein to Secretary of State, Dec. 19, 1923, *SDNA*, 751.60f.11/3.
[27] D'Abernon, *Diary*, III, 35.
[28] *Ibid.*

to permanent contacts between the general staffs."[29] Beneš agreed to this formula.

The treaty of alliance was signed in Paris on January 25, 1924, and the two letters, which remained secret, were exchanged shortly afterward. According to its preamble the alliance resulted from a desire to maintain peace, to ensure respect for international order as established by the peace treaties, and to devise mutual guarantees indispensable for security. By Article 1 both sides undertook to "concert their action" in all matters of foreign policy that threatened their security or undermined the new order in Europe. Article 2 expressed determination to agree on measures to safeguard common interests. Articles 3 to 5 more closely defined these interests by referring to exclusion of the Habsburgs from Hungary and the Hohenzollern family from Germany. The provision of the peace treaties which forbade an *Anschluss* of Austria to Germany was also included, being of special interest to both Paris and Prague. France and Czechoslovakia further agreed to submit their disputes to arbitration, and promised to communicate with each other on treaties affecting their policies in East Central Europe. The two countries agreed to consult each other before entering new pacts or ententes.[30]

A few days after signing the alliance, Poincaré and Beneš exchanged letters on the cooperation of their general staffs. Poincaré wrote that in accord with Article 2 of the alliance, both general staffs "will make constant efforts to maintain and to strengthen their collaboration, in the spirit [of the alliance] and in keeping with its aim, and to work out a common plan to cope with aggression directed against either of the two countries." Beneš replied on January 31, 1924, and emphasized that military collaboration between the two states would not cease even if the French military mission left Czechoslovakia.[31] Further, to implement the increased cooperation between France and Czechoslovakia a special French military attaché was appointed in late January 1924 in Prague.[32]

The alliance signed in Paris represented a clear victory for Beneš's diplomacy. The pact, in Beneš's words, was "a very pliable instrument calling for frequent conferences on a basis of mutual equality but reserving complete liberty of action to both partners." Prague "would henceforth possess the right to discuss with France its reparations policy, while France would be unable to pursue an independent course with regard to Austria or Hungary." The American envoy in Prague, to whom the

[29] Laroche, *Au Quai d'Orsay*, p. 185.

[30] The full text is in Appendix VI.

[31] Soják, *O zahraniční politice*, p. 120, quoting from Archiv Min. Zahr. Věci, Archiv Státních Smluv, Malá dohoda, XII, č. 3 and č. 11.

[32] Olivová, "V době rurské krise," p. 68.

Czechoslovak foreign minister addressed these remarks, added that Beneš had now a legal basis "on which to rest his oft given counsels in Paris on European affairs." [33] A few weeks later the same diplomat quoted Masaryk's remark that the alliance would enable him to influence Paris on German affairs, which was important insofar "as the Czechs understand the Germans and the French do not." [34] The Czechoslovak envoy in Rome later recalled that the foreign minister in a circular of February 3, 1924, strongly emphasized Czech liberty of action, and "lauded the Franco-Czechoslovak alliance as an ironclad guarantee for the future, as a protection for our vital interests that would still enable us to enjoy diplomatic independence with Germany, Britain, and Russia." [35]

The Czech public, with the exception of the Communists and the national minority groups that saw Czechoslovak subservience to France in the treaty, greeted the pact with enthusiasm. The National Socialist *České Slovo* underlined on January 28 the democratic spirit of the alliance; the Socialist *Právo Lidu* wrote on January 6 that this pact was not with Poincaré or the French reactionaries but with the real France and the entire French Left could endorse it. The National Democratic press felt that the treaty was a warning to Germany not to depart from a policy of peace, and it also established a bridge between France and Russia. As the Catholic *Lidové Listy* put it on December 30, 1923, "the French diplomatic road to the east will pass by our country," and the Agrarian *Venkov* stated that the new treaty "signified that France has adopted the political tendencies of Czechoslovakia."[36]

Beneš, in his great speech of February 6, 1924, which reviewed the achievements of Czechoslovak diplomacy during its first five years, devoted a good deal of attention to the French alliance. He presented it as the crown of the "treaty system in Central Europe," which opened the way toward greater international security. The Czechoslovak statesman denied that the alliance meant a return to the old system of blocs and pacts, and stressed that it would fit in well with the League of Nations. Beneš did his best to dispel suspicion that the treaty of alliance was directed against Germany, and in an article written at this time stated that those who thought so were simply putting "a sense into it which is not there."[37] In his parliamentary address the Czechoslovak statesman stressed the existence of correct relations between Prague and Berlin, and added that "an accord between Germany and France" was

[33] Einstein to Secretary of State, Jan. 4, 1924, *SDNA*, 751.60f.11/5.

[34] Einstein on Jan. 24, 1924, *SDNA*, 860f.00/214.

[35] Kybal, "Czechoslovakia and Italy: My Negotiations with Mussolini II: 1923–1924," *Journal of Central European Affairs*, XIV (1954–55), 70.

[36] *BPPT*, Oct. 1, 1923–Jan. 31, 1924, No. 9, pp. 2ff.

[37] Beneš, "The Foreign Policy of Czechoslovakia," *Nineteenth Century and After*, XCV (1924), 488.

"nearer at hand" than many people imagined.[38] The only bloc that was created, Beneš said, was one against reaction and imperialism as personified by the Habsburgs and the Hohenzollern family and their attempts at restoration. The Franco-Czech alliance did not create a new "legal or political situation" but merely embodied "the existing reality in a legal formula." The two countries were old friends; "none of the great Allies has supported Czechoslovakia in all our political difficulties as much as France." Was it strange that this friendship was expressed in a treaty? Beneš repeated once again that the alliance "leaves enough freedom to both states" and "it does not bind us to any automatic action,"[39] and he obviously felt that this latter point was very important indeed.

Beneš's interpretation of the alliance with Paris was entirely logical from the Czechoslovak point of view. By signing the pact in terms which he largely imposed on the French, the foreign minister retained all the important cards of Czechoslovak diplomacy. He refused to be drawn into a military engagement which might compromise his freedom of action; he obtained the right to influence Paris more effectively than before; he associated French policy with his own in the Danubian area, and made provision against renewals of direct French approaches to Budapest and Vienna. Appearances to the contrary, the alliance was not a step toward an effective *barrière de l'est* in which Paris was still interested, and if anything, the pact made it more difficult for the Quai d'Orsay to put pressure on Prague to help build one.

Compared with the Franco-Polish alliance of 1921 the new pact was more elastic and imprecise. The respective negotiations which had led to the signing of the two alliances revealed Polish weakness and Czechoslovak strength. While Paris had attempted to limit its obligations to Poland, and it was Warsaw which had to insist on a far-reaching engagement, the French tried to obtain more from Czechoslovakia and had to settle for less. The reasons were obvious. Paris considered Poland a liability and a risk; Czechoslovakia appeared as an international asset. The danger of German or Soviet aggression against Poland was ever-present in the minds of French diplomats and soldiers; Czechoslovakia seemed to occupy a secure position with numerous advantages. Control of the Bohemian quadrilateral was important strategically, and Czech military pacts with the Little Entente could be used in general French military planning. No wonder Paris insisted on a military convention and was disappointed not to obtain it.

The French public was probably unaware of these limits and nuances. It welcomed the alliance as enhancing the prestige of France, opening possibilities for contact with Russia, and generally contributing to the

[38] *Five Years of Czechoslovak Foreign Policy*, p. 35.
[39] *Ibid.*, pp. 27ff.

French diplomatic offensive against Germany.[40] It is true that the anti-revisionist character of the alliance constituted the most important common ground between Paris and Prague, but even here some Frenchmen overlooked that while France was preoccupied with German revisionism, Czechoslovakia concentrated on the revisionist tendencies of Hungary and Austria.

French officials in Czechoslovakia, who had a clearer picture of Prague's foreign policy than many of their countrymen at home, adopted a less enthusiastic attitude toward the alliance. The American envoy in Prague reported that French comments were somewhat reserved, that France's representatives in Czechoslovakia were disappointed, "having expected greater support from the Czechs," and were "now disposed to minimize its significance."[41] Keen observers of Franco-Czechoslovak cooperation could not fail to realize that France had paid a high price for the alliance and limited her possibilities of direct action in the Danubian area. For Paris, the alliance was hardly an unqualified success.

3

The text of the French-Czechoslovak pact sounded innocuous enough, and Prague had skillfully avoided being completely drawn into the French system. Yet London, Berlin, and Rome apparently misunderstood the nature of the new alliance. It was inconceivable to them that Paris had not obtained a secret military convention with Prague, and they looked upon the treaty as a new strand in the French diplomatic network spread over the European continent.

The German reaction was somewhat naive and crude. Stresemann seriously believed that a secret military convention had been signed.[42] On March 19 and 21, 1924, the *Berliner Tageblatt* came out with sensational revelations about an alleged military pact between Paris and Prague, and published what purported to be its secret text. The paper added an alleged draft treaty providing for accession of Yugoslavia to the Franco-Czechoslovak alliance.[43] Prague denied the existence of such a convention, and a Czech diplomat and historian wrote an elaborate explanation showing how a prewar document was used as a model for the fabrication.[44]

If Prague was annoyed with the German reaction, its prime concern

[40] A useful survey of the French press is in *Zahraniční Politika*, I/a (1924), 308.

[41] Einstein to Secretary of State, Jan. 4 and Jan. 8, 1924, *SDNA*, 751.60f.11/5 and 751.60f.11/6.

[42] Stresemann to principal missions abroad, March 13, 1924, *AANA*, container 1330.

[43] See in this respect a report of Houghton from Berlin to the Secretary of State, March 22, 1924, *SDNA*, 751.60f/9.

[44] Jan Opočenský, *Les Faux du "Berliner Tageblatt." Découverte des pièces ayant servi de modèle aux faux redigés en allemand* (Prague, 1924).

was with the effect the pact might have on Britain. Already on January 2, 1924, the Czechoslovak minister in London, Václav Mastný, wrote a letter to the *Times* stating that no military convention between France and Czechoslovakia was contemplated, although such a convention had been proposed to Masaryk and Beneš. The Czech minister in Berlin, Tusar, confided to D'Abernon that no military agreement was accepted by the Czechs, and he added—possibly to impress the British—that France had "exercised immense pressure on us" and used strong arguments of an economic nature.[45]

Beneš on his part, realizing that the British ascribed to the alliance a "deadly militaristic character" entailing "complete vassalage of Czecho-Slovakia to France," tried to calm London, and he assured the British that he intended "gradually to reduce the already diminished French Military Mission" and to replace the French chief-of-staff by a Czech general.[46] Speaking to the American envoy in Prague, the Czechoslovak statesman explained that the alliance was a second-best arrangement. He stated that he himself "was not overpleased with the treaty. He would have preferred some more general agreement to which all the nations of Europe could subscribe, but because this was not yet feasible he had been obliged to resort to specific conventions."[47] Despite these efforts one can doubt that Beneš was successful in dissipating all suspicions. The legend about a secret convention lingered on.

While the main reason for London's dislike of the alliance was that it seemed to represent an extension of French imperialism directed against Germany, Rome viewed it with mistrust because it appeared a step toward French domination of Danubian Europe. There is no doubt that French diplomatic activity in East Central Europe became more intense toward the end of 1923 and the beginning of 1924. The French Senate on December 17, 1923, voted credits to Poland of four hundred million francs, and three hundred million to Yugoslavia for purchase of armaments in France. An offer of credits was also made to Rumania. When some French circles objected to these loans, Poincaré replied that this was no time for leaving France's friends "without arms when they may be caught between two fires."[48] The American minister in Belgrade reported signs of increased French political activity and influence in Yugoslavia,[49] and rumor circulated that the Franco-Czechoslovak link would soon extend to that country. Italy who looked upon the Balkans and Danubian Europe as her own potential sphere of influence was greatly

[45] D'Abernon, *Diary*, III, 35.
[46] *Ibid.*, III, 34.
[47] Einstein to Secretary of State, Feb. 1, 1924, *SDNA*, 751.60f.11/13.
[48] Herrick to Secretary of State, Jan. 2, 1924, *SDNA*, 851.00/460.
[49] Dodge to Secretary of State, Sept. 17, 1923, *SDNA*, 751.60h/2.

disturbed with what she considered French encroachments. The Czechoslovak minister in Rome told Masaryk that "all Italians remained somewhat sensitive because of their apprehension that Czechoslovakia might become a vassal of France" and be used to promote French interests in this region.[50] He warned Prague of the dangers implicit in a policy which to Rome might seem a French-directed encirclement of Italy in southeastern Europe.

These warnings were in all probability superfluous. Beneš had already taken precautions against the possibility of becoming an instrument of French diplomacy in East Central Europe. Besides, he was not likely to ruin his good relations with Italy.[51] Thus the diplomatic world of Europe which awaited the signing of a Franco-Yugoslav pact was taken by surprise when it learned, in late January 1924, that Belgrade had signed an agreement with Italy. Kybal called this a "masterstroke" on the part of Beneš "to induce the Yugoslav government to come to understanding with Italy" and hence "to disarm and pacify Rome."[52] There is no doubt that Beneš played an important role in bringing about the Italo-Yugoslav pact, and the American diplomat who wrote from Belgrade that the Czechoslovak minister was caught by surprise[53] was simply misinformed. Einstein reported that Beneš was instrumental in the Yugoslav-Italian *rapprochement*,[54] and the foreign minister himself informed Czechoslovak diplomatic missions abroad that "the accord between Yugoslavia and Italy [was] made under our pressure and with our co-operation" so that "people could not talk about French hegemony."[55]

The part which Prague played in this incident showed that the French alliance had changed neither the aims nor the methods of Czechoslovak diplomacy in East Central Europe.

Shortly afterward Beneš also signed a treaty with Mussolini, but this did not mean that he was moving away from France. He merely asserted Czechoslovak freedom of action in the international sphere, and continued a middle course between the great powers. Besides he did not attach much importance to the agreement concluded in Rome,[56] and it certainly did not signify any deviation in Beneš's diplomacy. Whether this was wise or not is another question, and the Czechoslovak minister in Rome later criticized his lack of interest in an "Italian system of

[50] Kybal, "Czechoslovakia and Italy," *Journal of Central European Affairs*, XIII, 362.

[51] The German legation reported from Belgrade at the beginning of January that there would be no Franco-Yugoslav pact because of Italian antagonism. Keller to Auswärtiges Amt, Jan. 11, 1924, *AANA*, container 1329.

[52] Kybal, "Czechoslovakia and Italy," *Journal of Central European Affairs*, XIV, 68.

[53] Dodge to Secretary of State, Jan. 15, 1923, *SDNA*, 770.00/74.

[54] Einstein to Secretary of State, Feb. 5, 1924, *SDNA*, 751.60f.11/14.

[55] Soják, *O zahraniční politice*, p. 121. Quoting from Archiv Min. Zahr. Věci, tel. od., 1924, č. 38.

[56] Einstein to Secretary of State, June 3, 1924, *SDNA*, 760f.65.11/6.

guarantees" and for completely overlooking "the imminent threat facing Czechoslovakia from a reactionary Germany eventually allied to Italy."[57] For the time being, Beneš could justly claim that his policy was eminently consistent and that the French alliance did not interfere in any way. This was especially true with regard to relations between Prague and Warsaw.

There is no doubt that Paris in signing the alliance with Prague aimed at consolidation of the French system on the continent of Europe, specifically in the area east of Germany. It is equally evident that it strove to close the gap between Poland and Czechoslovakia and to achieve a strong tripartite bloc centered on Paris. With this in view Foch prepared a memorandum, dated February 16, 1924, dealing with Polish-Czechoslovak military cooperation. The French marshal analyzed the important role that Czechoslovakia could play in case of a German attack against Polish Silesia, and the Polish part in resisting a German thrust toward Glatz (Kłodzko). He discreetly suggested the need for a convention between Warsaw and Prague, and implied that the initiative ought to come from the interested countries themselves.

Polish military leaders had long been aware of the advantages of military cooperation with Czechoslovakia, and all the successive ministers of defense such as Generals Sosnkowski, Szeptycki, and Sikorski favored it in principle. Studying Foch's memorandum, however, General Sikorski, the minister of defense in the new Grabski cabinet—which assumed power on December 19, 1923—thought that military cooperation limited to defense of one border was bound to be ineffective. He felt that a Czechoslovak-Polish agreement had to be all-embracing even if fairly general in nature. He consequently announced himself in favor of only such an arrangement. In Prague the chief-of-staff, General Mittelhauser, and the French military mission naturally lent their full support to Foch's suggestion. Their views, supported by many Czechoslovak officers, were not shared by government and diplomatic circles. The government and the Foreign Ministry opposed any military convention, feeling it would clash with the established Czechoslovak foreign policy.[58] Foch's plan was not adopted.

Failing to achieve military cooperation, Czechoslovakia and Poland tried to overcome the heritage of the Javořina dispute and improve their mutual relations. In his great February speech, Beneš declared that he wanted normal relations between Prague and Warsaw, and after deploring past disputes he admitted that there had not been "enough under-

[57] Kybal, "Czechoslovakia and Italy," *Journal of Central European Affairs*, XIII, 367–368, and XIV, 69.

[58] See Bader, *Stosunki polsko-czeskie*, p. 31. Also Gasiorowski, "Polish-Czechoslovak Relations 1922–1926," p. 491.

standing either on our side or in Poland."[59] He advocated a *rapprochement* between the two states and added that it would have been better had it been achieved before Soviet Russia became active in international politics. Beneš's statements did not go beyond what he had said many times in the past. He made it obvious that the formula "Poland *and* the Little Entente" was all he had in mind, which signified a return to the situation as it existed in the early days of Skirmunt. It is useful to mention here that Poland had not participated in the Belgrade conference of the Little Entente in January 1924, or sent delegates to other meetings of this organization. The Czech foreign minister stated unequivocally that "there has never been any question of the creation of a great territorial combination or of an Allied bloc, but only of a lasting entente founded on real interests and restricted to concrete aims."[60] The meaning of this declaration, taken together with the Czechoslovak attitude to the French alliance and Prague's role in the Yugoslav-Italian negotiations, was perfectly clear, and any realistic statesman in Warsaw and Paris was bound to understand it.

The new Polish foreign minister, Zamoyski, who had until then occupied the post of minister in Paris, responded to these Czech overtures. His appointment had been favorably received in Prague and treated as an indication of a pro-French and pro-Czechoslovak turn in Polish diplomacy. Similarly the Czechs greeted the appointment of Alfred Chłapowski to the Polish legation in Paris. This was a good sign in view of the abuse heaped by the Czechs upon Polish foreign policy during the previous year.[61]

At a meeting of the *Sejm*'s foreign relations committee on February 13, 1924, Zamoyski went out of his way to make friendly statements about Prague and Paris. He declared that "one ought to welcome with satisfaction the accord that was signed between France and Czechoslovakia." He stated that Beneš's last speech "authorizes us to hope that there will be an evolution in our relations with the Czechoslovak republic, a progress to which I consider it very important to contribute." Zamoyski said that smaller things had to be sacrificed to achieve greater objectives, and predicted that even if the final decision on Javořina were unfavorable to Poland it could not affect mutual relations between the two countries.[62] Zamoyski's pro-Czech comments naturally made a good impression in Prague, and the Polish minister was praised for realizing

[59] *Five Years of Czechoslovak Foreign Policy*, p. 18.

[60] *Ibid.*

[61] See *Zahraniční Politika*, I/a (1924), 620. A much more balanced Czechoslovak appraisal of Polish diplomacy is found in Václav Fiala, *Soudobé Polsko* (Prague, 1936). For comments on Zamoyski and Chłapowski see *Zahraniční Politika*, I/a (1924), 429–430, 620ff.

[62] *BPPP*, Jan. 28–Feb. 24, 1924, No. 141, pp. 1–2.

that his country needed friends. The Polish chargé in Prague, Bader, who had told the American minister that he hoped Beneš would "find a response in Warsaw to his reiterated efforts to bring about friendlier relations with Poland" saw that Zamoyski's speech confirmed this hope. Even so, Bader was skeptical about a complete and radical change (for the better) in the relations between the two countries.[63]

Bader's skepticism was only too well founded. Prague was in no position to offer the Poles either full cooperation or an alliance; the Poles were suspicious of Beneš's friendly statements, which seemed to lead nowhere. Even a Peasant party leader such as Stanisław Thugutt, whose *Weltanschauung* was not far removed from that of the Czechoslovak statesman, could not find a common language with him. Thugutt has related how he had met Beneš in Geneva in early 1924, held a long conversation full of assurances of mutual friendship, and then parted from him "with a deep conviction that I had talked to a man whom we could not win over as a friend for Poland."[64] Under these conditions Zamoyski's remarks in which he welcomed the Franco-Czechoslovak alliance and echoed Beneš's words about friendly relations lost some of their significance in not reflecting the views of many important Polish political groups.

It is true, of course, that the traditional division between the Polish Left and Right prevented a uniform reaction. Rightist papers such as *Kurjer Warszawski* and *Gazeta Poranna* supported Zamoyski's stand, and *Rzeczpospolita* even wrote on January 13 that a French-Czechoslovak accord ought to exist and Poland "should see in it a necessary and happy completion of her own agreement with France." The conservative *Czas* and the Leftist and center press took a different position. *Czas,* after hinting that the alliance explained why Paris had not supported the Poles in the Javořina dispute, wrote that "The majority of Polish public opinion sensed almost instinctively that the French-Czech alliance, at least in the form in which it was concluded, is for Poland an extremely unfortunate event, and pushes us into the background."[65] The radical *Kurjer Polski* echoed these sentiments by saying that Poland was forgotten in both Paris and Prague. The Socialist *Robotnik* concluded on December 31, 1923, that "the agreement is to facilitate a penetration of Russia both by France and by Czechoslovakia."[66] This last view was shared by many other groups in Poland, and the American envoy in Prague expressed the opinion that the Poles feared the Czechs would

[63] Einstein to Secretary of State, Feb. 18, 1924, SDNA, 760c.60f/113. Compare with White's report from Warsaw, April 12, 1924, *ibid.*, 760c.60f/114.

[64] Stanisław Thugutt, *Wybór pism i autobiografia Stanisława Thugutta* (Glasgow, 1943), p. 115.

[65] Cited from *BPPP*, Dec. 24, 1923–Jan. 27, 1924, No. 140, p. 7.

[66] *Ibid.*

try to help France establish relations with Russia and also would put pressure on Poland to facilitate transit from Czechoslovakia to the Soviet Union.[67] According to the American minister in Warsaw the Poles felt that France was "quite willing to play one country off against another to her own advantage,"[68] which created a certain emotional tension between the two states.

There is no doubt that tension existed and that the Franco-Czechoslovak treaty increased it. If people in Poland were sensitive about their country's role in international politics, the Czechs showed little moderation when speaking about their claims to greatness. There were remarks in the Czechoslovak Parliament to the effect that "Prague, thanks to Dr. Beneš, is today the center of foreign policy in Europe,"[69] and the general tone of the press was one of self-praise and self-satisfaction. The Poles vented their spleen by referring to Beneš as the *commis voyageur*—the traveling salesman—in international politics,[70] which in turn Prague could hardly have been expected to appreciate.

Old issues such as Teschen kept re-emerging, and affected again the relations between the two countries. In mid-December 1923 communal elections took place in Teschen, and Warsaw calculated that the number of Polish votes cast was far larger than the Polish population—as that population had been listed in the Czechoslovak census of 1921. Poland felt that the complaints of the Polish minority in Teschen were amply justified, and a circular of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs addressed to diplomatic missions abroad stated that "the Silesian question constitutes the focal point of disagreement between Poland and Czechoslovakia."[71] While the American minister in Prague believed that after the Franco-Czechoslovak treaty France ought to be of "distinct advantage to him [Beneš] in helping to attenuate the recurring friction with Poland and bringing about friendlier relations between the two countries,"[72] the Poles looked upon French attempts at mediation as indicative of their partiality to the Czechs.

The Polish Left, especially those circles close to Marshal Piłsudski—then in political retirement—went so far as to question altogether the usefulness of a *rapprochement* between Prague and Warsaw. A spokesman of this group, who became the Polish ambassador in Paris in the 1930s, Juliusz Łukasiewicz, presented such a thesis in an article which appeared in early 1924. Łukasiewicz wrote that in view of the conflicting

[67] Einstein to Secretary of State, Jan. 8, 1924, *SDNA*, 751.60f.11/6.
[68] Gibson to Secretary of State, Jan. 31, 1924, *SDNA*, 860c.00/266.
[69] *Zahraniční Politika*, II (1923), 1534.
[70] *Ibid.*, I/a (1924), 203.
[71] Ministry of Foreign Affairs to diplomatic missions, Dec. 3, 1923, *CD*, "Czechosłowacja."
[72] Einstein to Secretary of State, Jan. 4, 1924, *SDNA*, 751.60f.11/5.

interests between Czechoslovakia and Poland, it was obvious that "at the present stage, taking into account the disproportion between a clearly enunciated and determined Czechoslovak policy and the indeterminate line of Polish policy, any closer understanding would be bound to create the appearance of predominance of Czech conceptions and programs."[73] Łukasiewicz opposed such a subordination of Polish diplomacy to Prague, which could only weaken Warsaw vis-à-vis the "non-Panslavist" states, meaning probably Rumania and Hungary. He concluded that while neighborly coexistence was necessary, close collaboration was not. Poland could gain no guarantees of security from a *rapprochement* with Prague, and was obliged therefore to conduct a totally independent policy. Future relations, Łukasiewicz thought, would depend on such factors as Poland's strength and the developments in Russia.

While the basic policy of Czechoslovak diplomacy, unaffected by the alliance with Paris, precluded creation of a tripartite political and military system centered on Paris, Polish antagonism toward Prague made any genuine improvement in relations very difficult. Common ground for cooperation was so restricted that there was just enough room left for concrete negotiations to liquidate the remnants of the Javořina quarrel and deal with commercial relations between the two countries. In this limited field some progress was achieved.

On March 12, 1924, the League of Nations gave its final verdict on Javořina, assigning it to Czechoslovakia. This decision was a foregone conclusion and did not create any great stir. In fact the Rightist *Gazeta Warszawska* appealed on March 17 to let bygones be bygones and denounced all those "who desired to continue Czech-Polish friction." A final protocol legalizing the Javořina situation and providing better transit and economic facilities in Spiš was signed in Cracow on May 6, 1924. Thus the last border issue affecting relations between the two countries finally disappeared, and the Czech press especially commented upon the Cracow protocol in friendly terms.

More general economic negotiations between Warsaw and Prague began, but they soon ran into difficulties. The Czechoslovaks were primarily interested in obtaining transit rights through so-called Eastern Galicia to Russia; the Poles were unwilling to grant them because of possible political implications. The creation of a Czechoslovak-Russian economic "corridor" through this area was a dangerous thing from the point of view of Warsaw.[74] Negotiations nevertheless proceeded throughout the summer and autumn of 1924. They were destined to be completed

[73] See *Przegląd Polityczny*, I (1924), 101.

[74] See Rykten, "Czynniki polityczne w stosunkach gospodarczych Polski z Czechosłowacją," *Przegląd Polityczny*, I (1924), 197ff.

in the forthcoming year under greatly different international circumstances.

The European scene began to change in the year 1924, and French-Polish-Czechoslovak relations were bound to be affected by the rapidly moving international current. The early part of the year not only witnessed the signing of the Franco-Czechoslovak alliance, which, as Beneš put it, ended one period in Czechoslovak foreign policy and opened a new chapter in the country's diplomatic history. Other events occurred that marked the end of an era and foreshadowed new international developments. The almost simultaneous deaths of former President Wilson in America and of Lenin in Russia symbolized the passing of a generation which had shaped the destinies of postwar Europe and indeed the world. And on the very day that Lenin died, Ramsay MacDonald became prime minister of England, heading the first Socialist government in British history. A *de facto* recognition of Soviet Russia by the French and British governments heralded the coming of even greater changes.

The most crucial development, however, took place in France. In May 1924 general elections swept from power the ministry of Poincaré and the National Bloc which had ruled France since the Paris Peace Conference. A coalition of the parties of the Left—the *Cartel des Gauches*—took over the government. This event influenced all the capitals of Europe; it had a great bearing on the history of the League of Nations; and it affected Poland and Czechoslovakia and the relations of those two states with France in a basic and lasting way.

12

HERRIOT AND THE NEW COURSE

POINCARÉ'S fall, and the electoral victory of the *Cartel des Gauches,* marked an important turn in French diplomacy. It spelled the doom of coercive methods toward Germany, and put an end to a policy that in D'Abernon's words made France "supreme on the Continent, supported by satellite Allies in Eastern and Central Europe."[1] Poincaré had done "his utmost to prevent France being lured by false hopes of security, based upon agreement and reconciliation,"[2] and he failed. His policy had been risky. The Ruhr intervention antagonized Britain, ever suspicious of French hegemony and afraid of German collapse;[3] it failed to command the unreserved support of the French people, who were unwilling to sacrifice their immediate interests for future security. Poincaré's success in the Ruhr proved largely a Pyrrhic victory. The French government, deprived of a necessary part of its financial basis, was paralyzed and its foreign policy became dependent on Anglo-Saxon finance. The initiative passed to London and Washington; the result was the Dawes Plan.

The *Cartel des Gauches* won its victory on the issue of lower taxes and a new policy toward Germany, and its electoral success was impressive. Important leaders of the National Bloc such as André Tardieu, Paul Reynaud, and Georges Mandel suffered defeat; the Communist André Marty, who had been instrumental in the Black Sea mutiny, became a deputy. The victorious *Cartel* was strong enough to force the president of the republic, Millerand, out of office—three years before the end of his tenure—and Gaston Doumergue took his place.

Leadership of the *Cartel* fell into the hands of the Radical Socialist party. Herriot became prime minister, and on June 15 installed himself also at the Quai d'Orsay.

[1] *Diary,* II, 25.
[2] *Ibid.,* II, 29.
[3] In late 1923 the Weimar republic came close to the brink of ruin. Inflation wrecked the country's economy; the Munich *Putsch* shook its political foundations; separatism in the Rhineland endangered national unity.

As outlined by Herriot the program of the new government called for defense of the peace treaties, staying in the Ruhr until an international solution was found, support for the League of Nations, unity with the other Allies, and willingness to admit Germany to the League.[4] The new slogan, launched by Aristide Briand who for domestic reasons did not join the cabinet but went instead, with Paul-Boncour, to represent France in Geneva, was "internationalization of the problem of security and reparations."[5] It clearly indicated the determination of the new French leaders to bring the country out of international isolation, renounce unilateral action, and inaugurate a policy of peace, reconciliation, and fulfillment.[6]

The victory of the French Left and its program in international relations produced a great impression in Poland. Ever since the Paris Peace Conference, Franco-Polish cooperation had been closely associated with the collaboration of the French and Polish parties of the Right. The victory of the *Cartel* alarmed Polish National Democrats and their allies. The strongly Francophile Christian Democratic *Rzeczpospolita* expressed its uneasiness; the *Gazeta Warszawska* saw in the slogan of "internationalization" the influence of British Socialists. *Kurjer Warszawski* was worried lest the new developments weaken France internally, and *Kurjer Poznański* warned its readers that the victory of the French Left might indicate a policy of illusions about Germany and the League of Nations. The conservative *Czas* wrote that "the fall of Poincaré's government is for Poland an inopportune and disquieting event."[7] Some Polish circles went so far as to suggest that Millerand's resignation reflected the vengeance of the Left for his attitude in the Polish-Russian war of 1920.

While the Polish government displayed an outwardly calm and confident attitude, it was clearly worried by the course of French developments. A member of the French legation in Warsaw, J. Barbier, a sworn enemy of the *Cartel*, recalled that Polish diplomatic circles "had no more illusion than we [French diplomats in Warsaw] about the forthcoming repercussions of the sad overthrow of the French parliamentary majority."[8] The Polish minister in London, Skirmunt, asked Herriot "to take into account the special position of Poland as a neighbor of Germany" in case of international agreements on security.[9] Warsaw feared particu-

[4] Herriot, *Jadis*, II, 138.

[5] Suarez, *Briand*, VI, 1922. Briand made this statement on May 11, 1924.

[6] Herriot told MacDonald in 1924 that "if there is another war, France will be wiped off the map." See W. M. Jordan, *Great Britain, France and the German Problem: 1918–1939* (London, 1943), p. 55.

[7] *BPPP*, May 10–June 14, 1924, No. 144, pp. 1–2.

[8] Barbier mentions a talk with the director of the political department of the Polish Foreign Ministry, Kajetan Morawski. *Un Frac de Nessus*, pp. 234–235.

[9] Communiqué of Polish press agency, P.A.T., *BPPP*, July 14, 1924–Aug. 25, 1924, No. 146, p. 2.

larly a French-German *rapprochement,* but it was also and perhaps even more concerned with the attitude of the new French government toward Russia. The chief of the Polish general staff, General Stanisław Haller, sensed on his visit to Paris that French obligations to Poland arising out of the 1921 alliance with regard to a Russo-Polish war might be weakened in practice.[10]

The Poles had good reason to feel uneasy about Herriot's views on the Soviet Union, for the French premier had long advocated abandonment of France's negative attitude toward the Bolsheviks, and after visiting Russia in 1922 he had come out for re-establishment of commercial relations and a new policy toward Moscow.[11] Warsaw took a dim view of his efforts. A Polish diplomat told his American colleague that Herriot had been "completely hoodwinked in Russia," and that any French attempt "to combat German influence in Russia was hopeless."[12] Here was the crux of the whole matter. Warsaw could see the connection between German and Russian policies aimed at destruction of the Polish state, and feared that any French attempt to detach Russia from the Rapallo policy could only be made at Poland's expense.

Exchanges between Paris and Moscow began in September 1924, and the Poles viewed with suspicion the assurances of Senator Anatole de Monzie, on his way to the Soviet capital, that recognition of the Bolshevik regime by France would in no way harm Poland's interests.[13] On October 28, 1924, Herriot recognized the Soviet Union, and to soften the blow to the Poles, Paris proposed elevating the Polish legation in France and the French legation in Poland to the rank of embassies. This gesture could hardly change the fact that the recognition of the Soviet regime was, as Chicherin put it, "an act of tremendous importance for international politics."[14]

Polish fears that the new French position would not only fail to detach Moscow from Germany but increase German bidding for Russian favors were promptly confirmed. Intimate talks between Berlin and Moscow took place after the French recognition, and Secretary of State Ago von Maltzan instructed the German ambassador in Moscow to discuss Polish problems. The German diplomat made the ominous statement that "the solution of the Polish question lay in driving Poland back into her ethnic frontiers,"[15] and intimated a coordinated German-Russian policy

[10] Józef Lipski, "Przyczynki do polsko-niemieckiej deklaracji o nieagresji," p. 23.

[11] See Herriot's book *La Russie nouvelle* (Paris, 1922).

[12] P. de L. Boal to Secretary of State, Aug. 27, 1923, *SDNA*, 861.00/100.31.

[13] See Lipski's report on his conversation with de Monzie, Dec. 20, 1924, *APGE*, "Francja 1924"; also Benndorf to Auswärtiges Amt, Sept. 2, 1924, *AANA*, container 1425; and Barbier, *Un Frac de Nessus*, pp. 242–243.

[14] Radowitz to Auswärtiges Amt, Oct. 29, 1924, *AANA*, container 1330.

[15] Maltzan to Brockdorff-Rantzau, Dec. 13, 1924, *AANA*, container 1425. For an exten-

with this aim in view. The Soviets might well capitalize on the French recognition, and Chicherin declared that Poland could count on French support only "so long as there is no close understanding between France and Russia." He added that Paris would have to choose between "the advantages of the Russian heiress and the charms of the Polish siren." Chicherin promised in Berlin, however, not to collaborate with France if Germany in her turn would not collaborate with England. The Soviet diplomat gloated over Poland's difficulties: "The Czechs dislike them and the Germans despise them," and England, even aside from being far away, would be unlikely to "sacrifice trade interests in Russia for the smiles of Warsaw." [16]

There is no doubt that Poland was in a difficult position, and the Polish Left which welcomed the *Cartel* in France did it partly in belief that new methods and a new approach to international problems were needed to solve these difficulties. The radical *Kurjer Poranny* commented that the bankruptcy of Poincaré's policy showed that nationalism was on the decline. "Democratic Poland," the paper said, "hails with joy the new chief of the allied Republic." The Socialist *Robotnik* stated that the defeated National Bloc had not always been friendly to Poland, and concluded that a new government in France increased the chances of peace in Europe.[17] While criticizing the fallen French Right, the Polish Socialists and radicals turned against their domestic opponents and began a violent campaign against the National Democratic minister of foreign affairs, Maurycy Zamoyski.

Zamoyski had been an object of severe criticism before the French elections when the parties of the Left and the conservative *Czas* accused him of subordinating Polish foreign policy to Paris, and demanded that Warsaw make overtures to England.[18] *Czas* on April 12, 1924, declared that Zamoyski represented the erroneous view that "our interests are sufficiently defended on the international forum by our French ally, and that our role ought to be limited to remaining quiet, trusting [France] and not embarrassing her by excessive zeal or an independent [foreign] policy."[19] The opposition clamored for changes in the personnel of the foreign ministry, and the Socialists demanded a pro-English turn in Polish diplomacy. This last demand was related to secret approaches to London by both the Socialists and big business, with seeming approval of the prime minister, Władysław Grabski.[20] The position of Zamoyski was thus very

sive discussion of German-Russian talks on Poland see Gasiorowski, "The Russian Overture to Germany of December 1924," *Journal of Modern History*, XXX (1958), 99–117.

[16] D'Abernon, *Diary*, III, 45. [17] *BPPP*, May 10–June 14, 1924, No. 144, p. 3.

[18] See Gibson to Secretary of State, March 6, 1924, *SDNA*, 280c.00/230.

[19] *BPPP*, April 1–May 9, 1924, No. 143, p. 9.

[20] See Henryk Jabłoński, "Z tajnej dyplomacji Władysława Grabskiego w r. 1924," *Kwartalnik Historyczny*, LXIII (1956), 440ff.

seriously undermined when the *Cartel des Gauches* assumed power in France.

The Left intensified its attack with new arguments. The minister, it was said, was a Rightist politician who failed to understand the revolutionary character of western European developments as exemplified by the Socialist government in England and a Leftist coalition in France; he was not the proper man to represent Poland in the vastly changed international situation; he and his party had placed all their reliance on the National Bloc, which proved to be a serious error of judgment.[21] This concentrated attack on Zamoyski led to his resignation on July 15, 1924, which in turn provoked an outburst of the Right. The National Democrats and their associates accused their opponents of using a foreign issue to overthrow a cabinet minister, and the *Kurjer Poznański* called Zamoyski's resignation "a political scandal." Zamoyski's successor met with a hostile attitude from the entire Right.[22]

The new foreign minister, Skrzyński, assumed control of Polish diplomacy for the second time since the Peace Conference. He sent at once a warm telegram to Herriot and proceeded to outline his program on foreign policy. As expected, Skrzyński emphasized the need for cooperation with England,[23] and he advocated general cooperation of all democratic states for peace and international security with an emphasis on the League of Nations. This program was not dissimilar to that of the *Cartel* in France, but the auguries for a close and sincere understanding between the French Left and Poland appeared uncertain. The Poles were annoyed by a declaration signed in May 1924 by prominent French Leftist intellectuals, published in *Le Populaire,* which protested Polish treatment of national minorities and spoke of a "white terror in Poland."[24] Communist demonstrations in Paris in November 1924, when Jaurès's remains were transferred to the Panthéon, produced a bad impression in Poland and helped weaken Polish confidence in France.[25] Cabinet changes in Warsaw were insufficient for creation of better understanding between the new leaders of France and Poland.

[21] Gibson to Secretary of State, May 22, 1924, *SDNA*, 860c.00/243; *BPPP*, May 10–June 14, 1924, No. 144, pp. 4ff.

[22] The new minister Skrzyński "had from the very beginning the entire Right ranged against him." Władysław Grabski, *Dwa lata pracy u podstaw państwowości naszej 1924–1925* (Warsaw, 1927), pp. 91–92.

[23] He developed this theme in his book, *Poland and Peace* (London, 1923). On Skrzyński's view see also Juliusz Łukasiewicz, "Aleksander Skrzyński," *Przegląd Polityczny*, XVI (1932).

[24] Signed among others by Paul Painlevé, Charles Richet, Georges Duhamel, and Romain Rolland. See an American comment in Gibson to Secretary of State, May 15, 1924, *SDNA*, 860c.00/241.

[25] Barbier as an enemy of the *Cartel* makes a big point of it in *Un Frac de Nessus*, p. 239. Compare reports of Polish embassy in Paris, Dec. 11, Dec. 17, 1924, *APGE*, "Francja 1924."

Upon taking office on July 27, 1924, Skrzyński made a friendly gesture toward Czechoslovakia, declaring that Warsaw and Prague, "linked by many common interests, had been separated so far by issues which ought to be eliminated by persistent diplomatic action," and implied that he would work in this direction.[26] Prague welcomed this overture as a sign of good will but otherwise showed little enthusiasm. *Zahraniční Politika* remarked that the change in Polish foreign ministers was not likely to facilitate Czechoslovak-Polish *rapprochement,* and the Czech caution can be understood if one remembers old Czech misgivings about Skrzyński's ties with the Piłsudski camp, and the support Prague had given to Zamoyski.[27] Relations between Warsaw and Prague for the time being remained unchanged.

News of the electoral victory of the *Cartel,* which produced such mixed feelings in Poland, met with almost universal approval in Czechoslovakia. Except for the Catholic and some Rightist papers, the press reacted in extremely favorable terms. The Agrarian *Venkov* wrote that France "pronounced herself against a far too radical foreign policy and against a masked dictatorship in internal politics"; the Socialist *Právo Lidu* hailed French Socialism, which became again "one of our most solid pillars of support"; *České Slovo* lauded the French for their "common sense," and even the National Democratic *Lidové Noviny* welcomed the victory of French Left with "genuine joy."[28] Many papers recalled Masaryk's prediction that Europe was moving to the left, and now anticipated a Franco-Russian *rapprochement.*

The Czechoslovak government took an equally optimistic attitude, Beneš having previously expressed his delight over the MacDonald government in England, which he called "one of the most important political events that have taken place since the war."[29] He welcomed wholeheartedly the *Cartel* regime. The foreign minister had feared an Anglo-French breach over the German issue which "would immediately be followed by a very strong British-German *rapprochement,*"[30] and the victory of the *Cartel* seemed to avert this danger. The Czechoslovak statesman who had been in close contact with Poincaré's enemies in Paris[31] and shared many of their views could only rejoice in their success.

Nothing in Herriot's program on foreign policy could alarm Czechoslovakia. Prague had opposed Poincaré's position on Germany and now welcomed attempts at reconciliation and internationalization of the is-

[26] *BPPP,* July 19– Aug. 25, 1924, No. 146, p. 5.
[27] *Zahraniční Politika,* II (1924), 1009–1010.
[28] *BPPT,* Feb. 1–May 22, 1924, No. 10, p. 4.
[29] Beneš, *Five Years of Czechoslovak Foreign Policy,* pp. 36–37.
[30] Department of State, division of western European affairs, to Secretary of State, Feb. 7, 1924, *SDNA,* 741.51/38.
[31] Saint Aulaire, *Confession,* p. 659.

sue of security and reparations. German revisionism was not a threat to Czechoslovakia, and Beneš took pains to emphasize in his speech in February 1924 that for "five years our relations [with Germany] have been good, loyal, and direct. During these five years there was no major conflict which would harm these relations in any way."[32] Herriot's recognition of the Soviet Union, and an eventual collaboration between Paris and Moscow, appeared to lie in Czechoslovakia's interest. Beneš declared that without Russia "European politics and European peace" were "not possible" and that he favored opening "as many doors as possible for contact between Russia and Europe." He added that "we shall not be opposed to a recognition *de jure*,"[33] and the American envoy rightly observed that the "ambition of Czechoslovakia to act as a bridge between Russia and the rest of Europe is likely to be utilized to the utmost of his ability by Dr. Beneš."[34] French recognition of the Soviet regime was naturally a prerequisite for such a policy.

The question of recognition of the Soviet Union by Prague, along with Paris, was discussed in Czechoslovakia and among the members of the Little Entente during the summer of 1924. Beneš favored it, but a strong domestic opposition stemming from the National Democratic and Catholic circles made him desist. The idea was dropped for the time being, but when Paris recognized the Bolshevik government in the autumn, the Czechs with the exception of the two above-named groups received it with approval and satisfaction.

Comparing the effect of the victory of the *Cartel* on Poland with that on Czechoslovakia, one is struck by the different repercussions in the two countries. For Beneš and the Czechoslovak government the Herriot cabinet and its program in foreign policies were clearly propitious and welcome. The outlook of the new French leaders was more akin to the makers of Czechoslovak diplomacy than was that of Poincaré and the National Bloc. The victory of the Left did not necessitate change or reappraisal of Czech foreign policy, and if anything, it strengthened the country's position toward Germany, the League, and the Soviet Union.

The effects of the *Cartel*'s victory on Poland were different and went deeper into the political life of the state. They contributed to the reevaluation of Poland's diplomacy and to the resignation of her foreign minister. The aims of the Herriot government created doubt and fear about future French moves with regard to Germany and Russia. Poland's precarious position in international relations appeared even more pronounced than before. Skrzyński found himself in a difficult situation. He tried to cope with it by making advances to England, although London

[32] *Zahraniční Politika*, I/a (1924), 268.
[33] *Ibid.*, pp. 267–268.
[34] Einstein to Secretary of State, July 15, 1924, *SDNA*, 770.00/79.

was sympathetic to revisionism, and by cultivating Prague's friendship, although it was obvious that Czechoslovak foreign policy differed considerably from that of Poland. Finally, he placed his hopes, however slender they may have been, on an international solution of the ever-present issue of security and reparations.

2

The question of German reparations dominated the international scene in 1924. As a result of Poincaré's inability to exploit his victory in the Ruhr, France agreed that the issue should be transferred from the reparation commission presided over by a French chairman to a new committee of experts under the chairmanship of an American, Charles G. Dawes. The acceptance of this scheme by Paris resulted largely from Anglo-American financial pressure. It was no coincidence that in Paris the two American names Dawes and J. P. Morgan were pronounced almost in the same breath,[35] and Jouvenel aptly summed things up by saying that "France put herself in the hands of the bankers and renounced her freedom of action."[36]

The Herriot government having inherited this situation proceeded together with England to work out the general plan of reparations at the London Conference from July 16 to August 16, 1924. It was a curious spectacle. The Labor government of England and the *Cartel* government of France agreed on a reparations program for Germany sponsored by big finance. Even Herriot and Léon Blum had to admit that the London Conference was dominated by bankers[37] and that the new Franco-British entente of the Left was founded in their shadow. French concessions amounted to a repudiation of previous policies toward Germany. Herriot promised to evacuate the Ruhr and the "sanction cities" of Düsseldorf, Duisburg, and Ruhrort when Germany accepted the reparations scheme. France promised not to undermine German stability, which the Dawes Plan was to secure, by sanctions dictated by political reasons. She henceforth had to watch her former enemy strengthened economically by foreign loans which eventually exceeded by far the original German reparations.[38]

The Polish and Czechoslovak publics watched the London developments with acute interest. The Czech press on the whole voiced approval, though at one point *Právo Lidu* spoke of a victory of western plutocracy

[35] Herriot, *Jadis*, II, 156.

[36] *D'Une guerre à l'autre*, I, 342.

[37] Saint Aulaire, *Confession*, p. 721.

[38] According to Renouvin, Germany paid about seven and one-half milliard marks and obtained about twenty-three to thirty milliards in loans. *Histoire des relations internationales*, VII, 257.

working for German reactionary ends. Later, however, the Socialist press began to praise Herriot and MacDonald and placed its hopes on the growth of German democracy.[39] The Polish Left took an equally positive approach to the Dawes Plan and the London Conference. The Right, on the other hand, expressed worry over the political repercussions of the new scheme and attacked the alliance of Socialist governments with big finance.[40]

With its alleged solution of the problem of reparations the Dawes Plan prepared for a new attempt to tackle the issue of security, and both Herriot and MacDonald agreed to coordinate their efforts at the forthcoming session of the League of Nations.

The session in Geneva opened in September 1924, and the representatives of the new British and French governments became the center of interest. The list of French delegates included such well-known names as Aristide Briand and Joseph Paul-Boncour—both in Geneva for the first time—Léon Bourgeois, Henri de Jouvenel, René Cassin, Léon Jouhaux, and the businessman-politician Louis Loucheur. Herriot held the reins and he approached his new task enthusiastically, believing himself "an elect of the ideology of the Left." [41] He had high hopes that collaboration with MacDonald would overcome British reluctance to become deeply committed to the League. The French could also count on strong support from the Poles and the Czechoslovaks; Skrzyński had already aired his interest in the League and in collective security, and Beneš, as it was phrased by a French writer, had "annexed Geneva as a colony" and made it an admirable instrument of Czechoslovak diplomacy.[42] Paul-Boncour spoke highly of the cooperation of the three delegations and called them the "friendly bloc." [43]

After initial Franco-British difficulties, Herriot launched the slogan of arbitration, security, and disarmament as a basis for a plan to strengthen the Covenant. A joint Franco-British resolution entrusted this task to a special subcommittee drawn from the First and Third Committees of the League with Beneš as *rapporteur*. The committees produced a document entitled "Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes" which skillfully used arbitration for the purpose of defining aggression.

Here was the so-called Geneva Protocol. The Assembly to which the Protocol was presented for approval endorsed it unanimously on October 2, 1924. But if the Geneva Protocol triumphed in the League it did not do so in England. The British voiced their criticism that the Protocol guaranteed the European *status quo* and was therefore a subtle French

[39] *BPPT*, May 29–Aug. 23, 1924, No. 11, pp. 6–8.
[40] *BPPP*, July 19–Aug. 25, 1924, No. 146, pp. 1–2.
[41] Suarez, *Briand*, VI, 47.
[42] *Ibid.*, VI, 52.
[43] *Entre deux guerres*, II, 154–155.

device for implicating Britain in its defense. According to London the main weakness of the Protocol was that it did not provide for arbitration of possible causes of war, namely the existing frontiers on the Continent. An anlysis of British views lies outside the scope of this book; suffice to say that after the fall of the Labor government in November 1924, the new Conservative ministry in March 1925 refused to accept the Geneva Protocol. The last important effort to give force to the Covenant ended in failure.

As mentioned, the session of the League in 1924 saw close cooperation between the French, the Poles, and the Czechoslovaks. France and her eastern allies strongly supported the new approach toward international security, and Czechoslovakia had the distinction of being the only state that ratified the Protocol. The Czech delegation led by Beneš was especially active, while the Poles played second fiddle, but collaboration between both groups was smooth and cordial.

The developments in Geneva had a clear effect on relations between Poland and Czechoslovakia as well as those between Poland and France. The uncertain fate of the Protocol made Prague think seriously about the usefulness of closer ties with Warsaw. The question of admitting Germany to the League of Nations, brought up by MacDonald and agreed to (though without enthusiasm) by Herriot, raised new issues which alarmed Warsaw and Paris, and led to intensified Franco-Polish exchanges.

Beneš and Skrzyński agreed in Geneva to smooth out all the controversial problems between their two countries and work for a *rapprochement.* Beneš upon his return to Prague commented favorably on his talks with the Polish foreign minister; in Poland the Rightist press responded with satisfaction. In late autumn 1924 impressive demonstrations took place in Prague in honor of the Polish writer Henryk Sienkiewicz, whose remains were transported back to his homeland via Czechoslovakia. *Venkov* wrote on this occasion that it hoped this demonstration would mark a new era in Czechoslovak-Polish relations; *Právo Lidu* commented that the brief sojourn of "the illustrious dead" in Prague may be "the beginning of a lively political friendship between the two greatest West Slav nations." *Národní Politika* wrote that "the spontaneous homage" to Sienkiewicz's memory was closely tied with "a desire that Czech-Polish collaboration be founded on more solid and more extensive bases."[44] An American diplomat describing this "zealous pro-Polish demonstration" attempted to analyze the political and economic reasons behind it. He felt that the growth of Germany's power, especially her economic strength, worried Prague, and that the Czechoslovaks were in search of new markets in the Baltic countries and Russia. For such a purpose, transit through

[44] *BPPT*, Aug. 24–Nov. 16, 1924, No. 12, p. 9.

Poland was naturally of great importance. From a political viewpoint the increase of German influence, a recent Russian-Hungarian treaty, and domestic difficulties also dictated the need for a *rapprochement* with Warsaw.[45]

The Poles responded to these overtures, and as a visible sign of improved relations a new minister, Zygmunt Lasocki, took over the legation in Prague which for over a year had been run by the chargé d'affaires Bader. The withdrawal of Bader was probably a good thing, and the American minister, while admitting the Polish diplomat's numerous gifts such as intelligence and capacity for hard work, passed severe judgment on his activities in Prague. He felt that Bader's work had been "vitiated by his ineffectual attempts to overthrow Dr. Beneš," which stemmed from "Bader's theory that more could be obtained by Poland from an avowed enemy than from a professed friend." The American diplomat added that Bader's activities put a special burden on the French legation in Prague, "one of whose most important duties it is to smooth down the differences between Czechoslovakia and Poland."[46]

The new Polish minister handed his letters of credence to Masaryk on December 22, 1924, and in his speech he referred to "those permanent interests arising out of the fact of neighborhood which imply special arrangements and which are elements of a [stable] policy that cannot be marred by passing disagreements or misunderstandings." Masaryk replied that the time had come "to build a solid foundation for an effective and sincere collaboration between the two neighboring sister nations."[47]

It is obvious, of course, that all the causes of past disagreements could not be dismissed by friendly statements, nor was it possible to reconcile the widely different policies of the two countries. The Teschen issue still rankled, and the Poles complained about treatment of their countrymen across the border. The Czechs replied by pointing to the treatment of national minorities in Poland.[48] Although Beneš declared that Czechoslovakia could not "declare herself either for Russia against Poland or for Poland against Russia,"[49] his advocacy of recognition of the Soviet government made the Poles wonder if he had really abandoned his pro-Russian leanings. But in spite of all the difficulties a Czechoslovak-Polish *détente* was clearly in sight. Czechs, except for the Communists and the National Democratic wing of Kramář, voiced their approval of the beginning exchanges between Warsaw and Prague. On the Polish side the Right made equally favorable comments, while the Left, by no means

[45] Pearson to Secretary of State, Nov. 3, 1924, *SDNA*, 760c.60f.1/1.

[46] Einstein to Secretary of State, July 23, 1924, *SDNA*, 701.60c.60f./orig.

[47] *BPPT*, Nov. 17, 1924–Feb. 5, 1925, No. 13, p. 8.

[48] Einstein to Secretary of State, Jan. 7, 1925, *SDNA*, 701.60c.60f/1.

[49] At a Socialist congress on Dec. 4, 1924. See Gasiorowski, "Polish-Czechoslovak Relations 1922–1926," p. 493.

united behind Skrzyński, spoke of Teschen and hailed the Slovak separatists.

The Geneva experiences and the general trend of international developments contributed to a Czechoslovak-Polish *rapprochement,* and they also affected the relations between France and Poland. In late 1924 cooperation between Paris and Warsaw became manifest in the economic sphere and important conversations took place on political and military matters.

The Polish minister of war, General Sikorski, visited Paris in late October and early November 1924, and held talks with the French general staff. Sikorski apparently thought that Franco-Polish military cooperation needed readjustment in view of the Geneva Protocol, and by November 4 the Poles and the French had prepared an additional convention foreseeing minor modification of the 1921 alliance.[50] Although this document became superfluous after rejection of the Geneva Protocol, it showed that Poland took the developments in Geneva seriously and felt that they had bearing on relations between Warsaw and Paris. The proposed admission of Germany into the League constituted another topic of Sikorski's talks in Paris, and the general pointed out that if Germany obtained a permanent seat on the Council, Poland ought to receive one as well, to strengthen her position and consolidate the allied bloc at Geneva. Other topics included naval matters and armament credits, and the French agreed to provide for upkeep of a common Franco-Polish air base on Polish soil.[51]

The issue of German entry into the League of Nations was especially important; Berlin showed interest in the Geneva organization, but insisted that it could join the League only if Germany were exempt from the obligations arising out of Article 16 of the Covenant. Berlin justified its position by saying that German disarmament precluded it from participating in sanctions; in reality it was determined to prevent passage of troops or war material to Poland should the latter become involved in a war with Russia. This was essential in view of the Russo-German *rapprochement* directed against Poland, and Germany was adamant in her insistence on strict neutrality and nonparticipation in any sanctions directed against the Soviet Union.[52]

While Warsaw was probably unaware of the precise nature and extent

[50] See Sikorski's declaration to the Polish press agency P.A.T. on Nov. 11, 1924, *BPPP*, Oct. 21–Nov. 27, 1924, No. 149, p. 6; also Bregman, *La Politique de la Pologne dans la Société des Nations*, p. 191.

[51] See *Documents from the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Political Department*, General Sikorski Historical Institute, London (hereafter cited as *SI*), "Francja-Polska," A, 11/2. Compare with Jabłoński, "Z tajnej dyplomacji Władysława Grabskiego," p. 452.

[52] See Gasiorowski, "The Russian Overture to Germany of December 1924," pp. 101ff. Also Jouvenel, *D'Une guerre à l'autre*, I, 384ff.

of Russo-German exchanges in the winter of 1924, problems connected with Germany's entry into the League were bound to create great uneasiness in Poland. The Poles feared that Paris might be led into a situation which both Germany and Russia could exploit to Poland's disadvantage. The French tried to calm these apprehensions. When Chłapowski, in his new capacity of ambassador, presented his credentials to the president of the French republic, the latter echoed the envoy's words about the importance of the Franco-Polish alliance, and went on to say that Polish borders were "definitely settled."[53] This comment was greatly appreciated in Warsaw. The Polish press reacted enthusiastically to Herriot's speech of late January 1925, in which he warned against German aggressive spirit and declared that France could not relax her watchfulness.[54] Thus in spite of potential threats to Franco-Polish unity, the alliance appeared solid and the attitude of the *Cartel*'s government reassuring.

Collaboration in the economic sphere saw some progress, even though France continued to have more advantages in that respect than Poland. On June 4 the Polish minister of industry and commerce signed an important agreement for construction of a modern port at Gdynia with a Franco-Polish consortium composed of *Schneider & Co.*, *Société Anonyme Horsent*, *Société de Construction des Battignoles*, and *Polski Bank Przemysłowy*.[55] Primarily an economic event, the founding of a Polish port on the Baltic also had a deep political significance. It freed Poland from dependence on Danzig, and offered unrestricted possibilities for maritime communication with France and the west.

Apart from the agreement on Gdynia, France and Poland negotiated a new commercial convention signed on December 9, 1924. The convention, which accorded additional tariff reductions to French imports, met with little enthusiasm from Premier Grabski and the officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,[56] and the main reason for Polish agreement was political rather than economic. Warsaw did, however, gain by obtaining limited rights of trade with French colonies and by regularizing the question of Polish immigrants in France.[57]

Such, then, was the state of Franco-Polish relations at the end of the year 1924, and it showed close collaboration in several fields; Polish-Czechoslovak relations also showed some general improvement. But the key to further developments lay on a higher level of European interna-

[53] Chłapowski to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Dec. 17, 1924, *APGE*, "Francja 1924."

[54] *Le Temps*, Jan. 30, 1925.

[55] See Smogorzewski, *Poland's Access to the Sea*, pp. 337ff.

[56] See Grabski, *Dwa lata pracy*, pp. 57ff.

[57] See Kurt Welkisch, "Die polnisch-französische Wirtschaftsbeziehungen," *Osteuropa*, XII (1937), Heft 10; J. Grzymała-Grabowiecki, *Polityka zagraniczna Polski w r. 1924* (Warsaw, 1925), pp. 28–29.

tional politics. Here there appeared the unresolved and perennial question of security.

3

On February 9, 1925, Germany made one of the boldest and most imaginative moves in the history of her diplomacy. In deepest secrecy she offered France a security pact confirming the *status quo* on the Franco-German borders, entailing a promise on the part of both states not to wage war against each other, and submitting all common disputes to arbitration or conciliation. The pact, placed under a guarantee by Great Britain and possibly Italy, offered satisfaction to French demands for security on France's eastern borders and confirmed France's possession of Alsace and Lorraine. The author of this startling proposal, Gustav Stresemann, had been in charge of German foreign policy since December 1923; he could claim as his collaborator and adviser the British ambassador in Berlin, Lord D'Abernon.

The move constituted a new departure in German diplomacy. It clashed with the views of those German nationalists for whom all negotiations with the Allies signified concession, and who used the phrase "fulfillment of Versailles" as an insult. It contrasted also with the program of such men as General von Seeckt, who believed that the only way to Germany's comeback lay through violent recovery of everything Germany had lost. A *rapprochement* with France, implied in Stresemann's initiative, was bound to entail the loss of Russian support, and it was precisely at this time that Moscow offered cooperation against Poland and promised to ignore French advances if Germany in turn declined to follow the British lead. In Germany the pro-Russian "eastern orientation" seemed to clash with the pro-British "western orientation," and Stresemann was accused of espousing the latter. In reality such was far from being true.

Stresemann certainly was a remarkable man. He cannot properly be classified either as an idealistic "European" or as a Machiavellian schemer, though both labels have been affixed to him many times. He can be understood best as a *Realpolitiker* of the Bismarckian school who belonged essentially to the prewar Reich, but who adapted himself to the new situation and determined to make the most of it for Germany. A typically middle-class German whose heavy and rather common features hid great political abilities and a tremendous drive and energy, an all-out annexationist during the First World War and a bitter opponent of the Treaty of Versailles, he slowly became a realist and a master tactician. Strongly nationalistic, he viewed Versailles as a *Diktat* and condemned the men who had signed it. He was interested in fulfilling it only insofar as was necessary for Germany's interest.

Stresemann was greatly impressed with the Allied decision not to evacuate the first zone of the Rhineland on January 10, 1925, as set forth in the Versailles Treaty, because of German failure to execute the disarmament clauses. He felt that the Allied, principally French, determination to link German disarmament with evacuation of the Rhineland had to be broken, and the best way of doing it lay in offering security to Paris. His offer of February 9, 1925, sacrificed in reality nothing that was German, and it opened the possibility of creating a European climate in which Germany, secure against western intervention, could rebuild her economy, rearm, and resume her place among the great powers.[58] Stresemann declared himself fully in agreement with Count Stolberg-Wernigerode who said that "the aim of our foreign policy must be first, not a breach, not a blind fulfillment but a gradual dismantling [*Abbau*] of the Treaty of Versailles; and secondly, an alliance system after the Bismarckian model."[59] As for eastern German borders, Stresemann's offer in 1925 contained no concessions of any kind, and nobody could have accused him of trying to fulfill the Treaty of Versailles in that respect.

Stresemann was determined to change the German frontiers in the east. His anti-Polish feeling was as firmly established, if less vocal, as that of his demagogic opponents. He sought to work toward this end with the British and French. He also anticipated an economic collapse in Poland. He disagreed with the idea prevalent in Germany that "a violent change of the Russian-Polish borders would give us a simultaneous possibility to rectify our frontiers with Poland."[60] This thinking pinned all hope for revision on Russia, and led to German-Russian cooperation. But cooperation with Russia did not lessen French pressure on Germany. On the contrary, one of the main reasons for Poincaré's policy in the Ruhr may have been the fear of Russo-German collusion. Paris would do its utmost to break the Rapallo partnership, perhaps even at the cost of sacrifices in eastern Poland. The Germans learned from the Latvian foreign minister that the French ambassador in Russia, Jean Herbette, had told him that France had not guaranteed the settlement of Riga and that "France considered the Polish eastern frontiers as requiring revision."[61] This must have given Berlin something to think about.

Instead of bidding against France for Russian favor Stresemann be-

[58] The literature on Stresemann is enormous, especially since the opening of his papers at the National Archives in Washington in 1953. Among the recent historians who deal with his policies are Henry L. Bretton, D. Erdman, Erich Eyck, Z. J. Gąsiorowski, Hans W. Gatzke, Walter Görlitz, Lionel Kochan, Hubertus Prinz zu Löwenstein, Anneliese Thimme, and Gerhard Zwoch.

[59] Anneliese Thimme, *Gustav Stresemann: Eine politische Biographie zur Geschichte der Weimarer Republik* (Hannover, 1957), p. 93.

[60] Hoesch memorandum, April 10, 1925, *AANA*, container 1510.

[61] Köster to Auswärtiges Amt, Feb. 2, 1925, *AANA*, container 1330.

lieved Germany had to solve the urgent problems of the day. These were a removal of the French from the Rhineland, prevention of a British-French alliance, and solution of the problem of German participation in the League of Nations. As the German ambassador in Paris put it, "The general position of Germany obliges us to take into account the necessity to solve first the burning current questions, and to relegate to the second place our future possibilities." [62] In a letter to Ambassador von Maltzan, Stresemann gave the following reasons for making the security offer to France: it would secure the Rhineland, split the Allies, and open new possibilities in the east.[63] The last point deserves emphasis here. Stresemann had no intention of abandoning military collaboration with Russia, nor did he consider eastern problems negligible. On the contrary the proposed western security pact would not bind German hands in the east, and if anything it would make revisionism easier. This is what Stresemann meant by *finassieren*, which he contrasted with the crude and unrealistic methods of Seeckt and the German maximalists.

The British interest in Stresemann's approach can easily be understood. With rejection of the Geneva Protocol, London was likely to be confronted with new French demands for security guarantees. Britain's foreign secretary, Austen Chamberlain, apparently had to soothe France with suggestions about a Franco-British-Belgian security agreement,[64] but this was hardly an ideal solution from London's point of view. D'Abernon in Berlin worried about German-Russian ties and wanted to detach Germany from the Soviet Union at any cost. A comprehensive security scheme in the west, forming a political "superstructure" on the basis of the Dawes Plan, suited London to the utmost, and D'Abernon admitted that he had "steadily advocated something of the kind for the last three years."[65]

Stresemann's plan, communicated secretly to London on January 20, 1925—Chamberlain referred the Germans to Paris—held another attraction for Britain because it gave the latter the position of arbiter between France and Germany. D'Abernon felt that it would make Britain "a dominating factor in European politics,"[66] and the French ambassador in London wrote later that the security pact appeared on the banks of the Thames to institute "British hegemony by arbitrating between France and Germany."[67] D'Abernon also believed that France in possession of a German guarantee would "be less inclined to constitute the Little En-

[62] Hoesch memorandum, April 10, 1925, *AANA*, container 1510.

[63] Henry Bernhard *et al.*, eds., *Gustav Stresemann: Vermächtnis, der Nachlass in drei Bänden* (3 vols., Berlin, 1932), II, 281 (hereafter quoted as Stresemann, *Vermächtnis*).

[64] Herrick to Secretary of State, Dec. 10, 1924, *SDNA*, 741.51/41.

[65] D'Abernon, *Diary*, III, 151.

[66] *Ibid.*, III, 184.

[67] Saint Aulaire, *La Mythologie de la paix* (Paris, 1929), p. 212.

tente"—he really meant the eastern barrier—"as an armed camp east of Germany." The British diplomat did not think that a France enjoying British support "and strong in her chain of Central European Allies" would be more friendly to England; he thought that the reverse was true.[68]

London showed little concern that a security scheme confined to western Europe might increase tension in the east, and dismissed such arguments by stating that security in one part of Europe would contribute to security all over the continent. Besides, British interests "were not thought to extend beyond the Rhine."[69] Prominent Britons like Philip Kerr felt that a plebiscite in the "Corridor" might be a good thing; D'Abernon believed that "Poland was no more entitled to a port than Czecho-Slovakia";[70] Chamberlain himself wrote to Ambassador Crowe that "no British government ever will or ever can risk the bones of a British grenadier" for the Polish "Corridor."[71] The German embassy in London was fully aware of these views, and it reported on pro-German and revisionist thinking in England.[72]

The German offer of February 9, 1925, clearly had far-reaching implications which affected all European cabinets. Its effects were naturally felt most on relations among Paris, Warsaw, and Prague.

Herriot received the German memorandum from the embassy counselor—Ambassador von Hoesch was absent from Paris. The German diplomat asked for strict secrecy, and Herriot promised to show the document only to the president of the republic.[73] Herriot, as he recalled later, saw at once that the note was of tremendous significance, and he communicated its content the same evening to President Doumergue, who was attending a theatrical performance.[74] The premier said that upon reading the note he was struck by several points which seemed to require clarification, among them the consulting of Poland on matters affecting her interests, and the issue of *Anschluss*. Herriot thus took the German note very seriously indeed, unlike Poincaré, who had dismissed a somewhat similar proposal made by Chancellor Wilhelm Cuno in December 1922 as a "clumsy maneuver." The French position, however, and the international situation in general had greatly changed since the days before the occupation of the Ruhr. From the German and British points of view Stresemann's action on February 9 could not have been better timed.

[68] D'Abernon, *Diary*, III, 158–159.
[69] Butler, *The Lost Peace*, p. 142.
[70] D'Abernon, *Diary*, III, 151.
[71] Sir Charles Petrie, *The Life and Letters of the Right Hon. Sir Austen Chamberlain* (2 vols., London, 1939–40), II, 259.
[72] Sthamer to Auswärtiges Amt, March 11, 1925, *AANA*, container 1425.
[73] Forster to Auswärtiges Amt, Feb. 9, 1925, *AANA*, container 1509.
[74] Herriot, *Jadis*, II, 182.

The question of French interests and commitments in East Central Europe became immediately the greatest problem, and Hoesch himself brought up the matter of the German eastern borders in a conversation with Herriot on February 17. He seemingly suggested that some calming assurance be given to France's eastern allies and succeeded in impressing the premier. The ambassador could report to Berlin that the first conversation was "unexpectedly favorable."[75] The German approach at this time consisted of allaying French fears of German designs on East Central Europe, and it also sharply separated French security problems from those of Poland. Maltzan tried to persuade the French ambassador in Berlin that France ought to be satisfied with a guarantee of her own frontiers. The Polish problem, the German officials said, was "really a part of the Russian question" and could be solved by Franco-Russian arrangements—an interesting statement, given German-Soviet exchanges on the Polish question.[76] D'Abernon seconded the German efforts. He held talks with the French ambassador before the German offer was officially made, and noted that while the latter protested that the French public "would not agree to a pact of Security which only ensured the French frontier and did not give protection to the Polish frontier against German aggression," he was becoming "less vehement" in his assertions.[77]

Herriot himself prepared the first reply to the German offer. It was little more than a confirmation of its receipt; it expressed French willingness to ignore nothing that could contribute to peace and stability, and it stated that France had to consult her allies on the creation of a regime of security "within the framework of the Treaty of Versailles."[78] Laroche who handed the French reply to Hoesch was, according to the latter, rather noncommittal. In his own report to Herriot, Laroche said that he had emphasized that a security pact ought to bring France more advantages than she already enjoyed by virtue of the Treaty of Versailles.

In late February, the French premier, unable to keep silent any longer, informed the foreign affairs committee of the Chamber of Deputies about the German offer. A communiqué from the Havas Agency reported Herriot's speech and especially noted his statement that Germany had "made so far no proposal concerning other borders, that is, those of Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Austria."[79] Discussion within the committee was apparently very stormy, and a verbal duel developed between Herriot

[75] Hoesch to Auswärtiges Amt, Feb. 17, 1925, *AANA*, container 1509; compare Laroche, *Au Quai d'Orsay*, p. 205.

[76] D'Abernon, *Diary*, III, 88.

[77] *Ibid.*, III, 87.

[78] Laroche, *Au Quai d'Orsay*, p. 205; Hoesch to Auswärtiges Amt, Feb. 20, 1925, *AANA*, container 1509. In their copy the Germans underlined the words "dans le cadre du traité de Versailles."

[79] See Hoesch to Auswärtiges Amt, Feb. 28, 1925, *AANA*, container 1509.

and Poincaré, in the course of which the latter exclaimed that France could not endure an exclusion of Poland from a security pact.[80]

Berlin was clearly annoyed that news of the Stresemann offer had leaked to the French press. The German foreign minister held a press conference on March 7 and explained at length why his proposal did not mention specifically the countries east of Germany. It was sufficient to say a word about any of them, Stresemann declared, and the news would be in all the Paris newspapers within twenty-four hours. The German statesman said that Berlin was prepared to sign arbitration treaties with all states and that this applied also "to the countries in which France has a special interest." As for territorial guarantees, it was no secret that Germany was interested in revision of her eastern borders, and even Article 19 of the Covenant provided for peaceful change. But, to offer no guarantees did not mean that Berlin had any intention of resorting to violence. Stresemann added, perhaps for the benefit of the German extremists, that "We could not hold our frontier with Poland even in a defensive war. An offensive war with the resources at our disposal is simply not to be thought of."[81] The German foreign minister voiced his anger that the problem of France's eastern allies was beginning to overshadow the main issue, which was a security pact in the west. He criticized the Poles for "seeking to influence France to include Poland in the agreement" and the French Right, which "at once raised the question of Czechoslovakia" and the issue of *Anschluss*.[82]

There is no doubt that the news of the German proposal created a great stir in France, and the attitude of Herriot was not crystal clear. The American ambassador reported that the premier took the "keenest interest" in Stresemann's offer and while unwilling to throw Poland overboard, he would try to induce her to make some sacrifices.[83] Herriot himself wrote later that he "never believed in the sincerity of Gustav Stresemann."[84] Whatever the truth was, the premier devoted a good deal of time and energy to preparing a formal reply to the German proposal and to exchanging views with Prague and Warsaw. Another leading figure of the *Cartel* Paul Painlevé, whom the German ambassador described as reasonable, explained to Hoesch that Herriot labored under great difficulties, having to face a concentrated attack from the opposition. Painlevé thought that the eastern problem could perhaps be solved by German entrance into the League or by a limited guarantee of the *status*

[80] The German ambassador learned about it from Herriot. Hoesch to Auswärtiges Amt, March 2, 1925, *AANA*, container 1509.

[81] Stresemann, *Vermächtnis*, II, 72.

[82] *Ibid.*, II, 69–70.

[83] Herrick to Secretary of State, March 10, 1925, *SDNA*, 740.0011, Mutual Guarantee/9 (Locarno).

[84] Herriot, *Jadis*, II, 166.

quo in eastern Europe, say for five years, and Hoesch reported that Painlevé expressed annoyance with the press campaign directed against the German proposal.

Meanwhile the campaign of the French Right was in full swing. Lauzanne wrote in *Le Matin* on March 9 that if "my country for the sake of a piece of paper would ever give up one inch of Polish territory, I would blush for her." *L'Avenir* ridiculed the German offer and suggested that it might be easier to go all the way and appoint General von Seeckt commander-in-chief of the French army. *Le Temps* declared on March 8 and 9 that "peace on the Rhine depends on peace on the Vistula" and that a refusal of security to Poland and Czechoslovakia would only encourage Germany to try "a violent alteration of her eastern and southern borders." The paper said that security obtained at the price of sacrifices by France's eastern allies was simply an illusion. *L'Echo de Paris* wrote on March 5 that "a French government intimately connected with the governments of Warsaw and Prague" could not "accept ideas today which it fought a few months earlier." The parliamentary group of the Rightist Democratic Republican party passed a resolution on March 16 demanding that "the Polish Republic be energetically supported in its resistance against the pretensions and intrigues of Germany" and that "no pact of guarantees shall exclude . . . the states of the Little Entente"; it protested "against any prejudice which may be caused eastward of Germany."[85]

Whether Stresemann liked it or not, the battle in France was now centered on the issue which his proposal had deliberately excluded, namely, security in East Central Europe.

4

What were the reactions of the interested capitals Warsaw and Prague? The Polish government must have learned about the German offer at a fairly early date. The German legation reported from Warsaw on February 13, 1925, that the Poles were greatly excited about a guarantee of their borders. The German report added that they appeared to put all their trust in France and did "not fear the conclusion of a pact which could leave Poland outside."[86] One can doubt whether this was a correct appraisal of Polish feelings. Relations between Warsaw and Berlin were tense: a customs war between the two states hit Poland hard,[87] and the question of "optants" (those individuals who had an option of nation-

[85] Herrick to Secretary of State, March 19, 1925, *SDNA*, 851.00/614.

[86] Rauscher (?) to Auswärtiges Amt, Feb. 13, 1925, *AANA*, container 1509.

[87] Grzymała-Grabowiecki, *Polityka zagraniczna Polski w r. 1924*, p. 50. Polish exports to Germany amounted to 44.4 per cent of her total exports; her imports from Germany were 34.3 per cent.

ality between Poland and Germany) created additional difficulties. The Poles had good reason to distrust Stresemann and were fully aware of his nationalism;[88] their trust in France was not unlimited. On February 26, Chłapowski spoke to Herriot and a few days later to Laroche, and both assured him that Paris had Polish interests at heart and would look after them.[89] This did not dispel all Polish fears, especially because Laroche made some remarks about the necessity of possible concessions to Germany.[90]

Skrzyński decided meanwhile to mention the German offer to the foreign affairs committee of the *Sejm,* which deliberated from February 20 to 24, 1925. The minister declared that "Any guarantee accorded to France, our ally, ought to fill us with satisfaction because Poland looks upon French security with almost the same interest and concern as France herself." He assured the deputies that security achieved at the price of the Franco-Polish alliance would be unthinkable because it would mean not security but insecurity for France. Such a pact would guarantee war, not peace.[91]

Skrzyński's guarded speech met with the approval of the deputies and evoked a friendly comment from *Le Temps* on February 28. Even Stresemann had to admit that Warsaw took a moderate stand. Skrzyński, however, was far more worried than he appeared from his remarks. The American minister reported that the Polish statesman was fully aware of all the dangers implied in the German proposal and perceived the possibility that Germany might be conciliated at Poland's expense. "The keynote of Polish foreign policy today," the envoy reported, "appears to be that Germany is the arch enemy and the only one most likely to attack."[92] The French ambassador in Warsaw likewise informed Paris of the dangers inherent in the Stresemann offer and insisted upon guarantees for Poland, at least in the form of a permanent seat on the Council of the League of Nations.[93]

The reaction of Polish public opinion to the news about the German security plan was vehement. *Czas,* in a series of articles published in early March, spoke of the German plan as an effort to disrupt the Franco-Polish alliance. *Gazeta Warszawska* called the Stresemann offer a prelude to a new partition of Poland. *Kurjer Poranny* affirmed that the only Polish answer to proposals for border alterations was a resounding no.

[88] See, for instance, the report from Berlin of Minister Olszewski, June 17, 1924, *CD,* "Niemcy 1924."

[89] Starzewski, *Zarys dziejów,* part III, pp. 8–9.

[90] Chłapowski to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Nov. 19, 1925, *SI,* "Francja-Polska," A 11/1.

[91] *BPPP,* Feb. 8–March 14, 1925, No. 152, p. 3.

[92] Pearson to Secretary of State, March 6, 1925, *SDNA,* 860c.00/278.

[93] Barbier, *Un Frac de Nessus,* p. 266.

All the parties in the *Sejm* tabled questions with regard to the German move, and Premier Grabski replied to them on March 6, declaring that "The French government has stated that it could examine German initiative only in close accord with its allies (strong applause), and that France would view as acceptable only a pact which fell within the frame of the Treaty of Versailles (applause)."[94]

While Grabski addressed the Polish Parliament, Skrzyński arrived in Paris on his way to Geneva and discussed the whole matter with Herriot, Briand, and Paul-Boncour. Herriot seemingly assured the Polish minister that "there was nothing in the intention of France of a nature to alarm the Polish Government,"[95] and Skrzyński in an interview with Havas in Geneva emphasized Polish confidence in France. He stated that to sacrifice Poland to Germany would create a paradoxical situation.[96] On his return from Geneva to Warsaw, Skrzyński stopped again in Paris and held further conversations with Herriot on March 14. It is clear that in spite of his cautious statements, Skrzyński was deeply perturbed by the general international situation. Britain had just rejected the Geneva Protocol and was applying pressure on Paris in favor of Germany. Chamberlain was unfriendly toward Poland, and his speech on March 24 hardly sounded reassuring.[97] Revisionism was rampant, and even the Lithuanian minister in Berlin, Vaclovas Sidzikauskas, inquired about the German attitude toward Wilno and hinted at German-Lithuanian cooperation.[98]

The Germans were annoyed with Skrzyński's activity and so were the British. Hoesch reported from Paris that the Poles were contributing to French excitement about the security pact, trying to interpret it as a first step toward revisionism.[99] Stresemann sneered that Skrzyński "took up his abode in Paris to represent there his country's interest."[100] Austen Chamberlain complained to Herriot about Skrzyński's unreasonable views and his inability to understand that "a pact of security would enable him better to watch over [Polish] interests with regard to Russia while an increase of security for France would strengthen his own security."[101]

No documentary evidence is as yet available on the content of the Herriot-Skrzyński talks, and it is curious that the French premier, who

[94] *Sprawozdania stenograficzne*, 1925, CLXXXIII/47.

[95] Herrick to Secretary of State, March 12, 1925, *SDNA*, 85100/612.

[96] *Le Temps*, March 11, 1925.

[97] This is how such German diplomats as Lucius saw it. Lucius to Auswärtiges Amt, March 26, 1925, *AANA*, container 1425. Petrie brings out the other aspects of the speech in *Chamberlain*, II, 270–271.

[98] Stresemann, *Vermächtnis*, II, 86–87.

[99] Hoesch to Auswärtiges Amt, March 6 and 7, 1925, *AANA*, container 1425.

[100] Stresemann, *Vermächtnis*, II, 65.

[101] Herriot, *Jadis*, II, 188.

described in detail his conversations with Beneš, failed to mention them in his book. The Wilhelmstrasse learned from Soviet sources about violent discussions between Skrzyński and Herriot, the former allegedly accusing the latter of wanting to betray Poland, the Frenchman swearing to the contrary.[102] It seems that the Quai d'Orsay was putting some pressure on Warsaw to consider seriously the German offer of an arbitration treaty with Poland, and Laroche confided to Hoesch that the Poles showed signs of accepting.[103]

Whatever took place in the confidential French-Polish exchanges, Skrzyński did his best to calm the Polish public, increasingly disturbed by the course of developments. He declared in the *Sejm*'s foreign affairs committee on March 24 that while Warsaw had good reason to worry, the attitude of the French government was "perfectly clear." The minister spoke of French solidarity with Poland and added that "In my last conversations with M. Herriot I was able to appreciate the comprehension he showed of this solidarity. We give France as always a credit of absolute confidence."[104]

Was the foreign minister deluding himself, or was he painting the picture rosier than it really was? It appears that the latter was the case and that Skrzyński was pouring oil on the stormy waters of Polish public opinion. He realized clearly, and this determined his policy in the months to come, that Warsaw could not take a completely negative stand toward the German initiative. Poland's possibilities of action were limited, and the important thing was not to give Paris the impression that Warsaw stood in the way of the French desire for security. The Franco-Polish alliance must not appear to French eyes as a liability which future French governments would be tempted to discard. Skrzyński believed also that a positive Polish attitude toward western security was necessary to convince the British that Poland was a factor of peace and stability in Europe.[105] With this aim in mind the minister tried to prepare the Polish public for acceptance of arrangements that might be unavoidable, while simultaneously he was trying to safeguard Poland's interests by pressure on Paris and by a *rapprochement* with Czechoslovakia.

The first reaction of Prague to the German offer of February 9 appeared to be similar to Warsaw's, but within a short time profound differences emerged between the Czechoslovak and Polish attitudes. The Czech public learned about the security proposal toward the end of February and the beginning of March, and the American chargé reported on

[102] Rantzau from Moscow to Auswärtiges Amt, April 4, 1925, *AANA*, container 1426.

[103] Hoesch to Schubert, March 19, 1925, *AANA*, container 1425.

[104] *BPPP*, March 15–April 28, 1925, No. 153, p. 3.

[105] See the appraisal of Skrzyński's motives by his close collaborator Juliusz Łukasiewicz in "Aleksander Skrzyński," p. 139.

a "sharply adverse reaction of Czech press and public opinion." He explained that the Czechs feared the Stresemann offer implicitly repudiated the peace treaties to which Czechoslovakia and Poland owed their existence. The diplomat added that Prague saw in the German move "a dexterous effort to separate Poland and this country from France and Belgium, or that failing France and Belgium from Great Britain."[106] *Národní Listy* asked whether guarantees in the west would not lead to a feeling of insecurity in East Central Europe. *Právo Lidu* complained about a return to a system of regional blocs and alliances. *Prager Presse* doubted whether the German proposals would be accepted because of the political and moral ties binding Czechoslovakia and Poland to France. German aims, the paper said, were contrary to the spirit of the League of Nations.[107]

The Czechoslovak government adopted a cautious attitude. Bearing in mind the relative security of the country and its satisfactory relations with Germany, Beneš felt that he had only to get assurances from France against the possibility of an *Anschluss*, and otherwise maintain a free hand in the forthcoming negotiations. Nothing is known about the first exchanges between the Czechoslovak foreign minister and Herriot, though some undoubtedly took place during the session of the League in Geneva or even before. The first known meeting was in Paris on March 16, 1925. According to German sources, Beneš rapidly read the German note of February 9, expressed interest in it, and voiced general approval of it.[108] According to Herriot's version, the Czech statesman did not declare himself hostile toward the idea of a security pact, and even affirmed that increased French security would be advantageous to Czechoslovakia. He made it clear, however, that there must be nothing in the arrangement which "explicitly, implicitly, or tacitly could authorize a belief that Germany in virtue of the western pact had free hands in Central and Eastern Europe." Herriot seemingly agreed to this. The Czechoslovak minister went on to explain that the Treaty of Versailles must be as valid in the east as in the west, because otherwise all other treaties in East Central Europe, especially that of Trianon, would be undermined. Beneš stressed also that the proposed pact should not mention Article 19 of the Covenant, which spoke of peaceful change. He was most emphatic on the issue of German union with Austria, and stated that as far as he was concerned *Anschluss* meant war. Beneš showed interest in the idea of arbitration treaties between Germany and her eastern neighbors, and he thought that the whole network of agreements might lead in the long run to a

[106] Pearson to Secretary of State, March 18, 1925, *SDNA*, 740.0011, Mutual Guarantee/32 (Locarno).

[107] *BPPT*, Feb. 6–April 6, 1925, No. 14, p. 5.

[108] Hoesch to Auswärtiges Amt, April 3, 1925, *AANA*, container 1510.

new version of the Geneva Protocol. Both statesmen spoke of the possibility of inducing England — who refused to guarantee the territorial *status quo* in East Central Europe — to guarantee the proposed arbitration treaties. The conversation ended with the following exchange.

Herriot: "To sum up, you do not want to create difficulties for France provided she does not make them for you."
Beneš: "This is exactly what I mean." [109]

The two ministers were evidently pleased with the Paris talk. Herriot felt that Beneš was as always "perfectly reasonable" and placed his confidence in French policy.[110] The Czechoslovak statesman displayed an attitude of moderate optimism. He told the Senate's foreign relations committee in Prague that he had reached complete agreement with Herriot and Doumergue, and he explained to them the chief Czech reservations. These according to Beneš were insistence on German inclusion in the League, no weakening of rights possessed by virtue of peace treaties, and viewing the security pact only as a first step toward a more general arrangement within the framework of the League of Nations. To allay Czech apprehensions about the German plan, Beneš declared that such fears were "somewhat exaggerated or at least premature," though he admitted that a certain "reserve" had to be maintained until all issues were clarified.[111]

Beneš's guarded optimism resulted from his general appraisal of the situation. According to the American chargé d'affaires, the Czech statesman thought that Czechoslovakia was secure because of the guarantee implied in her alliance with France, because Stresemann's offer was basically sincere and could help eliminate war hysteria, and because the proposed pact was the best substitute for the Geneva Protocol. Germany, Beneš assumed, would not be able to seek revenge for some twenty years, and during this time German revisionism and militarism might disappear under the moral pressure of the League and the growth of democratic spirit within the Weimar republic.[112]

While openly asserting the principle of inviolability of borders based on peace treaties, Beneš as a "realist" was willing to let the foreign diplomats know that he was in no way committed to maintenance of the Polish frontiers as they were. Germany and Britain viewed them as open to revision. The Czechoslovak statesman "speaking privately and not as a Minister of Foreign Affairs" told the American chargé that he did "not

[109] Herriot, *Jadis*, II, 189–190.
[110] *Ibid.*, p. 187.
[111] Beneš, *The Diplomatic Struggle for European Security and the Stabilization of Peace* (Prague, 1925), pp. 21ff.
[112] Pearson to Secretary of State, April 3, 1925, *SDNA*, 740.0011, Mutual Guarantee/34 (Locarno).

believe in the permanence of the present Polish frontiers." Poland, if "severely pressed, would accede" to some demands for revision.[113] The German minister in Prague reported on two occasions to Berlin that Beneš told the Czech Parliament that the Polish control over the "Corridor" and Upper Silesia could not be maintained in the long run, and that he "recognized the need for revision of the Polish western boundary."[114]

The reasons for Beneš's stand, which was contradictory to his official pronouncements, must have been two. First, he saw which way the wind blew in London and Berlin, and he was not going to compromise his reputation for being a reasonable and realistic politician by defending the unpopular Polish cause. Second, and infinitely more important, Beneš wanted to separate the Polish and Czechoslovak questions which were being lumped together in Paris and in diplomatic circles. Jan Masaryk told a German diplomat that Prague found this French tendency irritating because "the position of Czechoslovakia vis-à-vis Germany was completely different from that of Poland with whose interests people [in Prague] in no way identified themselves."[115] The policy of separating Polish and Czechoslovak issues was pronounced in some German-language newspapers in Czechoslovakia; the *Prager Tageblatt* emphasized that there was no Czech-German conflict, while there was one between Warsaw and Berlin, and consequently Poland had far better reasons than Czechoslovakia for being afraid of Germany.[116]

A clarification of this point mattered a great deal to Beneš because already on March 12 he had indicated to a German diplomat his willingness to start direct talks with Berlin on a German-Czechoslovak arbitration treaty.[117] He took up this subject again in a conversation with the German minister in Prague, and he also told him that Czechoslovakia would like to be directly informed by Berlin of the progress of the security offer. Beneš added that Herriot had taken the offer well but that later under pressure from the French Right and the Poles his position was more uncertain.[118] Stresemann in reply instructed Koch to tell Beneš that Berlin appreciated his interest in the security pact and to explain to him why Prague had not been notified directly. The reasons were, first, that the German offer concerned primarily western Europe and, second, that Germany did not want to inform Warsaw of it, a necessity if other eastern European capitals received notice of the offer.[119]

[113] *Ibid.*

[114] Koch to Auswärtiges Amt, March 31, 1925, and April 26, 1925, *AANA*, containers 1425 and 1510.

[115] Schubert to Koch, March 12, 1925, *AANA*, container 1509.

[116] On March 5 and 19, 1925, *BPPT*, Feb. 6–April 6, 1925, No. 14, p. 5.

[117] Auswärtiges Amt to Koch, March 16, 1925, *AANA*, container 1509.

[118] Koch to Auswärtiges Amt, March 24, 1925, *AANA*, container 1425.

[119] Stresemann to Koch, March 31, 1925, *AANA*, container 1510.

Was Warsaw aware that Beneš, who was engaged at this point in negotiations for a Czech-Polish *rapprochement*, was conducting direct exchanges with Berlin? Scarcity of sources does not permit an opinion, but it is possible that Paris had some inkling of it and showed concern over Beneš's private action. The German minister calling on Beneš on April 3 met the French envoy who was just leaving the foreign minister's office, and Koch felt that Beneš showed some reticence in the conversation which followed. He was still interested in an arbitration treaty but less eager for its rapid conclusion. The German envoy felt that Beneš was awaiting developments in Paris and was possibly worried that his activity might appear suspicious in Warsaw.[120] Under these circumstances Berlin decided to slow down the negotiations.

Czech assertions that they were in a different position from the Poles were, if sincere, not absolutely correct. Stresemann instructed Koch to conceal from Beneš the fact that the exclusion of territorial questions in a Czechoslovak-German arbitration treaty was not tantamount to territorial recognition.[121] Schubert wrote the German envoy to allay fears of the Sudeten Germans because an arbitration treaty had nothing to do with borders.[122] The German minister in Budapest assured Premier István Bethlen that under no circumstances would Germany guarantee Czechoslovak frontiers.[123] Minister Koch remarked ironically that Beneš, who said that there were only minor causes for German-Czech friction, failed to observe the biggest, namely the whole issue of the German minority in Czechoslovakia.[124] Prague was probably equally unaware that the German deputies to the Czechoslovak Parliament were "in constant touch" with the German legation.[125] Thus while the Czechoslovak position vis-à-vis Germany was undoubtedly more secure than that of Poland, there was not too much cause for the confidence and calm displayed in Prague. Beneš's direct contact with Berlin, which further isolated Poland, was perhaps characteristic of his desire to preserve a free hand in international politics; it is doubtful if it helped Paris greatly, or in the long run Prague itself.

The respective attitudes of Poland and Czechoslovakia toward the German offer doubtless exercised some influence on Herriot's policy toward Berlin. The French premier moved with great caution. On March 16, four days after the final collapse of the Geneva Protocol, and on the very day of his talk with Beneš, Herriot sent instructions to French envoys in London, Rome, and Brussels; and on March 17 he also sent them

[120] Koch to Auswärtiges Amt, April 3, 1925, *ibid.*
[121] Stresemann to Koch, March 31, 1925, *ibid.*
[122] Schubert to Koch, March 17, 1925, *AANA*, container 1509.
[123] Welczek to Auswärtiges Amt, April 23, 1925, *AANA*, container 1510.
[124] Koch to Auswärtiges Amt, March 11, 1925, *AANA*, container 1509.
[125] Koch to Auswärtiges Amt, April 3, 1925, *AANA*, container 1510.

to the envoys in Prague and Warsaw. The French statesman declared that while it was impossible to reject the German offer, Paris planned to present conditions before entering into serious negotiations. These included the principle that "an agreement cannot have as its counterpart the abandonment of our Allies" and a repeated prohibition of *Anschluss*.[126] The French ambassador in Berlin, Margerie, explained meanwhile to Stresemann that the eastern problems created great excitement in Paris, where people remembered that the First World War began as a result of an incident in East Central Europe. Besides, Poland was genuinely afraid that the German arbitration treaty would become a device for revisionist purposes, and France had to take this fear into account. Stresemann replied that the Poles could never be satisfied, and the conversation ended on a note of pious hope that some solution would eventually be found.[127]

Many people in France undoubtedly desired a security arrangement. The Socialist deputies began to apply pressure on the government by inviting it, in a resolution of March 26, "to take into consideration any guarantee pact, regardless of its form, on condition that it comes within the scope of the League of Nations, of which Germany should be made a member." [128] Two days later Herriot addressed the Senate's foreign relations committee to explain his stand on the German security offer. According to the version of his speech in *Le Temps*,[129] the premier denied that France would ever consider a security pact which would affect the rights of her allies without their consent. As for the German-Polish arbitration treaty, it "could be neither a forced correction nor a useless confirmation of the treaty [of Versailles]," and it "could complete the treaty only on the day when Poland would judge such a complement useful for her own security." The last phrase had an ominous ring in admitting the possibility of an arbitration treaty complementing the settlement of Versailles and affecting Polish territorial integrity. A confidential American report interpreted it as evidence of Herriot's inclination "to accept a modification of the present border," [130] and *Le Temps* wrote that the premier's speech created anxiety in Warsaw. Pearson reported to the State Department that "France apparently intends to bring pressure to bear on Poland" and wants to make her realize that European security "can only be bought through Poland's willingness to accede to Germany's insistent demand that the German-Polish frontier is open to discussion." [131]

[126] Herriot, *Jadis*, II, 190–191.

[127] Stresemann, *Vermächtnis*, II, 83–85.

[128] As reported by Herrick to Secretary of State, March 26, 1925, *SDNA*, 851.00/617.

[129] Reported by Herrick on April 2, 1925, *SDNA*, 851.00/623.

[130] Confidential Information Service for private circulation. Letter No. 136, May 12, 1925, *SDNA*, 840.00/23.

[131] Pearson to Secretary of State, April 4, 1925, *SDNA*, 860c.00/280.

The French Right and Warsaw were deeply disturbed. On March 29 in Bar-le-Duc, Poincaré made a scathing attack on German revisionism. He said that if "France and her Allies do not stand out against these pretensions" and have "the illusion of appeasing appetites on the increase by promises of partial concessions," they will "only excite the ambitions of the Reich."[132] The Poles complained that they were being kept in the dark about real French intentions, and their minister of war, General Sikorski, declared that "we know nothing about the Franco-German conversations or the reply to Germany which M. Herriot is now preparing."[133]

Herriot's reply to the German government took the form of a general memorandum handed to Stresemann on April 6, 1925.[134] It was an inoffensive document containing no concrete counterproposals but merely outlining the general French position. The preparation of a full statement had only begun, and it would be idle to speculate what form it would eventually have assumed. Herriot did not have a chance to carry out his plans, since he was overthrown with his cabinet in a parliamentary crisis on April 10, 1925. The leadership of French foreign policy passed into new hands, and new ministers had to decide what attitude to adopt toward the German offer. The preliminary stage characterized by French hesitation, direct Czech communication with Berlin, and Polish uncertainty and uneasiness was over.

[132] Reported by Herrick to Secretary of State, April 2, 1925, *SDNA*, 851.00/623.

[133] Interview for *Le Matin* on April 9, 1925. *BPPP*, March 15–April 28, 1925, No. 153. Compare Sikorski, *Le Problème de la paix*, p. 139.

[134] Herriot, *Jadis*, II, 191.

13

THE ILLUSION OF LOCARNO

THE fall of the Herriot ministry was largely a result of its inability to solve the financial problems of France. The fiscal policy of the *Cartel* invited trouble, and suppression of the French embassy at the Vatican added fuel to the internal strife. Herriot failed to understand that the *Cartel* was less an ideological crusade and more a union of interests against the National Bloc and the policies of Poincaré.[1] He bitterly complained of a campaign by the *bourgeoisie* against his regime and remarked that a Frenchman had his heart on the left but his pocketbook on the right and the latter influenced his action.[2]

The new cabinet was formed on April 17, 1925, without the participation of the Socialists. The brilliant mathematician Paul Painlevé of the Republican Socialist group became premier; Aristide Briand took over the Quai d'Orsay. The personalities of the new leaders and their policies deserve, of course, close scrutiny, but before discussing them one needs to turn to simultaneous developments in Poland and Czechoslovakia, which are of significance for the general picture of Franco-Polish-Czechoslovak relations and indeed of all European politics in the spring of 1925.

A *rapprochement* between Warsaw and Prague, initiated by Beneš and Skrzyński in the summer of 1924, had aimed principally at elimination of past disputes and at establishment of commercial cooperation between the two countries. Stresemann's offer to France on February 9 accelerated negotiations [3] and raised the question of whether their scope should be so enlarged as to acquire a distinctly political character. The American minister reported from Prague that he had learned "very confidentially" that Beneš "may try to emphasize the improved relations between the two countries by an agreement of some political significance." He added that since Warsaw and Prague had similar interests

[1] See the interesting remarks in Suarez, *Briand*, VI, 47.

[2] See Herriot, *Jadis*, II, 200ff; Paul-Boncour, *Entre deux guerres*, II, 114.

[3] Pearson to Secretary of State, March 18, 1925, *SDNA*, 740.0011, Mutual Guarantee/32 (Locarno).

vis-à-vis Germany "the French had been actively interested in bringing about a better feeling between the two States." [4]

It appeared possible that German initiative coupled with Prague's preoccupation with *Anschluss* and the Hungarian problem might provide adequate bases for a Czechoslovak-Polish political agreement, modeled on the Franco-Czechoslovak alliance of 1924. The German government persisted in believing for several months that the issue of Austria worried Beneš to the extent that he "was seeking allies" and wanted "to establish a common front regarding any proposal by Germany" and to reject any proposal "that related to frontiers." [5] The Poles entertained the same beliefs. *Rzeczpospolita* wrote on March 24 that "a union of both countries, supported by France would constitute the best obstacle to all of Germany's efforts." *Czas* and *Głos Narodu* emphasized that in view of the rumors about German revisionist claims in the east, Czechoslovakia needed Poland.[6] The German minister in Warsaw, Rauscher, informed Berlin that the Poles hoped for political negotiations; [7] an American report mentioned that Warsaw had been "making efforts to be admitted into the Little Entente." [8]

The Polish belief that Czechoslovakia needed the cooperation of Warsaw enough to make a political pact with her was without foundation. After the first shock of the German offer had subsided and Beneš had discussed things with Herriot, Prague adopted the fairly optimistic attitude described in the preceding chapter. While the Czechoslovak statesman admitted to the American chargé in Prague that the German offer had some bearing on his talks with Warsaw, he emphatically stated that he was "resolutely averse to concluding a military convention with Poland," and insisted on retaining an absolutely free hand in international politics.[9] Beneš gave similar assurances to the German envoy, and told him that Prague contemplated an arbitration treaty with Poland but "nothing more" because she did not intend to injure her relations with Berlin.[10] The Czechoslovak minister in Warsaw, Flieder, told his German counterpart that a political alliance between Czechoslovakia and Poland could be "completely ruled out" (*ganz ausgeschlossen*)—"Antagonism (*Gegensatz*) between Poland and Czechoslovakia was almost bigger than between Poland and Germany." [11]

[4] Einstein to Secretary of State, Feb. 24, 1925, *SDNA*, 760c.60f/115.

[5] Stresemann, *Vermächtnis*, II, 97.

[6] *BPPP*, March 15–April 28, 1925, No. 153, p. 7.

[7] Rauscher to Auswärtiges Amt, March 24, 1925, *AANA*, container 1425.

[8] Dodge to Secretary of State, April 11, 1925, *SDNA*, 770.00/88.

[9] Pearson to Secretary of State, April 3, 1925, *SDNA*, 740.0011, Mutual Guarantee/34 (Locarno).

[10] Koch to Auswärtiges Amt, March 24, 1925, *AANA*, container 1425.

[11] Rauscher to Auswärtiges Amt, March 25, April 1, 1925, *ibid.*

Minister Koch offered a shrewd interpretation of the real feelings of the Czechs when he said that they were interested in good relations with Poland as an insurance against Hungary, and because they needed transit facilities through Polish territory, but Beneš was most unlikely to commit his country to Poland militarily or politically. He opposed Polish participation in the Little Entente and objected to political support for Poland because of repercussions in the Soviet Union.[12]

This was certainly true. One must remember that at this time Beneš dropped remarks about possible revision of the Polish frontiers, and made overtures to Berlin related to the security pact and the Czech-German arbitration treaty. Nothing was farther from his mind than to defy Germany over Poland. The Russian angle was also important. Kramář proclaimed publicly in Bratislava on April 12, 1925, that Beneš "cannot conclude any agreement with the Poles at the expense of Russia" and that "when the regenerated Russia demands the return of her territories [meaning the eastern provinces of Poland] you need have no doubt at all as to our support."[13] Hopes for a genuine Polish-Czechoslovak political pact were slender indeed.

Meanwhile negotiations between Warsaw and Prague continued. Beneš explained on April 1, 1925, that they meant "definite liquidation of all the disputes" and would mark "the opening of a new period of friendly relations," as well as contribute to European peace and security.[14] Two weeks later Skrzyński came to Prague, was "unusually cordial," and spoke of an "absolute agreement" between the two governments.[15] On April 18, four days after Skrzyński's departure, Beneš traveled to Warsaw to sign the final texts of several Czechoslovak-Polish treaties. The foreign minister was met with a carefully staged reception calculated to enhance the feeling of solidarity between the two neighboring nations. Skrzyński went out of his way to stress the community of outlook between Warsaw and Prague; there were great receptions for diplomats, which only the Soviet envoy did not attend; the Rightist press of Warsaw and Poznań spoke enthusiastically about Beneš's visit. Only the Leftist organs and *Czas* maintained their usual reserve.

The treaties initialed in Warsaw on April 23, 1925, had a limited scope. A treaty of arbitration and conciliation covered all disputes between the two countries except for those on territorial matters. A liquidation convention settled issues arising out of border delimitations and regularized the reciprocal treatment of minorities in Czechoslovakia and Poland.[16]

[12] Koch to Auswärtiges Amt, March 31, 1925, *AANA*, container 1425.

[13] Quoted in Gasiorowski, "Polish-Czechoslovak Relations 1922–1926," p. 496.

[14] Beneš, *The Diplomatic Struggle*, pp. 29–30.

[15] Vondracek, *The Foreign Policy of Czechoslovakia*, p. 246.

[16] See Stanisław Kutrzeba, "Sprawa mniejszości w stosunkach polsko-czechosłowackich," *Przegląd Polityczny*, II (1925), 170–174.

A commercial treaty provided for an increase in trade on the basis of a most-favored-nation clause. Conventions of a more technical nature accompanied the three main treaties. One of them provided for transit of war material through Czechoslovakia to Poland and vice versa, and allegedly restricted it only to a situation in which Poland would be the victim of unprovoked aggression.[17]

Czechoslovakia did not sign any political pact with Poland, and the American minister in Prague was correct when he reported that, apart from an improvement in mutual relations between the two countries, the Warsaw agreements "did not signify any radical departure in [Prague's] policy." [18] In view of persistent rumors that some political agreement had been reached, the minister repeated a month later that no Polish-Czechoslovak alliance existed and that "there is no reason for one today." He added that Masaryk was critical of the Franco-Polish pact and that Beneš thought the Polish "Corridor" was an absurdity and in twenty years' time "Poland will be ready to abandon it." [19] The policy makers in Prague felt that the Warsaw meeting served its limited purpose, and Beneš told the American diplomat that he was "greatly pleased with the results of his visit." Knowing the excitable temperament of the Poles, Beneš did not try "to attempt too much," by which he probably meant that he had not advised the Poles to be more flexible with regard to territorial matters. "He had sought to dispel their feeling that he was an enemy of Poland, and this he believed that he had accomplished." [20]

Beneš and Skrzyński apparently did not discuss the question of Austria, but the former must have known that the Polish statesman opposed *Anschluss*. At this time the commissioner general in Austria for the League of Nations sounded out Polish circles on their attitude toward German-Austrian union. He found that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was against it, first, because such a union would undermine the Treaty of Versailles and, second, because *Anschluss* "would be regarded by Czechoslovakia as a direct menace to the integrity of her territory" and Poland could not afford "to do anything that would disturb the amicable relations now existing between the two countries." It is true that Commissioner Zimmermann also discovered that certain groups of the Left and some followers of Piłsudski held that an *Anschluss* would be a cheap price for German recognition of Polish western borders, but these views did not influence Poland's foreign policy.[21] Prague could thus rely on Polish support with regard to the Austrian issue.

[17] Koch to Auswärtiges Amt, April 3, 1925, *AANA*, container 1510.

[18] Einstein to Secretary of State, April 18, 1925, *SDNA*, 660c.60f.31/11.

[19] Einstein to Secretary of State, May 14, 1925, *SDNA*, 760c.60f/117.

[20] Einstein to Secretary of State, May 4, 1925, *SDNA*, 760c.60f/116.

[21] Pearson to Secretary of State, May 27, June 7, 1925, *SDNA*, 762.63/35 and 760c.6215/420.

If the Czechs were satisfied with the limited results of the Warsaw meeting, what was the attitude of the Poles? According to American reports the Poles felt that "there will be developed a close understanding with Czechoslovakia with the end in view of presenting a common front against Germany." Both countries would "resist by arms, if necessary, any movement on the part of Germany to modify her eastern frontier." [22] How did the Poles develop such opinions? Had Beneš encouraged them? Or did he perhaps do nothing to dispel Polish illusions? He mentioned in Warsaw the usefulness of an "Eastern Pact for the defense of Poland and the Little Entente"— a kind of eastern Locarno — and perhaps the Poles read into it things which Beneš did not have in mind. It is also possible that in view of the skeptical attitude of the Polish Left, which asserted that Czechoslovakia could not become a reliable ally, the government felt it wise to present the agreements as a pledge of more to come. Government pronouncements about complete solidarity between the two West Slav nations may also have been calculated to strengthen Polish self-confidence, especially after the election of Hindenburg to the presidency of the German republic.

Hindenburg's election on April 26, 1925, two days after Beneš's departure from Warsaw, created anxiety in Poland [23] and brought forth anti-German comments in Prague. *Lidové Noviny* wrote that "the spirit of the Kaiser is victorious," and *Právo Lidu* spoke of a "specter of war appearing over Europe." [24] It may well be that Warsaw thought it particularly important to stress Polish-Czechoslovak solidarity at that moment, and Prague momentarily echoed Polish opinions. Beneš gave an interview to *Le Matin*, on May 3, 1925, and referred to Czechoslovak-Polish cooperation as the foundation stone of a future alliance.[25] This statement, which hardly agreed with what Beneš was telling the American minister privately in Prague, and which went well beyond what he told the Parliament on June 23, may have been dictated not only by Hindenburg's election but also by a desire to please the French.

Paris wanted to see proof of a united Franco-Polish-Czechoslovak front in the Warsaw agreements and eagerly seized on all indications that such a bloc was coming into existence. *Le Temps* wrote that "France is indissolubly united with Poland and Czechoslovakia. The *rapprochement* between them causes her to rejoice." The Beneš-Skrzyński agreement "constitutes a new factor in the general political situation in Europe." [26] The French-sponsored *Gazette de Prague*, published by J.

[22] See reports from the American legation on April 24 and 20, 1925, *SDNA*, 860c.00/280 and 283.

[23] Pearson to Secretary of State, April 30, 1925, *SDNA*, 860c.00/283.

[24] *BPPT*, April 7–June 30, 1925, No. 15, p. 1.

[25] Quoted in Gasiorowski, "Polish-Czechoslovak Relations 1922–1926," p. 498.

[26] Quoted in Vondracek, *The Foreign Policy of Czechoslovakia*, p. 258.

Pichon, wrote on May 2, 1925, that the agreement was the best answer to those who pretend that Poland and Czechoslovakia could not collaborate. What "a profound joy it causes in Paris," the paper added.

Although the German legations in Prague and Warsaw were exceedingly well informed about the limitations of the Czech-Polish understanding, the fanfare which accompanied the signing of the treaties in Warsaw, and similar reactions in the two countries to Hindenburg's election, made Berlin suspicious. In the correspondence between Secretary of State Carl von Schubert and Minister Koch, Schubert constantly inquired about a rumored secret Polish-Czech political and military pact. Berlin also notified London of its suspicions. The Wilhelmstrasse instructed Koch to ask Beneš point-blank whether these rumors were true and whether Warsaw and Prague were really united to prevent "any peaceful solution [*Bereinigung*] of the Eastern question which would have to be achieved somehow in the future." [27] If it were true, Germany would consider such a stand as bearing gravely on the current negotiations pertaining to a security pact. Koch saw Beneš at once, and the latter emphatically denied the existence of any secret pact with Poland.[28] The German envoys in Warsaw and Prague explained to Berlin that the Warsaw meeting resulted from a desire to smooth down old controversies, to strengthen common opposition to *Anschluss*, and possibly to get Polish support for Prague in the League of Nations. Paris, according to the German diplomats, also played an important role in the *rapprochement*, attempting to show "that a French organization of Central Europe" was "still in the realm of possibility though perhaps not of reality." [29]

In retrospect how should one appraise the Polish-Czechoslovak *rapprochement* of early 1925? It seems clear that Warsaw and Prague viewed it from different angles. For Poland the main object was to strengthen the country in the face of ever-increasing dangers connected with German plans for a security pact in the west. A solid Czech-Polish front, however, did not materialize, and the Poles were either deceiving themselves or trying to bluff Germany when they pretended that it had. Beneš looked upon the *rapprochement* as a useful move in his diplomatic game, which was to enhance the Czechoslovak position but by no means limit her freedom in dealing directly with Berlin and Paris. France finally decided that even an apparent, if not real, closing of ranks by her eastern allies could strengthen her hand in further discussions of the German security offer. France also argued that the region east of Germany was

[27] Schubert to Koch, May 13, 1925, *AANA*, container 1510.

[28] Koch to Schubert, May 16, 1925, *ibid.* The Czech envoy in Berlin, Krofta, also did his best to calm the Germans.

[29] Rauscher and Koch to Auswärtiges Amt, April 24 and 26, 1925, *ibid.*

united to resist German revisionist encroachments, and such an argument could well be used in London or Berlin. The German government, though not its diplomatic representatives, overestimated the importance of the *rapprochement*. Stresemann found the Czechoslovak-Polish moves annoying, and angered by the French delay in replying to his offer, he complained to D'Abernon that the situation was becoming confused and his action distorted, "as the Eastern question and now the German-Austrian question were injected into the debate." [30]

2

The new French cabinet assumed its duties on the eve of Beneš's visit to Warsaw, and Painlevé presented his ministerial declaration on April 21, 1925, which contained an important passage referring to the security pact: "France, unequivocally faithful to all her allies, and peacefully disposed toward all other nations, has a profound desire to contribute to the world's tranquillity and peace which is needed so much. But the first condition of stable peace is the security of France herself."[31]

Did this mean that France was becoming less interested in her eastern allies? The above passage could give this impression, the more so because Painlevé throughout his speech made no explicit reference to Poland or Czechoslovakia. Whatever the premier's intention, it was obvious that the general position of France was weak in early 1925, and the country was in real need of security. The value of the franc was shaky; trouble brewed in Syria; in Morocco the Riff leader Abd-el-Krim marched on Fez. As Jouvenel put it, "while the defeated [Germany] moved toward order, the victor slid toward disorder."[32] This development explained much of France's policy toward the security pact in the months that followed.

The scientist Painlevé was not the strong man of the new government; that role fell to the foreign minister, Aristide Briand, who assumed complete control over French diplomacy. One of the greatest of French orators, a spellbinder on the speaker's stand, the astute Breton with his shaggy appearance became the symbol of the new policy of peace and reconciliation. This was no longer the Briand who once threatened to take Germany "by the collar" if she did not cooperate. At sixty-two, Briand became "the great prophet of salvation by self-hypnosis"; he indicated the new path to fulfillment, and "significantly the country accepted his gospel in foreign policy."[33]

[30] Stresemann, *Vermächtnis*, II, 100.
[31] Paul Painlevé, *Paroles et écrits* (Paris, 1936), p. 322.
[32] *D'Une guerre à l'autre*, I, 397.
[33] Edward W. Fox, "The Third Force 1897–1939," in Edward M. Earle, ed., *Modern France* (Princeton, 1951), p. 135.

One of the first moves of Briand was to restore Philippe Berthelot to the crucial post of secretary general of the Quai d'Orsay. Berthelot probably worked far better than anyone else with Briand, and he was credited with the witty comparison between Poincaré and Briand, according to which the former "knew everything and understood nothing," while the latter "knew nothing but understood everything." Berthelot's intimate knowledge of diplomacy and his sure grasp of detail served Briand admirably, and the two men complemented each other. Several years later a German newspaper praised the secretary general for his close collaboration with the German ambassador in Paris at this time,[34] and it would seem that Berthelot was in full sympathy with Briand's German policy.

Paris prepared its official reply to the German offer in late April and early May 1925, and on May 12 a draft was sent to London for the reaction of Chamberlain. The French note included the following points: Germany was asked to agree to the inclusion of Belgium in the western security pact, to recognize expressly the sanctity of peace treaties, to engage herself to enter the League, and to sign arbitration treaties with France's eastern allies. Unless such treaties were signed, "the objective pursued by the Rhine pact could not be attained, nor would the peace of Europe be completely guaranteed." Paris insisted on integrating the arbitration treaties into a general pact registered with the League of Nations and "placed under its auspices."[35] This represented an attempt to obtain as much security as possible for East Central Europe, by linking the arbitration treaties with the general security pact and by making Britain a guarantor of both.

It is hardly surprising that Chamberlain on May 19 expressed serious doubts about this point. Six days later Briand explained that he had purposely left the British guarantee of the arbitration treaties imprecise so as not to impose any new formal obligations on England. He wanted, however, to link the western and eastern arrangements in order to permit France to intervene in the east. The main point, as Briand put it, was that France "could not have the Rhine pact turned against her in case she would be called upon to assist Poland."[36] On May 29, Chamberlain repeated his objection to the French thesis that the Rhine pact and the arbitration treaties should constitute "an indivisible whole" coordinated "in a general convention."[37] He proposed other modifications which con-

[34] *Berliner Börsen Courier*, March 9, 1933, cited by Auguste Bréal, *Philippe Berthelot* (Paris, 1937), p. 70.

[35] Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, *Pacte de sécurité: neuf pièces relatives à la proposition faite le 9 février 1925 par le Gouvernement allemand et à la réponse du Gouvernement français: 9 février 1925–16 juin 1925* (Paris, 1925), p. 10 (hereafter cited as *Pacte de sécurité*).

[36] *Ibid.*, p. 10. [37] *Ibid.*, p. 12.

siderably weakened the original French text. After further exchanges Briand finally agreed to replace the expression "coordinated" by "simultaneous," thus loosening the connection between the western and eastern security arrangements. In return he won British recognition that France had to preserve some freedom of action and be able "to intervene between Germany and Poland or between Germany and Czechoslovakia."[38]

While Paris and London deliberated over the reply to Germany, the reactions of Warsaw and of Prague were becoming strikingly evident. Skrzyński told an American diplomat that although his government was "disappointed not to have gained more support" from London, it was "nevertheless very favorably impressed with Great Britain's reply to the French Government" of May 29. The Polish minister felt that the proposed arrangement "would permit France to come to the assistance of her eastern allies" in case of trouble with Germany, "and at the same time allow France the opportunity to accept the security England offers." Skrzyński was, however, emphatic that the security scheme should not become "a revision or a substitution for the Versailles Treaty."[39] The Polish statesman developed this point in an article published in Warsaw in May. He attacked in it the view that "a system of guarantees on the Rhine without a counterpart on the Vistula could solve the problem of European peace." Such an illusion, he wrote, could cost Europe dearly in the future.[40] Speaking in the foreign affairs committee of the *Sejm* on June 19, 1925, he struck a more optimistic note, saying that the harmony of the French and English points of view as embodied in the French reply to Germany did not "injure the interests which link France to her other allies."[41] In making these divergent statements Skrzyński was faithful to his policy, which was to warn against the danger of neglecting Polish interests and to avoid giving the impression that Warsaw took a negative stand.

In addition to Skrzyński's activities, the Polish minister of war, Sikorski, tried in Paris in the early spring of 1925 to stiffen the French attitude and to obtain more specific French promises relating to maritime communications, naval problems, and the use of Polish immigrants in France in case of war. Briand for technical reasons, however, did not endorse the protocol which he signed with Herriot.[42] On June 21, 1925, after dispatch of the French reply to Germany, Sikorski in a letter to Premier Grabski formulated what he considered the essential Polish desiderata. He suggested that Warsaw insist especially on maintenance of a demilitarized

[38] *Ibid.*, p. 20.
[39] Pearson to Secretary of State, June 8, 1925, *SDNA*, 760c.6215/420.
[40] "Istota i znaczenie paktu gwarancyjnego," *Bellona*, XXVIII (1925), 122.
[41] *BPPP*, June 1–June 30, 1925, No. 155, p. 3.
[42] *Polskie siły zbrojne*, Vol. I, Pt. 1, pp. 89ff.

zone in the Rhineland; on an adaptation of the Franco-Polish military convention to new conditions, without weakening, however, the *casus foederis*; on simultaneous signing of the Polish-German arbitration treaty, guaranteed by France, and the western security pact; and finally on securing for Poland a permanent seat on the Council of the League of Nations.[43]

Sikorski's experiences in Paris must have been unsatisfactory, since he wrote later that "one must regret that the [French] reply to Stresemann's memorandum (on June 16, 1925) was prepared outside of us."[44] If he meant that Warsaw had not been kept informed of the exchanges between Paris and London, he was certainly incorrect, since it is obvious from Skrzyński's remarks to the American diplomat mentioned above that Warsaw knew what was going on. *Le Temps* in an obviously inspired article on June 21 also made a big point of the fact that Skrzyński and Beneš had been consulted and fully informed.[45] If Sikorski meant, however, that the Poles were unable to influence the drawing of the French note, his remark probably was well founded.

The Polish press showed a good deal of uneasiness about the continuing exchanges over the security pact. The Socialist *Robotnik* voiced skepticism of French loyalty to Poland; *Gazeta Warszawska* worried lest the French right to intervene between Poland and Germany be so restricted as to invalidate the Franco-Polish alliance. Some papers spoke bitterly about Britain.[46]

The Czechoslovak attitude was very different, and Beneš in May and early June renewed his attempts for direct contact with Germany. Acting through the Czech envoy in Berlin he vainly tried to arrange an informal meeting with Stresemann.[47] The Czechoslovak statesman told the American envoy on May 13 that Berlin had informed Prague that "any rectification of frontier toward Czechoslovakia did not enter into their calculations," and that Germany was "ready to furnish any guarantee and to sign a treaty of arbitration." Beneš apparently took these assurances at their face value and explained to Einstein that Czechoslovakia had not been specifically mentioned in the original German offer because to do so would have been too pointedly anti-Polish.[48] At the end of May, Beneš went to Paris to discuss matters with Briand, and he also spoke with Berthelot and Laroche. He made another visit on June 19. According to

[43] Lipski, "Przyczynki do polsko-niemieckiej deklaracji o nieagresji," p. 23.

[44] Sikorski, *Le Problème de la paix*, p. 139.

[45] See Herrick to Secretary of State, June 24, 1925, *SDNA*, 851.00/654.

[46] *BPPP*, June 1–June 30, 1925, No. 155, pp. 3ff.

[47] See Gasiorowski, "Benes and Locarno: Some Unpublished Documents," *Review of Politics*, XX (1958), 219.

[48] Einstein to Secretary of State, May 14, 1925, *SDNA*, 740.0011, Mutual Guarantee/42 (Locarno).

American and German sources, Beneš expressed anxiety over the British version of the security pact, which seemed to open possibilities for German maneuvers in Austria. He developed a theory, popular with Masaryk, that the best alternative to *Anschluss* was a Danubian economic bloc including both Czechoslovakia and Austria and sponsored by France.[49]

Beneš must have been generally pleased with the result of his visit, and he affirmed in the continuing exchanges with Berlin that Briand would welcome a meeting between the German and Czechoslovak foreign ministers. Although Stresemann was not eager to arrange one, he appreciated the Czech overtures and commented to D'Abernon that a talk with someone "as intelligent and well informed" as Beneš could certainly be of interest.[50]

The Czechoslovak government's favorable attitude toward the security pact was not universally shared in the country. The National Democrats voiced their disapproval, and Kramář in addressing a party meeting in Brno criticized "French defeatism" and appealed for a *rapprochement* with Russia, the nation which was "powerful, nationalistic, and Slav." *Lidové Noviny* echoed this sentiment, writing that France ought to counter the British sponsorship of Germany by bringing in Russia.[51] These Pan-Slavist outbursts were utterly unrealistic. Beneš felt that one of the results of a security pact would be "to exclude the Bolsheviks more and more from Europe and this will help to draw a protecting wall around Poland."[52] Whether he really believed it or not, it would have been both foolish and unrealistic for Prague to come out with a strongly pro-Russian line at that particular time.

The Czechoslovak foreign minister defended the security pact against all criticism,[53] and he emphasized that his policy "has always been not to ask of others more than they can give."[54] In a speech to the combined foreign affairs committees of the Chamber and the Senate, Beneš declared that Paris had kept him informed of all developments and that he had approved of the French reply to Stresemann. He enumerated the advantages that a security pact would bring to Czechoslovakia: rebuilding of the Franco-British entente, admission of Germany to the League of Nations, and guaranteed arbitration treaties. Peace in the west, the

[49] See Hoesch to Auswärtiges Amt, June 1, 1925, *AANA*, container 1510; Soják, *O zahraniční politice*, p. 132; Gasiorowski, "Czechoslovakia and the Austrian Question 1918–1928," p. 117.

[50] D'Abernon, *Diary*, III, 176.

[51] *BPPT*, April 7–June 30, 1925, No. 15, pp. 4–7.

[52] Einstein to Secretary of State, June 23, 1925, *SDNA*, 840.00/24.

[53] One of the critics was no less than the Czechoslovak minister in Paris, Osuský, who told me that his attitude placed him in a difficult position with regard to Beneš and the Quai d'Orsay.

[54] Beneš, *Boj o mir a bezpečnost státu* (Prague, 1934), p. 330.

minister said, meant peace in the east, and the Franco-Czech alliance would remain as close as before. All that Prague wanted "was achieved."[55] The government press echoed these sentiments. *Prager Tageblatt* remarked that the French note to Stresemann "proved that Czech and Polish interventions in Paris were not without effect, and one could not deny the influence they exercised on England, through France."[56]

Paris dispatched its note on June 16, 1925, and Stresemann found it "extremely unsatisfactory because it showed how far England has given in to France."[57] According to Berlin, a spirit of mistrust of German intentions pervaded the document, and a wit remarked that it ought to be called the "Lorelei note" with the motto "Ich weiss nicht was soll es bedeuten dass ich so skeptisch bin."[58] Stresemann was not prepared to accept both German entry into the League and a system of comprehensive arbitration treaties in the east, and he was annoyed by French preoccupations with their eastern allies.[59] "The main point of the Briand note," wrote the German statesman, "is to be found in this, that it tries to work the idea of the Franco-Polish alliance into the western pact."[60]

Stresemann asked Ambassador de Margerie if the phrase about peace in Europe being incomplete without arbitration treaties meant that Polish refusal to accept an arbitration treaty could topple the entire security pact?[61] The French diplomat replied that Warsaw despite its early opposition was now prepared to sign such a treaty, and Stresemann began to suspect that the changed Polish attitude was a result of the French scheme to integrate the arbitration treaties and the general pact, an arrangement he was determined to prevent.[62] The German statesman further objected to a French guarantee of a German-Polish arbitration treaty, because France by virtue of her eastern alliance system was not impartial and would be bound to take Poland's side if a breach of arbitration procedure occurred. Finally Berlin found the emphasis on the peace treaties unwelcome because a guarantee of these treaties in East Central Europe was "wholly unacceptable."[63]

The Wilhelmstrasse took over a month to prepare its reply to the French note, and international developments played into Germany's hands. The tariff war between Germany and Poland reached its height when the coal convention expired on June 15, 1925, and Berlin refused to

[55] *Ibid.*
[56] *BPPT*, April 7–June 30, 1925, No. 15, p. 4.
[57] Stresemann, *Vermächtnis*, II, 109.
[58] Quoted by D'Abernon, *Diary*, III, 174.
[59] See his memorandum of June 20, *AANA*, container 1510.
[60] Stresemann, *Vermächtnis*, II, 116.
[61] *Ibid.*, II, 106.
[62] *Ibid.*, 114ff.
[63] *Ibid.*, 109.

renew it. Warsaw replied with an embargo on German products. The consequences of this economic conflict were serious for Poland. Furthermore, German capital began to leave the country and Polish currency was endangered. If Poland collapsed economically, a peaceful revision of the German-Polish border appeared quite possible to Berlin, and a German revisionist campaign was stepped up.[64] Stresemann could also capitalize on the British attitude, especially on Chamberlain's speech of June 24, in which the foreign secretary expressed his faith in German good will and alluded to Article 19 of the Covenant. Stresemann referred to this speech in his own address on July 22, and emphasized the point that if a comprehensive security system had existed earlier in Europe there would have been no need for the French alliances with Poland and Czechoslovakia. The German statesman also had confidence in the nascent economic cooperation between Germany, Britain, and the United States, and noted in his diary that it looked "as though a kind of Anglo-American-German capital trust were in the process of formation, presupposing naturally the realization of the security pact."[65] The chances that France would satisfy Berlin's demands were clearly increasing.

3

Fortified by the British stand and the economic difficulties of Poland, not to mention the differences between Warsaw and Prague, the German government sent a firm note to France on July 20, 1925. The French viewed this document as provocative and inspired by a revisionist spirit. It contained the statement that Briand's communication of June 16 had given a new construction to Stresemann's original offer and distorted its meaning. Berlin affirmed that there was no need to repeat statements about peace treaties; arbitration treaties as envisaged by Paris were unsatisfactory, and the whole "system of guarantees would by such constructions be invalidated to the sole detriment of Germany."[66] While Berlin had nothing against Belgian participation in the security pact, it objected to the preservation of French rights in the Rhineland. It seems that Stresemann had originally wanted to demand French evacuation of the Rhineland, but he was restrained from doing so by Britain.[67] He raised, however, the question of German membership in the League and affirmed that his country could not assume obligations arising out of

[64] See an interesting report by the Polish minister in Berlin about the activities of *Verband der Deutschtumsvereine, Deutsche Auslandsinstitut* in Stuttgart, and *Deutsche Notbund gegen die Bedrückung der besetzten Gebiete*. Polish Foreign Ministry to missions abroad, June 12, 1925, *APGE*, "MSZ 1925."

[65] Stresemann, *Vermächtnis*, II, 154.

[66] *Pacte de sécurité*, p. 8.

[67] See Renouvin, *Histoire des relations internationales*, VII, 260.

Article 16. This showed clearly that Germany was not prepared to burn her bridges to Russia.

Anglo-French exchanges and consultations followed the German note. In the course of them Britain limited her commitments as a guarantor of the security pact by claiming the right to exercise her judgment on whether or not a violation took place. By early August 1925 England and France reached a basic agreement on a new reply to Berlin. The French were giving ground, and Briand in his talk with the German ambassador assured him that pressure would be put on Warsaw not to raise difficulties. According to the German diplomat, Briand told him that in the long run Poland and Germany would have to work out their differences by direct agreement, and that he, Briand, would "certainly not stand in the way of its realization." After this talk Hoesch had, he said, the "best possible impression of Briand's intentions" (*Absichten*).[68]

The Poles probably ignored the conversations between the French foreign minister and the German ambassador, but they could not help suspecting that something was afoot and that Paris was giving in to London and Berlin. The Polish press showed anxiety lest "France may come to a final agreement with Great Britain at the expense of Poland." Rumors circulated about a secret German-English pact, and people spoke of British loans and support for revisionism on condition that Germany abandon all links with Bolshevik Russia.[69]

To calm Polish anxiety and to demonstrate that in spite of everything the Franco-Polish alliance was as strong as ever, a French representative, General Henri Gouraud, made himself conspicuous at the big Polish army maneuvers held along the western borders. The Polish minister of war, General Sikorski, made a speech at the end of the maneuvers, in Toruń on August 20, in which he stressed Poland's will to defend her access to the sea; Gouraud replied by drawing an analogy between Alsace-Lorraine on the one hand and *Pomorze*—the "Corridor"—on the other.[70] As the American chargé reported from Warsaw, the army maneuvers were not devoid of profound political meaning.[71]

Skrzyński meanwhile held another conference with Briand, which he described to an American diplomat as "very satisfactory." He added that the Polish government did not share the fears of the press that France would "make an arrangement in regard to this Pact with Great Britain at the expense of Poland."[72] This statement, like most of Skrzyń-

[68] Hoesch to Auswärtiges Amt, Aug. 6, 1925, *AANA*, container 1426.

[69] Pearson and Howell to Secretary of State, Aug. 8 and 18, 1925. *SDNA*, 860c.00/290 and 861.6131/48.

[70] *BPPP*, July 29–August 31, 1925, No. 157, p. 10.

[71] Howell to Secretary of State, Aug. 22, 1925, *SDNA*, 860c.00/291.

[72] Howell to Secretary of State, Aug. 20, 1925, *SDNA*, 740.0011, Mutual Guarantee/126 (Locarno).

ski's pronouncements at that time, can hardly be taken at face value. The Polish government was worried. Skrzyński's visit to the United States was calculated to counterbalance the effects of German revisionist propaganda, and as Sikorski pointed out, Briand's new note to Stresemann was communicated to Warsaw only in its "final form."[73]

The new reply of the French government to Berlin was delivered by Margerie on August 24, 1925, seven days after Paris communicated it to Warsaw and Prague. It was followed by withdrawal of French troops on August 25 from the "sanction cities" of Duisburg, Düsseldorf, and Ruhrort. The new note reiterated French demands for an express recognition of peace treaties and for an unconditional German membership in the League. The French must have felt, however, that a continuing exchange of notes would not advance matters, and Ambassadors D'Abernon and Margerie proposed to Stresemann a meeting of the legal advisers of the respective foreign ministers to work out points of difference between the powers. The German government accepted this proposal in its reply to the French on August 27. Negotiations thereupon entered a new phase.

The meeting of jurists in London from August 31 to September 4, 1925, prepared the ground for talks on a ministerial level. The British legal expert Sir Cecil Hurst, while openly favoring the elimination of the Franco-Polish alliance (which he said was fraught "with great dangers in view of the whole Polish attitude"),[74] supported nevertheless the French idea of guaranteed arbitration treaties, presumably as a lesser evil. The Germans were adamant, and the issue was set aside. The Quai d'Orsay was not unduly worried. Berthelot told the American chargé d'affaires that if Germany refused to accept French-guaranteed arbitration treaties, the difficulty could be overcome by giving French guarantees to Poland and Czechoslovakia, and communicating them to the League of Nations and to the states signing the security pact.[75] This proposal was a far cry from the original French ideas on security in East Central Europe.

Final exchanges between Paris and Berlin followed, and France on September 15 proposed a conference of foreign ministers. Geneva was mentioned as a meeting place, and D'Abernon, probably reflecting German views, criticized this choice, because the "atmosphere there contains too much Polish and Czecho-Slovakian perfume."[76] Like many of his countrymen, D'Abernon did not show great consistency in his reasoning when he wrote at the same time that "no countries except France and

[73] Sikorski, *Le Problème de la paix*, p. 139.

[74] See Gasiorowski, "Stresemann and Poland before Locarno," *Journal of Central European Affairs*, XVIII (1958–59), 43.

[75] Whitehouse to Secretary of State, Sept. 18, 1925, *SDNA*, 740.0011, Mutual Guarantee/146 (Locarno).

[76] D'Abernon, *Diary*, III, 182.

Germany, will gain more by this agreement than Czecho-Slovakia and Poland, where frontiers are hardly yet solidified."[77] He unfortunately failed to explain how the German refusal to guarantee these frontiers would solidify them.

Stresemann on September 26 accepted the invitation to a foreign ministers' conference in Locarno, and he suggested October 5 for its beginning. He simultaneously instructed the German ambassadors in Paris and London to deliver, along with his reply, an oral declaration requesting French evacuation of the zone of Cologne. This move, probably calculated to satisfy public opinion at home, was premature, and it met with a rebuff in both western European capitals. It indicated, however, the increasing German confidence and assurance, as well as the German belief in hard bargaining.

A few days before delivery of the German note, Berlin registered a new diplomatic success which further isolated Poland and brought into the open the lack of unity between Warsaw and Prague. Stresemann in a press conference on September 18 remarked that neither Poland nor Czechoslovakia had so far approached Berlin about arbitration, an obvious untruth in view of the constant Czech efforts in March, May, and June. If this statement was intended as a bait, Beneš rose to it immediately by instructing Minister Krofta to call on Stresemann and express Czechoslovak willingness to begin negotiations at once. Consequently Krofta went to see Stresemann on September 20, and this move created consternation in Warsaw, Paris, and even in Prague, where the prime minister, Švehla, was allegedly not consulted in this matter.[78]

The Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs tried to keep calm, and informed the diplomatic missions abroad that it "did not attach great weight to the *démarche* of the Czechoslovak government to Mr. Stresemann, which ought to be treated rather as an incident that should not bring any change to the basic line" of Polish foreign policy.[79] In spite of Skrzyński's attitude, the Polish press manifested surprise and annoyance. Several papers felt that Prague had cast Poland to the winds in a quick effort to gain more security for itself.[80] Some Polish circles believed that the Czech move indicated an important change in Prague's foreign policy, and there were American diplomats who agreed with this interpretation.[81] The fact that the Czechoslovak foreign ministry "did not wait to see what would be the attitude of Poland"[82] appeared incomprehensible,

[77] *Ibid.*, 183.

[78] The Czechoslovak press, however, reacted favorably.

[79] Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs to envoys in Paris, London, Rome, Geneva, and Brussels, Sept. 25, 1925, *APGE*, "MSZ 1925."

[80] Stetson to Secretary of State, Oct. 3, 1925, *SDNA*, 860c.00/294.

[81] Schurman to Secretary of State, Sept. 26 and 28, 1925, *SDNA*, 760f.6212/3 and 4.

[82] Soják, *O zahraniční politice*, p. 133.

and some people in Berlin suspected that the whole thing was a French-inspired trick, aimed to maintain unity between western negotiations and eastern problems.

Beneš felt obliged to explain to the Poles the reasons for his uncoordinated *démarche* in Berlin. He stated to a Polish diplomat in Geneva, Kajetan Morawski, that he had intended to deprive Stresemann of the argument that since neither Prague nor Warsaw had approached Berlin about the arbitration offer they had no right to attend the Locarno conference. Beneš then drew a detailed picture of the differences between the Polish and the Czechoslovak positions. From a purely formal point of view Czechoslovakia had begun negotiations with Berlin, and Poland had not; as for the substance of their relations, Germany was only interested in the German minority in Czechoslovakia, while there were grave territorial issues between Germany and Poland. Naturally, Beneš's position was easier than Skrzyński's, and if Berlin offered a more advantageous treaty to Czechoslovakia than to Poland he could not refuse to accept it. The Czech statesman declared that in order not "to create a disadvantageous precedent for Poland" he was prepared to keep in touch with Warsaw and to conduct his negotiations slowly, giving the Poles more time for their own efforts. Beneš then expressed his opinion on a possible Czech-German arrangement by saying that he saw two alternatives: Germany would either sign an arbitration treaty with Prague, or join the existing Franco-Czechoslovak pact of 1924.[83]

Beneš's offer to coordinate his activities with Warsaw was somewhat belated. It is hard to imagine that his *démarche* in Berlin did not result from a desire to emphasize the difference between the positions of Prague and Warsaw, even at the price of isolating Poland. Stresemann understood it that way, and D'Abernon noted that the German statesman while inimical toward the Poles showed no hostility toward the Czechs.[84] In a talk with Krofta on September 25 Stresemann dwelt on the initial Polish opposition to arbitration schemes, as if contrasting it with the more reasonable stand of Beneš. Finally the Czechoslovak foreign minister himself, speaking to a leader of the *Deutschnationale,* discreetly "but distinctly distanced himself from Poland."[85]

The meaning of the Czechoslovak *démarche* in Berlin on September 20 was not lost on foreign diplomats. The well-informed American minister in Prague reported that by "proceeding independently of Poland, Dr. Beneš has shown how lukewarm was the collaboration between the two states in spite of many professions to the contrary and the recent

[83] Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs to envoys in Paris, London, Berlin, and Prague. September 28, 1925, *APGE*, "MSZ 1925."

[84] D'Abernon, *Diary*, III, 101.

[85] The leader was Professor Hoetsch, and the above expression is his own. See Gasiorowski, "Benes and Locarno," p. 221.

conventions signed in Warsaw." The Czech move also indicated "a weakening in the ties" connecting "Prague with Paris."[86] An "obviously inspired" article in *Il Messagero* on September 26, 1925, said that Czechoslovakia "by her own initiative separates somewhat from France, and detaches herself from Poland, with whom, it seemed, she should have stood united."[87]

While the Czechoslovak move weakened Poland internationally by stressing her isolation, an initiative from Russia seemed to offer possibilities for strengthening Poland's hand. One day after the dispatch of Stresemann's reply to Paris, the Russian foreign commissar, Chicherin, arrived in Warsaw with suggestions for a *rapprochement* and an offer of a nonaggression pact. The majority of the Polish press commented favorably on this visit and saw in it possibilities for strengthening Poland vis-à-vis Germany.[88] Skrzyński was more doubtful about Chicherin's motives, and although Grabski favored the economic aspects of a Polish-Russian *rapprochement*,[89] the foreign minister assured Paris that Soviet wooing would not alter the basic course of Polish foreign policy. Warsaw was in no position to risk international isolation by relying completely on Russia; besides it appeared likely that Chicherin was only playing the Polish card to keep Berlin from cooperating with Britain and France, which appeared inimical to Moscow.

The visit of the Soviet diplomat intrigued Prague, and the Czechs viewed it with mixed feelings. Some expressed surprise that Russia had made advances to Warsaw and not to Prague. Government circles speculated on whether Chicherin's move was an indirect "overture of the Soviet to Paris,"[90] and whether it was an indication of a Soviet return to a more active European policy. The Agrarian *Venkov* came out with an appeal for a pro-Russian reorientation of Czechoslovak policy, and declared: "let us follow the example of Poland." The rest of the Czech press protested vigorously.[91]

Whatever the contemporary reaction to Chicherin's initiative, it appears now that the prime object of Soviet diplomacy was not to strengthen the eastern flank against Germany.[92] Apart from everything else it was far too late for such an initiative. If the Soviet Union genuinely wanted to strengthen France and the eastern states vis-à-vis Germany it ought

[86] Einstein to Secretary of State, Sept. 22, 1925, *SDNA*, 760f.6212/2.

[87] Quoted by Robbins to Secretary of State, Oct. 17, 1925, *SDNA*, 740.0011, Mutual Guarantee/174 (Locarno).

[88] *BPPP*, Sept. 1–Oct. 21, 1925, No. 158, p. 5.

[89] Stetson to Secretary of State, Oct. 3, 1925, *SDNA*, 760c.61/550.

[90] Einstein to Secretary of State, Oct. 6, 1925, *ibid.*, 760f.61/32.

[91] *BPPT*, July 1–Oct. 20, 1925, No. 15, pp. 4–5.

[92] This is also the opinion of Christian Höltje, *Die Weimarer Republik und das Ostlocarno-Problem 1919–1934* (Würzburg, 1958), p. 77, based on information from leading German diplomats.

to have attempted it at a more favorable moment. The timing of Chicherin's visit indicates that his main object was to thwart the security pact by putting pressure on Berlin and trying to bring it back to the Rapallo partnership with Russia. This comes out clearly from Chicherin's talks in Berlin, to which he proceeded from Warsaw. The Soviet diplomat expressed his surprise to Stresemann that while only nine months earlier Berlin had made friendly suggestions to Russia for a common anti-Polish front, it now sacrificed all these plans to a western security scheme. Stresemann assured his visitor that Germany did not contemplate any guarantee of Polish frontiers, and was determined not to assume any obligations arising out of Article 16 of the Covenant. Berlin would never permit the League to become an anti-Soviet instrument.[93] Chicherin expressed satisfaction but was far from pleased. He realized that Moscow would not succeed in drawing Germany away from England and bringing her closer to Russia. The playing of the Polish card was insufficient to make Berlin change its mind about general foreign policy. Stresemann while wanting to keep a Russian link—German-Soviet secret military cooperation continued—was bent on achieving Germany's goals in company with the western powers.

4

The historic conference of the foreign ministers of France, Germany, Britain, Italy, and Belgium opened in Locarno on October 4, 1925. The German program for the conference included demands for basic changes in the occupation regime, elimination of Allied supervision of the disarmament clauses, speeding up the evacuation of the Rhineland, and insistence on the German interpretation of Article 16 of the Covenant. Practically all these demands were satisfied in the course of the conference. Furthermore Stresemann went to Locarno determined to prevent any confirmation of the *status quo* in East Central Europe and to oppose "any possible arbitration treaty which includes these frontiers."[94]

The French delegation led by Briand, and including Berthelot, Henri Fromageot, Alexis Léger, and René Massigli, was intent on salvaging as much as possible of France's eastern interests and commitments. It hoped to achieve this object by making France guarantor of the German-Polish and Czechoslovak-German arbitration treaties, assuming thereby a position in East Central Europe comparable to that of England in the west. Still, French chances were slender. They could not count on British support, and Briand wanted by then to reach an agreement with Germany at almost any cost. Shortly before the opening of the conference,

[93] See Gasiorowski, "Stresemann and Poland before Locarno," pp. 45ff.
[94] Stresemann, *Vermächtnis*, II, 182.

the French foreign minister called Franco-German reconciliation a cornerstone of European security, and he declared that precisely "because the Rhine has an essential role in European peace we do not wish the young nations liberated by the war to feel themselves injured by the special precautions which the Rhineland exacts for the tranquility of our old Continent."[95] This statement smacked of hypocrisy, and Stresemann exposed the shallow French reasoning when he explained to the Germans that only the French threat to the Rhine stood in the way "of a recovery of German soil, or of a junction with Austria. . . . The moment the everpresent threat of war on the western frontier ceases to exist, this argument is no longer valid."[96] It stood to reason that an abandonment by France of her offensive powers on the Rhine would facilitate German expansion to the east, a fact emphasized by the French during the Paris Peace Conference and recalled over and over again by Skrzyński.[97]

The question of French guarantees for East Central Europe cropped up early in the Locarno discussions. During the second session on October 6, Briand declared that it was impossible for France "to obtain guarantees for her own borders without showing concern for the security of the borders of her allied eastern states."[98] Stresemann objected that France could not be an impartial guarantor of arbitration treaties in the east and remain at the same time an ally of Czechoslovakia and Poland. The arguments were bandied back and forth, and it took four days before Stresemann's position prevailed. During a boat trip on Lake Maggiore, on board the *Fiore d'Arancio*—the Orange Flower—Briand abandoned the French guarantee.[99]

The foreign ministers of Czechoslovakia and Poland did not participate in the early meetings at Locarno, which were of such interest to their respective countries. Although Beneš arrived on October 7, and Skrzyński a day later, they were both in the humiliating position of suppliants who had to wait before being admitted to the councils of others. Briand informed his fellow ministers on the third day of the conference that the Czech and Polish delegates would appear at the meeting on October 15, and Stresemann exclaimed "Already?" There was something paradoxical in the fact that a French statesman had to justify the presence of his allies to a German minister and assure him that they would not participate in the debate.[100] Stresemann could well gloat two months

[95] Speech at Nimes on Oct. 3, 1925.

[96] Stresemann, *Vermächtnis*, II, 237.

[97] Stetson to Secretary of State, Oct. 2, 1925, *SDNA*, 740.0011, Mutual Guarantee/169 (Locarno).

[98] Protocol of the 2nd session, Oct. 6, 1925, *AANA*, container 1512.

[99] Stresemann, *Vermächtnis*, II, 235.

[100] German diary of the Locarno Conference, signed by Luther, Oct. 7, 1925, *AANA*, container 1512.

later at Berlin that Beneš and Skrzyński "had to sit in a neighboring room until we let them in." He added maliciously that "such was the situation of states which had been so pampered until then, because they were the servants of others, but were dropped the moment it seemed possible to come to an understanding with Germany."[101]

There is no doubt that France's eastern allies received a cavalier treatment at Locarno. Admitted to the conference after Briand gave up the French guarantee for their arbitration treaties, they had no chance to have their own draft treaties seriously considered. Stresemann recalled that these drafts were "rejected [by Germany] without discussion." He added ironically that after this rejection it became apparent that "Beneš had made a mistake; he had intended another" draft to be proposed but this one was "not discussed either." Skrzyński was less accommodating, and his clash with the German legal experts brought negotiations to a standstill. The French and the British tried to put some pressure on the German delegation but without any noticeable result. Polish and Czech drafts were withdrawn and replaced by documents acceptable to the Germans.

France's eastern allies accepted this defeat in differing ways. Stresemann later said of Beneš that "this clever politician, not having got his way, behaved as if he had, smiled all over his face and looked pleased. Herr Skrzyński could not hide his agitation."[102] When the conference ended Skrzyński allegedly left the conference room in an abrupt fashion, and though Stresemann may have overdrawn the picture a little for domestic reasons,[103] the experiences of the Polish and Czechoslovak foreign ministers at Locarno were hardly pleasant.

Neither were the results of the conference pleasant. The Locarno agreements consisted of five related treaties: the Treaty of Mutual Guarantee, restricted to western German borders and guaranteed by Britain and Italy; and four arbitration treaties between Germany on the one side, and France, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, and Poland on the other. The Treaty of Mutual Guarantee provided for maintenance of the territorial *status quo* in the west (Art. 1) and for solemn promises by Germany, France, and Belgium not to resort to war against each other, except in case of legitimate defense or in pursuance of Article 15, paragraph 7, or Article 16 of the Covenant of the League (Art. 2). All disputes were to be submitted to arbitration or conciliation (Art. 3). In case of an alleged violation of Article 2 of the Treaty of Mutual Guarantee, the in-

[101] Stresemann, *Vermächtnis*, II, 243; compare protocols of the 8th and 9th sessions, Oct. 15 and 16, 1925, *AANA*, container 1512, and the German account of the Stresemann-Krofta conversation on Oct. 13, *ibid.*

[102] Stresemann, *Vermächtnis*, II, 233–234.

[103] *Ibid.*; compare with Edgar Stern-Rubarth, *Three Men Tried . . . Austen Chamberlain, Stresemann, Briand and Their Fight for a New Europe* (London, 1939), p. 99.

jured party would appeal to the Council of the League and to the remaining signatories of the Treaty who engaged themselves to come promptly to its assistance (Art. 4). The six other articles were of less interest and dealt with procedure in case of a refusal to arbitrate, with the relationship of the Treaty to the Covenant, and other technical matters.

The arbitration treaties signed at Locarno provided for pacific settlement of disputes by means of arbitration and conciliation. All four had twenty-one identical articles, but the German treaties with Poland and Czechoslovakia differed in their preambles from those with France and Belgium. The western arbitration treaties expressly mentioned the Treaty of Mutual Guarantee; those with Czechoslovakia and Poland did not.

In addition to the five treaties, the Locarno Pact contained a final protocol in lieu of a preamble to all the agreements, signed by all the participants in the conference: France, Britain, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, and Poland. The protocol spoke of "mutually interdependent treaties," meaning the five above-named accords, and it contained also a paragraph which mentioned the other treaties concluded at Locarno, between France, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. The last two treaties were not part of the Locarno Pact properly speaking, although Beneš described them as such in Prague.[104] The Germans were insistent on this point. As Stresemann recalled, these treaties "were laid before us at a certain meeting, and we refused to take cognizance of them." When the French tried to attach them as annexes to the general agreement, the German delegation protested by saying that they "had nothing to do with Locarno." Whatever agreement the French made with Poland "does not concern us," but they must not be published together with the main texts.[105] The only concession made to the French desire to link the new Franco-Polish and Franco-Czechoslovak treaties with the Locarno Pact was a passage in the final protocol which read as follows: "The Minister for Foreign Affairs of France states that as a result of the draft arbitration treaties mentioned above, France, Poland, and Czechoslovakia have also concluded at Locarno draft agreements in order reciprocally to insure to themselves the benefits of the said treaties."[106] This was no more than a unilateral declaration by France.

The Germans not only prevented a linking of the French-Czechoslovak-Polish treaties with the main security treaty, but also made several other gains. The final protocol contained nothing about the inviolability of peace treaties; the German arbitration treaties with Poland and Czechoslovakia did not imply a recognition of their borders and were not guar-

[104] In Parliament on Oct. 30, 1925; Beneš, *Boj o mir*, p. 352.

[105] Stresemann, *Vermächtnis*, II, 235.

[106] The English text is in Fritz J. Berber, ed., *Locarno: A Collection of Documents* (London, 1936), p. 48. See Appendix VII below for the French text.

anteed by other powers. Stresemann achieved the major German aim of drawing a clear distinction between western borders, recognized and guaranteed, and the frontiers in the east, which although officially unchanged appeared in comparison highly insecure. By obtaining French withdrawal from the zone of Cologne, Stresemann initiated the evacuation of the Rhineland, thus depriving France of possibilities for future offensive action. French hands were further tied by Article 2 of the Treaty of Mutual Guarantee and this was grave indeed for Warsaw and Prague.

The new treaties between France and her eastern allies, while more precise than the alliances of 1921 and 1924, were restricted by the obligations which Paris assumed by virtue of the Locarno Pact. Stresemann said that "the agreement which France has now concluded with Poland and Czechoslovakia can be concluded any day by any one state with any other. But it is no longer an alliance in the sense it was until now."[107] While this was an extreme view—the new treaties did not supersede the old—there was some truth in it. Before Locarno, France could have given immediate assistance to Poland in any situation she considered a threat to peace. Her troops in the Rhineland were the practical means for an offensive action. After Locarno, France could help Poland only if the latter invoked Article 16 of the Covenant—which certainly required no previous alliance—but she had agreed to act immediately in such a case. Similarly, if the Council of the League failed to reach a unanimous decision that an aggression had taken place, France promised to intervene at once in accord with Article 15, paragraph 7. Any other action on the part of France would bring into operation the mechanism of the security pact, or in other words would make Britain the guarantor of Germany against France. Moreover, French striking power was severely limited by her progressive evacuation of the Rhineland.

According to Laroche, the new Franco-Polish treaty was more "imperative" than the alliance of 1921 which spoke only of the need "to concert." At the same time it was more limited because it depended on the Covenant and covered only the case of a direct German aggression.[108] Another French diplomat, André François-Poncet, has observed that the new treaty did not add much to the previous agreement, and its main value was that of a "demonstration."[109] Similarly Léon Noël thought that the main object of the treaty was "to make it easier for Poland to accept the political and juridical discrimination between the eastern and western borders of Germany which resulted from the Locarno agreements."[110]

The relation between the new treaty and the alliance of 1921 remained

[107] Stresemann, *Vermächtnis*, II, 213. See Appendix VIII.
[108] Laroche, *La Pologne de Pilsudski*, p. 17.
[109] François-Poncet, *De Versailles à Potsdam*, p. 129.
[110] Noël, *L'Agression allemande*, p. 102.

unclarified and curious. Both documents were valid, but Paris began to feel an increasing need to revise the earlier accord, especially the military convention, which some French jurists considered contrary to the Covenant and irreconcilable with the French constitution.[111] (Practical steps to that effect were undertaken only at a later date and do not belong to this story.) Locarno affected Franco-Polish relations in still another way. The problem of German disarmament was largely taken out of the hands of the military and transferred to the political level, and consequently the close collaboration between the French and Polish general staffs mattered less than before. The influence of the general staffs on Franco-Polish relations declined considerably.[112]

The new Franco-Czechoslovak treaty did not create problems comparable to those discussed above. The alliance of 1924 was more general than the one with Poland and contained no military convention. Beneš was justified when he declared that "our previous agreement with France obtains quite new features without losing anything of its effectiveness."[113] The new treaty, according to his opinion, was "so construed that it would supplement the Rhine pact and our arbitration agreement."[114] The dependence of the Czech-French treaty on the League did not worry Prague—on the contrary it seemed in keeping with hitherto pursued Czechoslovak policy. And yet, even in the Czechoslovak case the probability of rapid French help was considerably lessened. Should Czech-German relations deteriorate to the point of war, Locarno by limiting French freedom of action in eastern Europe could become a menace to Prague. D'Abernon's prognostication for the future contained a good deal of truth when he wrote that "Under the Pact [of Locarno] these alliances [of France and eastern Europe] will not immediately be given up, but they will cease to be the main protection, and in process of time will probably fade away."[115]

Czechoslovakia and Poland reacted differently to Locarno. Warsaw received the news of the Locarno agreements with varied emotions. The public had been nervous before the conference, and it showed some signs of relief after its conclusion.[116] After his return to Warsaw, Skrzyński made statements which differed considerably depending on the person to whom he spoke and the place at which he made them. Thus he allegedly told the French ambassador that the security pact was "a dagger thrust in the back of the alliance between our two countries,"[117] and

[111] Starzewski, *Zarys dziejów*, p. 12; compare Laroche, *La Pologne de Pilsudski*, p. 17.
[112] Sikorski to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Nov. 19, 1925, *SI*, A, 11/1.
[113] Beneš, *Boj o mir*, p. 352. [114] *Ibid.*, pp. 349–350.
[115] D'Abernon, *Diary*, III, 194.
[116] Stetson to Secretary of State, Oct. 27, 1925, *SDNA*, 748.0011, Mutual Guarantee/212 (Locarno), also 280 (Locarno).
[117] Barbier, *Un Frac de Nessus*, p. 262.

then assured the chargé d'affaires Baron de Vaux that he had great admiration for the "extraordinary ability" of Briand.[118] Publicly, Skrzyński emphasized the positive aspects of Locarno, and he went so far as to tell the Polish press that he was "pleased with the results" of the conference, and that "our friendship with France will be stronger" because it was "endorsed by all those who were at Locarno."[119] Addressing the *Sejm*'s committee on foreign affairs on October 21, he declared that "no one left Locarno as a winner and no one left it as a loser."[120]

The progovernment press echoed his words, but there was much criticism from the Right as well as the Left. The National Democrat Stroński said that one ought to speak about "the misunderstanding of Locarno" rather than about the "Locarno spirit," and he pointed out that neither the Polish borders nor the alliance with France gained anything from the pact. Members of the radical Peasant *Wyzwolenie* called Locarno the end of the Franco-Polish alliance. A leading political science quarterly wrote that Polish chances in a future war "look generally less advantageous after the pacts concluded in Locarno than before them."[121] But a noted writer on Polish foreign policy expressed a contrary opinion.[122] While there was no unanimity of views in Poland, and grave domestic issues somehow obscured the importance of Locarno, many people sensed danger in the pact. Skrzyński's exaggerated and seemingly uncritical defense of the new arrangements gave the impression that the minister was totally unaware of such danger, which was not true. He merely tried to make the best of a bad situation and exaggerated in the attempt.[123]

The enthusiasm displayed by Beneš over Locarno was more sincere than that of Skrzyński. True, the Czechoslovak statesman also had to take domestic politics into account and silence the opposition which accused him of "picking up the crumbs which fell from the great powers' table."[124] But he could claim in good faith that the Locarno agreements were in "full harmony with our seven-year-long foreign policy."[125] D'Abernon aptly summarized the main reasons for Czech satisfaction by noting that because of Locarno Prague did not need to choose between France "to whom they largely owe their independence" and Germany "who buys 30 percent of their efforts."[126] The security pact also pre-

[118] Laroche, *Au Quai d'Orsay*, p. 214.

[119] Stetson to Secretary of State, Oct. 24, 1925, *SDNA*, 860c.00/295; also *BPPP*, Sept. 1–Oct. 21, 1925, No. 158, pp. 7ff.

[120] *BPPP*, Oct. 22–Nov. 14, 1925, No. 159, p. 2.

[121] J. Dąbrowski in *Przegląd Polityczny*, III (1925), 159.

[122] Grzymała-Grabowiecki, *Polityka zagraniczna Polski w r. 1925* (Warsaw, 1926).

[123] See Lipski, "Przyczynki do polsko-niemieckiej deklaracji o nieagresji," p. 24.

[124] Pearson to Secretary of State, Nov. 2, 1925, *SDNA*, 740.0011, Mutual Guarantee/222 (Locarno).

[125] Beneš, *Boj o mir*, p. 356.

[126] D'Abernon, *Diary*, III, 194.

cluded a repetition of the French venture into the Ruhr which Prague had found so little to its taste. As for the French guarantee, Beneš had not been particularly anxious to get it, and asked for it mainly because Poland did and "Dr. Beneš cannot afford to accept less."[127] Now he could affirm, and the progovernment *Tribuna* expanded on the theme, that the Czechoslovak position had improved greatly with the three guarantees: one direct from France, one arising out of Locarno, and one enjoyed under the League of Nations.[128] Hence it appeared that the security of Prague was greater than before, and Beneš prophesied in Parliament that *"It will not take long before it will come to a second Locarno when all Europe will reach an agreement with Russia."*[129]

The Czechoslovak foreign minister lauded Briand who had behaved like a "devoted, sincere, and loyal" friend. He stated that "at no stage of the negotiations were there any differences of opinion between Paris and Prague,"[130] a sentiment echoed in Briand's statement to the Czech press that the main French concern had been "not to undertake anything except with total agreement of the government of Prague."[131]

Beneš also had warm words for the Poles with whom he had worked in "full harmony." He stated that "our arbitration agreement with Poland will, as a result of Locarno, acquire a new and a fuller significance." The minister assured the Czechs that Locarno brought "greater stability" to Poland and contributed to better relations between Warsaw and Prague.[132]

The French public greeted Locarno with diverse feelings in which an optimistic note predominated. The extreme Right saw in Locarno an abdication of French power and prestige and deplored it as did the Communists, who viewed it as sponsored by big capital and directed primarily against the Soviet Union. Some papers of the Right criticized it severely. *L'Echo de Paris* called it the beginning of a Pax Germanica; *La Liberté* felt that Locarno estranged France's eastern allies; *L'Éclair* predicted the eventual formation of a German-Italian-Polish bloc; Poincaré writing in a Belgian review made sharp and pertinent criticism of the pact; but the prevailing mood in France was one of approval and sometimes enthusiasm.[133] A prominent Socialist, Paul-Boncour, wrote much later that Locarno was the most concrete French gain after Ver-

[127] Einstein to Secretary of State, Oct. 12, 1925, *SDNA*, 740.0011, Mutual Guarantee/187 (Locarno).

[128] *BPPT*, July 1–Oct. 20, 1925, No. 16, p. 6.

[129] Beneš, *Boj o mir*, pp. 355–356. Italics in original.

[130] *Ibid.*, p. 360.

[131] *Gazette de Prague*, Oct. 31, 1925.

[132] Beneš, *Boj o mir*, p. 358.

[133] Whitehouse to Secretary of State, Oct. 16, 1925, *SDNA*, 740.0011, Mutual Security/188 (Locarno).

sailles, because it brought with it the British guarantee which France had vainly sought at the Paris Peace Conference and after. He also believed that Locarno gave France "the possibility of fulfilling our obligations vis-à-vis Poland and Czechoslovakia." [134] One could doubt whether Briand, who also made similar statements, really believed that. He must have thought that he had gained security for France and that a limitation of French commitments in East Central Europe was not too heavy a price to pay.

Briand knew that the major success of Locarno was prevention of a German-Russian combination with which France and her eastern allies could not cope without British support. London sought to defeat such a combination not by bolstering France, Poland, and Czechoslovakia, but by detaching Berlin from Moscow even if it involved the risk of encouraging German expansionism in the east. Thus London more than any other capital was responsible for the illusion that Locarno meant security on the continent of Europe. There were people in England who saw things clearly enough, such as the historical adviser to the Foreign Office Sir James Headlam-Morley, who wrote that "in the future the real danger may lie, not here [on the Rhine] but rather on the eastern frontiers of Germany—Danzig, Poland, Czechoslovakia—for it is in these districts that the settlement of Paris would be, when the time came, most easily overthrown. But in these districts no military help would be available from this country. . . ." [135] Many Frenchmen must also have seen this truth, but feeling that nothing could be done without British assistance they preferred to close their eyes to realities. This was the "policy of an ostrich," as Paul Reynaud wrote later, or "perhaps, and this is even worse, there was already the spirit of Munich in Locarno." [136]

It was only on paper that the Locarno Pact with all its implications could be reconciled with an effective system of French eastern alliances. The French ambassador in London, Saint Aulaire, pointed out in a book that "the accords of Locarno undermined France diplomatically by destroying our alliances";[137] Barbier called the accords a "fatal and decisive blow to the Franco-Polish alliance, the pillar of our system of Continental alliances." [138] A Senate *rapporteur,* analyzing in 1940 the Franco-Polish treaty, admitted that "the first shadow which passed over Franco-Polish friendship was thrown by the monument of Locarno." [139] Eastern

[134] *France entre les deux guerres,* II, 162.

[135] James Headlam-Morley, *Studies in Diplomatic History* (London, 1930), p. 156.

[136] Paul Reynaud, *La France a sauvé l'Europe* (Paris, 1947), pp. 47–50.

[137] *La Mythologie de la paix,* p. 158.

[138] Barbier, *Un Frac de Nessus,* p. 262.

[139] Commission sénatoriale des affaires étrangères, *Rapport presenté par M. Marcel Plaisant sur les traités franco-polonais. Séance du . . . 9 février 1940, sécret, no. 18,* Bibliothèque de documentation internationale contemporaine, Paris.

alliances could function only if France were determined and able to help Warsaw or Prague at the *casus foederis* by starting an offensive action across the Rhine. Locarno by creating an illusion of peace and security in the west, and by limiting French freedom of intervention against Germany, led naturally to a gradual abandonment of offensive strategy. The security pact built a protective wall on the French eastern borders —first on paper, but completed two years later by the Maginot line— behind which France could feel secure. A purely defensive strategy soon prevailed, and this in turn led to pacifism, which was encouraged and exploited by Germany. As a high official of the Quai d'Orsay remarked, Briand "has unwittingly encouraged the braying sheep of pacifism who, if they had not succeeded in weakening our material forces, had not increased our moral strength."[140] It would be pointless to debate here whether the lowering of French morale, which undeniably came sometime during the interwar period, resulted from Locarno or whether it made Locarno possible, but whatever the answer is, the two things went together.

The effect of the Locarno treaties on the long-range relations between France and her eastern allies was grave indeed. The ties binding Paris and Warsaw weakened; Czechoslovak and Polish interests became less compatible, Poland bearing the brunt of German revisionism, Czechoslovakia basking in her apparent security. Jouvenel passed penetrating judgment on Locarno's influence on the eastern alliances when he wrote that "we put ourselves in a position in which we were incapable of helping our allies and this naturally led them to turn away from us. The Polish-German agreement of 1934 was logically included in the accords of Locarno."[141] This observation was eminently true, and no one should have been greatly surprised in Paris and Prague when a few months after Locarno Piłsudski emerged into power again and attempted a diplomatic game that disregarded the allies who could be of so little practical assistance to his country.

The post-1919 attempts to establish an eastern barrier under French leadership, a barrier that would provide protection from both Bolshevik Russia and Germany, had come full circle. Begun at the time of the Paris Peace Conference, never fully thought out, the attempts failed with regard to Soviet Russia in 1920, and after the direct Franco-German *rapprochement* at Locarno the idea of a barrier to restrict German action lost most of its meaning. All that remained of a grandiose project were shaky bilateral French alliances in East Central Europe.

[140] Peretti de la Rocca, "Briand et Poincaré," p. 769.
[141] *D'Une guerre à l'autre*, I, 399.

Appraisal

A PATTERN OF RELATIONS

THE preceding chapters of this study have set out in considerable detail the relations between France and her eastern allies, Czechoslovakia and Poland, during the important years from the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 to the conclusion of the Locarno Pact in 1925. It is necessary to look beyond these events, to the broad, general trends which marked French-Polish-Czechoslovak relations during this era. These trends are sometimes difficult to discern in the course of the historical narrative, and to understand their general pattern one must go beyond the chronological account and seek the policy-making forces in the three countries.

It is obvious that the foreign policy of any state results from an interplay of several factors: geography, economic and social structures, political forces, ideological trends, mass psychology, and national characteristics. All these have to be analyzed and their proper place assessed. One must also remember that policies are, in the final analysis, made and carried out by men who may not be free agents but who bring their own ideas, ambitions, and prejudices into the public life of their countries. If it were possible to dissect and fully examine all these elements of foreign policy, a clear picture of French-Czechoslovak-Polish relations would emerge; but this is beyond achievement, and conjecture, hypothesis, and interpretation are bound to be debatable and tentative. Yet, such speculation is in the nature of any conclusion to a complex subject—in the present instance a general examination of the factors molding the policies of, and relations between, Paris, Warsaw, and Prague.

Political geography and demography lay at the root of the French policy of eastern alliances. Twentieth-century France was confronted with an eastern neighbor, Germany, who far exceeded her in population and economic power. France possessed no natural frontier with Germany which could offer an adequate safeguard, and the strategic boundary on the Rhine which France had tried to achieve at the Peace Conference

was denied her. But, even this Rhine frontier, had it been obtained, could not have solved all the French problems, and hence geography dictated an association between France and the states east of Germany. The collapse of imperial Russia rather than a deliberate choice made Paris contract ties of alliance with the two states contiguous to Germany in the east: Poland and Czechoslovakia.

The two West Slav countries were a natural substitute for the Russian ally, but not fully a satisfactory one. Strategically, Poland and to a lesser degree Czechoslovakia were highly vulnerable, and unlike Russia neither nation possessed vast hinterlands, which were so important in wartime. Poland's western borders were open; and while Czechoslovakia commanded the Bohemian quadrilateral, a natural fortress of great strategic significance, she had other weaknesses. A natural boundary, the Carpathian Mountains, divided the two Slav states, making their political coordination difficult. Their remaining frontiers were highly insecure.

Czechoslovakia, long and narrow in shape, faced in the south Austria and Hungary, which if aligned with Germany could encircle and isolate the Czechoslovak republic. Hence, Prague was constantly preoccupied with her Danubian neighbors, and she was unwilling to commit herself exclusively to a French policy directed toward Germany to the neglect of Hungarian and Austrian problems. Poland's geographic position raised, of course, even graver issues. A long, drawn-out frontier with hardly any natural obstacles, except for the marshes of Polesie, separated Poland from the Soviet Union. No wonder Warsaw could not engage all her forces and energies against Germany with this threat from the east hanging over her head. Therefore the geographic situations of Czechoslovakia and Poland, while providing common interests with France vis-à-vis Germany, created other problems which Paris was obliged to take into account.

Any French flirtation with Hungary was bound to alarm Czechoslovakia; any French approaches to Russia raised Polish suspicions and fears. In that sense the eastern allies were simultaneously an asset to France with regard to Germany and a source of trouble with regard to Russia and the Danubian region.

The fact that Prague persuaded Paris to give up meddling in the Danubian basin, while Warsaw was unable to prevent direct French approaches to Russia, was not merely a result of the former's good diplomacy or the latter's bad diplomacy. France could afford to ignore Austria and Hungary, but she could not dismiss Russia. Here was one of the sources of constant friction not only between Poland and France but also between Poland and Czechoslovakia; the French and the Czechs

wanted Russian assistance to strengthen the eastern flank against Germany. A rather ineffective attempt by Poland to counter this policy by a flirtation with Hungary only increased the tension between Warsaw and Prague.

To turn from political geography to demographic factors one must realize that the combined populations of France, Czechoslovakia, and Poland were larger than that of Germany, but neither France alone nor the two eastern allies, even if together, could equal the German reservoir of manpower. Demographic trends favored Poland where the population was increasing rapidly, but the same was less true for Czechoslovakia and even less so for France.

Furthermore one must realize that population figures are only meaningful, as a factor in international relations, when taken in the general context of the economic and social structure of a country. Hence some attention must be devoted to socioeconomic problems.

The French economy after the First World War was seriously shaken, and in the years 1919 to 1925 commercial and above all financial difficulties plagued the country. Inter-Allied debts occupied an important position, since French indebtedness of over thirty billion francs to the Anglo-Saxon powers provided the latter with strong political and economic pressure. A shortage of manpower and an alarming population shift from the country to the cities created additional problems for the severely tried French economy.

The Polish economy, ruined by the First World War, was in serious difficulties. Predominantly agricultural, carrying the heritage of three different economic policies from the partitioning powers, Poland in the first years after the war faced problems of extraordinary magnitude. The country had to be reconstructed, economically unified, and modernized, and the means for this were practically nonexistent. While Poland made attempts to attract foreign capital, her insecure international position and inflationary trends made foreign investments risky. Consequently French capitalists who played an important role in the Polish economy were more interested in quick profits than in developing the country by systematically planned long-range investments. As a result of all these factors Poland, to use the words of one of her economic experts, was unable to reach "a financial, economic, and social equilibrium" during the period from 1919 to 1926.[1]

The impact of this situation on demographic factors was clear. While the Polish population was increasing far more rapidly than that of Czechoslovakia or France, the economic structure of the country did not allow full use of the available manpower. A "hidden unemployment" in the rural areas put a burden on the Polish economy; industrialization

[1] Adam Rosé, *La Politique polonaise entre les deux guerres* (Neuchâtel, 1945), p. 147.

was far too slow to absorb the expanding population. Thus the population figures, which seemed to point to a constant strengthening of Poland, and thereby of the anti-German front, were misleading, and the fact that the Poles outnumbered the Czechoslovaks by nearly two to one did not give an accurate idea of the relative power of the two countries.

In contrast to Poland, Czechoslovakia, with the richest and best developed parts of the Habsburg monarchy, untouched by war, was a picture of prosperity. Of the three states, Czechoslovakia's economy was by far the best balanced, and the industrialized Bohemia was complemented by the predominantly agrarian Slovakia. This could and did produce internal friction between the Czechs and the Slovaks, but its impact on foreign policy in the 1920s was still relatively slight. Prague was able to overcome rapidly her initial financial difficulties, and the Czech koruna became a far more stable currency than either the French franc or the Polish złoty. All this put Czechoslovakia in a privileged position, although from the point of view of the French alliance system, it was perhaps unfortunate that the smallest country of the three was the best off economically and that the vast Polish population and the great natural riches of France could not have weighed more heavily in the international balance.

Political geography dictated Franco-Polish-Czechoslovak collaboration, but the economic character of the three countries did not help to foster close links between them. "To her allies," Frank H. Simonds and Brooks Emeny have observed, "France could make loans and give military guarantees . . . but she could not offer them adequate markets for their agricultural and industrial surpluses." [2] The bulk of foreign trade of both Czechoslovakia and Poland went to Germany, giving rise to the view that East Central Europe was a natural area of German economic influence. France's economy was ill-designed to satisfy the needs of her two eastern allies, and French postwar policies did not improve matters. Protectionism, limitation of foreign imports, and reluctance to grant the most-favored-nation clause created difficulties. The attempts of French capitalists and merchants to exploit political relations for economic gains —as evidenced by the linking of the political alliance with economic conventions in 1921—were disliked but tolerated and sometimes encouraged for purely political reasons, as in the cases of Upper Silesia and Teschen.

Thus it appears that political considerations determined economic relations among the three countries, rather than vice versa, and so even the grandiose French scheme for economic penetration of the Danubian area in 1920 broke down largely because of the political opposition of Czechoslovakia. The building of the port of Gdynia was as much a polit-

[2] *The Great Powers in World Politics* (New York, 1939), p. 361.

ical as an economic event; French loans were generally designed to increase the military preparedness of the eastern allies. Their extensive military budgets (that of Poland amounted to one third of her total budget) were generally out of proportion to their economic capacities, and in that sense the alliance system put a heavy burden on the Poles and the Czechs.

Dealing with relations between economics and politics, one enters a field in which little documentation exists. How is one to evaluate the influence on French policy of such large concerns as the *Comité des Forges* or the *Comité des Houillères*? Is the fact that Poincaré had close connections with the *Comité des Forges* an indication that it influenced his diplomacy? What pressures if any could the French-controlled companies in Poland and Czechoslovakia exercise on the policies of Warsaw and Prague, and to what extent did the native big business affect those policies? Unless some evidence is forthcoming, all these important questions can be raised but not really answered.

How did the respective class structures in the three states affect their foreign policies? In that field as in those previously discussed one can observe striking differences among France, Czechoslovakia, and Poland. In highly industrialized Czechoslovakia, class conflicts were fairly sharp and they helped the growth of a large Communist party. The party's influence was felt on Prague's policy toward the Polish-Bolshevik war and to a lesser extent during the Ruhr crisis. Yet this influence was far from decisive, and the leadership of the state rested in the hands of the bourgeois, even if the latter were often of a recent peasant background. In the rather antiquated Polish social structure the supremacy of the intelligentsia, partly derived from and partly influenced by the landowning gentry, was evident. While at times social conflicts connected with land reform or industrial relations assumed serious proportions, as in 1923, the influence of extreme Leftist groups was small. This was largely a result of the internationalist outlook of the Communists which made them highly unpopular in nationalist-minded Poland, not to mention Poland's experiences with Soviet communism in 1920 and before. As for France, class consciousness and class antagonism were apparent, but again one can find little evidence of their direct influence on the conduct of French foreign policy, though there was a good deal of indirect influence, especially at the time of the emergence of the *Cartel des Gauches* in 1924. Moreover, unresolved social problems weakened France, but the full effects of this process were not fully felt before Locarno.

Therefore class antagonism and differences in social structures were not important factors in the foreign policies of the three states, except insofar as they influenced national psychologies and popular thinking about international matters.

Appraisal

An analysis of psychological factors is particularly difficult because it involves national character, national myths, and other *imponderabilia* which escape easy definition. One must also generalize without much tangible evidence, and there is the danger of oversimplifying highly complex phenomena. The fact remains that most Polish, Czechoslovak, and French people had definite ideas about each other. Whether these ideas were correct matters less than the realization that they influenced the behavior of each nation toward the others and remained a constant element in the Franco-Polish-Czechoslovak relations.

The Czechs believed that the Poles were greatly inspired by their past, especially as interpreted by the Polish Romantics who emphasized such notions as honor, patriotism, bravery, and sacrifice. The principal carrier of these ideas was the gentry, and since this class took a prominent role in Polish life the Czechs tended to identify its outlook with that of the entire nation. The Poles appeared by and large as romantically reared artistocrats whose notions of chivalry and military virtue could at times be combined with hard and relentless policies toward other nations. The Czechs pointed to past experiences with the Poles under the Habsburg monarchy to justify this opinion.

An astute Czech observer of the Polish scene, Václav Fiala, summarized the effect of Polish psychology on the country's policies: "It is typical of the Polish nature," he wrote, "that it conceives a great aim without being unduly concerned with the possibilities of attaining it, and without weighing the required strength on accurate scales. It prefers vain but grandiose efforts to moderate and repeated successes, or to small settlements of current issues. In the Polish dictionary the word compromise is not an expression *comme il faut.*"[3] The Poles thus appeared to the Czechs as basically rash and intransigent, especially in matters which seemed to affect their honor. This is what Beneš really meant when he accused Warsaw of following prestige policies during the Javořina crisis. The bold plan of Piłsudski in 1920 and the Polish desire to achieve either complete solidarity with Prague, or failing that, to reject all half-measures, appeared to confirm the Czech diagnosis. The Czechs found these characteristics highly irritating and difficult to understand. They invariably connected them with Polish class consciousness, which they resented and which clashed with their own egalitarian ideas.

Similarly, the Polish view of the Czechs contained some truth but was overdrawn and colored by emotion. The Polish upper class saw the Czechs as a half-peasant, half-bourgeois nation characterized by shrewdness and opportunism. While a Czech writer and politician once said that "Our creative faculty and our characteristic trait express themselves in

[3] Fiala, *Soudobé Polsko*, p. 163. The French is in the original.

the domain of the practical,"[4] the Poles saw a good deal of opportunism in a purely practical approach to things. Imbued with a traditional respect for martial virtues, they looked down on the Czechs whom they considered poor fighters. Fiala who spoke of the Polish contempt for the word "compromise" was right in the sense that to many Poles the term appeared synonymous with an abandonment of principles, and since the Czechs were masters of compromise it followed that they were naturally unprincipled. If the Czechs considered the Poles irrational romantics, the Poles felt that Czech rationalism was hardly more than a capacity for shrewd calculation, which they found on the whole distasteful. A Polish intellectual might admire Czech perseverance, hard work, and social discipline, but these were not qualities which would really appeal to him. The quick-tempered Pole saw the Czech as essentially slow and down-to-earth.

After centuries of being neighbors and having close linguistic affinities each nation felt that it really knew the other, and neither made genuine efforts to probe deeper into the other's psychology and understand it. It is interesting to note that few Czechs visited Poland or Poles Czechoslovakia, so there was little firsthand knowledge of prevailing conditions. The similarity of language was not always conducive to understanding, and both sides felt that there was something peculiar about the other's language which seemed a corruption of their own. Looking at the similarities and differences between the Czech and the Polish languages, where the same words meant different things and widely different expressions had the same meaning, one is tempted to treat them as symbolic of the frequent misunderstandings between the two nations. The affinity of languages, like that of politics or social life, may well provide sources of friction rather than promote amity. A Czech was not really a foreigner in Poland and neither was a Pole in Czechoslovakia, consequently both lacked the glamour which traditionally surrounded a foreigner in Central Europe. They were neighbors speaking an understandable tongue and brother Slavs, yet they were somehow far more different from each other than they ought to have been. Besides, the Pole appeared in Czech eyes as a megalomaniac. The Czechs seemed upstarts to the Poles.

The impact of these views and ideas on mutual relations was important. The Poles thought Czechoslovakia's reluctance to commit itself unreservedly to a pro-Polish policy vis-à-vis Germany or Russia was due to the calculating nature of the Czechs and to their inability to become genuine friends. The Czechs behaved like businessmen in politics, looking for the highest profits, and neither a trader nor a businessman was

[4] Hubert Ripka, "Le Fondateur de la Tchécoslovaquie: pionnier de la nouvelle Europe," *Le Monde Slave*, I (1936), 6.

held in high esteem in traditionally agrarian Poland. The Czechs though unwilling to identify themselves with Poland in international politics were prepared to carry on friendly relations, and they viewed Warsaw's determination to offer them all or nothing as another example of Polish unreasonableness and extremism. These Czech assurances of friendship devoid of far-reaching commitments were treated in Poland as mere hypocrisy. A vicious circle existed.

The traditional Czech and Polish attitudes toward other nations complicated the relations between Warsaw and Prague. The Poles always resented Czech Pan-Slavist, Slavist, or Neo-Slavist trends, and saw in them a sign of subservience to Russia. The Czechs were suspicious of Polish friendship toward Hungary, which appeared to be based primarily on class solidarity between the Polish gentry and the Magyar landowners. The Polish habit of drawing a sharp distinction between the Czechs and the Slovaks—the latter seemingly resembled the Poles much more closely—was another source of annoyance to Prague. Finally, the Czechs felt that among the Poles, those from ex-Galicia were least friendly to them while those from Poznania were more amicably disposed, and there was a modicum of truth in this surmise.

How did psychological motives affect French relations with the two West Slav nations? Both of them, though Poland probably to a greater extent than Czechoslovakia, were within the French sphere of cultural influence. This was particularly noticeable among the Polish upper classes and in certain parts of Poland where there was a veritable French cult. Historical traditions and myths largely accounted for this, and the Napoleonic legend, for instance, was probably stronger in Poland than in France. Romantic visions of glorious France influenced people's thinking more than the memories of French neglect of Poland's interests in the Napoleonic period, during the national uprisings, or even in the course of the First World War. This attitude underwent a certain change in the 1930s but was still very pronounced in the twenties. As for pro-French sentiment in Czechoslovakia, it was on the whole a more recent phenomenon. While less emotional than in Poland, it existed on a fairly wide scale, and one can safely conclude that the French system of eastern alliances was firmly grounded on the public sentiment of both the Czechoslovaks and the Poles.

The French were on the whole more vocal in their expressions of friendship for Poland than for Czechoslovakia, but in reality they probably understood and appreciated the Czechs better than they did the Poles. The mentality of the former was in many ways more "western" and appealed to the French just as it found sympathy in the Anglo-Saxon countries. French declamations about *la pauvre Pologne* or *la Pologne martyre*—favorite terms conveying sympathy to the brave but unlucky

Poles—often hid an astonishing ignorance of conditions in Poland. The average Frenchman had vague ideas about the Poles, associated with Sobieski, Marie Leszczyńska (usually misspelled Leczinska), and brave Polish exiles and revolutionaries. The Poles were often taken for granted as faithful comrades in arms, following the French star and basking in the glory which an association with France bestowed upon them. The French knew relatively little about the Czechoslovaks, but they remembered the pro-French attitude of the old Diet in Prague, and they felt the egalitarian, reasonable, and hard-working Czechs were worthy of support. The names of Masaryk and Beneš commanded respect especially in intellectual and Leftist circles. The close ties between French and Czechoslovak Free Masonry were often alleged to be a factor strengthening the amity of influential groups in both countries, but lack of evidence does not permit examination of this problem.

To the French public the eastern alliances appeared to be dictated by logic and history, and though many regretted the loss of their first love Russia, which had a tremendous appeal to French imagination, the new arrangement was popular and enjoyed the support of public opinion.

2

As for political forces, the major emphasis in the present volume, these questions at once arise: Where should one look for the policy-making factors in France, Poland, and Czechoslovakia? What were the political influences on the conduct of foreign policy?

To begin with the constitutional framework, one can say that the French constitution and electoral regime with their characteristic features of a strong legislature and a multiparty system served largely as models for Poland and Czechoslovakia. Parliament had a good deal of control over the government in other areas, but, for reasons mentioned later, control over foreign policy was limited. In coalition governments it is difficult for any single party to realize its program in foreign affairs. But while this generally holds true for all three countries, important differences in political structures in Poland, France, and Czechoslovakia require separate examination of the policy-making powers in each state.

In France, of course, the president of the republic theoretically enjoyed supreme authority over matters of foreign policy. In practice he could do little more than exert his influence and put pressure on the cabinet. Poincaré's attempts to override Clemenceau in 1919 were unsuccessful; Millerand had more say in 1920 and 1921, but he paid for it with the loss of his office in 1924. Deschanel and Doumergue had little influence on French diplomacy. It seems evident that on the whole the foreign minister rather than the president shaped the country's foreign

policy. This was especially true when men like Millerand, Poincaré, Briand, and Herriot united the offices of premier and minister of foreign affairs. When the two functions were separate either the premier dominated the foreign minister—this was the case with Clemenceau and Pichon—or vice versa, which was true with Briand and Painlevé.

Parliamentary control over foreign policy was more apparent than real. The French constitution did not require that all foreign treaties be submitted to Parliament for ratification, and secret conventions escaped Parliament altogether. While the foreign affairs committee discussed in detail questions of international importance, it had no power to institute inquiries or to publish its findings. The Chambers, while showing far more interest in foreign matters than in the pre-1914 period, were still mainly concerned with domestic issues. It is hard to find a parliamentary debate that would have changed the course of French diplomacy in the 1920s. Briand resigned after Cannes largely on a question of foreign policy, but he was not forced to do so by the Chambers. Poincaré's fall in 1924 was due chiefly to his policy on the Ruhr, but he was defeated in a general election and not overthrown by the Parliament. While foreign issues contributed to government changes, they were never the sole reason for them.

Under these conditions the premiers and the foreign ministers enjoyed a great deal of latitude in their diplomacy, although frequent cabinet changes—there were ten ministries in France from 1919 to 1925—restricted their chances of carrying out their policies. The execution and continuity of French foreign policy depended a good deal therefore on the permanent staff, and here such individuals as Berthelot and Paléologue played a very important role in the shaping of diplomacy.

During the period from the Paris Peace Conference to Locarno, France had several men with strong personalities who occupied the positions of premier and foreign minister, and their views deserve consideration. According to Bainville, these leaders represented four distinct schools of thought with regard to the Versailles settlement on which the entire system of international relations rested. Clemenceau thought that Versailles was the best obtainable treaty as long as it was properly used. Poincaré, who considered the treaty essentially bad, saw in it the only legal basis for French action, and he insisted on reaping every advantage from it by a rigid and full application of its clauses. Poincaré's legal training, his lawyer's mentality, and his efforts to make the best out of a poor case provide the key to his political outlook. Millerand, who in contrast to Poincaré believed in the actual rather than the legal rights which the Treaty of Versailles conferred on France, felt that with Allied (mainly British) cooperation the treaty could well serve French interests. Briand, finally, looked upon Versailles as dead by 1925, and he favored a prag-

matic approach to European politics, exploring possibilities and gaining advantages from the changing situation. The differences between these approaches were to a large extent of a tactical nature, and ideological notions colored them to a lesser extent. Herriot was probably the only one who believed that the ideology of his *Cartel* government could profoundly affect European politics; Briand was too astute for that.

As for the views of these French statesmen on a system of eastern alliances, their interpretation varied depending on their feeling about the solidity of Versailles, and also on the development of Franco-British and Franco-Russian relations. In that sense their policies toward Czechoslovakia and Poland were intimately connected with French relations to the other great powers. Clemenceau's determination to maintain Allied unity weakened his support of Polish territorial claims, though the latter were of strategic importance for France. Clemenceau's and Millerand's hopes for a reborn Russia made them cautious toward Poland's interests in the east. Millerand's views on the organization of a big bloc in East Central Europe, including Hungary, reflected his determination to increase French power and security. The same motives influenced him in the direction of an alliance with Poland in 1921. Poincaré with his unilateral attitude toward Germany treated Poland and Czechoslovakia as instruments of French policy without paying much attention to their problems. His insistence on a Franco-Czechoslovak treaty led to its signing in 1924. In contrast to Poincaré, Briand tried his best to reconcile eastern alliances with Franco-British cooperation, or even with a softer policy toward Germany. He failed to achieve his objectives in 1922 but was more successful at Locarno in 1925.

While the views of Clemenceau, Millerand, and Poincaré corresponded by and large to the opinions of the French Right, and those of Briand and Herriot on the Left, it would be difficult to identify them completely with any definite party programs. Both the Left and the Right, traditional forces in French politics, included groups and parties of different outlook, and the extremists — Communists on the one hand, and Royalists on the other — had no direct means of influencing cabinet decisions. The attitudes of the political parties toward international matters were, however, important since they created the general atmosphere in which French diplomacy operated.

The Left opposed Versailles as a vindictive treaty, and the Socialists voted against its ratification. In the years that followed, the Left encouraged the growth of a democratic spirit in Germany and favored more conciliatory policies than those pursued by the governing Rightist National Bloc. A large part of the Left was also well disposed toward the Soviet Union. This explains why the Left, which had been so strongly pro-Polish in the past when Polish revolutionaries fought both tsarist

Russia and the autocratic German empire, became noticeably cooler toward Poland in the 1920s. While the extreme Left showed a good deal of consistency in its denunciation of the "imperialism" of Millerand or Poincaré, the Radical Socialists followed more hesitant policies. They approved of the Versailles Treaty but began to grow doubtful after Briand's resignation in 1922. After the invasion of the Ruhr, Radical ministers remained in Poincaré's cabinet, and the party had to expel them from its ranks. This provides a good illustration of the usual splits in the Radical Socialist party.

The Right, in power until 1924, also showed frequent signs of hesitation in foreign matters. While more pro-Polish than the Left, it carried the heritage of the old Russian alliance and found it hard to realize that prewar Russia had disappeared forever. Hence its contradictory attitudes toward Polish-Russian problems, combining support to Poland against Bolshevism with fear of injuring Russian interests should the old Russia one day re-emerge. The French Right was less pro-Czechoslovak than the Left, not only on ideological grounds but because of the hopes of many Rightist groups to see a Danubian confederation. The Right while traditionally anti-German was not anti-Austrian, and some of the extremists believed that Germany rather than Austro-Hungary should have been broken up in 1919. This intransigence of the Right toward Germany, and its leniency toward Austria and Hungary, could not fail to alarm the Czechs.

Generally speaking both the Right and the Left, extremists excluded, accepted the system of eastern alliances as one of the elements of French diplomacy. The Rightist National Bloc approached it from a strong anti-German and anti-Soviet position, while the Leftist *Cartel* tended to subordinate it to a desire for British understanding and to a belief in the internationalization of security. A certain French weariness and the decline of *élan vital* contributed to narrowing the gap between the main political forces, and in 1925 both the Right and the Left were prepared to accept Locarno and see in it a reconciliation of eastern French interests with general stabilization of European politics.

In Poland, perhaps more than in France and Czechoslovakia, the connection between domestic and foreign politics was very close indeed. Under the constitution of March 1921—preceded by a provisional constitution—the power of the president of the republic was reduced to a bare minimum, and the legislature became nearly omnipotent. Bitter party strife between Right and Left, which found its full expression in the *Sejm*, led to the frequent overthrow of cabinets, and eleven of them came into existence from 1919 to 1925. Ten different men held the portfolio of foreign affairs—three of them in one cabinet, Grabski's, which was in power from 1923 to 1925. Two ministries (Paderewski's and Poni-

kowski's) fell over issues in foreign policy, and at least two foreign ministers, Zamoyski and Seyda, were forced to resign. Few Polish foreign ministers were acceptable to both the Right and the Left, and there were instances of nonparty ministers who drew attacks from both sides. During the period preceding adoption of the Polish constitution, Piłsudski as chief-of-state was able to exercise decisive influence over foreign policy and even to force one cabinet (Ponikowski-Skirmunt) to resign over a question of external relations; but that was exceptional and was largely due to Poland's critical position in 1920–1921. From late 1922 onward this was no longer possible and though each minister jealously guarded his department secrets, policies stood or fell with parliamentary approval or disapproval.

The cleavage between the Right and Left, which followed roughly the Dmowski and Piłsudski positions in foreign affairs, was naturally of greatest significance. The two schools of thought disagreed on Poland's policies in eastern Europe, on attitudes toward France and Czechoslovakia, and on Poland's role in international politics. Piłsudski's federalist program ran counter to the ideas of the Right, which did its best to oppose it even at the time of the Treaty of Riga. While this program could not be pursued after 1921 the bitterness connected with that issue remained.

Both Piłsudski and Dmowski had, of course, forceful personalities. Although Piłsudski ceased to be the head of the state in 1922 and temporarily retired from politics a year later, his influence remained considerable. Dmowski, apart from his activities at the Paris Peace Conference and a brief stay of less than two months as foreign minister, never exercised direct control over Poland's diplomacy, but his ideas were applied by his followers and collaborators. Piłsudski's views on foreign (as on domestic) affairs stemmed from his consideration of Poland's position in military and strategic terms, and these views were colored by his spirit of independence and his shrewd appraisal of realities. Even his supposedly romantic schemes of federation had a strong realistic touch, but it was a kind of realism learned in the tough revolutionary school and differed greatly from the rationalism of such men as Beneš. Piłsudski believed in the French alliance but was often skeptical about the French, and he resented the fact that Poland appeared to be France's satellite. He had little liking for Czechoslovak statecraft, but he respected Masaryk. Among the Polish foreign ministers, Patek, Narutowicz, and Skrzyński were perhaps closest to Piłsudski in their outlook on foreign affairs, though none of them was really an exponent of Piłsudski's diplomacy.

Dmowski was in many ways a doctrinaire, and his influence on the direction of Polish thinking toward nationalism was profound. He was more of a rationalist than Piłsudski and felt that Polish foreign policy

ought to rely on France and aim at a *modus vivendi* with Czechoslovakia. For ideological reasons he was strongly anti-Soviet, though less anti-Russian than Piłsudski, and he approached the German issue with a less open mind than the marshal. His understanding of economic problems was probably greater than Piłsudski's, and he saw many of the international problems as a theorist rather than an active diplomat. There are few if any traces of pragmatism in Dmowski's thinking. His influence on Polish foreign policies can be seen through the policies of the men who stood close to him at one time or another, such as Seyda, Skirmunt, and Zamoyski.

Among the Polish foreign ministers and diplomats who showed individuality and imaginative thinking, one should include Skirmunt and Piltz on the one hand and Narutowicz and Skrzyński on the other. None of them stayed in office long enough to carry his policies to a logical conclusion. Internal difficulties made the task of each one of them hard and thankless.

The position of the Right on international politics corresponded to that of Dmowski, and was characterized by an uncritically pro-French orientation and the advocacy of an entente with Czechoslovakia. Although ministers like Seyda staked their careers on the Czechoslovak issue, the Right could show no real gains in foreign affairs. It persisted in its efforts, and ideological affinities between the Polish and the French Right seemed on the surface to cement Franco-Polish cooperation.

The attitude of the Left was often characterized by skepticism. The Left tried on several occasions to complement Poland's reliance on France with overtures to England, but registered no success. It doubted the possibility of cooperation with Czechoslovakia and exhibited a spirit of mistrust of Prague's intentions. Many Leftists theoretically favored the League of Nations, but practical experience in Geneva was not calculated to make the Poles enthusiastic about that organization. The Left accepted the French alliance as the cornerstone of Poland's foreign policy for want of any other choice, but here again it resented French interference in Polish political and economic life.

As one can easily see, the two main forces in Polish politics differed considerably in their views of foreign affairs, but when it came to practical matters neither the Right nor the Left was able to realize its program in international politics. While Leftist or Rightist ministers of foreign affairs could so easily fall because of domestic or foreign issues, their practical possibilities of maneuvering were severely limited. Government instability aggravated matters, and able ministers were prevented from assuring continuity to Polish diplomacy.

But reasons for Polish shortcomings in domestic and foreign politics went deeper than that. No Polish minister, whether following the Right-

ist or the Leftist program, could break the Russo-German ring of hostility around his country; none had a real choice of allies, and each had to rely on France in one way or another; none could afford to ignore Czechoslovakia. As a French historian pointedly remarked, "It was a tragedy for Poland to have been reborn too weak to be a power, and strong enough to aspire to more than the status of a small state." [5]

The international position of Poland affected the country's domestic, political, economic, and social life, and added to its instability; domestic difficulties in turn had a bearing on Poland's diplomacy by weakening and disrupting it. Partisan feeling receded into the background only in moments of crisis, as during the war with Russia in 1920; at other times it dominated the scene, though neither the Left nor the Right could offer a program that would solve Poland's problems in the 1920s.

To complete the picture one must turn from Poland's domestic affairs to those of Czechoslovakia. There was a striking contrast between the situations of the two West Slav countries.

The Czechoslovak constitutional system was characterized by a sensible adaptation of the French model to existing conditions, which resulted in a happy balance between the executive and the legislative powers. The powers of the president of the republic were more extensive than those of the presidents of France or Poland. The Czech president had the right to preside over cabinet meetings. Moreover, since President Masaryk enjoyed unrivaled prestige in the country, his voice carried great weight and influence. In spite of a proportional system of representation, government coalitions in Czechoslovakia were stronger and lasted longer than in the other two states, and relative domestic stability found its expression in foreign policy. The country was fortunate in having one man in charge of diplomacy during the entire period from 1918 to 1925, and the fact that Beneš, a disciple and collaborator of Masaryk, was foreign minister in every cabinet encouraged harmonious cooperation and assured a continuity of Czechoslovak policies. It is true, of course, that frequent cabinet changes occurred, and there were six ministries from 1918 to 1925, but if one looks closely at them he sees that four cabinets were formed before 1922 and two remained in power from late 1922 to 1925, a clear indication of increasing stability. While Beneš as foreign minister was naturally affected by ministerial crises and faced the problem of dealing with new colleagues, his position, supported by Masaryk and enhanced by diplomatic successes, compared favorably with that of any French or Polish minister of foreign affairs.

In the struggle of political trends and parties for influence over Czechoslovak foreign policy, Beneš had to contend mainly with the National Democrats on the Right and the Socialists and Communists on the Left.

[5] Louis Eisenmann, "La Question de Teschen," *La Vie des Peuples*, I (1920), 837.

Appraisal

The foreign policy platform of the National Democrats was largely formed and influenced by Kramář. This veteran politician with a strong personality favored a Pan-Slavist or Neo-Slavist line in Czechoslovak diplomacy. He advocated cooperation with other Slavs and primarily with Russia, which he hoped would re-emerge again as a non-Bolshevik power. Beneš was undoubtedly right when he labeled this Neo-Slavism as traditional, romantic, and Rightist if not reactionary. Kramář's program was unrealistic, but it received its driving force from Czech nationalism and traditional regard for Russia. The National Democrats were ever critical of Czechoslovak diplomacy and described it as exclusively western-oriented, but Beneš was on safe ground again when he pointed out that this was not the result of an a priori position but of the existing conditions. Besides, Beneš also favored cooperation with Russia, and in 1922, 1924, and 1925 he made efforts to balance the western orientation with closer relations with the big eastern power.

Kramář had a definite dislike for the Poles, who were anti-Slavist by tradition, and his aggressive attitude toward the Poles influenced the National Democratic party. In 1920 and at the time of the Javořina dispute the National Democratic pressure made it difficult for Beneš to be more conciliatory with regard to Poland. While Kramář did not regain power after his electoral defeat at the time of the Paris Peace Conference, his party was influential enough—largely because of the strong men within it— to make itself felt in Czechoslovak politics.

The Czechoslovak Left, the Socialists and the Communists, constituted important party groups in the Parliament, and the Socialists participated in most of the coalition ministries. The Socialist leader Tusar led two out of the six cabinets during this period. Yet the influence of the Left, especially the extreme Left, on Czech foreign policy was perhaps less than one might have expected. In a sense the extremists of the Right and the Left canceled each other out, and provided Beneš with the argument that his middle-of-the-road policy was the only feasible one. The Left was sympathetic toward the Soviet Union and put its trust in German democracy. It was critical of the French National Bloc and of Poincaré's policies, and enthusiastically welcomed the *Cartel des Gauches*. The Left criticized Beneš for precisely those policies which appealed to the Right and vice versa, and the foreign minister was able to gain support by combining the less extreme demands of both groups and carrying them out successfully.

One could say, thus, that while the Left and the Right at times limited Beneš's freedom of action and kept his policy on a middle course, neither group ever gained decisive influence over Czechoslovak diplomacy. Moreover, if pressures of the extremists made the task of Beneš difficult, he could occasionally exploit those pressures for propaganda

purposes and impress foreign, especially French, statesmen with the necessity of acceding to his demands to avoid his resignation from the foreign ministry. He generally obtained full satisfaction.

It is important to realize that the middle-of-the-road character of Czechoslovak diplomacy—stemming partly from the need for compromise at home, partly from Czechoslovakia's position in Europe—accorded well with Beneš's rationalism and his belief in the value of compromise in politics. Czech foreign policy was not merely opportunistic but rested on the firm foundations of Masarykian realism,[6] as interpreted and applied by Beneš. The foreign minister viewed diplomacy as a science, insofar as a politician must look for the "constant, the regular, the systematically occurring," and an art, which requires intuition, feeling, and a creative genius. "To be calm, prudent, scientifically reserved in matters of foreign policy," wrote Beneš, "is a categorical imperative for every politician active today in a democratic regime." [7] The foreign minister went so far as to state that "we created a political system supported by a philosophical approach and scientifically proved," and he argued that all Czechoslovak diplomacy stemmed from it. Starting from basic premises, Beneš declared, "we evaluated, calculated, considered, almost in mathematical terms, the interests which link us with Western Europe and especially with France," and the result was a pro-French line in Czech policy. Similarly with regard to Poland, the Czechs "took into consideration the existing conditions, historical tradition, assets and liabilities, genuine interests of and real threats to Poland, and we measured out our definite relation toward her." [8]

According to Beneš, this rationalistic approach, unaffected by passion or sentiment, excluded or at least minimized the element of risk in Franco-Czech relations, and that is why Prague viewed with such concern Poincaré's policy toward Germany, the effects of which seemed incalculable. With regard to Poland, Czechoslovakia also sought advantages without risks, and as a Polish diplomat characterized Czech diplomacy, its objective was "to do only as much as was required by a friendly but neutral neighborly relationship, plus special regard for the parallelism of the French alliance." [9] Czechoslovak diplomacy ran counter to the idea of an eastern barrier, which Beneš felt would compromise Czechoslovakia vis-à-vis both Germany and Russia. He advocated instead the idea of Czechoslovakia being a bridge between the east and the west. Beneš's moderate diplomacy expressed itself in cautious maneuvering

[6] Masaryk's notion of realism must of course not be confused with any kind of Bismarckian *Realpolitik*.

[7] Beneš, "Zahraniční politika a demokracie: Problémy a metody naší zahraniční politiky," *Zahraniční Politika*, I (1923), 373.

[8] *Ibid.*, 381–382.

[9] Bader, *Stosunki polsko-czeskie*, p. 27.

within three systems: the Little Entente, the French alliance, and the League of Nations. The Little Entente secured Czech interests in East Central Europe; the link with France provided a safeguard against Germany; the League finally complemented the others and brought security through international means. In this general system Franco-British cooperation was essential for the working of the League, and the Franco-German *détente* contributed to peace. Beneš of course strongly favored both.

The personality of the foreign minister heavily influenced Czechoslovak diplomatic methods. Beneš, as his one-time secretary Eduard Taborský remarked, was the "Grand Master of Compromise" and he combined a "methodical Cartesian rationalism" with the "practical approach of a hard-bargaining, down-to-earth Czech peasant." His temperament as well as his *Weltanschauung* made him dislike risks, and he viewed national risks in terms not only of the present but also of the future. Beneš's experiences in Geneva, where he shone as a diplomat and negotiator, made him acquire the habit of "suitable formulas for resolving diplomatic deadlocks," [10] and perhaps in time he forgot that formulas help to side-step issues but rarely solve the problems themselves.

Beneš's likes and dislikes also affected his policies, though generally he was not swayed by passion and sentiment. He liked France, where he had studied and won his first diplomatic laurels, and this was important because Masaryk had less knowledge of France and generally preferred the Anglo-Saxon countries. It is doubtful whether Beneš had any real liking for the Poles, and his outlook, mentality, and attitude to politics offered a complete contrast to those of the majority of the Polish leaders. Certainly Masaryk on more than one occasion expressed skepticism of Polish statecraft.

While Masaryk towered over the Czechoslovak scene in the 1920s, Beneš had a much closer contact with everyday matters and with the conduct of foreign policy. Thus when one looks at the forces which shaped Czechoslovak diplomacy during this period, the figure of Beneš comes naturally to the fore as the single most important factor in the Czechoslovak republic.

In examining the elements which conditioned relations among France, Czechoslovakia, and Poland, one naturally emphasizes the principal factors and excludes a host of lesser forces. Before attempting some final conclusions, it may be worthwhile to mention the problem of national minorities, which amounted to nearly one third of the Czechoslovak population and a little less of the Polish.

In Poland the existence of a sizable German minority in the west and

[10] Eduard Taborský, "The Triumph and Disaster of Eduard Benes," *Foreign Affairs*, XXXVII (1957–58), 669–670.

a big Ukrainian minority in the east weakened the cohesion of the state and provided an opportunity for foreign intervention especially through the League of Nations. Czechoslovak interest in the Ukrainians made Warsaw resentful. The French and Czechs at times used the Polish treatment of national minorities as a political weapon. The minority issue which became acute under the National Democratic administration in the middle 1920s made Poland vulnerable to foreign criticism.

Minority problems in Czechoslovakia were even more important. The big German bloc in the western areas of the republic weighed heavily on Czechoslovak politics. The reluctance of Prague to adopt strongly anti-German policies resulted not only from a belief in the growing democracy of the Weimar republic but also from domestic considerations. The role of the German Socialists in the Prague Parliament, and their close contacts with the Czech Socialists, affected both domestic and foreign relations. The presence of a large Hungarian minority increased Prague's mistrust of Budapest and made the Czechs especially sensitive to any Hungarian moves. The Polish minority in Teschen, finally, affected gravely the relations between Warsaw and Prague; the problem of the Teschen Poles appeared whenever Czechoslovak-Polish relations deteriorated. The Slovak-Czech issue did not fall, properly speaking, into the national minority category but was connected more with constitutional problems of the state. However, the Poles were prone to exploit Czech-Slovak differences, so this issue also affected the relations between Prague and Warsaw.

While national minorities taken by themselves could not be considered a decisive element in Czechoslovak or Polish diplomacy, their existence undoubtedly created domestic complications which were reflected in the foreign policies of both West Slav states.

3

The French system of eastern alliances was based on realities, and yet it possessed inherent shortcomings which prevented the system from ever becoming fully effective. Political geography, the postwar situation on the continent of Europe, and fear of German revenge provided the foundations for the eastern barrier. Economic incompatibilities among the three states accounted for the fact that cooperation among France, Czechoslovakia, and Poland never really extended to the economic and social spheres. Psychological elements encouraged Franco-Polish and Franco-Czechoslovak amity, but they made any genuine Polish-Czechoslovak friendship difficult indeed.

The greatest divergences existed, however, in the realm of politics, or to put it more precisely, in the policies in East Central Europe. Poland,

endangered from both the west and east, believed in the necessity of a bloc comprised of all the major states in this area and connected with France by ties of partnership. Paris favored such a bloc under its influence, seeing, however, its only function as restraint of Germany (and Bolshevism), but not Russia, whom the French hoped to bring over eventually to their side. While Poland demanded complete solidarity and full commitments, France was hesitant because she sought simultaneously to solve general problems of security with England's help, and the British had no interest in the states east of Germany. As time went on France felt it necessary to rely more and more on London, even at the price of limiting her commitments in East Central Europe.

Czechoslovakia believed that full cooperation with Poland was inopportune because it would unnecessarily expose the country to German antagonism and offend Russia, whom Prague like Paris saw as a possible future ally against Germany. The most that Warsaw could ever obtain from Czechoslovakia were promises that Prague would not harm Polish interests in the east, a negative and limited formula.[11] Czechoslovak interests as conceived by the Czechoslovak government in the 1920s were hardly compatible with those of Poland.

The policy of each nation—France, Poland, and Czechoslovakia—was based on considerations of national security, and it is not surprising that each state tried to commit the others to its defense. Seen from a perspective of more than thirty years, both Paris and Prague failed to appreciate fully the long-range community of interests with Poland. When an aggressive Germany re-emerged under Hitler, Poland and Czechoslovakia were isolated from each other, and France, having lost a good deal of her initiative to Britain, was hardly in a position to give full assistance and protection to her eastern allies. If Prague had realized that the risk of an alliance with Poland was preferable to the less immediate risk of isolation—the Little Entente was of no use against an aggressive great power—she might have helped to create a united bloc of forty million people or more in East Central Europe. Such a bloc would perhaps have been able to put greater pressure on France and draw her away from Locarno and subsequent dependence on England. France in turn, seeing close collaboration between Prague and Warsaw, might have been able to pursue more consistent and determined policies toward East Central Europe, Germany, and Russia.

If one looks at the forces molding the foreign policies of France, Poland, and Czechoslovakia in the 1920s, he can see why these things

[11] It is interesting that in the Polish-Czechoslovak negotiations in London during the Second World War, Beneš used the same negative formula, promising not to "act in any way as to injure Polish actions or intentions." See my *Czechoslovak-Polish Confederation and the Great Powers 1940–1943* (Bloomington, 1956), p. 81.

did not happen. The rationalistic approach of Beneš, firmly grounded in his Czech mentality, precluded a policy of risk and took for granted the basic differences in approach between Warsaw and Prague. France, influenced by the experiences of the First World War, alive to the disunity of her allies, was engaged in a desperate search for security which blurred long-range visions. Polish attempts to enlist the support of the other two states, inconsistently pursued and punctuated by nationalistic outbursts of self-confidence, strengthened the conviction of the French and the Czechs that Poland was a risk and liability.

It is true, of course, that the six years which followed the First World War were too short a period to allow a crystallization of any stable relations between the three countries. France, bled white by the great conflict, deprived of old allies, and afflicted by domestic consequences of the war, could only grope about in a search for security. Poland—re-emerging as a state after a century and a half of partitions, rebuilding or building on weak foundations her political, economic, and social structure, and confronted with almost insoluble problems—had barely succeeded in consolidating her territorial position. Czechoslovakia, though more fortunate in many respects, sought to safeguard her newly won freedom and elevated her initially successful diplomatic formulas into scientific dogmas, but the brief period of the 1920s was not long enough to test them in practice. Time was short, and the swift current of international life moved on relentlessly. By late 1925 only a few years remained before the statesmen of Paris, Warsaw, and Prague would face the rising tide which brought with it the Depression, Hitler, and eventually the cataclysm that paralyzed France and engulfed Poland and Czechoslovakia.

Appendixes

Appendix I

JOINT FRANCO-POLISH COMMUNIQUÉ ISSUED IN PARIS ON FEBRUARY 6, 1921 [1]

Les deux Gouvernements de France et de Pologne, également soucieux de sauvegarder leur sécurité et la paix de l'Europe, ont reconnu une fois de plus la communauté des intérêts qui unissent les deux pays amis. Ils ont été d'accord pour confirmer leur volonté de coordonner leurs efforts, et dans ce but, de maintenir étroitement leurs contacts pour la défense des intérêts supérieurs.

Appendix II

POLITICAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN FRANCE AND POLAND SIGNED IN PARIS ON FEBRUARY 19, 1921 [2]

Le GOUVERNEMENT POLONAIS et le GOUVERNEMENT FRANÇAIS, également soucieux de sauvegarder, par le maintien des traités qui ont été signés en commun ou qui seront ultérieurement respectivement reconnus, l'état de paix en Europe, la sécurité et la défense de leur territoire ainsi que leurs intérêts mutuels politiques et économiques, ont convenu ce qui suit:

1. Afin de coordonner leurs efforts pacifiques, les deux Gouvernements s'engagent à se concerter sur toutes les questions de politique extérieure intéressant les deux Etats et relatives au règlement des relations internationales dans l'esprit des traités et conformément au Pacte de la Société des Nations.

2. Le relèvement économique étant la condition primordiale du rétablissement de l'ordre international et de la paix en Europe, les deux Gouvernements s'entendront à cet égard en vue d'une action solidaire et d'un mutuel appui.

Ils s'emploieront à développer leurs relations économiques; des accords spéciaux et une convention commerciale seront conclus à cet effet.

3. Si, contrairement aux prévisions et aux intentions sincèrement pacifiques des deux Etats contractants, ceux-ci ou l'un des deux se voyaient attaqués sans provocation de leur part, les deux Gouvernements se concerteraient en vue de la défense de leur territoire et de la sauvegarde de leurs intérêts légitimes dans les limites précisées dans le préambule.

4. Les deux Gouvernements s'engagent à se consulter avant de conclure de nouveaux accords intéressant leur politique en Europe centrale et orientale.

5. Le présent Accord n'entrera en vigueur qu'après la signature des accords commerciaux actuellement en négociation.

Paris, le 19 février 1921

(Signé) A. Briand
(Signé) E. Sapieha

---

[1] Georges Suarez, *Briand* (6 vols., Paris, 1938–52), V, 156.

[2] *League of Nations Treaty Series*, vol. 18 (1923), 12.

Appendix III

FRANCO-POLISH SECRET MILITARY CONVENTION SIGNED IN PARIS ON FEBRUARY 21, 1921[3]

En exécution de l'accord du 19 février 1921, il est convenu entre les représentants militaires soussignés dûment autorisés par leurs Gouvernements respectifs:

Article I

Les deux Gouvernements dans le cas où la situation en Allemagne deviendrait menaçante au point d'impliquer un danger de guerre contre l'un des pays et notamment en cas de mobilisation allemande, comme aussi dans le cas où l'exécution du Traité de Versailles viendrait à nécessiter une action commune de leur part, s'engagent à renforcer leurs préparatifs de façon à être en mesure de se prêter un concours efficace et rapide et à agir en commun. En cas d'agression allemande contre l'un des deux pays, les deux pays sont également tenus de se prêter le concours, suivant un commun accord.

Sera considéré comme agression de l'Allemagne toute agression partant d'un territoire relevant du Gouvernement Allemand, tel que ce territoire est délimité par le Traité de Versailles.

Article II

Dans le cas où la Pologne serait menacée d'une guerre par la République des Soviets ou dans le cas d'une attaque de cette dernière, la France s'engage à agir tant sur terre que sur mer pour contribuer à assurer à la Pologne la sécurité vis-à-vis de l'Allemagne, telle que ce pays est défini ci-dessus, comme aussi à l'aider dans sa défense contre l'armée des Soviets.

Article III

Dans l'une et l'autre des éventualités envisagées aux Articles I et II ci-dessus, l'aide directe que la France s'engage à porter en Pologne, pourra consister en l'envoi de matériel de guerre et de chemins de fer, ainsi que de personnel technique, mais non dans l'envoi de troupes françaises combattant en renfort de l'armée polonaise. La France s'engage également, dans la mesure de ses moyens, à assurer la sécurité des lignes de communications entre elle et la Pologne y compris les lignes maritimes.

Article IV

. . . . . .

a) L'unification de l'armement d'infanterie en armes des modèles en service en France;

b) L'unification de l'armement de l'artillerie en matériel des modèles en service en France;

c) La constitution d'un stock de mobilisation en munitions d'infanterie et d'artillerie et en grenades pour six mois de guerre;

d) L'entretien et le développement du matériel d'aviation et de transmissions;

e) Les moyens de protection contre les gaz asphyxiants.

---

[3] This text is reconstructed from a report of January 18, 1928, submitted by the director of the political department, Jackowski, to Foreign Minister August Zaleski. General Sikorski Historical Institute, *Documents from the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Political Department*, "Francja-Polska," A 11/3. The report, marked top secret, dealt with a French proposal for a new military convention. The report reproduced in their entirety Articles I, II, III, and VI of the 1921 convention, and had other original articles written in (in pencil) above the corresponding new articles. The reproduction of Article IV is obviously incomplete, and the missing part presumably referred to the size of the Polish army, which was to consist of 30 infantry divisions and 9 cavalry brigades.

Le tout sera calculé sur la base indiquée à l'alinéa A du présent article, étant entendu que les divisions d'infanterie seront à trois régiments de 3 bataillons (chaque bataillon ayant une compagnie de mitrailleuses) et deux régiments d'artillerie divisionnaire comprenant 3 groupes de 3 batteries de 4 pièces d'artillerie de campagne et 1 groupe de 3 batteries de 4 pièces d'artillerie lourde.

Article V

En vue d'assurer à l'armée polonaise le matériel nécessaire à sa mobilisation et à son ravitaillement pendant la guerre, la Pologne s'engage à développer, avec l'aide de la France, son industrie de guerre conformément à un plan spécial.

Article VI

Les états-majors des deux pays contractants s'entendront constamment sur les préparatifs et les moyens nécessaires à l'exécution des décisions de la présente convention et au maintien des lignes de communication entre les deux pays.

Article VII

Les décisions de l'accord du . . . concernant la mission militaire française en Pologne pourront être soumises, après chaque période d'une année, à une révision, à la condition d'une entente préalable entre les deux Etats. En vue d'assurer une harmonie complète et l'indispensable collaboration intime entre les officiers français de ladite mission, les commandements et autorités militaires polonaises auprès desquels ces officiers seront accrédités, les renseigneront sur toutes les affaires courantes et les inviteront à toutes les conférences, séances et conseils afin de leur donner la possibilité de se prononcer en temps utile.

D'autre part, la Pologne:

a) instituera en France, auprès de l'attaché militaire polonais un bureau de liaison composé d'officiers;

b) détachera dans les écoles et corps de troupes de l'armée française, pour y suivre un cycle entier d'instruction, un nombre d'officiers à fixer d'entente entre les états-majors.

Article VIII

Le présent accord n'entrera en vigueur qu'après la signature des accords commerciaux actuellement en négociation.

Appendix IV

POLITICAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND POLAND SIGNED IN PRAGUE ON NOVEMBER 6, 1921[4]

Egalement soucieux de sauvegarder la paix en Europe et fermement désireux d'organiser les relations entre la Tchécoslovaquie et la Pologne sur la base de la solidarité de leurs

[4] République Tchécoslovaque, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, *Documents Diplomatiques relatifs aux conventions d'alliance conclues par la République Tchécoslovaque avec le Royaume des Serbes, Croates et Slovènes et le Royaume de Roumanie. Décembre 1919–Août 1921* (Prague, 1923), pp. 181–184.

intérêts mutuels politiques et économiques, le Gouvernement tchécoslovaque et le Gouvernement polonais se sont entendus pour conclure un Accord politique.

Dans ce but, les Chefs des deux Etats ont nommé pour leurs plénipotentiaires:

Le Président de la République Tchécoslovaque, son Président du Conseil et Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, Monsieur le Dr. Edouard Beneš,

Le Chef de l'Etat Polonais, son Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, Monsieur Constantin Skirmunt,

Lesquels, après s'être communiqué leurs pleins pouvoirs, reconnus en bonne et due forme, ont convenu des engagements suivants.

Article 1

Les deux Etats se donnent mutuellement la garantie de l'état de possession, ayant pour base les traités sur lesquels reposent l'indépendance et l'organisation d'Etat de la Pologne et de la Tchécoslovaquie. Les deux Etats vont se concerter, quand le besoin et l'occasion l'exigeront, sur l'application des traités signés en commun.

Article 2

Les deux Etats s'engagent à garder la neutralité bienveillante dans le cas où l'un d'eux serait attaqué par un de leurs voisins, et particulièrement à assurer le libre transit du matériel de guerre.

Article 3

La Tchécoslovaquie déclare son désintéressement dans la question de la Galicie Orientale. En conséquence de cet acte, elle prend l'obligation de dissoudre les formations ukrainiennes qui étaient internées en Tchécoslovaquie et de réprimer toute propagande active, tendant à détacher un territoire quelconque de la République de Pologne.

Des obligations analogues sont prises par la Pologne envers la Tchécoslovaquie.

Dorénavant, chacun des deux Etats s'engage à ne tolérer sur son territoire aucune organisation politique ou militaire, dirigée contre l'intégrité et la sécurité de l'autre Etat.

Article 4

Les deux Gouvernements prennent note des conventions politiques, militaires et économiques conclues entre la Tchécoslovaquie, la Roumanie et la Yougoslavie, d'une part, et des conventions analogues conclues entre la Pologne, la France et la Roumanie, de l'autre.

Article 5

Une convention commerciale entre la Tchécoslovaquie et la Pologne réglera entre ces deux Etats toutes les questions économiques et financières, ainsi que celles relatives au transit.

Article 6

Les deux Parties s'engagent à ce que, dans toutes les questions litigieuses d'une plus haute portée, les deux Etats auront recours à un arbitrage. Les questions devant être résolues par un arbitrage pourront être, par un commun accord entre les deux Gouvernements, soumises à des arbitres choisis ad hoc ou bien seront portées devant la Cour de Justice Internationale.

Article 7

Engagement réciproque est pris par les deux Etats qu'aucun accord nouveau qui contreviendrait au présent accord ne sera conclu par eux avec d'autres Etats.

Article 8

La durée du présent accord est de cinq ans, à partir de l'échange des notes de ratification, mais chacun des deux Gouvernements est libre de le dénoncer après deux ans, tout en avisant l'autre Etat six mois à l'avance.

Article 9

Le présent accord sera ratifié et les instruments de ratification seront échangés dans le plus bref délai.

En foi de quoi, les plénipotentiaires ont signé le présent accord et y ont apposé leurs sceaux

Fait en double exemplaire à Prague, le 6 Novembre 1921.

Edouard Beneš Constantin Skirmunt

Appendix V

ANNEX TO THE CZECHOSLOVAK-POLISH POLITICAL AGREEMENT OF NOVEMBER 6, 1921 [5]

Dès la signature du présent accord, les deux Parties Contractantes s'engagent à mettre en exécution les mesures spéciales qui suivent:

A/ Le règlement des questions et des litiges locaux sur l'ancien territoire plébiscitaire de Cieszyn, Spisz et Orawa sera effectué à l'aide d'une Délégation spéciale polono-tchécoslovaque, constituée de réprésentants des deux Etats nommés en nombre égal. Cette Délégation, étant munie de pleins-pouvoirs étendus et précis prendra les dispositions nécéssaires en vue d'établir dans la région en question un état de légalité, d'équité et de justice, et de contribuer de la sorte à l'apaisement dans les rapports entre Polonais et Tchécoslovaques.

La Délégation sera partagée en deux Sous-Délégations, polonaise et tchécoslovaque. Chacune de ces Sous-Délégations sera tenue d'appliquer sur le territoire rélevant de sa compétence les décisions prises en commun par le Délégation.

La délégation sera chargée d'intervenir dans les cas où une atteinte serait portée aux libertés personnelles, aux droits des minorités nationales dans l'administration des communes et des districts politiques dans la vie scolaire, ainsi que dans tous les domaines de l'activité économique et spécialement de l'organisation du travail.

B/ Le règlement dans un délai de six mois par l'entente directe et amiable des deux Gouvernements de la question de la commune de Jaworzyna.

Fait en double exemplaire à Prague, le 6 Novembre 1921.

Konstanty Skirmunt
Dr. Edvard Beneš

---

[5] This text is taken from a mimeographed copy in *Ciechanowski Deposit*, archives of the Polish legation and embassy in the United States, Hoover Institution.

Appendix VI

TREATY OF ALLIANCE AND FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN FRANCE AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA SIGNED IN PARIS ON JANUARY 25, 1924 [6]

LE PRÉSIDENT DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE et LE PRÉSIDENT DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE TCHÉCOSLOVAQUE,

fermement attachés au principe des engagements internationaux confirmé solennellement par le Pacte de la Société des Nations,

également soucieux de sauvegarder la paix dont le maintien est nécessaire à la stabilité politique et au relèvement économique de l'Europe,

résolus à cet effet d'assurer le respect de l'ordre juridique et politique international établi par les traités qu'ils ont signés en commun,

considérant que pour atteindre ce but des garanties réciproques de sécurité contre une agression éventuelle, et en vue de la défense de leurs intérêts communs, leur sont indispensables,

ont désigné pour leurs plénipotentiaires, savoir:

LE PRÉSIDENT DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE:

M. Raymond Poincaré, Président du Conseil, ministre des Affaires étrangères;

LE PRÉSIDENT DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE TCHÉCOSLOVAQUE:

M. Edvard Benes, ministre des Affaires étrangères,

Lesquels, après avoir échangé leurs pleins pouvoirs reconnus en bonne et due forme, ont convenu des dispositions suivantes:

Article 1

Les Gouvernements de la République française et de la République tchécoslovaque s'engagent à se concerter sur les questions extérieures de nature à mettre en danger leur sécurité et à porter atteinte à l'ordre établi par les Traités de paix dont ils sont l'un et l'autre signataires.

Article 2

Les Hautes Parties contractantes se mettront d'accord sur les mesures propres à sauvegarder leurs intérêts communs dans le cas où ils seraient menacés.

Article 3

Les Hautes Parties contractantes pleinement d'accord sur l'importance que présentent pour le maintien de la paix générale les principes d'ordre politique contenus dans l'article 88 du Traité de Paix de Saint-Germain-en-Laye du 10 septembre 1919, ainsi que dans les Protocoles de Genève du 4 octobre 1922 dont elles sont toutes deux signataires,

s'engagent à se concerter sur les mesures à prendre au cas où l'observation de ces principes serait menacée.

Article 4

Les Hautes Parties contractantes, prenant en considération particulière les déclarations faites par la Conférence des Ambassadeurs le 3 février 1920 et le Ier avril 1921, dont leur politique continuera à s'inspirer, ainsi que la déclaration faite le 10 novembre 1921 par le Gouvernement hongrois aux représentants diplomatiques alliés,

S'engagent à se concerter dans le cas où leurs intérêts se trouveraient menacés par l'inobservation des principes énoncés dans ces diverses déclarations.

---

[6] *League of Nations Treaty Series*, vol. 23 (1924), 164–168.

Article 5

Les Hautes Parties contractantes confirment leur plein accord sur la nécessité qui s'impose à elles, en vue du maintien de la paix, d'adopter une attitude commune en présence de toute tentative éventuelle de restauration de la dynastie des Hohenzollern en Allemagne et s'engagent à se concerter sur les mesures à prendre dans cette éventualité.

Article 6

Conformément aux principes énoncés dans le Pacte de la Société des Nations, les Hautes Parties contractantes conviennent que, au cas où il surgirait entre elles, dans l'avenir, des questions litigieuses qui ne pourraient être résolues par un accord amiable et par la voie diplomatique, elles soumettront ce litige soit à la Cour permanente de Justice internationale, soit à un ou à plusieurs arbitres choisis par elles.

Article 7

Les Hautes Parties contractantes s'engagent à se communiquer les accords intéressant leur politique en Europe centrale qu'elles ont conclus antérieurement et à se consulter avant d'en conclure de nouveaux. Elles déclarent que, à cet égard, rien dans le présent traité n'est contraire aux susdits accords et spécialement au traité d'alliance entre le France et la Pologne, aux accords ou arrangements conclus par la Tchécoslovaquie avec la République fédérale d'Autriche, la Roumanie, Le Royaume des Serbes, Croates et Slovènes, non plus qu'à l'accord constaté par l'échange de lettres intervenu le 8 février 1921 entre le Gouvernement italien et le Gouvernement tchécoslovaque.

Article 8

Le présent traité sera communiqué à la Société des Nations conformément à l'article 18 du Pacte.

Le présent traité sera ratifié et les instruments de ratification seront échangés à Paris le plus tôt possible.

En foi de quoi, les Plénipotentiaires respectifs dûment autorisés à cet effet ont signé le présent traité et l'ont revêtu de leurs cachets.

Fait à Paris, en double exemplaire, le 25 janvier 1924.

(L.S.) (Signé) R. Poincaré
(L.S.) (Signé) Dr. Edvard Benes

Appendix VII

FINAL PROTOCOL OF THE CONFERENCE OF LOCARNO SIGNED ON OCTOBER 16, 1925 [7]

Les représentants des Gouvernements allemand, belge, britannique, français, italien, polonais et tchécoslovaque réunis à Locarno du 5 au 16 octobre 1925, en vue de rechercher d'un commun accord les moyens de préserver du fléau de la guerre leurs nations respectives, et de pourvoir au règlement pacifique des conflits de toute nature qui viendraient éventuellement à surgir entre certaines d'entre elles,

Ont donné leur agrément aux projets de traités et conventions qui les concernent re-

[7] *League of Nations Treaty Series*, vol. 54 (1926–27), 296–298.

spectivement et qui élaborés au cours de la présente conférence, se réfèrent réciproquement les uns aux autres:

Traité entre l'Allemagne, la Belgique, la France, la Grande-Bretagne et l'Italie (Annexe A).

Convention d'arbitrage entre l'Allemagne et la Belgique (Annexe B).

Convention d'arbitrage entre l'Allemagne et la France (Annexe C).

Traité d'arbitrage entre l'Allemagne et la Pologne (Annexe D).

Traité d'arbitrage entre l'Allemagne et la Tchécoslovaquie (Annexe E).

Ces actes, dès à présent paraphés ne varietur porteront la date de ce jour, les représentants des parties intéressées convenant de se rencontrer à Londres le Ier décembre prochain, pour procéder au cours d'une même réunion, à la formalité de la signature des actes qui les concernent.

Le ministre des Affaires étrangères de France fait connaître qu'à la suite des projets de traités d'arbitrage ci-dessus mentionnées, la France, la Pologne et la Tchécoslovaquie ont également arrêté à Locarno des projets d'accords en vue de s'assurer réciproquement le bénefice desdits traités. Ces accords seront régulièrement déposés à la Société des Nations mais dès à présent M. Briand en tient des copies à la disposition des Puissances ici représentées.

Le Secretaire d'Etat aux Affaires étrangères de Grande-Bretagne propose qu'en réponse à certaines demandes d'explications concernant l'article 16 du Pacte de la Société des Nations et présentées par le Chancelier et le ministre des Affaires étrangères d'Allemagne, la lettre, dont le projet également est ci-joint (Annexe F), leur soit adressée en même temps qu'il sera procédé à la formalité de la signature des actes ci-dessus mentionnés. Cette proposition est agréée.

Les représentants des gouvernements ici représentés déclarent avoir la ferme conviction que l'entrée en vigueur de ces traités et conventions countribuera grandement à amener une détente morale entre les nations, qu'elle facilitera puissamment la solution de beaucoup de problèmes politiques ou économiques conformément aux intérêts et aux sentiments des peuples et qu'en raffermissant la paix et la sécurité en Europe elle sera de nature à hâter d'une manière efficace le désarmement prévu par l'article 8 du Pacte de la Société des Nations.

Ils engagent à donner leur concours sincère aux travaux déjà entrepris par la Société des Nations relativement au désarmement et à en rechercher la réalisation dans une entente générale.

Fait à Locarno, le 16 octobre 1925.

Dr. Luther Stresemann
Emile Vandervelde
Aristide Briand
Austen Chamberlain
Benito Mussolini
Al. Skrzynski
Dr. Eduard Beneš

Appendix VIII

TREATY OF MUTUAL GUARANTEE BETWEEN FRANCE AND POLAND SIGNED IN LOCARNO ON OCTOBER 16, 1925,[8] AND TREATY OF MUTUAL GUARANTEE BETWEEN FRANCE AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA SIGNED IN LOCARNO ON OCTOBER 16, 1925[9]

LE PRÉSIDENT DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE et LE PRÉSIDENT DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE DE POLOGNE,

Egalement soucieux de voir l'Europe s'épargner la guerre par une sincère observation des engagements pris en date de ce jour en vue du maintien de la paix générale.

Ont résolu de s'en garantir réciproquement les bienfaits par un traité conclu dans le cadre du Pacte de la Société des Nations et des traités existant entre eux,

Et ont, à cet effet, désigné pour leurs plénipotentiaires, savoir:

LE PRÉSIDENT DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE:

M. Aristide Briand, ministre des Affaires étrangères;

LE PRÉSIDENT DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE DE POLOGNE:

M. le comte Alexandre Skrzynski, président du Conseil, ministre des Affaires étrangères;

Lesquels, après avoir échangé leurs pleins pouvoirs reconnus en bonne et due forme, sont convenus des dispositions suivantes:

Article Premier

Dans le cas où la Pologne ou la France viendrait à souffrir d'un manquement aux engagements intervenus en date de ce jour entre elles et l'Allemagne, en vue du maintien de la paix générale, la France et réciproquement la Pologne, agissant par application de l'article 16 du Pacte de la Société des Nations, s'engagent à se prêter immédiatement aide et assistance, si un tel manquement est accompagné d'un recours aux armes qui n'aurait pas été provoqué.

Dans le cas où le Conseil de la Société des Nations, statuant sur une question portée devant lui conformément auxdits engagements, n'aurait pu réussir à faire accepter son rapport par tous ses membres autres que les représentants des Parties au différend, et où la Pologne ou la France se verrait attaquée sans l'avoir provoqué, la France, ou réciproquement la Pologne, agissant par application de l'article 15, alinéa 7, du Pacte de la Société des Nations, lui prêterait immédiatement aide et assistance.

Article 2

Rien dans le présent traité ne portera atteinte aux droits et obligations des Hautes Parties contractantes en tant que membres de la Société des Nations et ne sera interprété comme restreignant la mission de celle-ci de prendre les mesures propres à sauvegarder efficacement la paix du monde.

Article 3

Le présent traité sera enregistré à la Société des Nations, conformément au Pacte.

---

[8] *League of Nations Treaty Series*, vol. 54 (1926–27), 354–356.

[9] The text of this treaty is identical with that between France and Poland. *Ibid.*, pp. 360–362.

Article 4

Le présent traité sera ratifié. Les ratifications en seront déposées à Genève, à la Société des Nations, en même temps que les ratifications du traité conclu en date de ce jour entre l'Allemagne, la Belgique, la France, la Grande-Bretagne et l'Italie, et du traité conclu à la même date entre l'Allemagne et la Pologne.

Il entrera et demeurera en vigueur dans les mêmes conditions que lesdits traités.

Le présent traité, fait en un seul exemplaire, sera déposé aux archives de la Société des Nations, dont le Secrétaire général sera prié de remettre à chacune des Hautes Parties contractantes des copies certifiées conformes.

En foi de quoi les plénipotentiaires susnommés ont signé le présent traité.

Fait à Locarno, le seize octobre mil neuf cent vingt-cinq.

(L.S.) (Signé) Aristide Briand
(L.S.) (Signé) Al. Skrzynski

Appendix IX

DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIVES, 1919–1925

French Ministers in Warsaw:
- Eugène Pralon (to January 1920)
- Auguste Béaupoil Comte de Saint Aulaire (to February 1920; never reached his post)
- Hector de Panafieu (ambassador after 1924)

French Ministers in Prague:
- Clément Simon (to September 1920)
- Joseph Couget

Czechoslovak Ministers in Paris:
- Lev Sychrava (to January 1921)
- Štefan Osuský

Czechoslovak Ministers in Warsaw:
- Vladimír Radimský (to spring 1920)
- Prokop Maxa (to February 1922)
- Adolf Černy (chargé d'affaires; to July 1924)
- Robert Flieder

Polish Ministers in Paris:
- Maurycy Zamoyski (to January 1924)
- Alfred Chłapowski (ambassador after November 1924)

Polish Ministers in Prague:
- Alfred Wysocki (chargé d'affaires; to October 1920)
- Erazm Piltz (to December 1922)
- Karol Bader (chargé d'affaires; to July 1924)
- Stanisław Hempel (chargé d'affaires; to November 1924)
- Zygmunt Lasocki

Appendix X

PRESIDENTS, PREMIERS, AND FOREIGN MINISTERS FROM THE PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE TO LOCARNO[10]

Year	*France*	*Czechoslovakia*	*Poland*
1919	POINCARÉ	MASARYK	PILSUDSKI
	Clemenceau*	Kramář*	Paderewski§
	Pichon†	Beneš†	
			Skulski* (Dec.)
		Tusar* (July)	Wróblewski†
		Beneš†	Patek†
1920	Millerand§ (Jan.)	Tusar* (May)	Grabski* (June)
		Beneš†	Sapieha†
	DESCHANEL (Feb.)		
	Millerand§	Černy* (Sept.)	Witos* (July)
		Beneš†	Sapieha†
	MILLERAND (Sept.)		Dąbski†
	Leygues§		Skirmunt†
1921	Briand§ (Jan.)	Beneš§ (Sept.)	Ponikowski* (Sept.)
			Skirmunt†
1922	Poincaré§ (Jan.)	Švehla* (Oct.)	Ponikowski* (March)
		Beneš†	Skirmunt†
			Śliwiński* (June)
			Narutowicz†
			Nowak* (July)
			Narutowicz†
			NARUTOWICZ (Dec.)
			WOJCIECHOWSKI (Dec.)
			Sikorski*
			Skrzyński†
1923			Witos* (May)
			Seyda†
			Dmowski†
			Grabski* (Dec.)
			Bertoni†
			Zamoyski†
1924	Poincaré§ (March)		
	François-Marsal* (June)		
	Lefebvre du Prey†		
	DOUMERGUE (June)		
	Herriot§		Skrzyński†
1925	Painlevé* (April)		
	Briand†		

[10] Capital letters are used for presidents, * for premiers, † for foreign ministers. Premiers who were simultaneously foreign ministers are denoted by §. The months in parentheses indicate when presidents assumed office and cabinets were formed.

Bibliographical Essay

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY

THE number of publications relevant to the study of Franco-Czechoslovak-Polish relations during and after the Paris Peace Conference is staggering—which is only natural since these relations formed part of general European international affairs in that era. Still, relatively few studies deal exclusively with the foreign policies of France, Poland, and Czechoslovakia; there are even fewer published documents. A worthwhile bibliographical list presents therefore difficult problems: it cannot contain all the pertinent works—limitation of space alone would prevent that; and if restricted to only a few studies, it might be more misleading than helpful. This bibliographical essay attempts to strike a happy medium by presenting a selected list which, without being exhaustive, is long enough to include works particularly useful to a student of Franco-Czechoslovak-Polish relations in the early 1920s.

Bibliographical Aids

For a general survey of the literature the three volumes edited respectively by William L. Langer and Hamilton F. Armstrong, *Foreign Affairs Bibliography: 1919–1932* (New York, 1935), R. G. Woolbert, *Foreign Affairs Bibliography: 1932–1942* (New York, 1945), and Henry L. Roberts, *Foreign Affairs Bibliography: 1942–1952* (New York, 1955) are especially valuable. In addition one should consult the volumes published by the Institut für Weltpolitik, Kriegsbücherei, namely *Bibliographie zur Geschichte Frankreichs in der Nachkriegszeit* (Stuttgart, 1938) and *Bibliographie zur Aussenpolitik der Republik Polen: 1919–1939* (Stuttgart, 1943). Both are excellent and it is regrettable that nothing comparable exists for Czechoslovakia. To remedy this and to complete the bibliographical aids listed above the student should consult the bibliographies in many of the general works and monographs listed below, as well as such periodicals as the *American Historical Review, Journal of Modern History, Foreign Affairs, Journal of Central European Affairs, Slavonic and East European Review, American Slavic and East European Review, Revue d'Histoire Moderne et Contemporaine, Revue d'Histoire Diplomatique, Revue d'Histoire de la Deuxième Guerre Mondiale, Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte, Zeitschrift für Ostforschung, Kwartalnik Historyczny, Przegląd Zachodni, Sprawy Międzynarodowe,* and *Československý Časopis Historický.*

On the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 there are several useful bibliographies, including *A Catalogue of Paris Peace Conference Propaganda in the Hoover War Library* (Stanford, 1926) and Nina Almond and Ralph H. Lutz's *An Introduction to a Bibliography of the Paris Peace Conference,* Hoover War Library Bibliographical Series II (Stanford, 1935). Two bibliographical articles by Robert G. Binkley, "Ten Years of Peace Conference History," *Journal of Modern History,* I (1929), and Paul Birdsall, "The Second Decade of Peace Conference History," *Journal of Modern History,* XI (1939), can still be profitably consulted.

General Works

European interwar diplomacy is the subject of many studies, some of which are of special value in providing an excellent general background for Franco-Polish-Czechoslovak relations. The brief and penetrating study by Hajo Holborn, *The Political Collapse of*

Europe (New York, 1951), is a good introduction. The standard British work is G. M. Gathorne-Hardy's *A Short History of International Affairs: 1920–39* (London, 1950), and the next best is E. H. Carr's *International Relations since the Peace Treaties* (New York, 1940). The third volume of the collective Soviet publication edited by V. P. Potemkin, *Istoria Diplomatii*, translated as *Histoire de la diplomatie* (3 vols., Paris, 1946–47), deals with the interwar period but is a rather unimaginative study, cramped by rigid ideological interpretation. A far better book, providing also a general synthesis, is the seventh volume of the monumental *Histoire des relations internationales*, edited and written by Pierre Renouvin under the title *Les Crises du XXe siècle: De 1914 à 1929* (Pt. 1, Paris, 1957). The leading French work on the interwar period, not limited to diplomacy, is Maurice Baumont's *La Faillite de la paix: 1918–1939* (2 vols., Paris, 1951). A good recent textbook is Jean-Baptiste Duroselle's *Histoire diplomatique de 1919 à nos jours* (Paris, 1957). Jacques Chastenet's *Vingt ans d'histoire diplomatique* (Geneva, 1946) provides a clear and concise survey, and there is a comparable study by Geneviève Tabouis, *Vingt ans de suspense diplomatique* (Paris, 1958), a readable account by a brilliant and well-informed French journalist.

The relations among France, Britain, and Germany, which were of such importance for France's eastern allies, are discussed in many books, the most important of which are the following: W. M. Jordan, *Great Britain, France, and the German Problem: 1918–1939* (London, 1943); Arnold Wolfers, *Britain and France between Two Wars* (New York, 1940); and the more recent essay by a famous French diplomat, André François-Poncet, *De Versailles à Potsdam: La France et le problème allemand contemporain 1919–1945* (Paris, 1948). A particularly stimulating and informative book is the large work by Bertrand de Jouvenel, *D'Une guerre à l'autre* (2 vols., Paris, 1940–41). There is a great deal about French diplomacy in Gordon A. Craig and Felix Gilbert, eds., *The Diplomats: 1919–1939* (Princeton, 1953), a valuable study indeed. Sir Lewis Namier's review of the latter volume in *Personalities and Powers* (London, 1955) also deserves attention.

The *Survey of International Affairs* edited by Arnold J. Toynbee is an indispensable guide to the complex events of the interwar period, even though one may disagree with some interpretations of this publication.

FRANCE

There is no scholarly book on French foreign policy in the postwar period. Wladimir d'Ormesson's *France* (London, 1939) is a brilliant account by a political journalist; David Thomson's *French Foreign Policy* (Oxford, 1944) is an excellent short pamphlet; Louis Paul Deschanel's *Histoire de la politique extérieure de la France: 806–1936* (Paris, 1936) can only be regarded as a broad and general survey. Pierre E. Flandin's *Politique française: 1919–1947* (Paris, 1947) falls between a political treatise and a memoir; the purpose of the author, a leading French politician, was not to write a scholarly monograph on his country's foreign policy. Georges Bonnet's *Le Quai d'Orsay sous Trois Républiques* (Paris, 1961) falls roughly in the same category. There is finally the recent work by René Albrecht-Carrié, *France, Europe and the Two World Wars* (New York, 1960).

To gain insight into French diplomacy one must turn either to general studies on European diplomacy, like those mentioned above, or to books dealing with twentieth-century France. Georges Bonnefous's *Histoire politique de la Troisième République* (3 vols., Paris, 1956–59) can be consulted with profit despite the polemic note which pervades the book. The monumental work by Jean Chastenet, *Histoire de la Troisième République* (4 vols., Paris, 1952–57), may be of use when completed, but so far the author has not reached the postwar period. Among other books one can mention Robert Lacour-Gayet, *La France au XXe siècle* (Paris, 1954); Denis W. Brogan, *France under the Republic* (New York, 1940), and his *Development of Modern France: 1870–1939* (London, 1953); and Edward Mead Earle, ed., *Modern France* (Princeton, 1951).

The relations between diplomacy and domestic affairs are explored by F. L. Schuman, *War and Diplomacy in the French Republic* (New York, 1931); Bertha R. Leaman, "The Influence of Domestic Policy on Foreign Affairs in France: 1896–1906," *Journal of Modern History*, XIV (1942); John E. Howard, *Parliament and Foreign Policy in France*

(London, 1948), a helpful study; and S. R. Chow, *Le Contrôle parlementaire de la politique étrangère en Angleterre, en France et aux États Unis* (Paris, 1920). Particularly illuminating and important is the collective work edited by Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, *La Politique étrangère et ses fondements* (Paris, 1954).

The machinery and functioning of the Quai d'Orsay are treated at length by Emmanuel de Lévis-Mirepoix, *Le Ministère des affaires étrangères* (Paris, 1934), and by Richard Sallet, *Der diplomatische Dienst* (Stuttgart, 1953). For the influence of economic factors on France's diplomacy, one can consult (apart from the above mentioned work of Duroselle) Henri de Jouvenel, ed., *Notre diplomatie économique* (Paris, 1925). Good studies of internal politics, which weighed heavily on foreign relations, appear in François Goguel, *La Politique des parties sous la IIIe République* (Paris, 1946); Roger Soltau, *French Parties and Politics: 1871–1930* (New York, 1930); and W. L. Middleton, *The French Political System* (New York, 1933). Brief and interesting sketches of leading French political personalities of the 1920s appeared in an anonymous publication, translated by W. Katzin, *As They Are: French Political Portraits* (New York, 1923).

A number of writers and politicians have attempted to portray the basic traits of French foreign policy, among others André Gérard, "French Responsibilities in Europe," *Foreign Affairs,* V (1926–27); L. Aubert, "Security: Key to French Policy," *Foreign Affairs,* XI (1932–33); Paul Périgord, "Foreign Policies of France," in *Foreign Policies of the Great Powers* (Berkeley, 1939); and Jules Cambon, "France," in *The Foreign Policy of the Powers* (New York, 1935), published by the Council on Foreign Relations.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

There are some serious studies of Czechoslovak foreign policy in the interwar period, but all of them have shortcomings. Felix Vondracek's *The Foreign Policy of Czechoslovakia: 1918–1935* (New York, 1937) is a good and solid book but a little out of date now. Emil Strauss's *Tschechoslowakische Aussenpolitik* (Prague, 1936) is even more out of date, as well as being a brief and uncritical survey. A very important study, based on Czechoslovak archives, is the recent collective work edited by Vladimír Soják, *O československé zahraniční politice 1919–1939* (Prague, 1956). The main fault of the book is a clear-cut ideological approach which vitiates many interpretations. If used cautiously, it provides a wealth of material. Another recent Marxist book published in Czechoslovakia is F. Kejik's *O zahraniční politice Československa* (Prague, 1951), and there is also an essay written by a Czechoslovak Communist diplomat "debunking" Wilson and the west, J. S. Hájek, *Wilsonovská legenda v dějinách ČSR* (Prague, 1953).

Among general works on Czechoslovakia relevant to the study of its diplomacy one finds Robert J. Kerner, ed., *Czechoslovakia: Twenty Years of Independence* (Berkeley, 1940); R. W. Seton-Watson, *Twenty-Five Years of Czechoslovakia* (London, 1953); the old booklet by Josef Borovička, *Ten Years of Czechoslovak Politics* (Prague, 1929); and the more recent L. Hosak, *Nové československé dějiny* (Prague, 1947).

Insight into the internal problems of Czechoslovakia can be obtained from several books and articles, to mention only Charles Hoch, *The Political Parties in Czechoslovakia* (Prague, 1936), a semiofficial account; Josef Chmelař, *Political Parties in Czechoslovakia* (Prague, 1926); Joseph S. Roucek, "The Czechoslovak Party System," *Journal of Central European Affairs,* I (1941–42), a valuable analysis; Kamil Krofta, *Z dob naši první republiky* (Prague, 1939); E. Čapek, *Politická příručka ČSR* (Prague, 1931), an important sociological study; and Lucien Graux, *La Tchécoslovaquie économique* (Paris, 1930).

POLAND

No history of Polish foreign policy has been published so far. A detailed study based on archival material by Jan Starzewski, *Zarys dziejów polskiej polityki zagranicznej,* written in London in 1944, is available only in mimeographed form, and only a few copies exist. Tadeusz Romer's *The Foreign Policy of Poland* (Tokyo, 1938) is hardly more than an essay by a former Polish diplomat, and one can find more extensive treatment in general books dealing with Poland after the First World War.

One of the best accounts of Polish diplomacy is Adam C. Rosé's *La Politique polonaise*

entre les deux guerres (Neuchâtel, 1945) a synthesis rather than a detailed history. Casimir Smogorzewski's *La Pologne restaurée* (Paris, 1927) contains highly informative chapters on Polish foreign policy. The same is true for such works as the collective publication edited by J. Modzelewski, *Pologne: 1919–1939* (3 vols., Neuchâtel, 1946–47); Bernadotte E. Schmitt, ed., *Poland* (Berkeley, 1945); the recent volume edited by Werner Markert, *Polen* (Cologne, Graz, 1959); and prewar books like Raymond L. Buell, *Poland: Key to Europe* (New York, 1939), or Robert Machray, *The Poland of Pilsudski* (London, 1936). A large history of modern Poland by Władysław Pobóg-Malinowski, *Najnowsza historia polityczna Polski 1864–1945* (3 vols.; Paris, 1953; London, 1956, 1960), contains a wealth of material bearing on foreign policy, but the work is uneven and somewhat journalistic in character. A publication issued by the Groupe parlementaire polono-français en Pologne, *Recueil d'études: Dix années de l'indépendence de la Pologne* (Varsovie, 1929), provides important accounts by leading Polish personalities.

Economic aspects are examined by Ferdynand Zweig, *Poland between Two Wars: A Critical Study of Economic and Social Changes* (London, 1944). The relations between public opinion and foreign affairs are the subject of Aleksander Bregman, "Opinja polska a sprawy zagraniczne," *Przegląd Współczesny*, X (1931). Jan Belcikowski examines political parties in *Charakterystyka i programy stronnictw politycznych na terenie Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej* (Warsaw, 1923), and there is a later study in English by J. W. Rose, *Poland's Political Parties: 1919–1939* (London, 1947).

EAST CENTRAL EUROPE

There are practically no studies devoted to international relations in East Central Europe in the 1920s that would be directly relevant to Polish-Czechoslovak diplomacy. Some material can be found in the last chapters of Oscar Halecki, *Borderlands of Western Civilization: A History of East Central Europe* (New York, 1952); in Hugh Seton-Watson, *Eastern Europe between the Wars: 1918–1941* (New York, 1945); and in an excellent chapter by Henry L. Roberts, "International Relations between the Wars," in Cyril E. Black, ed., *Challenge in Eastern Europe* (New Brunswick, N.J., 1954). There is much need for new studies and interpretations.

Special Works

MONOGRAPHS AND ARTICLES

France and Poland. There are no systematic studies of Franco-Polish relations covering either the entire interwar period or the early 1920s. Among the few works which bear on the political and military relations between the two countries one can include Władysław Sikorski, *Le Problème de la paix: Le jeu des forces politiques en Europe orientale et l'alliance franco-polonaise* (Paris, 1931), an interesting and stimulating book by a Polish general and statesman; General Maurice Gamelin, "La Collaboration militaire franco-polonaise," *Cahiers Polonais*, Nos. 8/10 (1937); General Henry Niessel, "La Pologne et la paix du monde," *Revue des Deux Mondes*, 8e periode, XXI (1934), and "France et Pologne dans l'Europe de demain," *Revue des Deux Mondes*, 7e periode, VII (1922). Economic relations from the French point of view are discussed by E. Tavernier, *Les Relations commerciales de la France et de la Pologne* (Paris, 1920), and from the Polish point of view by Roman Górecki, "Les Relations économiques franco-polonaises," *La Pologne*, XII, No. 7 (1931), and more recently by Zbigniew Landau, "Gospodarcze i polityczne tło kredytów francuskich," *Sprawy Międzynarodowe*, VII–VIII (1959).

There is a good deal of writing of a propagandistic nature. Casimir Smogorzewski, *La Politique polonaise de la France* (Paris, 1926), and Louis Frederic Rouquette, *La Pologne et nous* (Paris, 1919), wrote to foster Franco-Polish amity. Olivier d'Etchegoyen in *Pologne, Pologne* (Paris, 1925), or René Martel, *La Pologne et nous* (Paris, 1928), inspired by the *Auswärtiges Amt*, sought to drive a wedge between the two countries. Direct anti-Polish propaganda coming from Berlin, meant to influence the French, is found in such books as Friedrich Grimm, *Frankreich und der Korridor* (Hamburg, 1939), translated under the title *La France et le corridor polonais* (Paris, 1941).

FRANCE AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA. There is a striking scarcity of books or articles on Franco-Czechoslovak relations. One finds occasional writings such as V. Crkala-Darrase, "Rapports tchèco-français," *Revue des Sciences Politiques*, XLVI (1923), and some information in books like J. Morini-Comby, *Les Échanges commerciaux entre le France et les pays danubiens austro-hongrois* (Paris, 1937), but there are no systematic or scholarly studies of the relations between the two countries. The Germans paid some attention to these relations as witnessed by a larger work by E. Preissig, *Die französische Kultur-Propaganda in der Tschechoslowakei: 1918–1939* (Stuttgart, 1943), but otherwise one searches in vain for serious studies.

POLAND AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA. Polish-Czechoslovak relations have received far more generous treatment. The period from 1918 to 1926 is discussed in two excellent articles, based largely on the material in the National Archives in Washington, by Zygmunt J. Gasiorowski, "Polish-Czechoslovak Relations 1918–1922," *Slavonic and East European Review*, XXXV, No. 84 (1956), and "Polish-Czechoslovak Relations 1922–1926" in *Slavonic and East European Review*, XXXV, No. 85 (1957). A general study devoted to the history of the relations between the Poles and the Czechs from the tenth century onward by Zygmunt Wojciechowski, T. Lehr-Spławiński, and W. Piwarski, *Polska-Czechy: Dziesięć Wieków sąsiedztwa* (Wrocław, 1947), contains relatively little about the 1920s, and the same is probably true about a Czechoslovak counterpart of this volume by J. Dolanský which I was not able to see.

Several Polish diplomats who held posts in Prague wrote about interwar relations, for instance Karol Bader, *Stosunki polsko-czeskie* (Warsaw, 1938), and Kazimierz Wierzbiański, "Czechy a Polska," *Niepodległość*, new series, IV (1952). On the Czech side there is an early study by Jaroslav Bidlo, *Les Polonais et la République Tchécoslovaque* (Prague, 1919). Polish-Czechoslovak relations seen in retrospect are the subject of an article by Michał Straszewski, "Czesi i my," *Przegląd Zachodni*, II (1946).

French interpretations of Polish-Czech relations appear in F. Dominois, "Pologne et Tchécoslovaquie," *Affaires Étrangères*, IV (1934), and in N. P. Perdrieux, "Vicissitudes des rapports polono-tchèques," *Revue Politique et Parlementaire*, XLV (1938). An impartial analysis of the two nations by a noted Canadian historian long familiar with East Central Europe, William J. Rose, "Czechs and Poles as Neighbors," appeared in *Journal of Central European Affairs*, XI (1951–52). Cultural issues are treated by Stanisław Kolbuszewski, *Polska a Czechy: Zarys zagadnień kulturalnych* (Poznań, 1939).

The Polish minority in Czechoslovakia, which grievously affected relations between Warsaw and Prague, provided a topic for several studies on both sides. We have thus *Les Polonais en Tchécoslovaquie à la lumière des faits et des chiffres* (Varsovie, 1935), published under the auspices of the Institut polonais de collaboration avec l'étranger; L. Wolf, *La Minorité polonaise en Tchécoslovaquie* (Varsovie, 1936); and J. Chmelař, J. Auerhan, and J. Boháč, *La Minorité polonaise en Tchécoslovaquie* (Prague, 1935).

THE FIRST WORLD WAR. French diplomacy during the 1914–1918 conflict is discussed extensively only in the work of a former director of the Quai d'Orsay archives, Albert Pingaud, *Histoire diplomatique de la France pendant la Grande Guerre* (Paris, 1937–38), and it contains little on France's policy toward the Poles and practically nothing about the policy toward the Czechoslovaks. The best study of France's eastern policy is Ernst Birke, "Die französische Osteuropa-Politik 1914–1918," *Zeitschrift für Ostforschung*, III (1954), and there is also valuable material in E. Hölzle, *Der Osten im ersten Weltkrieg* (Leipzig, 1944).

Czechoslovak policies are dealt with by Z. Tobolka, *Česká politika za světové války* (Prague, 1923); Jan Papousek, *The Czechoslovak Nation's Struggle for Independence* (Prague, 1928); Jan Opočenský, *The Collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the Rise of the Czechoslovak State* (Prague, 1928); Victor S. Mamatey, *The United States and East Central Europe: 1914–1918* (Princeton, 1957); and by an anonymous author in "Allierte Kriegspolitik und tschechische Grenzen 1914–1919: Eine Antwort an André Tardieu," *Berliner Monatshefte*, XVI, No. 2 (1938).

There are several works which discuss Polish problems during the first World War. They include Michał Sokolnicki, "Sprawa Polska na terenie międzynarodowym 1914–18," *Niepodległość*, I (1933); C. Smogorzewski, *L'Union sacrée polonaise: Le gouvernement de*

Varsovie et le "gouvernement" polonais de Paris 1918–1919 (Paris, 1929); A. Merlot, *L'Armée polonaise: constitution en France et l'organisation: juin 1917–avril 1919* (Paris, 1919); Jan Antoni Wilder, "Wpływ rosyjskiej rewolucji październikowej na stanowisko zachodnich aliantów wobec sprawy polskiej," *Kwartalnik Historyczny*, LXIV, No. 6 (1957); and a recent book by Werner Conze, *Polnische Nation und deutsche Politik im ersten Weltkrieg* (Cologne, Graz, 1958).

A good deal of information can be found in Mermeix (G. Terrail), *Les Négotiations secrètes et les quatre armistices* (Paris, 1921); Harry R. Rudin, *Armistice 1918* (New Haven, 1944), the standard work on the subject; and Commandant Lhopital, *Foch, l'armistice et la paix* (Paris, 1938).

THE PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE. A satisfactory, critical history of the Peace Conference of 1919, based on all available sources, remains to be written. Otherwise the number of books on the subject is impressive. There is first of all an old but detailed work, Harold W. V. Temperley, ed., *A History of the Peace Conference of Paris* (6 vols., London, 1920–24); a good brief study of the conference's organization and structure by Frank S. Marston, *The Peace Conference of 1919* (London, 1944); the brilliantly written volume by Harold Nicolson, *Peacemaking 1919* (London, 1945), the best introduction to the atmosphere in Paris; a German analysis in Karl F. Nowak, *Versailles* (London, 1928); a well-arranged though at times naive treatment by Paul Birdsall, *Versailles: Twenty Years After* (New York, 1941); a revealing book by G. B. Noble, *Policies and Opinions at Paris: 1919* (New York, 1935); and vivid and penetrating accounts by two political journalists, E. J. Dillon, *The Inside Story of the Peace Conference* (New York, 1920), and Mermeix, *Le Combat des trois* (Paris, 1922). Memoirs dealing with the Peace Conference will be discussed elsewhere but one can mention here books by active participants such as Charles H. Haskins and Robert H. Lord, *Some Problems of the Peace Conference* (Cambridge, Mass., 1920); Edward M. House and Charles Seymour, eds., *What Really Happened at Paris* (New York, 1921); and the colorful though superficial book by Stephen Bonsal, *Suitors and Suppliants: The Little Nations at Versailles* (New York, 1946). Two studies, by C. T. Thompson, *The Peace Conference Day by Day* (New York, 1920), and Gabriel Hanotaux, *Le Traité de Versailles du 28 juin 1919: L'Allemagne et l'Europe* (Paris, 1919), are also useful. Etienne Mantoux's *The Carthaginian Peace* (New York, 1952) is particularly valuable not only as a critique of Keynes' famous volume, *The Economic Consequences of the Peace*, but also as a thoughtful analysis of the influence of the Versailles settlement on the entire interwar period.

Two monographs composed largely of documents, Nina Almond and Ralph Lutz, eds., *The Treaty of Saint Germain: A Documentary History of Its Territorial and Political Clauses* (Stanford, 1935), and Francis Deák, *Hungary at the Paris Peace Conference: The Diplomatic History of the Treaty of Trianon* (New York, 1942), are useful for information on the Czechoslovak settlement and French policy in Danubian Europe. Another half-documentary survey, E. Moulis and E. Bergonier, *La Guerre entre les alliés et la Russie 1918–1920: Documents réunis* (Paris, 1937), has interesting material on the Czechoslovak legion.

French policy in 1919 has not been extensively studied and there are no good monographs. Among books which throw light on the French attitude toward the Versailles settlement one should cite General Charles A. E. X. Maitrot, *La Paix qu'il faut à la France* (Paris, 1919); Jacques Bardoux, *Lloyd George et la France* (Paris, 1923); and F. Beau de Loménie, *Le Débat de ratification du traité de Versailles* (Paris, 1945). Concerning that French attitude, a good deal can be learned from Léon Bourgeois, *Le Traité de paix de Versailles* (Paris, 1919); Charles Bénoist, *Les Nouvelles frontières de l'Allemagne et la nouvelle carte d'Europe* (Paris, 1920); and Louis Barthou, *Le Traité de paix* (Paris, 1919). These last three volumes contain reports presented to the Chamber and to the Senate when the treaty was submitted for ratification to the French Parliament. (J. Clemens King's *Foch versus Clemenceau: France and German Dismemberment 1919* (Cambridge, Mass., 1960) came out too late to be used for this study.)

CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND THE PEACE CONFERENCE. No special study devoted exclusively to Czechoslovakia and the Paris Peace Conference has appeared, although a monograph by D. Perman-Horna, *The Diplomatic Struggle for the Boundaries of Czechoslovakia: 1914–*

1920, will be published shortly by Brill as volume seven of the *Studien zur Geschichte Osteuropas*. It will doubtless cover the conference in some detail. Two brief and older works by Vlastimil Kybal, *Les Origines diplomatiques d'État Tchécoslovaque* (Prague, 1929), and M. Mercier, *La Formation de l'État Tchécoslovaque* (Chartres, 1922), are useful, but the most informative work by far is the monumental history of the first years of the Czechoslovak state by Ferdinand Peroutka, *Budování státu: Československá politika v letech popřevratových* (4 vols. in 5, Prague, 1934–36), a study of capital importance. An article which borders on memoir writing, by Charles Seymour, "Czechoslovak Frontiers," *Yale Review*, XXVIII (1938–39), is extremely interesting. Critical presentations of Czechoslovak claims and activities in Paris are contained in B. K. Both, "La Tchécoslovaquie a la Conférence de la Paix: Les cartes et mémoires . . . présentés par la délégation tchèque," *Nouvelle Revue de Hongrie*, LXI (1937); and Otto Graf zu Stolberg-Wernigerode, "Die Tschechen auf der Friedenskonferenz," *Süddeutsche Monatshefte*, XXII (1925). Literature of a clearly revisionist nature is of course abundant.

There are many works about the Czechoslovak settlement at the Peace Conference, and one could mention here a strongly pro-Czechoslovak book by Arthur Chervin, *De Prague à l'Adriatique* (Paris, 1919); and Harold W. V. Temperley's "How the Hungarian Frontiers Were Drawn," *Foreign Affairs*, VI (1927–28).

Poland and the Peace Conference. The most recent and extensive study of Poland at the Paris Peace Conference which also covers the war years is by Titus Komarnicki, *Rebirth of the Polish Republic: A Study in the Diplomatic History of Europe: 1914–1920* (London, 1957). Among the older books are Joseph Blociszewski's *La Restauration de la Pologne et la diplomatie européenne* (Paris, 1927), a very valuable work; and Adam Przybylski's *La Pologne en lutte pour ses frontières* (Paris, 1929). Among the principal studies in Polish are Michał Bobrzyński, *Wskrzeszenie państwa polskiego* (Cracow, 1920–25); Stanisław Kozicki, *Sprawa granic Polski na konferencji pokojowej w Paryżu* (Warsaw, 1921), written by the secretary of the Polish delegation in Paris; and Stanisław Kutrzeba, *Kongres, Traktat i Polska* (Warsaw, 1919).

The question of Upper Silesia at the Peace Conference is discussed by Kazimierz Smogorzewski, *Sprawa Śląska na konferencji pokojowej* (Katowice, 1935), and Stanisław Szpotański, *Sprawa Górnego Śląska na konferencji pokojowej* (Warsaw, 1922). Books dealing with the Upper Silesian plebiscite will be listed later in this essay. Other aspects of the Polish settlement may be found in L. M. Sieveking, *The Peace Settlement in the German-Polish Borderlands* (London, 1936), and Casimir Smogorzewski, *Poland's Access to the Sea* (London, 1934), a particularly illuminating and valuable volume.

The Problem of Teschen. The Czechoslovak-Polish dispute about Teschen at the conference and later is discussed in many works. Among French studies of the problem the most important and revealing is Jules Laroche's "La Question de Teschen devant la conférence de la paix en 1919–1920," *Revue d'Histoire Diplomatique*, LXII (1948). The author was intimately associated with the entire issue and his interpretation is of the greatest interest. L. Eisenmann's "La Question de Teschen," *La Vie des Peuples*, I (1920), is less important and far less accurate; the sympathies of the author lie clearly with the Czechs. Victor L. Tapié, *Le Pays de Teschen et les rapports entre le Pologne et la Tchécoslovaquie* (Paris, 1936), wrote a general synthesis that is rather superficial. A German treatment by Kurt Witt, *Die Teschner Frage* (Berlin, 1935), is far better and contains an excellent bibliography. P. Fechner's "Die Teschen-Frage in der polnischen Aussenpolitik," *Osteuropa*, X, H 11/12 (1935), treats the whole problem from a larger perspective.

Numerous Polish books deal with Teschen. Among the best documented and most informative are these: Franciszek Szymiczek, *Walka o Śląsk Cieszyński w latach 1914–1920* (Katowice, 1938); Witold Sworakowski, *Polacy na Śląsku za Olzą* (Warsaw, 1937); K. Matusiak, *Walki o ziemię cieszyńską w latach 1914–1920* (n.p., 1930); and a brief account by Adam Przybylski, "Walka o Śląsk Cieszyński w styczniu 1919," *Bellona*, XIV (1932). The origins of the Polish national revival in Teschen are treated in a recent article by Józef Chlebowczyk, "Kształtowanie się świadomości narodowej i początków ruchu narodowego na Śląsku Cieszyńskim," *Kwartalnik Historyczny*, LXVI (1959).

Two accounts by participants in the Teschen crisis are of importance, namely the book by the Polish commanding general in Teschen, Gen. Franciszek K. Latinik, *Walka o Śląsk*

Cieszyński w r. 1919 (Cieszyn, 1934), and Damian S. Wandycz's *Zapomniany list Piłsudskiego do Masaryka* (New York, 1953), a reprint from *Orzeł Biały*, Nos. 32–35 (1953), which contains the story of the Polish mission to Prague in December 1918.

There are fewer studies of the Teschen problem by Czechoslovak authors, and probably the best analysis is in the great work of Peroutka mentioned above. One may cite also a book by one of the Czech leaders in Teschen, Ferdinand Pelc, *Těšínsko* (Slezská Ostrava, 1928); a study by J. Hejret, *Czechs and Poles in Těšín Silesia* (Prague, 1919); and an account by V. Pekárek, *Obsázeni Těšína a útok na Skočov* (Prague, 1923).

After Versailles. Among the many works on European relations after the Paris Peace Conference relevant to French relations with Poland and Czechoslovakia are Arnold J. Toynbee, *The World after the Peace Conference* (New York, 1925), which paints the general picture; Sarah Wambaugh, *Plebiscites since the World War: With a Collection of Official Documents* (2 vols., Washington, 1933), a particularly valuable study; a survey, colored by the period in which it was written, by J. W. Wheeler-Bennett and F. E. Langermann, *Information on the Problem of Security: 1917–1926* (London, 1927); Georges Castellan, "Reichswehr et Armée Rouge," in J. B. Duroselle, ed., *Les Relations germano-soviétiques de 1933 à 1939* (Paris, 1954); a recent article by H. W. Gatzke, "Russo-German Military Collaboration during the Weimar Republic," *American Historical Review*, LXIII (1957–58); J. Paul Selsam, *The Attempts to Form an Anglo-French Alliance: 1919–1924* (Philadelphia, 1936), a useful summary; and finally Christian Höltje, *Die Weimarer Republik und das Ostlocarno-Problem: 1919–1934* (Würzburg, 1958).

There are very few books bearing directly on France's policy in East Central Europe immediately after the Peace Conference and none is particularly distinguished. One can mention here I. Durand, *La Pologne actuelle: Les rapports franco-polonais: La politique de M. Lloyd George* (Paris, 1922); Eugène Vicomte de Guichen, *Du Rhin à la Vistule: Questions d'histoire diplomatique et économique contemporaine* (Paris, 1923); E. Ruge, "Die französische Polenpolitik seit dem Waffenstillstand," *Die Grenzboten*, LXXX, No. 2 (1921); Bremond, "Französische Mitteleuropa Politik," *Europäische Revue*, Jan. 1929; and the larger work of Martin Acherman, *Quelques aspects de l'opinion publique en France sur le problème allemand 1920–1940* (Paris, 1940).

The Crisis of 1920. There is no exhaustive and fully documented study of the Polish-Russian war of 1920 and of the peace settlement at Riga. The best Polish treatment is by General Tadeusz Kutrzeba, *Wyprawa kijowska 1920 roku* (Warsaw, 1937). Articles dealing with Piłsudski's political plans include M. K. Dziewanowski, "Pilsudski's Federal Policy 1919–1920," *Journal of Central European Affairs*, X (1950–51); Edmund Charaszkiewicz, "Przebudowa wschodu Europy: Materjały do polityki wschodniej Józefa Piłsudskiego w latach 1893–1921," *Niepodległość*, new series, V (1955); and Juliusz Łukasiewicz, "Uwagi o polityce ukraińskiej marszałka Piłsudskiego," *Wiadomości Polskie*, Dec. 14, 1941. Nicholas P. Vakar's *Belorussia: The Making of a Nation* (Cambridge, Mass., 1956) and John S. Reshetar's *The Ukrainian Revolution 1917–1920* (Princeton, 1952) are important especially because they provide a non-Polish viewpoint.

The problem of the Curzon Line which excited a good deal of controversy and confusion is well presented in Gotthold Rhode, "Die Entstehung der Curzon-Linie," *Osteuropa*, April 1955; Alius (Alexandre Abramson), *La Ligne Curzon* (Neuchâtel, 1944); and in two illuminating articles, one by Witold Sworakowski, "An Error regarding Eastern Galicia in Curzon's Note to the Soviet Government," *Journal of Central European Affairs*, IV (1944–45), and the other by Eugene Kusielewicz, "New Light on the Curzon Line," *Polish Review*, I (1956).

The Polish-Soviet crisis as seen from Paris is discussed by a well-informed supporter of Millerand, Jean Bardoux, *De Paris à Spa* (Paris, 1921). Millerand himself contributed "Au Secours de la Pologne," *Revue de France*, 12e année, IV (1932); and another contemporary account can be found in Maurice Pernot, "L'Epreuve de la Pologne," *Revue des Deux Mondes*, 6e periode, LIX (1920). Some information can be derived from two works by General H. Mordacq, *Le Ministère Clemenceau: Journal d'un temoin* (4 vols., Paris, 1931) and *Les Légendes de la Grande Guerre* (Paris, 1935). The latter is important for information on Weygand's role in Poland. There is, however, no single satisfactory monograph on French policy toward Poland in 1920.

The part played by Weygand is examined by General Hubert Camon, *La Manoeuvre libératrice du maréchal Pilsudski contre les Bolchéviks* (Paris, 1929), and more recently by Piotr S. Wandycz, "General Weygand and the Battle of Warsaw of 1920," *Journal of Central European Affairs*, XIX (1959–60). The French attitude toward Polish-Lithuanian problems emerges among others from a pro-Polish presentation by General Fernand du Moriez, *Wilno, la Lithuanie et la Pologne, la Bretagne et la France* (Paris, 1922); and from a pro-Lithuanian account by Henry de Chambon, *La Lithuanie moderne* (Paris, 1933).

Danubian problems of 1920 and 1921 centered around the formation of the Little Entente, and there are several books which deal with the latter. One may mention Robert Machray, *The Little Entente* (New York, 1929); John O. Crane, *The Little Entente* (New York, 1931); Albert Mousset, *La Petite Entente* (Paris, 1923); Florin Codresco, *La Petite Entente* (Paris, 1930); Bojidar Saritch, *La Petite Entente facteur de paix en Europe* (Paris, 1933); and F. Jean-Desthieux, *La Petite Entente* (Paris, 1922). Except for the last work, which is pro-Hungarian, these books adopt an uncritical friendly attitude to the group, and there is need for a new study of the Little Entente seen from the perspective of forty years and using documents which have appeared since the 1930s. There are few books dealing with the Habsburg restoration, but the pro-Habsburg account by E. Ashmead-Bartlett, *The Tragedy of Central Europe* (London, 1923), is of considerable interest.

The Franco-Polish Alliance and Upper Silesia. The Franco-Polish alliance of 1921 and its repercussions on the two countries are not covered extensively. P. Bernus discussed it in "Sojusz Francji i Polski," *Przegląd Współczesny*, XII (1932), and M. de La Revelière in "Nos Alliances et la Pologne," *Mercure de France*, CXLIX (1921). The article by Piotr Wandycz, "Sojusz polsko-francuski z 1921 r.," *Kultura*, 11/145 (1959), is the most recent treatment of the alliance based on unpublished documents and it contains the reconstructed text of the secret military convention. An analysis of the Franco-Polish alliances of 1921 and 1925 and of the Czechoslovak-French pacts of 1924 and 1925 from a legal point of view is found in F. Kraemer, *Das Verhältnis der Französichen Bündnisverträge zum Völkerbundpakt und zum Pakt von Locarno* (Leipzig, 1932). Economic aspects of Franco-Polish cooperation are covered to some extent by Zygmunt Rawita-Gawroński, *Konwencja handlowa polsko-francuska* (Warsaw, 1923), and by Kurt Welkisch, "Die polnisch-französische Wirtschaftsbeziehungen," *Osteuropa*, 12/10 (1937).

Several authors have discussed the question of Upper Silesia in its international setting. There is an excellent analysis in a chapter by C. Smogorzewski in *La Silésie polonaise* which appeared as volume two of *Problèmes politique de la Pologne contemporaine* (4 vols., Paris, 1931–33). One of the major treatments of Upper Silesia in Polish is by Adam Benisz, *Górny Śląsk w walce o polskość* (Katowice, 1933), and there is a new study by Tadeusz Jędruszczak, *Polityka Polski w sprawie Górnego Śląska 1918–1922* (Warsaw, 1958), a well-documented volume written from a Marxist position. Karl Hofer's *Oberschlesien in der Aufstandszeit: 1918–1921* (Berlin, 1938) is an important German publication. Other good studies include Georges Kramsztyk, *La Pologne, l'Allemagne et l'industrie de la Haute Silésie* (Mikolow, 1921); and William J. Rose, *The Drama of Upper Silesia* (Brattleboro, Vt., 1935). Sidney Osborne's *The Upper Silesian Question and Germany's Coal Problem* (London, 1920) is a good example of the anti-Polish propaganda then current in England.

French acquisition of an economic stake in Upper Silesia and its impact on France's policy are analyzed with much useful detail by Franciszek Ryszka in "Kulisy decyzji w sprawie Śląska w r. 1921," *Kwartalnik Historyczny*, XL, No. 1 (1953). The value of this article is seriously impaired by its strict adherence to the Marxist-Stalinist school of writing.

The Early 1920s. Various aspects of Czechoslovak-Polish relations in the early 1920s are still insufficiently explored. Two articles by Piotr S. Wandycz, "The Czechoslovak-Polish Rapprochement of 1921," *Central European Federalist*, VI (1958), and "U Źródeł paktu Skirmunt-Benesz," *Kultura*, 11/133 (1958), contain respectively a brief description of the *rapprochement* and an analysis of its origins based largely on Piltz's reports. Czech policy during the attempted Habsburg restoration is extensively discussed by Věra

Olivová, "Československá zahraniční politika a pokus o restauraci Habsburků v roce 1921," *Československý Časopis Historický*, VII (1959), an important study based on foreign ministry archives.

German-Russian maneuvers in 1922 and their significance for France and her eastern allies can be ascertained from such writings as Wipert von Blücher's *Deutschlands Weg nach Rapallo* (Wiesbaden, 1951), and Julius Epstein's "Der Seeckt Plan," *Der Monat*, I, No. 2 (1948). A French translation of this document appeared in *Cahiers Pologne-Allemagne*, Oct.–Dec., 1959.

Czechoslovak diplomacy during the Ruhr crisis is brilliantly discussed by Věrá Olivová in "Československá diplomacie v době rurské krise roku 1923," *Československý Časopis Historický*, VI (1958). As for Poland, the book by Stanisław Kutrzeba, *Nasza polityka zagraniczna* (Cracow, 1922) — which at the time of its appearance led to a heated discussion between the Czechs and the Poles — is of some interest. R. Vaucher's "Avec le maréchal Foch en Pologne et en Tchécoslovaquie," *Revue des Deux Mondes*, 7e periode, XV (1923) has an interesting account of the French marshal's visit at the time of the Ruhr and Javořina crises. The little official booklet entitled *President Masaryk in Paris, Brussels and London in October 1923* (Prague, 1923) covers the tour of the Czechoslovak leaders to the west which led to the Franco-Czechoslovak alliance but naturally contains no account of the secret talks.

From Franco-Czechoslovak Alliance to Locarno. The Franco-Czechoslovak alliance of 1924 still awaits its historian, but there is a good article on Czechoslovak diplomacy in 1924 by Alfred Fichelle, "La politique extérieure de la République Tchécoslovaque en 1924," *L'Année Politique Française et Étrangère*, I (1925–26). Polish foreign policy during the same year is treated by J. Grzymała-Grabowiecki in *Polityka zagraniczna Polski w r. 1924* (Warsaw, 1925). The same author wrote another volume under the same title for the year 1925, published in Warsaw in 1926. Both are useful and informative. An article by a supporter of Piłsudski, Juliusz Łukasiewicz, "Stosunek do Czechosłowacji w polskiej polityce zagranicznej," *Przegląd Polityczny*, I (1924), reflects the opinion of a large segment of the Piłsudskiites about Czechoslovakia. A recent article by Henryk Jabłoński, "Z Tajnej dyplomacji Władysława Grabskiego w r. 1924," *Kwartalnik Historyczny*, LXIII, Nos. 4–5 (1956), reviews certain aspects of Poland's foreign policy in 1924 from a strongly Marxist position, and though some new material is presented the result is more confusion than clarification.

The international background of 1924 which bears directly on Poland's problems is ably discussed by Zygmunt J. Gasiorowski in "The Russian Overture to Germany of December 1924," *Journal of Modern History*, XXX (1958). Developments in the League of Nations emerge clearly from P. J. Noel-Baker's *The Geneva Protocol* (London, 1925). Alexandre Bregman contributed an important study of Polish policies in Geneva in his *La Politique de la Pologne dans la Société des Nations* (Paris, 1932).

The Locarno treaties have long excited the interest of historians and journalists, and yet no first-rate monograph on Locarno has been written. Among the older works which are of some value one finds Alfred Fabre-Luce, *Locarno sans rêves* (Paris, 1927); K. Strupp, *Das Werk von Locarno* (Berlin, 1926); and Edgar Stern-Rubarth, *Three Men Tried . . . Austen Chamberlain, Stresemann, Briand and Their Fight for a New Europe* (London, 1939). All these volumes lack full documentation and reflect the somewhat optimistic attitude toward Locarno which prevailed in the 1920s and 1930s. The most recent monograph by V. M. Turok, *Lokarno* (Moscow, 1949), presents the Soviet point of view.

The constantly increasing literature on Stresemann contributes a great deal to knowledge of the German view, and there are many recent studies based on Stresemann's papers. They include Hans W. Gatzke's *Stresemann and the Rearmament of Germany* (Baltimore, 1954), and also his "Stresemann und die deutsche Russland-Politik," *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte*, IV (1956), and "The Stresemann Papers," *Journal of Modern History*, XXVI (1954); Karl Dietrich Erdmann, "Das Problem der Ost-oder Westorientierung in der Locarno-Politik Stresemanns," *Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht*, VI (1955); Erich Eyck, "Neues Licht auf Stresemanns Politik," *Deutsche Rundschau*, LXXXI (1955); Anneliese Thimme, "Gustav Stresemann, Legende und Wirklichkeit,"

Historische Zeitschrift, CLXXXVI (1956), and her *Gustav Stresemann: Eine Politische Biographie zur Geschichte der Weimarer Republik* (Hanover, 1957).

Czechoslovak and Polish problems connected with Locarno are examined penetratingly by Zygmunt J. Gasiorowski in his "Stresemann and Poland before Locarno" and "Stresemann and Poland after Locarno," both in *Journal of Central European Affairs*, XVIII (1958–59), and also his "Benes and Locarno: Some Unpublished Documents," *Review of Politics*, XX (1958). These articles based largely on the National Archives contrast forcibly with a superficial account by Józef Kukułka, "Układy locarneńskie a bezpieczeństwo zachodnich granic Polski," *Zeszyty Naukowe Szkoły Głównej Służby Zagranicznej*, I (1955). Charles Kruszewski's "German-Polish Tariff War (1925–1934) and Its Aftermath," *Journal of Central European Affairs*, III (1943–44) may also be consulted.

French policy toward Locarno has not been fully examined and lack of documentation is bound to delay the appearance of a detailed monograph.

MEMOIRS AND BIOGRAPHIES

Memoirs and reminiscences of leading French, Polish, and Czechoslovak politicians as well as of those of other Europeans constitute a rich source of information for the 1920s. Their value and reliability varies considerably but they often are the best substitute for original documents.

FRANCE. Georges Clemenceau's memoir, *Grandeurs et misères d'une victoire* (Paris, 1930), which appeared in English as *Grandeur and Misery of Victory* (New York, 1930), is largely a polemic against political adversaries and gives a good idea of Clemenceau's way of thinking. There is no full biography of the Tiger, but Geoffrey Bruun's *Clemenceau* (Cambridge, Mass., 1944), Jean J. H. Mordacq's *Clemenceau* (Paris, 1939), and John J. Jackson's *Clemenceau and the Third Republic* (London, 1946) are good studies of the great French statesman. André Tardieu's *La Paix* (Paris, 1921), translated under the title *The Truth about the Treaty* (Indianapolis, 1921), is important for what it tells about the attitude of the French peacemakers. His "The Policy of France," *Foreign Affairs*, I (1921–22) may also be consulted. A collective study by L. Aubert, J. Martin, *et al.*, *André Tardieu* (Paris, 1957), deserves attention. The volume of Raymond Poincaré's *Au Service de la France* (10 vols., Paris, 1926–33) which is to deal with the 1920s has not yet been published and apparently will not be for several years. This is an important gap in our knowledge of Poincaré's policies. Among the biographers of Poincaré are S. Huddleston, *Poincaré* (London, 1924); Gordon Wright, *Raymond Poincaré and the French Presidency* (Stanford, 1942); and, the most recent, Jacques Chastenet, *Raymond Poincaré* (Paris, 1948). There are no memoirs of Millerand, and Raoul Persil's biography, *Alexandre Millerand: 1859–1943* (Paris, 1949), is partisan in its approach. Paul Painlevé's *Paroles et écrits* (Paris, 1936) adds little to our knowledge of Painlevé, but his role in the 1920s was limited anyway. Aristide Briand left no memoirs or extensive writings, though his *Paroles de paix* (Paris, 1927) is of some use. On the other hand there is a very detailed biography of Briand, based on his personal papers, by Georges Suarez, *Briand* (6 vols., 1938–52). However, Briand's ideas on East Central Europe are not dealt with extensively in this otherwise exhaustive publication. There are older biographies by Ch. Daniélou, *Le Vrai visage d'Aristide Briand* (Paris, 1935), and V. Margueritte, *Aristide Briand* (Paris, 1932). Edouard Herriot's memoir, *Jadis: D'Une guerre à l'autre: 1914–1936* (Paris, 1952), is important despite the fact — which can be said of almost all memoirs — that he left many things unsaid. Herriot's "The Program of Liberal France," *Foreign Affairs*, II (1923–24) is useful as an exposition of his conceptions at a crucial point in French politics. A great deal of interesting and significant material can be found in the memoir of the Socialist leader Joseph Paul-Boncour, *Entre deux guerres: souvenirs sur la Troisième République* (3 vols., Paris, 1945–46).

Among the writings of the chief French military figures, *The Memoirs of Marshal Foch* (New York, 1931) are on the whole disappointing. Two biographies, by Sir George Aston, *The Biography of the Late Marshal Foch* (New York, 1929), and by R. Recouly, *Foch: My Conversations with the Marshal* (New York, 1929), are not particularly useful for the purpose of this study. G. Beyerhaus's *Die Europa-Politik des Marschalls Foch* (Leipzig,

1942) is far more revealing. The second volume of the memoirs of General Weygand, entitled *Mirages et réalité* (Paris, 1957), provides much information on Franco-Polish relations in 1920. An interview which Weygand gave to a Polish review in Paris, K. A. Jeleński, "Wywiad z gen. Weygand," *Kultura*, 6/68 (1953), is also interesting. General Maurice Gamelin's second volume of his memoirs, entitled *Le Prologue du drame* (Paris, 1946), contains some valuable material on the Franco-Polish alliance.

Philippe Berthelot left no memoirs that could help us fathom his political secrets. The biography by Auguste Bréal, *Philippe Berthelot* (Paris, 1937), written by a personal friend, is hardly revealing, but Richard D. Challener's "The French Foreign Office: The Era of Philippe Berthelot," in Craig and Gilbert, *Diplomats*, gives pertinent information on the leading figure of the Quai d'Orsay. Also very important in this respect are Jules Laroche, *Au Quai d'Orsay avec Briand et Poincaré: 1913–1926* (Paris, 1957), and Emmanuel de Peretti de La Rocca, "Briand et Poincaré: Souvenirs," *Revue de Paris*, année 43, VI (1936). Both authors occupied leading positions at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and have many important things to say and to conceal.

The two French ambassadors to Russia, Maurice Paléologue, *La Russie des tsars pendant la Grande Guerre* (3 vols., Paris, 1921), and Joseph Noulens, *Mon Ambassade en Russie soviétique: 1917–1919* (Paris, 1923), are highly informative if not always reliable, and one must regret that Paléologue left no writings of the period when he was secretary general at the Quai d'Orsay in 1920. Some interesting material on the mid-1920s, especially Locarno, can be found in Auguste Comte de Saint Aulaire, *Confession d'un vieux diplomate* (Paris, 1953). Saint Aulaire was the French ambassador in London and had Rightist sympathies which show in his book. The memoirs of the two French ambassadors in Poland in the late 1920s and in the 1930s, Jules Laroche, *La Pologne de Pilsudski: Souvenirs d'une ambassade 1926–1933* (Paris, 1953), and Léon Noël, *L'Agression allemande contre la Pologne* (Paris, 1946), deal in their early chapters with events prior to Locarno but do not go deeply into them. One must regret the lack of memoirs of the first two French ministers in Warsaw, Pralon and Panafieu. The only book written by a junior French diplomat who spent some time in the French legation in Warsaw in the 1920s is J. B. Barbier, *Un Frac de Nessus* (Rome, 1951), which takes a pro-Paléologue and an anti-Berthelot position; the author is friendly to Poland but engages in bitter polemics with and indiscriminate attacks on his superiors, which prevented the publication of his book in France. It is difficult to obtain in that country.

Three other works deserve mention here: Paul Cambon, *Correspondance: 1870–1924* (3 vols., Paris, 1940–46); a biography of his brother Jules, by Geneviève Tabouis, *Jules Cambon par l'un des siens* (Paris, 1938); and Alexandre Ribot, *Journal et correspondance inédites: 1914–1922* (Paris, 1936). All of these books contribute interesting material.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA. The writings of President Masaryk are too numerous to include all of them here, and only a few will be cited. *Světová Revoluce* (Prague, 1925), translated into English as *The Making of a State: Memoirs and Observations, 1914–1918* (London, 1918), is more important for Masaryk's views than for his description of events, which is not always careful or exact. T. G. Masaryk's *L'Europe nouvelle* (privately printed, 1918) contains many striking ideas. *Les Slaves après la guerre* (Prague, 1923) also deserves mention. The largest biography of Masaryk is that by Zdeněk Nejedlý, *T. G. Masaryk* (5 vols., Prague, 1930–37), which, however, does not cover his entire life. Jan Herben's *T. G. Masaryk: Život a dílo presidenta osvoboditela* (Prague, 1947) is very important. Hubert Ripka, a follower of Masaryk, and himself a political figure of some caliber, contributed a thoughtful study, "Le Fondateur de la Tchécoslovaquie: pionnier de la nouvelle Europe," *Le Monde Slave*, I (1936), which is of great interest. K. Kierski's *Masaryk a Polska* (Poznań, 1935) is not a profound study.

The memoir of Eduard Beneš, *Světová válka a naše revoluce* (3 vols., Prague, 1927–28) is a work of capital importance. Only its French translation is full and unabridged, and the English version, *My War Memoirs* (New York, 1928), is not always reliable. As compared with Masaryk's war memoirs, Beneš wrote his with the aid of full documentation, and the third volume consists entirely of original documents. Most of Beneš's writings have direct bearing on foreign policy, and the following deserve special attention: *Bohemia's Case for Independence* (London, 1917), which appeared also in French and German;

Où vont les Slaves (Paris, 1948); *International Security* (Chicago, 1939); and *La France et la nouvelle Europe* (Paris, 1932). Among Beneš's articles one ought to mention "The Little Entente," *Foreign Affairs*, I (1921–22); "The Foreign Policy of Czechoslovakia," *Nineteenth Century and After*, XC (1924); "The League of Nations: Successes and Failures," *Foreign Affairs*, XI (1932–33); and the penetrating and revealing study of foreign policy in a democracy entitled "Zahraniční politika a demokracie: Problémy a metody naší zahraniční politiky," *Zahraniční Politika*, Part I (1923).

Although numerous biographies of Beneš have been written there is none that treats the Czech statesman in a critical and scholarly fashion. Some are thinly veiled eulogies, others — written recently in Czechoslovakia — border on calumny, and it may well be that to approach Beneš's career in a proper perspective one has to wait for another less involved generation. One of the best and most stimulating appreciations of Beneš is found in E. Taborsky, "The Triumph and Disaster of Eduard Benes," *Foreign Affairs*, XXXVI (1957–58), written by his onetime secretary. Pierre Crabitès's *Beneš: Statesman of Central Europe* (New York, 1936), Louis Eisenman's *Un Grand Européen: Eduard Benes* (Paris, 1934), Godfrey Lias's *Benes of Czechoslovakia* (London, 1941), Compton Mackenzie's *Dr. Benes* (London, 1946), and Edward B. Hitchcock's *Benes: The Man and Statesman* (London, 1940) exemplify the friendly and largely uncritical treatment accorded Beneš by western historians and journalists. More useful material is found in Jan Papoušek, *Dr. Edvard Beneš: Sein Leben* (Prague, 1937), and Jan Opočensky, ed., *Edward Benes: Essays and Reflections Presented on the Occasion of His Sixtieth Birthday* (London, 1945), a collective study by people who knew Beneš at various stages of his career.

The controversial figure of Kramář does not emerge clearly from his limited writings. One can mention here Karel Kramář, *Pět přednášek o zahraniční politice* (Prague, 1923), which is indicative of his views on Poland and international relations. There is also a biography by a follower, V. Sis, *Dr. Karel Kramář. Život-Dílo-Práce vůdce národa* (Prague, 1936). Štefánik left no memoir, and there are no good biographies of him. Rotislav Rajchl's *Štefánik: Voják a diplomat* (Prague, 1947) is a brief and popular story of his life. Czechoslovak diplomats left no important writings dealing with the 1920s. An exception is Vlastimil Kybal, "Czechoslovakia and Italy: My Negotiations with Mussolini: 1922–23," *Journal of Central European Affairs*, XIII–XIV (1953–54, 1954–55).

POLAND. Józef Piłsudski's *Pisma zbiorowe* (10 vols., Warsaw, 1937–38) contains the collected writings and speeches of Piłsudski and constitutes the principal source of information on him. Biographies of Piłsudski suffer on the whole from being uncritical, or from being based on incomplete documentation. Those which do not cover the post-1918 period are not included here. Among books which one may consult with some profit are Anatole Muhlstein, *Le Maréchal Pilsudski* (Paris, 1939), written by a pro-Piłsudski Polish diplomat; P. Bartel, *Le Maréchal Pilsudski* (Paris, 1935); W. F. Reddaway, *Marshal Pilsudski* (London, 1939); Aleksandra Piłsudska's, *Pilsudski: A Biography by His Wife Alexandra* (New York, 1941); Władysław Baranowski, *Rozmowy z Piłsudskim: 1916–1931* (Warsaw, 1938), containing information on interesting talks between Piłsudski and one of his followers; Leon Wasilewski, *Józef Piłsudski jakim go znałem* (Warsaw, 1935), by a leading Polish Socialist and collaborator of Piłsudski in the formative years of the Polish republic; Vernon Kellogg, "Paderewski, Pilsudski and Poland," *World's Work*, XXXVIII (1919); and finally a penetrating study of Piłsudski's ideas on foreign policy by Tytus Komarnicki, "Piłsudski a polityka wielkich mocarstw zachodnich," *Niepodległość*, new series, IV (1952).

For material on Paderewski one may consult Ignacy J. Paderewski and Mary Lawton, *The Paderewski Memoirs* (New York, 1937), which, however, do not cover the postwar years; and the two eulogistic and poorly documented works by Rom Landau, *Paderewski, Musician and Statesman* (New York, 1936), and Charles J. Phillips, *Paderewski: The Story of a Modern Immortal* (New York, 1934). Dmowski's collected writings appeared in Roman Dmowski, *Pisma* (7 vols., Czestochowa, 1938). His early views and ideas are reflected in *La Question Polonaise* (Paris, 1909) and *Problems of Central and Eastern Europe* (London, 1917). Dmowski's *Polityka polska i odbudowanie państwa* (Warsaw, 1925) is an important source for information on Poland's role at the Paris Peace Conference, but Dmowski's book must be used cautiously because of his carelessness regarding dates and

events. Besides, his intense political prejudices often render his judgment unfair and biased.

The important Christian Democratic leader Wojciech Korfanty was recently the subject of a German study by Ernst Sontag, *Adalbert Korfanty: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der polnischen Ansprüche auf Oberschlesien* (Kitingen/Main, 1954). Wincenty Witos's *Wybór pism i mow* (Lvov, 1939) is a selection of the writings and speeches of the Peasant leader; his memoirs exist in manuscript form but are not available for research.

Among the writings of important Polish political figures are Leon Biliński, *Wspomnienia i dokumenty: 1846–1922* (2 vols., Warsaw, 1924), and Stanisław Głąbiński, *Wspomnienia polityczne* (Pelplin, 1939). The years 1924 and 1925 are described in detail by the then prime minister Władysław Grabski, *Dwa lata pracy u podstaw państwowości naszej 1924–1925* (Warsaw, 1927), but his attention is focused on domestic, especially economic, issues and there is little on diplomacy. Polish foreign ministers and diplomats left few memoirs. Marian Seyda contributed *Polska na przełomie dziejów: Fakty i dokumenty* (2 vols., Poznań, 1927–31), which is of interest; Aleksander Skrzyński's *Poland and Peace* (London, 1923) is an exposition of his pro-English program in foreign policy. It also has interesting chapters on Piłsudski's federalist ideas. Skirmunt's memoirs in manuscript form were apparently destroyed during the Second World War but a reconstructed version is said to exist in Poland. Józef Beck's *Dernier rapport: Politique polonaise, 1920–1939* (Neuchâtel, 1951) contains some background material on the early 1920s, but hardly enough to be of real value.

Miscellaneous. Several English memoirs are of primary importance for the study of the Peace Conference and the years which followed. David Lloyd George's *The Truth about the Peace Treaties* (2 vols., London, 1938) must be consulted even if his volumes abound in half-truths and cannot be taken at face value. George A. R. Riddell's *Intimate Diary of the Peace Conference and After: 1918–1923* (New York, 1934) throws much light on English policies. Harold Nicolson's *Curzon: The Last Phase: 1919–1925* (London, 1934) depicts well the British attitude toward Upper Silesia and toward Polish questions. *The Diary of Lord Bertie of Thane: 1914–1918* (2 vols., London, 1924), written by the British ambassador in Paris, is highly critical of Lloyd George and his policies toward France. The biography of Balfour by Blanche E. C. Dugdale, *Arthur James Balfour* (2 vols., New York, 1937), contributes additional material on the period of the Paris Peace Conference. The volumes by Sir Charles Petrie, *The Life and Letters of the Right Hon. Sir Austen Chamberlain* (2 vols., London, 1939), are important for the middle 1920s. A work by Major General Sir Charles Callwell, *Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson: His Life and Diaries* (2 vols., London, 1937), is also of interest.

Lord D'Abernon's *The Diary of an Ambassador* (3 vols., New York, 1929–31) is a first-rate source on the 1920s, and especially on the origins of Locarno with which the British ambassador in Berlin was so closely connected. D'Abernon's little volume entitled *The Eighteenth Decisive Battle of the World* (London, 1931) is also a valuable diary dealing with the work of the Franco-British mission in Poland (of which D'Abernon was a member) at the time of the Russian war of 1920. The reminiscences of a British soldier deeply involved in Poland's affairs, General Carton de Wiart, entitled *Happy Odyssey: The Memoirs of Lieutenant-General Sir Adrian Carton de Wiart* (London, 1955) contribute many interesting observations and descriptions of events. The second volume of the memoirs of a British diplomat who was active in Poland with the Noulens mission, Sir Esme Howard, *Theatre of Life* (2 vols., Boston, 1935–36) should also be consulted, as well as A. L. Kennedy, *Old Diplomacy and New: 1876–1922* (London, 1922). The reminiscences of the foreign editor of the London *Times* Henry W. Steed, *Through Thirty Years 1892–1922: A Personal Narrative* (2 vols., New York, 1924), are especially useful in view of his contacts with Czechoslovak leaders during the war and the Paris Peace Conference.

Among books on European politics by persons connected with the Foreign Office one ought to mention the excellent volumes by Harold Butler, *The Lost Peace: A Personal Impression* (New York, 1942), and Sir James Headlam-Morley, *Studies in Diplomatic History* (New York, 1930). Both show an awareness of the problems of East Central Europe so often neglected by Whitehall.

Two German collections of papers are particularly important for this study. They are

Friedrich von Rabenau, *Seeckt: Aus seinem Leben* (Leipzig, 1940), and Henry Bernhard, ed., *Gustav Stresemann: Vermächtnis* (3 vols., Berlin, 1932). The English translation of the latter work, Eric Sutton, ed., *Gustav Stresemann: His Diaries, Letters and Papers* (London, 1935–40), is abbreviated and cannot be absolutely relied upon.

The Italian minister in Warsaw wrote a truly excellent book on Poland, which contains a wealth of material. This is Francesco Tommasini, *La Risurrezione della Polonia* (Treves, Milan, 1923), also translated in Polish as *Odrodzenie Polski* (Warsaw, 1928). Two Italian statesmen have written about postwar Europe: Carlo Conte Sforza, *Diplomatic Europe since the Treaty of Versailles* (New Haven, 1928), and Francesco Nitti, *Peaceless Europe* (London, 1922). The latter is bitterly anti-French and anti-Polish, and views the Versailles settlement from a revisionist position. The book by the former regent of Hungary, Nicholas Horthy, *Memoirs* (London, 1956), contributes some interesting observations on Czechoslovakia and the Habsburg restoration, but otherwise reveals no secrets of Hungarian diplomacy.

Two books by the Secretary of State Robert Lansing, *The Peace Negotiations: A Personal Narrative* (Boston, 1921) and *The Big Four and Others at the Peace Conference* (Boston, 1921), are useful for material on the year 1919; Charles Seymour, ed., *Intimate Papers of Colonel House* (4 vols., Boston, 1926–28), should also be consulted. The recently published papers of an American diplomat who spent some time in Poland in 1919 and 1920, Nancy H. Hooker, ed., *The Moffat Papers* (Cambridge, Mass., 1956) are of some, though limited, interest.

Newspapers and Periodicals

Convenient summaries of articles which appeared in the Czechoslovak press and which have special bearing on foreign policy can be found in *Bulletin périodique de la presse tchécoslovaque,* a digest issued by the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. One of the most important and informative Czechoslovak periodicals in the 1920s was *Zahraniční Politika,* previously called *Sborník Zahraniční Politiky* (1920–22), published under the auspices of the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It contained articles by leading Czechoslovak officials, notes on diplomatic appointments, and reviews of current events in Czechoslovakia and abroad. The Czechoslovaks also published an English-language periodical of a similar nature, called *The Central European Observer.*

The French Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued before the Second World War a *Bulletin périodique de la presse polonaise,* which was more complete and appeared more frequently than the equivalent on the Czechoslovak press. Among the chief Polish journals concerned with matters of foreign policy in the 1920s were *Przegląd Dyplomatyczny, Przegląd Polityczny, Przegląd Współczesny,* and *Niepodległość*; and those of a later date, *Sprawy Obce* and *Sprawy Międzynarodowe.*

There is also a digest of the French press, published by the Quai d'Orsay, of lesser value because French newspapers are more easily available today than are Polish and Czechoslovak papers. There were several French-language periodicals and newspapers concerned with East Central Europe. One can mention here *L'Est Européen* and the *Journal de Pologne,* published after the First World War in Warsaw; and the *Gazette de Prague* published by J. Pichon in Czechoslovakia. *L'Europe Nouvelle* can also be profitably consulted.

Among French periodicals the *Revue des Deux Mondes* is perhaps the single most important journal for international politics in the 1920s. It published at one time a series of articles by Poincaré and other outstanding political figures. The *Revue de Paris* and the *Revue de France* are also important. Several noted political journalists had their collections of articles published in book form, which greatly facilitates research on French political trends. Thus lead articles in *Le Journal des Débats* by Auguste Gauvain appeared in *L'Europe au jour le jour* (14 vols., Paris, 1921–24); Charles Rivet's articles which supported the Czech cause in *Le Temps* were published under the title *Les Tchécoslovaques* (Paris, 1921); Jacques Bainville's articles in *L'Action Française* appeared in the volumes entitled *Les Conséquences politiques de la paix* (Paris, 1920), *La Russie et la barrière de l'est* (Paris, 1937), and *L'Allemagne* (2 vols., Paris, 1939). The contributions of Auguste Comte de Saint-Aulaire to *Le Figaro,* dealing with international issues at the time

of Locarno, were published as *La Mythologie de la paix* (Paris, 1929); Charles Maurras's violent critiques of French foreign policy from an extreme Rightist position in *L'Action Française* appeared as *Le Mauvais Traité: De la victoire à Locarno* (2 vols., Paris, 1928). Pro-Polish articles written by L. Ripault for *Le Radical* during the war years were collected under the title *Pendant la tourmente 1914–1918: France et Pologne* (Paris, 1927). Needless to say, leading French, British, German, American, Russian, Italian, and Hungarian periodicals often carried articles dealing with problems pertinent to this study, but a full list of these would require a bibliography of its own.

Because of time considerations and technical difficulties, I relied on journals, digests, and press bulletins more than on the actual press. While a thorough study of the latter could have added some interesting detail, I did not consider it sufficiently rewarding to devote more time to it.

Documents and Official Publications

Neither France nor Czechoslovakia nor Poland published a systematic series of documents on foreign policies during the interwar period, but there are several collections that were issued at one time or other.

As for the Paris Peace Conference, there is the second volume of the Comité d'Études, *Travaux du Comité d'Études: Tome Second, Questions européennes* (Paris, 1919). Part three of this volume deals with Czechoslovak questions, and part four is concerned with Poland and Russia. The French also printed the most complete set of documents covering the Peace Conference, Conférence de la Paix 1919–1920: *Recueil des actes de la conférence* (36 vols., Paris, 1924–34). These volumes, marked confidential or secret, have not been commercially published, and were seemingly intended for government use. To my knowledge the only complete set easily available to scholars is at the Hoover Institution in Stanford, California, and so far no monograph or publication has made reference to this collection. Its value is of course very great. The most extensive collection of documents outside of the above, has been published by the Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States: The Paris Peace Conference 1919* (13 vols., Washington, 1942–47). It is complemented by Paul Mantoux's *Les Déliberations du Conseil des Quatre: 24 mars–28 juin 1919* (2 vols., Paris, 1955), based on the French translator's notes of the meetings. David Hunter Miller's *My Diary at the Conference of Paris* (21 vols., New York, 1926) has lost a little of the value it possessed before publication of the above two collections, but still remains an important source and includes material not found elsewhere.

The main Czechoslovak documents for the war period and the Peace Conference are the third volume of Beneš's war memoirs, already mentioned; a compilation of memorandums submitted by the Czechoslovak delegation to the conference edited by Herman Raschhofer, *Die tschechoslowakischen Denkschriften für die Friedenskonferenz von Paris: 1919–1920* (Berlin, 1938), containing the eleven memorandums in French with a German translation; and Masaryk's wartime speeches published as *Masarykové projevy a řeči za války* (Prague, 1919).

The best known Polish collection of documents is that edited by Stanislaw Filasiewicz, *La Question polonaise pendant la guerre mondiale: Recueil des actes diplomatiques, traités et documents concernant la Pologne* (Paris, 1920). The most complete set of documents bearing on the Peace Conference is that issued by the secretariat of the Polish delegation: Sekretariat Jeneralny Delegacji Polskiej, *Akty i dokumenty dotyczące sprawy granic Polski 1918–1919* (4 vols., Paris, 1920–26). It includes the territorial program of the delegation (volume 1); problems of the German-Polish border (volume 2); the question of Galicia (volume 3); and Teschen, Orava, and Spisz (volume 4). This collection is extremely rare and difficult to find. Probably only a couple of complete sets exist today, and this explains why no authors refer to them, except for the more easily available first volume. Polish memorandums, or at least the most important, are found in two volumes issued by the Commission polonaise des travaux préparatoires au Congrès de la Paix, *Questions relatives aux territoires polonais sous la domination prussienne* (Paris, 1919) and *Les Confins orientaux de la Pologne* (Paris, 1919). Apart from these memorandums there is a series of books authenticated by the Polish delegation and written by Henri

Grappin, *Considérations sur les frontières occidentales de la Russie et la paix en Europe* (Paris, 1919); *Pologne et Lithuanie* (Paris, 1919); *Polonais et Ruthènes: La Question de Galicie* (Paris, 1919); *La Question de Silésie* (Paris, 1919); *Polonais et Tchèques: La Question de la Silésie de Teschen* (Paris, 1919); and *Mémoire sur l'application du principe des nationalités à la question russe: Réponse à l'opuscule de M. André Mandelstamm intitulé "Mémoire sur l'application du principe des nationalités à la question polonaise"* (Paris, 1919). The last memorandum was intended as a counterblast against the propaganda of the Russian *émigrés* in Paris, whose organization, the Conférence Politique Russe, issued among other publications *Considérations sur les frontières orientales de la Pologne et la paix en Europe* (Paris, 1919).

Among documents prepared by the Anglo-Saxon governments which throw light on their attitudes toward the Czechoslovak and Polish settlements, one must include the memorandums of the American Inquiry, found in Miller's *Diary*, and the series of the British Foreign Office, prepared by the Historical Section, called *Peace Handbooks* (London, 1920). The volumes numbered 2, 3, and 4 deal with Czechoslovak issues; volumes 39 to 46 (except for 41) deal with Polish problems.

Published French diplomatic papers concerning the period from 1920 to 1925 are scanty. They include the following collections issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: *Documents relatifs aux négociations concernant les garanties de securité contre une agression de l'Allemagne 19 janvier 1917–7 décembre 1923* (Paris, 1924); *Pacte de securité: Neuf pièces relatives à la proposition faite le 9 février 1925 par le gouvernement allemand et à la réponse du gouvernement français, 9 février 1925–16 juin 1925* (Paris, 1925); and *Documents signés ou paraphés à Locarno le 16 octobre 1925 precedés de six pièces relatives aux négociations préliminaires* (Paris, 1925). Some of these documents are also in the volume by Fritz J. Berber, ed., *Locarno: A Collection of Documents* (London, 1936).

The Czechoslovak government began systematic publication of documents but produced only two little volumes, issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, marked respectively *Recueil des documents diplomatiques*, No. 1 and No. 2. They are *Documents diplomatiques concernant les tentatives de restauration des Habsbourgs sur le trône de Hongrie* (Prague, 1922) and *Documents diplomatiques relatifs aux conventions d'alliance conclues par la République Tchécoslovaque avec le Royaume des Serbes, Croates et Slovènes et le Royaume de Roumanie. Décembre 1919–août 1921* (Prague, 1923).

Major statements by Beneš on foreign policy were published as separate booklets by the official publishing house Orbis of Prague, and they include *The Foreign Policy of Czechoslovakia, January 27, 1921; The Genoa Conference, May 23, 1922; The International Situation, January 30, 1923;* the major work *Five Years of Czechoslovak Foreign Policy, February 6, 1924; The Foreign Policy of Czechoslovakia, October 30, 1924; The Diplomatic Struggle for European Security and the Stabilization of Peace, April 1, 1925;* and *The Locarno Treaties, October 30, 1925.* The collected speeches of Beneš prior to 1924 can be found in *Problémy nové Evropy a zahraniční politika Československá* (Prague, 1924), and those after 1924 appear in the bulky volume E. Beneš, *Boj o mir a bezpečnost státu* (Prague, 1934). Masaryk's collected speeches are in his *Cesta demokracie: Soubor projevu za Republiky* (2 vols., Prague, 1939). Carefully selected documents intended to expose Masaryk's "antinational and antidemocratic" policies have been published in Communist Prague in a book edited by František Nečásek, Jan Pachta, and Eva Raisová, *Dokumenty o protolidové a protinárodní politice T. G. Masaryka* (Prague, 1953). This publication, apart from its tendentious character, is of a limited value indeed.

The Polish government has published few collections of documents. However, under the auspices of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs *Documents diplomatiques concernant les relations polono-lithuaniennes: décembre 1918–septembre 1920* (2 vols., Varsovie, 1920) appeared, to which the Lithuanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs responded with *Documents diplomatiques: Conflit polono-lithuanien* (2 vols., Kaunas, 1924). The Polish Ministry also published *Recueil des documents diplomatiques concernant la question de Jaworzyna, décembre 1918–août 1923* (Varsovie, 1923). Many of the latter documents can also be found in the publications of the Permanent Court of International Justice, *Acts and Documents . . . series C, no. 4* (Leyden, 1923).

Bibliographical Essay

During the Second World War the Germans published documents captured in the archives in Warsaw. One of these documents is particularly important for study of this period, namely, the circular note of Skirmunt which appeared under the title "Polens Aussenpolitik zwischen Versailles und Locarno: Runderlass des polnischen Aussenministers Skirmunt an alle Missionen," *Berliner Monatshefte*, XVIII (1940).

Collections of documents of other European powers are helpful for study of Franco-Czechoslovak-Polish relations. Useful material appears in E. L. Woodward and R. Butler, eds., *Documents on British Foreign Policy 1918–1945*, 1st series (London, 1947–); in Jane Degras, ed., *Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy* (3 vols., London, 1951–53); in Xenia J. Eudin and Harold H. Fisher, *Soviet Russia and the West 1920–1927: A Documentary Survey* (Stanford, 1957); and in R.S.F.S.R. Commissariat du Peuple pour les Affaires Étrangères, *Livre rouge: Recueil des documents diplomatiques relatifs aux relations entre la Russie et la Pologne 1918–1920* (Moscow, 1920). The volume of Francis Deák and Dezsö Ujváry, eds., *Papers and Documents Relating to the Foreign Relations of Hungary: I: 1919–1920* (Budapest, 1939), is of great interest for French policies in 1920. *I Documenti Diplomatici Italiani*, 7th series (Rome, 1953–) contains a few scattered references which are useful. Finally in the American *Foreign Relations of the United States*, apart from the above mentioned volumes on the Peace Conference and *The Lansing Papers* (2 vols., Washington, 1939), there is occasional material on the period after the Peace Conference.

Parliamentary debates and proceedings in France, Czechoslovakia, and Poland naturally provide an important historical source, and must of course be included in the category of official publications. They are, for France, Journal Officiel, Chambre des Députés, *Débats;* for Poland, Sejm, *Sprawozdania stenograficzne;* and for Czechoslovakia, Národní Shromáždění, *Těsnopisecké zprávy*. Debates in the French, Polish, and Czechoslovak senates were, on the whole, less important. Foreign affairs committees in the three parliaments did not publish their proceedings, but one can learn a little about them from the accounts given to the press.

The major alliance treaties can be found in the *League of Nations Treaty Series*, and others are in the *Dziennik Ustaw R. P.* Information on diplomatic appointments and personalities appears in official publications such as the French *Annuaire diplomatique*, the Polish *Dziennik Urzędowy MSZ*, and other volumes issued by the respective Foreign Ministries.

Archival Material and Unpublished Documents

Archives of the French, Polish, and Czechoslovak Ministries of Foreign Affairs suffered losses during the Second World War, and the Quai d'Orsay and Warsaw archives are in the process of reorganization and reconstruction. The French archives are as a rule closed to scholars for the period after 1918. Only a few former high officials of the Quai d'Orsay are said to have consulted them in preparing their memoirs. Access to the Czechoslovak diplomatic archives is greatly restricted. Only some privileged historians have used them and quoted them in their publications. The archives of the Polish foreign ministry in Warsaw suffered even greater loss than did the others, and are still widely scattered. Scholars can gain access to them by special permission. Having obtained access to these archives only after this book was written I did not try to include any of the material here, especially since it was not likely to change drastically either presentations of facts or interpretations.

The difficulty of access to some and the inaccessibility of others of these archives naturally constituted a major obstacle in this work, but painstaking research in archives and collections has turned up a surprisingly large amount of important original material bearing directly on Franco-Czechoslovak-Polish relations.

At the Hoover Institution at Stanford in the so-called *Ciechanowski Deposit* one finds the bulk of the archives of the Polish legation and embassy in Washington for the years 1920–1938; as an important diplomatic mission it possessed copies of many reports from the Polish legations and embassies in Paris and Prague as well as circular notes of the ministry. The Polish Government-in-Exile has in its safekeeping a collection of diplomatic documents (deposited in Montreal) containing copies of important reports which supple-

ment those in the *Ciechanowski Deposit*. There are, in addition, many documents of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Political Department, in the General Sikorski Historical Institute (London) which are of great interest. The Józef Piłsudski Institute of America (New York) possesses a rich archival collection including *Akta Adjutantury Generalnej Naczelnego Dowództwa* (Papers of the Adjutant General's Office of the High Command) for the years 1918–1922; *Akta Generała Rozwadowskiego* (General Tadeusz Rozwadowski Papers) for 1920; and files of documents relating to the Upper Silesian uprisings (*Archiwum Powstań Śląskich*). These three bulky sets of papers contain not only military reports but many copies of diplomatic dispatches transmitted to the High Command.

The National Library in Warsaw has in its manuscript division the Wasilewski Papers, and that of Ossolineum in Wrocław the unpublished memoirs of Alfred Wysocki. Both are relevant for this period. The New Archive (Archiwum Akt Nowych) in Warsaw has, in the Council of Ministers' files, some interesting documents on the French-Polish alliance of 1921.

Among unpublished French documents outside of the Quai d'Orsay, there are mimeographed minutes of the Comité d'Études, entitled *Procès-verbaux des réunions, rapports, 1917–1918*, in the Bibliothèque Polonaise in Paris. There also are two mimeographed documents, *Mission militaire française auprès de la République Tchèco-Slovaque, cabinet du général, no. 33690/cab. Prague le 15 décembre 1938: "Rapport de fin de mission"* (a detailed report on the activities of the French military mission); and *Rapport présenté par M. Marcel Plaisant sur les traités franco-polonais le 9 février 1940, sécret, no. 18* (under the heading of Commission Senatoriale des Affaires Étrangères), both in the Bibliothèque de Documentation Internationale Contemporaine in Paris. There are, finally, the personal papers of L. L. Klotz (a member of the French Peace Conference delegation and minister of finance in Clemenceau's cabinet), entitled *Dossier Klotz*, also located in this library.

The Department of State files in the National Archives in Washington are open to researchers for the period in question, and they have a great abundance of documents, chiefly reports of the American embassy in Paris and legations in Warsaw and Prague. These reports are of value especially for Czechoslovakia, and contain records of conversations with Beneš, Masaryk, and other Czech leaders. As for other American collections, the *Arthur Bliss Lane Collection* at the Yale University Library contains a few reports from Warsaw in 1919.

The microfilmed documents of the captured archives of the German *Auswärtiges Amt*, deposited in the National Archives in Washington, provide another immense source of material. Reports of the German envoys in Paris, Warsaw, and Prague, and their correspondence with the Wilhelmstrasse, are valuable indeed, as well as the papers of Stresemann, in the *Nachlass*.

The hitherto largely unused original documentation mentioned above, supplemented by talks and interviews with leading French, Czechoslovak, and Polish diplomats and military figures, provided the foundation of the present study.

Index

INDEX

Abd-el-Krim, 347
Adenauer, Konrad, 272, 275
Agrarians, Czech, 96. *See also* Press (*Venkov*)
Albert I, king of Belgians, 150
Alby, General Henry, 110–111
Allenstein, plebiscite in, 36, 47, 138, 160
Alliances: and geography, 369–370, 372; and economics, 372–373; French-Polish and French-Czechoslovak compared, 302
French-Polish of *1921*: Polish attitude toward, 213, 214, 222; French attitude toward, 213, 214–215, 218–219, 222–223; character of, 216–217; and military convention, 217–218; and economic treaties, 218–222; and eastern borders, 223; and Beneš, 225; and Skirmunt, 243; and Ruhr occupation, 271–272; and western security pact, 350, 352
French-Polish of *1925*, 362: compared with *1921*, 363–364
French-Czechoslovak of *1924*: proposed by Foch, 281, 292; Czechoslovak attitude toward, 281, 292, 301; negotiated, 285, 291, 297–298; Beneš on, 287, 296, 297–299, 301; Masaryk on, 297, 298; and Germany, 298; and Italy, 298; and Poland, 298, 308–309; and interpretative letters, 299–300; signed, 300; French reaction, 302–303; international reaction, 303–305; and plans for Polish-Czechoslovak cooperation, 306
French-Czechoslovak of *1925*, 362, 363, 364
Polish-Rumanian, 207
See also Little Entente
Allied war aims: and Poland, 8; and Czechoslovakia, 10; and Fourteen Points, 13–14; and Lloyd George, 13–14; and Joint Declaration, 14; Upper Silesia and, 45
Allied War Council, 17
Alsace and Lorraine, 325, 354
American-British guarantee for France: proposed, 39; and Poland, 39, 41; and Czechoslovakia, 39; repudiated, 136, 253
American Inquiry: and Czechoslovak borders, 55, 56; and Teschen, 92; and Eastern Galicia, 107; and Polish-Lithuanian problems, 125
Anschluss: prohibition of, and Czech-Austrian border, 49, 59; and Habsburg restoration, 240; and French-Czechoslovak alliance, 300; and Stresemann's security offer, 328, 330, 335, 339; and Czechoslovak-Polish *rapprochement*, 342, 346; Polish views on, 344; Czechoslovak views on, 351
Anti-Bolshevik intervention, *see* Intervention
Anti-Bolshevik League: of Poland and Baltic states, 131; Little Entente and, 196–197
Apponyi, Count Albert, 188
Arbitration: Russian-Polish borders and, 127; and Teschen, 150; clause in Skirmunt-Beneš pact, 250; in French-Czechoslovak alliance, 300; in Geneva Protocol, 320, 321; German treaties of, with Czechoslovakia and Poland, 325–363 *passim*; Czechoslovak-Polish treaty of, 342, 343, 366; four treaties of, at Locarno, 361, 362
Armistice of *1918*: with Germany, 16–18; Article Twelve, 17, 18; Article Sixteen, 18, 29, 30, 32; with Hungary, 20, 62–63
Arms and munitions, transit of, *see* War material
Askenazy, Professor Szymon, 293
Austria: protests Czech occupation of German-inhabited areas, 21; at Peace Conference, 59–62; and border with Czechoslovakia, 59, 61; peace terms to, 59–60, 193; and Teschen coal, 92; signs treaty of Lány, 242; and French-Czechoslovak alliance, 300; and Czechoslovakia, 370. *See also Anschluss*
Austria-Hungary: outbreak of war and, 7; breakup of, 9–11; and Lloyd George, 13–14; secret negotiations with France, 11, 12, 14, 17; disintegration of, 78, 105, 187; cooperation of successors of, 193; Czechs and Poles in, 374
Austrian-German Union, *see Anschluss*
Azerbaijan, 118

Bader, Dr. Karol, 308, 322

Bailly, Rose, 8n
Bainville, Jacques: on Versailles, 135, 378–379; on Teschen, 160; on France and Russia, 177; on Danubian union, 187; on Little Entente, 195–196; on French-Polish alliance, 222–223
Balduri Conference, 180
Baldwin, Stanley, 271
Balfour, Arthur James: and Polish prepartition borders, 17; on German evacuation, 17n; and Polish National Committee, 19; and Polish *faits accomplis*, 30–32; on Teschen, 32n, 94, 97, 100, 101–102; and Haller's army, 34; and Upper Silesia, 43, 46; and Polish ethnic borders, 109; and Polish struggle in east, 113
Baltic region of: and France, 44; Soviet interest in, 289; Polish request for French naval demonstration in, 289, 290
Baltic states: autonomy of, and Peace Conference, 127; and peace with Soviet Russia, 130n, 162; league of, and Poland, 131, 139; and Foch's intervention plans, 139; conference with Poland, Russia, and Eastern Galicia urged by Lloyd George, 155; and Balduri Conference, 180; Poland and, 251; Skirmunt's cooperation with, 259. *See also* Estonia; Latvia; Lithuania
Banks, French: and Hungary, 189; and Czechoslovakia, 199; and Upper Silesia, 228, 229
Baranowicze, 162
Barante, Baron de, 213
Barbier, J., 313, 367
Bardoux, Jacques, 174, 199
Barrès, Maurice, 236
Barrière de l'est, see Eastern barrier
Bartha, V., 63
Barthélemy, General Marie-Joseph, 85, 89
Barthou, Louis, 215, 216, 235, 261
Bastid, French financier, 220
Bavaria: Teschen coal and, 92; monarchism in, 275; Czechoslovak Plan "N" and, 280–281; separatism in, 298
Beck, Major Józef, 253n
Belgium: and Stresemann's security offer, 348, 353; at Locarno, 359, 361, 363
Belgrade Convention, *see* Little Entente
Beneš, Eduard: and Masaryk, 9, 246, 283; and France during war, 9, 10; and Berthelot, 10, 24, 224, 241–242; on Poland and Russia, 12, 205, 224, 322; and Czechoslovak troops in Russia, 13; and cooperation with Poland, 14, 204, 224, 246, 249, 257, 277, 280, 287–288, 291, 306–307, 321, 341, 343, 345, 346, 388n; agreements with Pichon, 14, 15, 78; foreign minister in provisional government, 15; and Teschen, 15n, 52, 75–76, 80, 81, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 100, 149, 150, 157–158, 159, 224; foreign minister, 16; and armistice with Hungary, 20, 62–63; delegate to Peace Conference, 23; Clemenceau's opinion of, 23; and Kramář, 23–24, 95; Council of Ten and, 24; on Dmowski, 25; on Czech role in war, 26; on Czech position at Peace Conference, 49, 55; and Allied recognition of right to historic borders and Slovakia, 50; author of memorandums for Peace Conference, 52; before Supreme Council, 52, 55–56, 66, 86, 99; on Swiss regime for Czechoslovakia, 55, 56; and Lusatian Sorbs, 56; before Commission on Czechoslovak Affairs, 56, 57, 61, 67; and Glatz, 57; and Austrian peace delegation, 59; and Germans in Czechoslovakia, 60–61; on Slovakia, 62, 63, 66; and "corridor" to Yugoslavia, 65–66; and Subcarpathian Ukraine, 66, 115; and Grosse Schütt, 67, 68; and Hungarian withdrawal from Slovakia, 69, 72; and Hungarian "plot," 69, 89; and intervention against Béla Kun, 69, 72, 73; and hostilities in Slovakia, 70; signs military contract with Clemenceau, 71; talents of, 74; criticizes Czech illusions, 88; before Joint Commissions, 97; moderation of, 100; Clemenceau's support for, 102; criticized by Hlinka, 102; and Polish-Ukrainian problems, 107n; on Polish situation, 148; on Bolshevism, 151; and recognition of Soviet Russia, 151, 318; deplores Russian-Polish war, 151, 152; opposes independent Ukraine, 151; and transit of war material to Poland, 153, 165n; goes to Spa, 157; on regional alliance in East Central Europe, 173; and secret French-Hungarian negotiations, 190, 194–195; and Trumbič, 193; and Little Entente, 194, 195, 196, 204, 206, 207, 257, 264; and French military mission, 197; and economic relations with France, 198, 199; and Ionescu, 202; and Piłsudski, 205, 224, 381; and Briand, 207, 366; opposes Danubian federation, 224; confers with Sapieha, 224; on Eastern Galicia, 224, 247, 248; on French-Polish alliance, 225, 297–298; and pact with Skirmunt, 238, 249–250, 252; and Upper Silesia, 238–239; and Free Masonry, 239; and Habsburg restoration, 241–242; and Piltz, 244; and Germany, 246, 289, 301–302, 318, 337–338, 356–358; and Czechoslovak political parties, 246; on Russia, 246, 262–263; premier, 249; mediates between Lloyd George and Poincaré, 256; on Franco-British guarantee pact, 257, 262; and Skirmunt, 259; middleman between Russia and West, 260; criticized in Poland, 264, 309; and Ja-

vořina, 266, 267, 268, 277, 280, 282, 283, 284; and Conference of Ambassadors, 267, 279, 283; visits France, 268; resigns premiership, 268; and occupation of Ruhr, 274–275, 275–276; and French-Czechoslovak alliance, 281, 285, 287, 292, 296, 297–299, 300, 301, 304, 306, 311; and Seyda, 282, 284; Czech nationalists and, 285; joins National Socialists, 285; in Paris and London, 285, 286, 297–298; and League of Nations, 287, 292, 294, 295, 320; drafts Treaty of Mutual Assistance, 295; critical of Poincaré, 297, 317; antagonistic to Poland, 298; instrumental in Italian-Yugoslav treaty, 305; and treaty with Mussolini, 305; and Thugutt, 308; welcomes MacDonald cabinet, 317; welcomes *Cartel*, 317; confers with Herriot about Stresemann's offer, 333–334, 335–336, 342; on Stresemann's offer, 335–337; and Doumergue, 336; and revision of Polish borders, 336–337, 343, 344; opposes military alliance with Poland, 342; and treaties with Skrzyński, 343, 345, 346; confers with Berthelot, 350; confers with Laroche, 350; seeks meeting with Stresemann, 350, 351; confers with Briand, 350–351; on security pact, 351–352; on *Anschluss*, 351; and Osuský, 351n; draws away from Poland, 357; and Locarno, 360–361, 364, 365–366; on Locarno and French alliances, 362; on Locarno and Polish-Czech relations, 366; on Poles, 374; respected in France, 377; and foreign policy, 383–386; on Poland, 386; on France, 386; personality of, 386; rationalism of, 389

Beneš-Skirmunt pact: signed, 238; annex to, 250; Czechoslovak reaction, 251; Polish reaction, 251–252; and France, 252–253; and Genoa Conference, 261; and Javořina, 265, 266, 277

Benis, Dr. Artur, 228, 229

Berthelot, Philippe: and secretaryship of Peace Conference, 4; and Beneš, 10, 24, 224, 241–242; and Czechoslovakia, 24; and Upper Silesia, 46, 232; and Slovakia, 63; on Teschen, 100; on mandate in Eastern Galicia, 117n; and indivisible Russia, 123; loses influence at Quai d'Orsay, 136; on December *8* line, 155; and Hungary, 188, 193n; assumes secretaryship at Quai d'Orsay, 200, 348; and Leygues, 200; opposes idea of Rumanian-Polish-Hungarian bloc, 202; and French-Polish alliance, 215, 216; and Habsburg restoration, 240; and Briand, 348; confers with Beneš, 350; on arbitration treaties with Germany, 355; at Locarno, 359; and conduct of French foreign policy, 378

Bertie of Thane, Lord, 42n

Bethlen, István, 338

Białystok, 170

Bidlo, Professor Jaroslav, 285

Bielitz, *see* Bielsko

Bielsko: Polish majority in, 75, 98; under Polish control, 78; Beneš and, 95

Biliński, Leon, 203, 220

Bloch, Oscar, 161n

Blum, Léon, 319

Bobek, Paweł, 78n

Bobula, Jan, 191n

Boerner, Captain Ignacy, 138

Bohemia, *see* Czech lands

Bohumín: to Košice railroad, 75, 90; to be occupied by Czech troops, 80; and Czechoslovak-Polish defenses, 227; and Czechoslovak population census, 247

Bolsheviks: expose secret treaties, 9; advance westward, 30, 122; defeat Petliura, 110; annul partitions of Poland, 119; and principle of national self-determination, 119–120; and Russian-Polish border, 120; peace with, opposed by France, 130; and French-Polish alliance, 217. *See also* Communists

Bolshevism: French fears of, 13; threat of, to Czechoslovakia, 70, 125, 151, 164; and Teschen, 81, 85, 86, 87n; and East Central Europe, 104; and Eastern Galicia, 110; and Allies, 130; and Millerand, 136, 138; anti-Polish propaganda and, 161. *See also* Intervention

Bonar Law, Andrew, 269, 271

Bonsal, Colonel Stephen, 46

Borisov, 144

Borský, Lev, 247n

Botha, General Louis, 109, 111

Botha commission, 109, 110

Bourbon-Parma, Prince Sixtus, 240

Bourgeois, Emile, 137

Bourgeois, Léon: on Poland, 8n; on Czechoslovakia, 54, 58; and League of Nations, 292–293, 320

Boussac, Marcel, 219

Bratislava: bridgehead near claimed, 61, 67; occupied by French and Czech troops, 63; and Czechoslovak memorandums, 64; to Esztergom line, 66; approached by Hungarian troops, 70; and secret French-Hungarian negotiations, 189; French officers withdrawn from, 281

Brest-Litovsk, Treaty of, 13, 14, 76

Briand, Aristide: and Peace Conference, 4; premier, 9; and negotiations with tsarist Russia, 9; confers with Masaryk, 10; on

battle of Warsaw, 174; and Little Entente, 207; and French-Polish alliance, 213n, 215; in power, 215; Piłsudski's opinion of, 216; on Russian-Polish relations, 217; signs agreement with Benis, 229; and Upper Silesia, 231, 232, 233–234, 235, 236, 239; and Habsburg restoration, 240–241; rumored visit of, to Prague, 253; negotiates French-British guarantee pact, 254–255; and safeguards for eastern allies, 255; with Lloyd George at Cannes, 255; resigns, 255; Czech reaction to resignation, 256; Polish reaction to resignation, 256; delegate to League, 313, 320; and Skrzyński, 333; foreign minister, 341; outlook of, 347, 378–379; and Berthelot, 348; compared with Poincaré, 348; confers with Chamberlain, 348–349; and Herriot-Sikorski protocol, 349; confers with Beneš, 350–351; and Beneš-Stresemann exchanges, 351; note to Stresemann, 352, 353; on Germany and Poland, 354; confers with Skrzyński, 354–355; at Locarno, 359–360; abandons French guarantees, 360; Skrzyński on, 365; lauds Beneš, 366; and Locarno, 367; and foreign policy, 378–379; and eastern alliances, 379; resignation of, 380

Britain: and France in *1919*, 4–5; Germany and, 5; Czechoslovak agreements with, 14; views Poland as French instrument, 25, 29, 39; and eastern French policy, 48; and Russian-Polish war, 140, 154–156, 162, 163–164, 165–166, 168, 169, 170, 171, 184–185; and French privileges in Eastern Galicia, 222; and plebiscite in Upper Silesia, 226–227, 230–231, 233–234, 235–236; and negotiations for guarantee pact with France, 261; and Ruhr, 290–291; rejects Treaty of Mutual Assistance, 295; and French-Czechoslovak alliance, 304; Labour government in, 311; recognizes *de facto* Soviet Russia, 311; Polish advances to, 315, 316, 318–319; and Geneva Protocol, 320–321, 327, 333; fall of Labour cabinet, 321; conservatives in power, 321; and security in East Central Europe, 348–349; economic cooperation with Germany, 353; at Locarno, 359, 361, 362, 363

British-American guarantee for France, *see* American-British guarantee

British Foreign Office: and Polish territorial claims, 36; and Czech borders, 54–55; and Slovak-Hungarian border, 65; on Poles in Teschen, 92; Lloyd George and, 122n; and Polish-Lithuanian Union, 125; and Soviet peace terms to Poland, 171; historical adviser of, on Locarno, 367

Brockdorff-Rantzau, Count Ulrich, 42, 290

Buat, General Edmond, 215

Budenny, Marshal Semen, 153

Bug River, 124

Bukovina, 105

Bulak-Bulakhovich, General, 145

Bulgaria, 203

Byelorussia: proclaims independence, 118; Chicherin and, 120n; and Dmowski, 121; and federal links with Poland, 121, 124, 178; and Russia, 125; Polish borders with and plebiscite, 143; and Polish *1920* offensive, 145; and Treaty of Riga, 178, 179, 180

Cambon, Jules: member of Peace Conference delegation, 4; on Brest-Litovsk Treaty and alliance with Russia, 14; presides over Commission on Polish Affairs, 35; presents reports, 37, 39, 40; on Danzig, 42; presides over Commission on Czechoslovak Affairs, 56; presents reports, 56, 57–58; on Eastern Galicia, 108, 113, 114; on Polish advance in Lithuania, 127; presides over Conference of Ambassadors, 233; and recognition of Poland's eastern borders, 274

Cambon, Paul, 5, 122

Cambon commission, *see* Commission on Polish Affairs; Commission on Czechoslovak Affairs

Cannes Conference, 254–255, 378

Capital, French: in Eastern Galicia, 114; in Teschen, 149–150; in Czechoslovakia, 150, 198, 199; in Hungary, 188–189, 199; Little Entente and, 197; in Poland, 219–220, 222, 228–229, 324

Carpathian Ruthenia (Ukraine), *see* Subcarpathian Ukraine

Cartel des Gauches: in power, 311, 312; Polish reaction to, 313, 315, 318, 324; and Zamoyski, 316; Czechoslovak reaction to, 317, 318; and reparations, 319; fiscal policy of, 341; and foreign policy, 373; and Herriot, 379; and eastern alliances, 380; and Czech Left, 384. *See also* French political parties (of Left)

Carton de Wiart, General Sir Adrian, 113, 212

Cassin, René, 320

Castle, R. W., 158n

Catherine II, empress of Russia, 144

Catholicism, Polish, 25, 215

Caucasus, 127, 139

Cecil, Lord Robert, 294–295

Chamber of Deputies, *see* Parliament (French)

Chamberlain, Austen, 327, 328, 333, 348, 353

Champignol, Victor, 199

Chappedelaine, de, French deputy, 124
Chardigny, Colonel Pierre, 181, 183, 184
Charles, former emperor of Austria and king of Hungary, 240–242
Cheb, 57, 58
Chełm, 126, 129, 157, 170
Chéradame, André, 10n, 225
Chicherin, Georgi V.: on independence of Byelorussia and Lithuania, 120n; and peace negotiations with Poland, 139, 144; proposes diplomatic relations to Prague, 151; and Beneš, 152; on Curzon Note, 157; on Treaty of Riga, 178–179; on France and Poland, 290; on French recognition, 314; on relations with France, 315; in Warsaw, 358; in Berlin, 359
Chłapowski, Alfred, 307, 324, 332
Christian Democrats (Polish), 276. *See also* Press (*Rzeczpospolita*)
Churchill, Winston, 119n, 130n
Cieszyn, *see* Teschen
Clemenceau, Georges: president of Peace Conference, 3; and Pichon, 3–4, 378; and Poincaré, 4, 41n, 377; and Foch, 4, 41n; nominates Dutasta, 4n; and Lloyd George, 4–5; and Wilson, 5; and House, 5; defines peace, 6; on French wartime attitude toward Poland, 6; on Polish historic borders. 17; and armistice with Hungary, 20; and Beneš, 23, 55, 102; congratulates Dmowski, 32; and German-Polish hostilities, 33, 44n; attitude toward Poles, 35; and American-British guarantee, 39, 41; and Rhineland, 41; defends Polish rights, 41; and Upper Silesia, 41, 45, 47; introduces Polish and Czechoslovak questions before Supreme Council, 50–52; on Germans in Bohemia, 57; on Ratibor, 59; on hostilities in Slovakia, 70, 72; signs military contract with Beneš, 71; and intervention against Béla Kun, 73; and Teschen, 86, 88, 89, 94, 97, 99, 138; annoyed with French experts, 100–101; on Eastern Galicia, 111, 112, 116–117; confers with Lloyd George, 117; tries to save Paderewski's cabinet, 117; distrusts Polish judgment on Russia, 122; and Polish advance in Lithuania, 127; and Polish eastern policy, 128, 131n; on "barbed wire fence," 130; opposes peace of Baltic states with Soviet Russia, 130n; on Poland's role in eastern barrier, 131; criticized in France, 136; retires from politics, 136; and Lloyd George on Russia, 138; on Henrys, 147; Tardieu and, 162; and foreign policy, 378; and eastern alliances, 379
Cochin, Denys, 8n
Cologne, 356, 363
Comité d'Études, 21–22: and Czechoslovak territorial claims, 54; and Teschen, 92; on Russia and Ukraine, 123; fears German influence in Baltic provinces, 123
Comité des Forges, 228n, 270, 373
Comité des Houillières, 228n, 229n, 373
Comité Interallié Pro Polonia, 8n
Commission on Czechoslovak Affairs, 56–57, 59, 60, 61, 67, 68
Commission on Eastern Borders of Germany, 45, 46
Commission on Polish Affairs: composition and competence of, 34, 35; reports on German-Polish border, 36, 37, 39, 40, 41; maintains stand on Upper Silesia, 45; to examine ethnic borders in east, 109; recommendations on Eastern Galicia, 113–114, 115; recommends eastern border, 126, 129
Communism, *see* Bolshevism
Communists
Czech: and France, 301; and Poland, 322; and foreign policy, 373, 383, 384
French: emerge at Tours congress, 135; Trotsky and, 140; and Upper Silesia, 229; and Ruhr occupation, 270; demonstrations of, 316; and Locarno, 366; and foreign policy, 379
Polish: and Russian-Polish war, 162–163; and foreign policy, 373
See also Press (French: *Humanité*; Polish: *Komunistyczna Trybuna*)
Conference of Ambassadors: divides Teschen, Spiš, and Orava, 158, 159, 265; and Upper Silesia, 226, 233, 236; and Habsburg restoration, 242; Czechoslovak position with, 244; and Javořina, 266, 267–268, 269, 277, 279, 280, 286; and recognition of Poland's eastern borders, 273, 274; and Beneš, 283; and revision of frontiers, 284
Conférence Politique Russe: and Polish borders, 116, 125, 126, 129, 179; claims Byelorussia, Lithuania, and Ukraine, 125
Congress Kingdom, 8, 120, 124, 125–126, 129
Congress of Vienna, *see* Congress Kingdom
Cook, Sir Joseph, 56n
Coolidge, Archibald, 66, 83, 84, 85
Coolidge mission, 43n, 82, 88
Corfu incident, 295
"Corridor," Czechoslovak-Yugoslav: proposed in Czech memorandums, 52, 64, 65, 74; Laroche on, 65; Lloyd George on, 65; and Masaryk, 65; Nicolson on, 65–66; and Kramář, 65–66; and Beneš, 65–66; and intervention against Béla Kun, 72; French support for, 65
"Corridor," Polish: Britain and, 328; Beneš

on, 337, 344; Alsace and Lorraine compared to, 354
Couget, Joseph, 195, 197
Council of Foreign Ministers: and Czechoslovak borders, 57–58, 59, 62, 67, 68; and Teschen, 90, 95, 96; and Eastern Galicia, 113, 114, 115
Council of Four, *see* Supreme Council
Council of Heads of Delegations, *see* Supreme Council
Council of Ten, *see* Supreme Council
Covenant of League, 359, 361–362, 363
Cracow Protocol, 310
Crane, Richard, 158n, 190, 195, 247
Crimea, 118
Crowe, Sir Eyre, 94, 97, 115–116, 158, 328
Csáky, Count Emeric, 188n, 189
Csallóköz, *see* Grosse Schütt
Csekonics, Count Ivan, 192
Cuno, Chancellor Wilhelm, 328
Curzon, George N., Marquis, 5, 253, 294
Curzon Line: and December *8* line, 156; and Eastern Galicia, 156–157; rejected by Chicherin, 157, 162; and Teschen, 159; and Soviet peace terms, 170; Piłsudski on, 175; France and, 176, 214; Treaty of Riga and, 179
Curzon Note, *see* Curzon Line
Czech historic borders: Dmowski and, 12; France and, 14, 15, 23, 63; Polish National Committee and French recognition of, 15; and Teschen, 15, 56, 63, 75, 76, 78, 79, 80, 90, 93; and armistice with Hungary, 20; modification of, 52; in Czechoslovak memorandums, 53; Foreign Office and, 54; economic reasons for, 54n, 56; and Americans, 55, 61; and Commission on Czechoslovak Affairs, 56; and peace treaty with Austria, 59, 61–62
Czech lands (Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia): under control of Prague, 50; attempted secession of German areas, 50; Beneš on history of, 55; historic borders of, accepted at Peace Conference, 56; Germans in, claimed by Austria, 60; plebiscites in, demanded by Austria, 61; historical rights to, advanced by Czechs, 63–64; Czechoslovak troops under French command in, 71; and Teschen, 90
Czechoslovak and Polish commissions, *see* Joint Commissions
Czechoslovak Commission, *see* Commission on Czechoslovak Affairs
Czechoslovak National Council: established, 10; and Polish war aims, 12; and Czechoslovak army in France, 13; recognized by France, 14; recognized by Britain and United States, 15; *de facto* government, 15; position of, 78
Czechoslovak political parties
Of Left: and Russian-Polish war, 152, 164; and Beneš, 246; and foreign policy, 383–384; and French National Bloc, 384; and Poincaré, 384; and *Cartel des Gauches*, 384
Of Right: and Beneš, 246; and foreign policy, 383–384
See also Agrarians; Communists; National Democrats; Socialists
Czechoslovak-Russian border: Czech hopes for, 12, 205, 247; advocated by Kramář, 107; advocated by *Conférence Politique Russe*, 116; advocated by *Národní Listy*, 151
Czechoslovak troops in France: Poincaré's decree on, 13; return home, 34, 50, 80; occupy Slovakia, 63; to occupy Teschen, 80
Czechoslovak troops in Russia, *see* Russia
Czechoslovakia: outbreak of war and, 9; independence proclaimed, 15, 16; Czechs and Poles, 26, 374–376; situation in, 50; borders with Germany drawn, 57–59; borders with Austria drawn, 59–62; borders with Hungary drawn, 66–69; Bolshevism and, 70, 125, 151, 164; elections of *1920*, 151; and Polish Ukrainians, 152, 205, 243, 387; borders of, and secret French-Hungarian negotiations, 188, 189; and Trianon, 190; proposed sanctions against Germany and, 238; population census, 247–248, 309; economic ties with Germany, 275, 365, 372; as bridge between West and Russia, 301, 318, 385; and Stresemann's security offer, 334–338; *rapprochement* with Poland, 341–343, 346–347, 357–358, 388; overtures to Germany, 350–351, 356–358; and Austria (general), 370; and Hungary (general), 370; geography and politics, 370; demography and politics, 371, 372; economics and politics, 372; social structure and foreign policy, 373; constitutional system and foreign policy, 383–385; and Poland (general), 385; and national minorities, 387. *See also* Alliances; Arbitration; Czech historic borders; Czech lands; Czechoslovak political parties; "Corridor"; Javořina; Little Entente; Military cooperation; National minorities; Pan-Slavism; Parliament; Press; Slovakia; Subcarpathian Ukraine; Teschen; Trade agreements; Treaties
Czechs and Poles, 26, 374–376

D'Abernon, Edgar V., Viscount: and Russian-Polish war, 140, 165, 166, 167; on Czech

hostility to Poland, 165; on Beneš's regional plans, 204; on Lloyd George and Upper Silesia, 233; on Beneš-Skirmunt pact, 253; on French overtures to Russia, 258; on Ruhr occupation and Czechs, 274; on French-Czechoslovak alliance, 299; and Tusar, 304; on Poincaré's policy, 312; and Stresemann, 325, 327, 329, 347, 351, 355; on Polish "Corridor," 328; on Locarno and security for East Central Europe, 355–356; on German attitude toward Poland and Czechoslovakia, 357; on French eastern alliances, 364; on Czechs and Locarno, 365
D'Abernon-Jusserand mission, *see* Franco-British mission to Poland
Dąbski, Jan, 276
Danube: Czechoslovak border on, and French, 23, and Beneš, 62, and Czechoslovak memorandums, 64, and Americans, 66, and Commission on Czechoslovak Affairs, 67; internationalization of river, 52
Danubian Confederation, *see* Danubian Union
Danubian Union: French plans for, 187; favored by Paléologue, 188; Little Entente and, 194, 197; and Habsburg restoration, 240; French Right and, 380
Danzig: Allied occupation of, and help to Poland through, 17, 30, 32, 33–34; attribution to Poland recommended, 37, 42; Foch's views on, 38; Lloyd George's views on, 41; free city, 42; Fiume and, 42; French and British interests in, 44, 163–164; and Upper Silesia, 45; and American views, 47; and Teschen, 99; Spa Conference and, 155; under high commissioner of League of Nations, 163; and transit of war material to Poland, 163–164; and French-Polish military convention, 218; and French-British guarantee pact, 256; and Russian overtures to Poland, 289; and League of Nations, 293; and Gdynia, 324; and Locarno, 367
Daszyński, Ignacy: and Teschen, 81; and Slovakia, 96; French and, 153; vice-premier, 165; and Biliński, 203
Dawes, Charles G., 319
Dawes Plan, 291, 312, 319, 320
Democratic Republicans (French), 331
Denikin, General Anton: successes of, 128; Allies and, 128; Poland and, 128, 138, 139; defeated, 130; French support of, 139, 145–146; Piłsudski and, 145n; Kramář and, 150
Denis, Ernest, 10n, 21–22
Deschanel, Paul, 136, 377
Desticker, General Pierre, 192
Disarmament, *see* League of Nations; Rearmament; Security
Dmowski, Roman: wartime views of, 7; president of Polish National Committee, 11; on Czechs, 12, 15n, 26; urges joint Allied statement on Poland, 13; compares National Committee with Czechoslovak National Council, 16; urges German evacuation, 16; and Article *12* of Armistice, 18n; and Lansing, 18n; and Piłsudski, 19, 24, 121, 381–382; delegate at Peace Conference, 20, 24–25, 120n; and Lloyd George, 25, 41; Beneš and, 25; French opinion of, 25; temporary withdrawal from politics, 25; and Prussian Poland, 30; and Clemenceau, 32, 88, 94; before Supreme Council, 32, 46, 86–87, 99, 105, 123; presents memorandums to Peace Conference, 35, 109; and *1772* borders, 35–36, 123; and Commission on Polish Affairs, 36–37; on French support to Poland, 47; and Teschen, 75–76, 78, 86–87, 91, 94, 99; on Eastern Galicia, 105, 107, 116–117; on Polish eastern borders, 118, 120–121; and Polish federalist program, 123; and Zamorski, 149; and Treaty of Riga, 179; and Seyda, 282; eulogizes Poincaré, 282; foreign minister, 288; program of foreign policy, 288, 381–382; resigns, 291; personality of, 381–382
Dmowski's committee, *see* Polish National Committee
Don region, 118
Doumer, Paul, 219
Doumergue, Gaston, 312, 328, 336, 377
Duca, Ion, 286
Düsseldorf, 230, 319, 355
Duhamel, Georges, 316n
Duisburg, 230, 319, 355
Dulles, Allen W., 56n
Dupont, General Charles, 34n
Dutasta, Paul, 3, 4n
Dvořaček, Jan, 249
Dvorčak, Victor, 102
Dzierżyński, Feliks, 162

East Central Europe: France and, 6; Bolshevik Revolution and, 104
Security in: and France, 38, 137, 355; and Polish federalist program, 121; and Ionescu's plan, 201; and Stresemann's security offer, 331, 348; and Britain, 348–349; and London jurists' conference, 355
Regional bloc in: and Beneš, 173, 204; and Masaryk, 193; and Little Entente, 194; of Hungary, Poland, and Rumania, 196, 202, 203; Ionescu's plans for, 201–202; Sapieha's conception, 203; Piltz's views on, 203–204, 245; and Poland, 206, 387–388;

Czechoslovak-Polish disunity, 207; and Millerand, 379; and France, 388
East Prussia: proposed Allied occupation of, 17; German evacuation of, recommended, 22; represented in Poznań diet, 30; Lloyd George fears inclusion in Poland, 34; Polish claims in, 35; League of Nations protectorate proposed by Dmowski, 36; demilitarization of, and Commission on Polish Affairs, 36; and Franco-Polish military cooperation, 279; and Russian overtures to Poland, 289. *See also* Allenstein; Marienwerder
Eastern barrier (between Soviet Russia and Germany): Poland and, 22, 41, 131, 139, 186, 191; and Polish-Lithuanian union, 184; France and, 186; Hungary and, 191, 192–193; and Ionescu's plans, 202; and Little Entente, 207, 223; and French-Polish alliance, 216; and Russian-Polish problems, 223; weakness of, 269; and French-Czechoslovak relations, 302; and D'Abernon, 328; idea of, appraised, 368; and Beneš, 385; foundations for, 387
Eastern Galicia: and union with Russia, 12, 104, 107, 114, 115, 116, 117, 151–152; Czechoslovak views on, and interest in, 12, 107, 110–111, 151–152, 205, 245, 247, 310; France and, 22, 107, 111–112, 114, 176, 219, 222; Ukrainian-Polish hostilities in, 30, 104, 105, 108; analogy with Teschen, 100, 105, 112, 239; ethnic composition of, 104–105; oil fields in, 105, 109, 110, 114, 176, 219, 222; before Supreme Council, 105, 108, 110–111; Western Ukrainian Republic proclaimed in, 105; and Ukrainian People's Republic, 107; and Inquiry, 107; Britain and, 107, 114, 116, 117, 222; Italian views on, 107, 114; truce in, 108–110; demarcation line in, 109, 110; Polish offensive in, 111; Upper Silesia and, 111; settlement of, discussed in Commission on Polish Affairs, 113–114; lines A and B, 114, 115, 156; autonomy of, 114, 115–116, 273n; Polish advance to Zbrucz authorized by Peace Conference, 115; Polish civil administration authorized, 115; question of Polish mandate for, 117, 131; renunciation of, by Petliura, 145; and Spa Conference, 155, 156; and Curzon Line, 156, 176; and Czechoslovak-Polish relations, 205; Beneš and, 224, 247, 248; Skirmunt on, 243; Masaryk on, 247; rumored Czechoslovak mandate over, 247; Beneš-Skirmunt pact and, 250–251; and Genoa Conference, 260. *See also* Botha commission; Galicia; Plebiscites
Eck, Dr. Louis, 187–188
Eger, *see* Cheb
Einstein, Lewis, 281, 283, 350
Eisenmann, Louis, 10n
Erzberger, Matthias, 34, 44n
Estonia, 118, 290
Esztergom, 66

Faure, Paul, 161n
Feldsberg, 61
Feleky, Geza, 192
Felsztyn, 266
Fiala, Václav, 374
Finland, 118, 127, 139, 290
Fiume, 42
Flandin, Pierre, 223
Fleuriau, de, French diplomat, 18n
Flieder, Robert, 342
Flipo, Captain, 148
Foch, Marshal Ferdinand: supreme Allied commander, 3; delegate to Peace Conference, 4; and Clemenceau, 4, 41n; Armistice and Poland, 16, 17; and Rhineland, 29, 38, 41n; and return of Haller's army, 30, 32, 34; and anti-Bolshevik intervention, 30–32, 108, 128, 139; and American-British guarantee, 41; and Slovak borders, 63; favors intervention against Béla Kun, 70, 72, 73; and Czechoslovak army, 71n; Teschen and, 82; on Eastern Galicia, 104, 108, 112; and Polish offensive in Ukraine, 141–142, 146; scorns Grabski, 154; and Russian-Polish war, 156, 163, 166, 168–170, 172, 173–174; and French-Czechoslovak alliance, 214–215, 216, 218, 278, 299; on Upper Silesia, 226, 232, 236; at Conference of Ambassadors, 233; and recognition of Polish eastern borders, 273; visits Poland, 278–279; visits Czechoslovakia, 278, 281; critical of Piłsudski, 279; and French-Czechoslovak alliance, 281, 285, 292, 297, 298, 299; and Javořina, 282; and Ruhr, 289; invites Masaryk to Paris, 297; urges Polish-Czechoslovak cooperation, 306
Foch line, 127, 181
Foster, Lieut. R. C., 82n
Fouchet, Maurice, 189
France: effects of war on, 3; situation in *1919*, 4; and Britain, 4, 5; and United States, 5; wartime attitude toward Poland, 6, 7–8, 11, 13, 14, 15, 16; border agreement with tsarist Russia, 8–9; and Czechoslovak cause, 9–11, 13, 14–16; secret exchanges with Austria-Hungary, 11, 12, 14, 17; eastern policy of, and Britain, 48; friction with Italy over Czechoslovakia, 71, 93, 94; domestic situation in *1920*, 135–137; economic situation in *1921*, 220–221; overtures to

Soviet Russia, 258; credits to Poland, 261–262, 304; inflation in, 291; credits to Yugoslavia, 304; credits offered to Rumania, 304; recognizes *de facto* Soviet Russia, 311, 314; elections of *1924*, 311, 312; Warsaw legation of, becomes embassy, 314; and Soviet Russia, 315; general situation in *1925*, 347; and Locarno Conference, 359–361; and Germany, power of compared, 369; policy of eastern alliances and geography, 369–370, 372; demography and politics, 371; economics and politics, 371–372, 373; eastern alliances and economics, 372–373; loans to eastern allies, 373; social structure and foreign policy, 373; general attitude toward Czechoslovakia and Poland, 376–377; constitutional system and foreign policy, 377–378. *See also* Alliances; Arbitration; Banks; Capital; Military cooperation; Military mission; Press; Trade agreements; Treaties

Franchet d'Esperey, Marshal Louis, 20, 62, 111, 240

Franco-British mission to Poland: in Prague, 164; composition and task of, 165–166; appraised by Tommasini, 165; appeals for aid to Poland, 167, 168; activities of, 171

François-Poncet, André, 363

Franklin-Bouillon, Henry, 8n, 124, 137, 258

Free Masonry, 239n, 377

Freikorps, 235

French-British guarantee pact: French proposals, 253–254; and French eastern alliances, 254; British proposals, 254–255; criticized in Paris, 255; new exchanges, 256–257; Beneš on, 257; after Rapallo, 261

French-Hungarian secret negotiations: in Košice, 187; in Paris, 188–189; and territorial claims, 189; after Trianon, 190, 198n; and Rumania, 190; and Poland, 190; and Gödöllö convention, 190; and Czechoslovakia, 190–191, 194–195; and Germany, 194–195

French military mission, *see* Military mission

French political parties

Of Left: and Clemenceau, 4, 136; and Poland, 19, 145, 234, 316, 379–380; in *1920*, 135; and "barbed wire" formula, 141; and Russia, 145, 379–380; and Germany, 234, 379–380; and Briand, 379; and Herriot, 379; and Versailles, 379; and Millerand, 380; and Poincaré, 380; and Locarno, 380

Of Right: and Clemenceau, 4, 136, 379; and Versailles, 135; and Poland, 147–148, 165, 222–223, 279, 313, 315, 340, 380; and Russia, 147–148, 380; and Paléologue's policy, 198–199; defeat of, 291; and Germany, 330, 331, 380; and Locarno, 366, 380; and Poincaré, 379; and Millerand, 379; and Czechoslovakia, 380; and Austria, 380; and Danubian Union, 380

See also Cartel des Gauches; Communists; Democratic Republicans; National Bloc; Radical Socialists; Socialists

Friedland, 57, 58

Frištat, Frysztat, 75, 78, 98, 247

Fromageot, Henri, 359

Frýdeberk, 53

Frýdek, 75, 76, 78

Gailhard-Baucel, de, French deputy, 137, 142

Galicia and Lodomeria: Poles from, and war, 6; under Polish control, 18; Teschen and, 84, 90; character of, 104; French capital in, 219; Poles from, and Czechs, 376. *See also* Eastern Galicia

Gauvain, Auguste, 8n, 10n, 19n, 44

Gdynia, 324, 372–373

Geneva Protocol: adoption of, 320; and Britain, 320–321, 327, 333; and Czechoslovak ratification, 321; and French-Polish military cooperation, 323; and Stresemann's security offer, 336; collapse of, 338

Genoa Conference: and French-British guarantee pact, 256; Britain and, 257; France and, 257; and French-Polish relations, 257–258; Beneš on, 260; French-Czechoslovak-Polish cooperation at, 260, 262

Genty, Paul, 173

Georgia, 118

German-Austrian Union, *see Anschluss*

Germans: in Czechoslovakia, 21, 45, 49, 50, 53–54, 55, 57, 59, 60, 61–62, 275, 338, 357, 387; in Poland, 37, 386; in Upper Silesia, 44, 172, 226, 230; in Teschen, 60, 86, 88, 94

Germany: collapse of, in *1918*, 3; outbreak of war and, 7; disarmament of, and hostilities in Poznania, 33; and Soviet Russia, 33, 130, 131, 167, 261, 270–271, 289, 314–315, 323–324, 326–327, 354, 359, 367; and peace conditions, 42–43; and Czechoslovakia, 57–59, 101, 238, 275, 342–343, 350–351, 356–358, 365, 372, 375; at Spa, 155; neutrality of, in Russian-Polish war, 161; and secret French-Hungarian negotiations, 194–195; and French-Polish alliance, 217, 218; opposes partition of Upper Silesia, 226–227, 230–231, 233; and Treaty of Rapallo, 261; passive resistance in Ruhr, 270, 271, 288; uprisings in, 289; and French-Czechoslovak alliance, 301–302, 303; inflation in, 312n; *Cartel des Gauches* and, 313; accepts Dawes Plan, 319; loans to, 319n; entry into League, 321, 323, 324, 327, 336, 339, 348,

351, 352, 353–354; customs war with Poland, 331, 352–353; and Czechoslovak-Polish *rapprochement*, 342–343; economic cooperation with Britain and United States, 353; western and eastern frontiers, and Locarno, 363; and France, power compared, 369; Poland and (general), 370, 372; Czech-Polish disunity on, 375. *See also* Arbitration; Bavaria; Danzig; East Prussia; Locarno; Palatinate; Pomerania; Poznania; Reparations; Revisionism; Rhineland; Ruhr; Saar; Saxony; Silesia; Thuringia; Upper Silesia; Westphalia
Gibson, Hugh, 84, 112, 183, 220, 222
Gillain, Colonel Charles, 83
Gingr, Petr, 78n
Glatz, 53, 54, 57, 306
Głąbiński, Stanisław, 76, 79
Gmünd, 53, 59, 61
Gödöllö, 169
Gouraud, General Henri, 354
Grabski, Władysław: and Teschen, 75, 158; premier, 153; in Spa, 154–158; and Piłsudski, 154, 156; promises of, at Spa and Riga preliminaries, 184; and cooperation with Czechoslovakia, 282; cabinet of, and foreign policy, 288, 388; premier in *1923*, 306, 349; and Britain, 315; and French-Polish commercial convention, 324; and Stresemann's security offer, 333; and economic cooperation with Russia, 358
Grappin, Henri, 125
Greece, 201
Grenard, chairman of Teschen Commission, 88, 89, 94
Grodno, 122, 125, 161, 180
Grosse Schütt, 64, 67, 68, 189
Guarantee, *see* American-British guarantee; French-British guarantee
Gutowski, Stanisław, 80–81

Habsburg Restoration in Hungary, 238, 240–242, 250, 300, 302
Haller, General Józef, 16, 84, 112, 276
Haller, General Stanisław, 314
Haller's army: organized in France, 11; National Committee and, 12, 19; convention on, 16; Piłsudski's demands for, 19n; question of return home, 30, 33, 34; strength of, 34n; and Upper Silesia, 46; and Foch's interventionist plans, 108; and fighting in Eastern Galicia, 109, 111–112
Halmos, Charles, 188
Haskings, Charles H., 42n
Haumant, Maurice, 10n
Headlam-Morley, James W., 42n, 367
Hennocque, General Edmond, 71
Helsinki Conference, 139
Henrys, General Paul: on Upper Silesia, 46; and Polish advance to Zbrucz, 113; and Polish advance in Lithuania, 127; and Piłsudski, 142n, 147; heads military mission in Poland, 146; and Polish-Russian war, 146–147, 163; and Weygand, 167
Herbette, Jean, 326
Herriot, Edouard: and Poland, 8n, 322; premier and foreign minister, 312; program of, 313; and Russia, 314; and Skrzyński, 316, 333–334; Czechoslovak attitude toward, 317, 318; Polish reaction to, 318, 320; and reparations, 319; and ideology of Left, 320, 341, 379; and MacDonald, 320; and League of Nations, 320; and Germany's entry into League, 321; on Germany, 324; and Stresemann's security offer, 328, 329, 333–334, 335–336, 337, 338–340; and Poincaré, 329; and Beneš, 333–334, 335–336, 342; and German-Polish arbitration treaty, 339; fall of, 340, 341; signs protocol with Sikorski, 349; and foreign policy, 349
Hervé, Gustave, 227
Hindenburg, Field Marshal Paul von, 345, 346
Hitler, Adolf, 289, 388, 389
Hlinka, Monsignor Andrej: journey to Paris, 73–74, 102; on Teschen, 102; on Beneš, 102; Polish support for, 102
Hodža, Milan, 63
Hoesch, Leopold von, 270, 328, 329, 330–331, 333, 334, 354
Hohenzollern family, 300, 302
Hoover Food Mission, 20n
Horthy, Admiral Nicholas: in power, 73; and secret French-Hungarian negotiations, 189, 190, 198n; and Ludendorff, 198; and Habsburg restoration, 240–241, 242
House, Colonel Edward M., 5, 25, 58
Howard, Sir Esme, 42n, 85–86
Hungarian-French secret negotiations, *see* French-Hungarian secret negotiations
Hungarian-Polish border, *see* Polish-Hungarian border
Hungarians in Slovakia, 64, 66, 68, 387
Hungary: and Poland, 12, 92, 152, 153, 191–192, 194, 198n, 206, 248, 203, 370–371, 376; Ukrainians of, 52; and Czechoslovakia, 62–63, 68, 69, 70, 72, 112, 152, 370; hopes for American support, 66; Communists in power, 69; fall of Communism, 73; and Teschen, 92; French policy toward, 187, 198–199; and Germany, 192–193, 194–195, 198; and Little Entente, 194, 195, 198, 202, 206; Czechoslovak-Polish relations and, 224, 243; French-Czechoslovak alliance and,

300. *See also* Intervention; Rearmament; Revisionism; Slovakia; Subcarpathian Ukraine; Transylvania; Trianon
Hurst, Sir Cecil, 355
Hythe Conference, 168–170

Inter-Allied commission for negotiation of armistice between Poland and Ukraine, *see* Botha commission
Inter-Allied mission to Poland, *see* Noulens mission
Inter-Allied Permanent Commission for Teschen, *see* Teschen
Intervention, anti-Bolshevik
In Hungary: Beneš and, 69; Foch and, 70, 72; Czechoslovakia and, 70, 72; discussed at Peace Conference, 72; plans for, collapse of, 73; and France, 187; and regional cooperation, 193
In Russia: plans for, 11; and Czechoslovak troops, 13, 50; and Polish troops, 13; Kramář and, 24, 150–151; Foch and, 30–32, 108, 128, 139; Noulens and, 32n; and Eastern Galicia, 108, 116; opposed by Lloyd George, 108, 116, 118–119, 122; favored by France, 118; border states and, 119; opposed by Wilson, 119; Poland and, 122, 128, 139; Piłsudski and, 138, 145n
Ionescu, Take: and Little Entente, 194, 206; plans vast regional bloc, 201–202, 206; and Beneš, 202; and Lloyd George, 205n; visits Warsaw, 206; for recognition of Polish-Russian frontier, 223; arranges Beneš-Sapieha meeting, 224, 225
Italy: Czechoslovak agreements with, 14; jealous of French position in Czechoslovakia, 71, 73, 93, 94; ideas on cooperation with Hungary and Poland, 94; and Eastern Galicia, 107, 114; and Polish-Russian peace, 140; and Little Entente, 197; and French-Czechoslovak alliance, 298, 304–305; treaty with Yugoslavia, 305; treaty with Czechoslovakia, 305–306; at Locarno, 359, 361, 362

Jagellonian tradition, 121
Jaurès, Jean, 316
Javořina, Jaworzyna: and Beneš-Skirmunt pact, 250, 251, 252, 265–266; conflict over, 264; description of, 265; and Teschen, 265, 277, 286; Piltz and, 265; Slovak stand on, 266; proposal of territorial exchange, 266, 267–268; Czech stand on, 266–267, 277, 284, 285; and Conference of Ambassadors, 267–268, 277, 279, 280, 286; Beneš and, 267, 268, 277, 280, 282, 283, 284; French stand on, 268, 285, 305; and Czechoslovak-Polish relations, 271, 306, 374; Polish stand on, 277–278, 286; Foch and, 279, 280, 282; and Seyda, 282, 283, 284; and Jusserand, 286; and League, 286–287, 291, 293; and Permanent Court of International Justice, 291; Zamoyski on, 307; assigned to Czechoslovakia, 310
Javořnik, 53
Joffe, Adolf, 178
Joffre, Marshal Joseph, 4
Joint Commissions on Czechoslovak and Polish Affairs, 57, 58, 90, 95, 97, 98, 101
Jouhaux, Léon, 320
Jouvenel, Bertrand de, 319, 347, 368
Jouvenel, Henri de, 320
Jurgenies, German diplomat, 275
Jusserand, Jules: and mission to Poland, 165, 166, 167, 171; on Czechoslovak-Polish cooperation, 204, 286
Jusserand-D'Abernon mission, *see* Franco-British mission to Poland

Kacvin, 266, 267
Kamenev, Leo, 168, 169
Kammerer, Albert, 126, 129
Kammerer, Charles, 199
Kapp Putsch, 193, 195
Karvina, 75, 85, 90, 92, 150, 158
Kenworthy, J. M., 233
Kerr, Philip, 328
Keynes, John Meynard, 136, 230
Kholm, *see* Chełm
Kiedroń, Józef, 78n
Kiev, 145, 147, 153, 155
Klaipeda, *see* Memel
Kłodzko, *see* Glatz
Klofáč, Václav, 69, 85
Klotz, L. L., 4
Koch, German diplomat, 337, 338, 343, 346
Kolchak, Admiral Alexander, 117, 126–127, 130
Kon, Feliks, 162
Kopp, Victor, 289n
Korfanty, Wojciech: and Upper Silesia, 229, 231, 234; and Polish politics, 276; and cooperation with Czechoslovakia, 276; in cabinet, 288
Korfanty Line, 227, 231, 236. *See also* Upper Silesia
Košice, 63, 70, 189
Kovno, 122
Kozicki, Stanisław, 25
Koźle, 227
Kramář, Karel: wartime views of, 9; Russophilism of, 9, 24, 97, 107; premier, 16; delegate to Peace Conference, 23; Beneš and, 23–24, 95; for intervention in Russia, 24,

150–151; resignation of, 24, 96, 151; Czechoslovak frontiers and, 50, 62; before Supreme Council, 52, 55, 86; before Commission on Czechoslovak Affairs, 56, 61; and Czech-Yugoslav "corridor," 66; on hostilities in Slovakia, 70, 72; and intervention against Béla Kun, 72–73; on France, 74, 351; and Poland, 76–77, 81, 97, 107, 152, 263, 322, 343, 384; and Teschen, 76–77, 80, 81, 86, 87, 90, 95, 159n; Noulens complains of, 89; and Denikin, 150; Pan-Slavism of, 351, 384; and foreign policy, 384
Krassin, Leonid, 168, 169, 258
Krestinsky, Nicholai N., 260
Krofta, Kamil, 346, 356, 357
Kuban, 118
Kucharski, Władysław, 272n
Kujtun, Treaty of, 150
Kun, Béla, 69, 72, 73, 187, 193
Kunicki, Dr. Ryszard, 78n
Kutrzeba, Professor Stanisław, 278
Kwidzyń, *see* Marienwerder
Kybal, Vlastimil, 298, 305

Labour party (British): pro-Soviet, 161; in power, 311, 319; defeat of, 321
Lanckorona, 282
Lansing, Robert: and Dmowski, 18n; on Paderewski, 25; and Czechoslovak borders, 58, 67; and Eastern Galicia, 113
Lány, Treaty of, 242
Laroche, Jules: and Beneš, 10n, 350; in Commission on Polish Affairs, 35; in Commission on Czechoslovak Affairs, 56, 58, 67, 68; on Czech-Yugoslav "corridor," 65; and Teschen, 91, 95, 101, 158; and Eastern Galicia, 117; and Wilno coup, 183–184, 215; and Hungary, 188, 198; and French-Polish alliance, 217, 218; and French-Czechoslovak alliance, 285, 297, 299–300; and Stresemann's security offer, 329; and Poland, 332; and German-Polish arbitration, 334; and French-Polish alliance of *1925*, 363
Lasocki, Zygmunt, 322
Latinik, General Franciszek, 84, 149
Latvia, 118, 290
Lauzanne, French journalist, 331
Lavisse, Ernest, 21
Law, Andrew Bonar, 269, 271
League of Nations: Wilson and, 6; France and, 38, 292–293, 295, 311, 320; French-American difficulties over, 40; and Eastern Galicia, 114, 115, 117; and Russian borders, 127; Czechoslovakia and, 151, 244, 294, 321, 366, 386; Danzig under authority of, 163; and Polish-Lithuanian dispute, 181, 185; and Upper Silesia, 236, 239; and French-British guarantee pact, 254; and Javořina, 286, 287, 291, 310; elections to council of, 286–287; Skirmunt and, 286–287; Beneš and, 287, 292, 294; security and disarmament discussed by, 292, 294–295, 320; Poland and, 293–294, 321, 323, 332, 350, 382, 387; Canada and, 293; Britain and, 293, 295, 320–321, 353; and national minorities, 293–294; Resolution XIV, 294; Treaty of Mutual Assistance adopted by, 295; and Corfu incident, 295; and French-Czechoslovak alliance, 299, 301; and Germany's entry into, 313, 321, 323, 324, 327, 330, 335, 336, 339, 348, 351, 352, 353–354, 355, 359; Herriot and, 313; Skrzyński on, 316; and Geneva Protocol, 320–321; Czechoslovak-Polish *rapprochement* and, 346; Covenant of, and Locarno, 359, 361–362, 363
Lebrun, French diplomat, 295
Léger, Alexis, 359
Legrand, French diplomat, 110
Lenin, Vladimir I.: on intervention by border states, 119; exchanges with Piłsudski, 138; on Russian-Polish war, 140, 145, 161, 162; on Germany, 161; on Versailles, 162; on Genoa Conference, 257; death of, 311
Leobschutz, 59, 226
Le Rond, General Henri: in Commission on Polish Affairs, 35, 36; presides over Commission on Eastern Borders of Germany, 45n; in Commission on Czechoslovak Affairs, 56; on Czech-Polish relations, 93; on Teschen, 96, 97; in Botha commission, 110; and Eastern Galicia, 111, 113; in Upper Silesia, 212, 231, 232, 236
Leszczyńska, Maria, 377
Leygues, Georges, 183, 200, 215
Ligue Française pour la Pologne Libre, 8n
Line of December *8, 1919*, *see* Curzon Line; Poland
Lithuania: issue of, 104, proclaims independence, 118; links with Poland considered, 121, 123, 124, 125; and Russia, 123, 125, 127, 129, 161, 180, 184; territorial claims of, 126; dispute with Poland, 127, 180, 181, 182, 185; and France, 181, 211. *See also* Baltic States; Polish-Lithuanian Union; Wilno
Lithuanian-Byelorussian state, plans for, 178, 182
Little Entente: and France, 193, 195–197, 199, 200, 202, 203, 207, 211; Czechoslovak-Yugoslav alliance, 194, 203; and Hungary, 194, 196, 198, 202, 206; and secret French-Hungarian negotiations, 194; Beneš on, 195, 224, 257; and Germany, 195, 196; and

Russia, 196, 199; Poland and, 196–197, 202–203, 206, 224, 225, 244, 245, 246, 248, 250, 251, 258, 259, 260, 263, 264, 286, 287, 307, 342, 343, 345; and anti-Bolshevik front, 196–197; and French economic expansion, 197, 199; and Danubian Confederation, 197, 200–201; Britain and, 197; Rumania and, 201–202, 207, 241; transformation of, and Ionescu, 201–202; and Czechoslovakia, 205, 206; and Lloyd George, 205n; and Poland, 206; and eastern barrier, 207, 223; and Polish-Rumanian alliance, 207n; tripartite, 207, 241; and French-Polish alliance, 225; and Habsburg restoration, 241–242; and Piltz, 245, 248; and Beneš-Skirmunt pact, 250, 251; tripartite military conventions, 253; and French-British guarantee pact, 254, 255; and Riga settlement, 259; and Genoa Conference, 260; and Skirmunt, 262; and occupation of Ruhr, 272; and Beneš's talks in Paris, 285; Sinaia Conference of, 286–287, 292; and League of Nations, 294; and French-Czechoslovak alliance, 302; Belgrade Conference of, 307; and recognition of Soviet Russia, 318; D'Abernon on, 327–328; Stresemann's security offer and, 331; Czech diplomacy and, 386; shortcomings of, 388

Lloyd George, David: and Clemenceau, 4–5; on war aims, 13–14; and Armistice with Germany, 17; and Dmowski, 25, 41; and French security, 29; and Haller's army, 30, 107, 108, 111–112; and Teschen, 32n, 86, 89, 94; on German-Polish hostilities, 33; and Commission on Polish Affairs, 37, 39, 40n; opposes France on Rhineland, 38–39, 40; and American-British guarantee, 39, 41; attacked by Paris press, 39–40; and East Prussia, 40; praises Germans, 40; Fontainebleau memorandum, 40; for purely ethnic Poland, 40, 155; and Danzig, 41, 42; and Marienwerder, 42; and peace conditions, 43; and Upper Silesia, 43, 44–45, 46, 226, 230, 233, 234, 236, 239; accuses Poles of imperialism, 45, 154; demagogy of, 45n; critical of Beneš, 55; and Czech borders, 57; compares Supreme Council and Council of Foreign Ministers, 57; on Czechs, 62n; against Czech-Yugoslav "corridor," 65; and Slovak-Hungarian border, 66, 67; on hostilities in Slovakia, 70; on Eastern Galicia, 107, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113n, 114; and anti-Bolshevik intervention, 108, 116, 118–119, 122, 128; annoyed with Lord, 109; Botha and, 109; for sanctions against Poland, 110; confers with Clemenceau, 117; and Polish-Russian problems, 122, 128; ignores Foreign Office experts, 122n; and Paderewski, 128; for peace with Soviets, 130, 139; pays lip service to Poland, 131; opposes Baltic League, 131n; and Clemenceau on Russia, 139; advises Polish-Russian peace, 140; at Spa Conference, 154–156; unperturbed by Soviet victories, 162; and control of Danzig, 163–164; and Franco-British mission to Poland, 165; receives Soviet trade mission, 168; meets Millerand at Boulogne, 168; hostile to Poles, 168; at Hythe Conference, 168–170; blames Piłsudski, 170, 205n; and Soviet peace terms to Poland, 171; and battle of Warsaw, 173; opposes guarantees for Poland and Czechoslovakia, 254; at Cannes Conference, 255; and Briand's fall, 256; and French-British guarantee pact, 256; and Genoa Conference, 257–260; on Rapallo, 262; fall of, 269

Locarno

Negotiations leading to: Stresemann's security offer, and Britain, 327–328, and Herriot, 328–330, and East Central Europe, 329, 330, and arbitration treaties, 330, and France, 331, and Poland, 331–334, and Czechoslovakia, 334–338, and Czechoslovak-Polish *rapprochement*, 341–343; French reply to Stresemann, 348, and Britain, 348–349, and Poland, 349–350, and Czechoslovakia, 351–352; Beneš's overtures to Stresemann, 350–351; Stresemann's reply, 353–354; and French-British views, 354, and Poland, 354–355; Briand's reply, 355; London jurists' conference, 255

Conference of: proposed, 355; agreed upon, 356; and Italy, 359; and Britain, 359; and Belgium, 359; German program for, 359; France and, 359–360; Czechoslovakia and Poland at, 360–361

Pact: Treaty of Mutual Guarantee (Rhine Pact), 361–362; arbitration treaties, 361; final protocol, 362; French treaties with Poland and Czechoslovakia, 362, 363; Polish reaction to, 364–365; Czechoslovak reaction to, 365–366; and Ruhr, 366–367; French reaction to, 366–367; and German-Russian cooperation, 367; and future conflicts, 367; and French eastern alliances, 367–368; long-range consequences of, 368

Locher, Karel, 80

London Conference on Reparations, 319–320

Lord, Dr. Robert H., 109

Lorin, Henry, 234

Loucheur, Louis, 188n, 320

Ludendorff, General Erich, 198

Łukasiewicz, Juliusz, 260, 309–310

Lusatian Sorbs, 52, 56

Lvov, Prince Georgi V., 116n
Lwów, 83, 105, 108, 109, 110, 114
Lyautey, Marshal Louis, 240
Lympne Conference, *see* Hythe Conference

MacDonald, Ramsay, 311, 317, 320, 321
Maginot, General André, 298
Maginot line, 368
Makhrov, General Pyotr, 117
Maklakov, M., 116n
Maltzan, Ago von, 314–315, 327, 329
Mandel, Georges, 236, 312
Manneville, Gustave, Comte de, 148, 149, 150, 157, 160
Marchal, Major René, 94
Marchlewski, Dr. Julian, 138, 162, 178
Mareau, Marcel, 198
Margerie, Pierre de, 4n, 339, 352, 355
Marienwerder, 37, 40, 42, 47, 138, 160
Marinis, de, Italian diplomat, 231
Martonne, de, French diplomat, 69, 113
Marty, André, 312
Masaryk, Jan, 337
Masaryk, Tomáš Garrigue: western orientation of, 9; and Beneš, 9, 246, 283, chairman of National Council, 10; meets Briand, 10; welcomes March revolution in Russia, 12; telegram to Miliukov, 12, 65n; and Poland, 12, 26, 80, 81, 204, 298, 322, 386; and Czech troops in Russia, 13; president of provisional government, 15; president of republic, 16; and France, 21, 71, 386; and memorandums for Peace Conference, 52; on Swiss regime for Czechoslovakia, 56; on Germans in Czechoslovakia, 60–61; on Czech-Yugoslav "corridor," 65; talks to Smuts, 67, 68; and Grosse Schütt, 67, 68; appoints Pellé commander-in-chief, 71; and intervention against Béla Kun, 72; and Teschen, 75–76, 81, 82, 85, 87n, 92, 96, 158; Noulens and, 89; on Russia, 125; on Bolshevism, 151; and Russian-Polish relations, 164, 204–205; against aid to Poland in *1920*, 164; and Mid-European Democratic Union, 193; on Eastern Galicia, 247; and Javořina, 267; on occupation of Rhineland, 274; death of wife, 279; on Ruhr occupation, 281, 297; visits Paris, London, and Brussels, 297–298; against military convention with France, 297; on Franco-German relations, 298; and Poincaré, 298; and French-Czechoslovak alliance, 300, 304; and Italy, 305; on trends in Europe, 317; on French-Polish alliance, 344; on *Anschluss*, 351; respected in France, 377; Piłsudski's respect for, 381; and foreign policy, 383; realism of, 385
Massigli, René, 359
Mastný, Václav, 304
Maurras, Charles, 174, 240
Maxa, Prokop, 244, 249
Memel, 273
Military cooperation: within Little Entente, 193, 253; German-Soviet, 201; French-Polish, 217–219, 279, 323; French-Czechoslovak, 235, 280–281, 296, 300; Polish-Czechoslovak, plans for, 306. *See also* Alliances; Haller's army; Czechoslovak troops in France; Military mission
Military mission (French): in Czechoslovakia, 71, 197–198, 280–281, 296, 300, 304, 306; in Poland, 93, 146–147, 163, 167, 183, 213, 218, 279
Miliukov, Pavel N., 12, 65n
Millerand, Alexandre: premier and foreign minister, 136; and Teschen, 138, 157; Bolshevism and, 138; opposes Polish-Soviet peace, 141; promises French support, 141, 171; and Polish eastern plans, 142, 143; and offensive in Ukraine, 146; counsels prudence to Poland, 147; at Spa, 154, 155, 156; and Soviet victories, 161–162; presses Czechs on arms transit, 164; at Boulogne meeting, 168; at Hythe, 168–170; blames Piłsudski, 169, 170; annoyed with Lloyd George, 171; and battle of Warsaw, 174; presidency of, 174; Curzon Line and, 176; and policy toward Hungary, 188, 200, 207; on transformation of Little Entente, 202; and Piłsudski's visit to Paris, 214n, 216; and French-Polish alliance, 215, 216, 218; and Polish-Russian frontier, 223; and Upper Silesia, 235; and Briand, 255; against *rapprochement* with Soviet Russia, 258; and Ruhr, 289; and French-Czechoslovak alliance, 298; resignation of, 312, 313; and foreign policy, 377, 378; and eastern alliances, 379; French Left and, 380
Minsk: Polish entry into, 121; armistice negotiations in, 162, 172–173, 177; Treaty of Riga and, 178, 182
Miskolc, 64, 69
Mittelhauser, General Eugène, 71, 73, 296, 306
Montille, Lazare de, 188, 198
Monzie, Anatole de, 187, 314
Moraczewski, Jędrzej, 18, 76, 179, 220
Moravia, *see* Czech lands
Morawski, Kajetan, 313n, 357
Morel, Jean, 21
Morgan, J. P., 319
Morgenthau mission, 43n
Moriez, General du, 8n
Morocco, 347

Moutet, Marius, 7n, 229
Mussolini, Benito, 273, 305

Narutowicz, Gabriel: foreign minister, 263; and Piłsudski, 263; policy of, 264, 381, 382; president, 269; assassination of, 269; and Polish eastern frontiers, 273n
National Bloc (French): in power, 136; defeat of, 311, 312; Poland and, 315; and Zamoyski, 316; and Czechoslovakia, 318; and *Cartel des Gauches*, 341; and Germany, 379; and eastern alliances, 380; and Czechoslovak Left, 384. *See also* French political parties
National defense, *see* Security
National Democrats
Polish: led by Dmowski, 25; oppose Piłsudski, 143, 166; oppose federalist policy, 143, 178; pro-French, 165; and Weygand, 173, 174; and Riga negotiations, 178; and Czechoslovakia, 204, 276; and Skirmunt, 243; and French Right, 279; in power, 282; and *Cartel des Gauches*, 313; and Zamoyski's resignation. *See also* Polish political parties (of Right); Press (*Gazeta Warszawska, Kurjer Warszawski, Kurjer Poznański*)
Czechoslovak: critical of Tusar, 97; and Teschen, 102; and Poland, 149, 283; election losses of, 150; and Javořina, 266–267, 384; and recognition of Soviet Russia, 318; and Stresemann's security offer, 351; and foreign policy, 383–384. *See also* Czechoslovak political parties (of Right); Press (*Národní Listy, Národní Politika*)
National minorities: treaty on, with Poland, 47, 129; and League of Nations, 293–294; in Czechoslovakia, and foreign policy, 301, 322, 386–387; in Poland, and foreign policy, 316, 322, 386–387; treatment of, and Czechoslovak-Polish treaties, 343
National self-determination: for Germans, Lloyd George and, 39; and Czechoslovak territorial claims, 55n; of Germans in Bohemia, 59; for Slovakia, 63; and Socialism, 120n; Bolshevik use of, 120; for Lithuania, and Piłsudski, 121; for Byelorussia, 121–122; of non-Russian peoples, and France, 130
Němec, Antonín, 99
NEP, 257
Neustadt, 226
Nicholas II, emperor of Russia, 8
Nicolson, Harold: on Kramář and Beneš, 24; in Commission on Czechoslovak Affairs, 56n; critical of Czech-Yugoslav "corridor," 65–66; and Grosse Schütt, 68; on Poland and Czechoslovakia, 93; on report by Joint Commissions, 95; on Teschen, 97, 98; on Lloyd George and Upper Silesia, 230
Niederle, Lubor, 91
Niedzica, 266, 267
Niessel, General Henri: in Noulens mission, 32; pro-Polish, 89; and Teschen, 89; on Eastern Galicia, 113; heads French military mission, 213; and French-Polish military convention, 213
Noël, Léon, 223, 263
Nohel, Jan, 78n
Noseda, Major, 83
Noulens, Joseph, 32, 89, 93
Noulens mission to Poland: set up, 32; in Poland, 33; and Haller's army, 33; Commission on Polish Affairs and, 35; dissolved, 35n; returns from Poland, 42; on Danzig, 42; on Teschen, 86, 87; on Eastern Galicia, 108, 113; Cambon on, 122
Nové Zamký, 70
Nowak, Jan, 263

Odessa, 146, 151
Olsztyn, *see* Allenstein
Olza, 158, 159n
Opava, 55
Orava, 75, 250, 251, 265
Orlando, Vittorio Emanuele, 119
Osborne, S., 230
Osuský, Štefan, 23, 294, 351n

Paderewski, Ignacy Jan: premier and foreign minister, 20; delegate at Peace Conference, 24–25; Lansing's admiration for, 25; friendship with House, 25; American opinion of, 25n; in Poland, 30; and Danzig, 41, 42; before Supreme Council, 45–46, 99; clashes with Lloyd George, 45–46; and Upper Silesia, 45–46; and Teschen, 76, 88, 91, 95, 96, 97, 99, 159; resignation of cabinet, 110, 117–118; and use of Haller's army in Eastern Galicia, 111, 112; and Eastern Galicia, 115, 117; and federalist program, 121; for plebiscites in eastern borderlands, 121; opposed by nationalists, 122; inquires about Allied policy in Russia, 128; and Wilno coup, 183; and Little Entente, 203, 206; on Czechoslovak policy toward Russia, 205; cabinet of, and foreign policy, 380
Painlevé, Paul: and minorities in Poland, 316n; and Stresemann's security offer, 330–331; premier, 341; on French security, 347; and foreign policy, 378
Palatinate, 289. *See also* Rhineland
Paléologue, Maurice: ambassador in Saint Petersburg, 8; secretary general at Quai

d'Orsay, 136; fears Polish eastern expansion, 143; and Wrangel, 169n, 177; resignation of, 177, 200; pro-Hungarian policy of, 188, 189, 190n, 191, 193, 207; and Little Entente, 194, 196; drops support to Hungarian rearmament, 198; and Millerand, 200; and Habsburg restoration, 240; and foreign policy, 378
Panafieu, Hector de: minister in Warsaw, 147; and Russian-Polish war, 147; and Little Entente, 203; and French-Polish alliance, 213; and Upper Silesian uprising, 232; and new French policy, 256; and recognition of Poland's eastern frontiers, 273
Pan-Slavism: tendencies in France, 10; and Teschen, 93; trend in Czechoslovakia, 348, 351, 376, 384. *See also* Russophilism
Paris Peace Conference: opens, 3; Big Three and, 3–6; French proposals for organization and procedure, 23; Czechoslovak delegation to, 23–24; Polish delegation to, 24–25; Polish territorial demands, 24, 35, 36, 47, 105; relations between Czechoslovak and Polish delegations at, 25–26; appeal from Poznań diet to, 30; Polish memorandums, 35–36, 123; French support for Polish and Czechoslovak claims, 36, 47, 54, 58–59, 65, 74; Fontainebleau memorandum, 40, 57; French reply to Fontainebleau memorandum, 41; peace conditions for Germany, 42–43, 59; Czechoslovak territorial claims, 49, 58–59, 63–64, 65, 69, 74, 75; Czechoslovak memorandums, 52–54; peace conditions for Austria, 59–61; Ukrainians and, 105, 110, 126. *See also* Commissions; Council of Foreign Ministers; Joint Commissions; Saint Germain; Supreme Council; Trianon; Versailles
Parliaments
Czechoslovak: and Teschen, 82–83, 84–85, 98, 99, 149, 157; and Javořina, 277; and foreign policy, 384–385; German deputies, 388
French: Peace Conference and, 4; "chambre blue horizon," 136; ratification of Versailles debate, 137; and Russian-Polish war, 141; and Upper Silesia, 227, 230–231, 234; and Poincaré, 291; and foreign policy, 377, 378
Polish, *see Sejm*
Pašič, Nikola, 196
Patek, Stanisław: foreign minister, 140; and Russian-Polish war, 140, 142, 143n, 147; and Teschen, 148–149, 150; at Spa Conference, 154; and Polish-Hungarian border, 191; and foreign policy, 381
Paul-Boncour, Joseph: on Polish-Lithuanian union, 184; on Danubian Union, 189; on Socialist stand on Upper Silesia, 234; delegate to League, 313, 320; and Skrzyński, 333; on Locarno, 366–367
Peace Conference, *see* Paris Peace Conference
Pearson, Alfred I., 339
Peasant party (Polish), 282, 365
Pelc, Dr. Ferdinand, 78, 92
Pellé, General Maurice: heads French mission and commands Czechoslovak army, 71; and demarcation line in Slovakia, 72; pro-Czech, 89; and Teschen, 99; denies Czechoslovak warlike plans, 148; on Czech railroad strike, 152; and Czechoslovak neutrality in Russian-Polish war, 195
Percival, H. F. P., 231
Peretti de La Rocca, Emmanuel, Comte, 196, 229, 287
Perl, Feliks, 222, 247, 252, 272, 276
Permanent Court of International Justice, 291
Peroutka, Ferdinand, 87–88
Pertinax, 139, 198–199, 227
Peter the Great, tsar of Russia, 144
Petliura, Ataman Semon: defeated by Bolsheviks, 110; Eastern Galicia and, 117, 145; signs pact with Poland, 145; French distrust of, 145–146; suspected of promising Odessa to Poland, 151; Wrangel and, 176–177; and Piłsudski, 179
Petruchevich, Dr. Eugene, 105
Philippe, Colonel Armand, 83
Piccione, General Luigi, 71
Pichon, J. E., 92, 148, 345–346
Pichon, Stephen: foreign minister, and Clemenceau, 3–4, 378; delegate to Peace Conference, 4; declaration of, on Poland, 13, 14; recognizes Czechoslovak National Council, 14; pact with Beneš, 15, 16, 78; and Polish borders of *1772*, 17; and Polish National Committee, 19; and Polish government, 20; and armistice with Hungary, 20; confirms Czechoslovak right to occupy territory, 20–21; on French support of Czechoslovak cause, 21; and Commission on Polish Affairs, 37; and Upper Silesia, 46, 100; supports Czechoslovak claims, 54n, 58; and Beneš on Slovakia, 63; on Smuts-Masaryk talks, 67, 68; and Teschen, 81, 100, 101; and Eastern Galicia, 108, 112, 115; supports indivisible Russia, 127; and foreign policy, 378
Piłsudski, Marshal Józef: wartime views of, 7; released from Magdeburg, 18; in power, 18–19; and German evacuation of Poland, 18n; French distrust of, 19, 122, 169, 170, 215, 217; and Dmowski, 19, 24, 121, 381–

382; requests Haller's army, 19n; head of state, 20; letter to Masaryk, 81; and Teschen, 81, 84; and use of Haller's army in Eastern Galicia, 111–112; eastern plans of, 118, 121, 128, 186; distrusts Russian Whites, 122, 128; opposed by nationalists, 122; on Russian officers in Lithuania, 127n; exchanges with Lenin, 138, 139; on peace and war with Bolsheviks, 140, 141, 142; Henrys and, 142n, 147; and Russian *émigrés*, 144; offensive in Ukraine, 144, 151; signs pact with Petliura, 145–146, 147; and Denikin, 145n; French army and, 147, 215; and Grabski, 154; British distrust of, 156, 169, 170; criticized by National Democrats, 165; and Franco-British mission, 166; and Weygand, 166–167, 171–172, 174, 183; battle of Warsaw and, 173; on Russian-Polish war, 175, 177–178; Wrangel and, 176–177; and Petliura, 179; on Poland's security, 179; and Wilno coup, 179, 182; threatens resignation, 185; and Polish-Hungarian border, 191; Csekonics and, 192; favors bloc with Hungary and Rumania, 203; Beneš and, 205, 381; French interest in, 211; visits Paris, 213–214, 215–216, 221; on Millerand, 216; and Briand, 216; fails to visit Prague, 225; dismisses Ponikowski's cabinet, 263; and Narutowicz, 263; refuses to be candidate for presidency, 269; and Czechs, 276, 374, 381; and Foch, 278, 279; and French-Polish military cooperation, 279; retires from army, 282, 309; and Skrzyński, 317; followers of, and *Anschluss*, 344; after Locarno, 368; and French, 381; and Masaryk, 381; and foreign policy, 381–382; personality of, 381–382

Piłsudski's federalism, *see* Polish federalist program

Piltz, Erazm: before Supreme Council, 32; and Teschen, 87, 91n, 150; and Little Entente, 197, 205n, 248, 264, 286–287; favors bloc in East Central Europe, 203–204; pro-Czech, 204, 244; minister in Prague, 242; member of National Committee, 244; respected by Beneš, 244; works for *rapprochement* with Czechoslovakia, 244–245; outlook on foreign policy, 244–245; talks with Beneš, 247, 248; talks with Masaryk, 248; and Javořina, 265, 266; recalled from Prague, 269; at Sinaia Conference, 286–287

Pittsburgh Declaration, 14

Plebiscites: in Allenstein, 36, 138, 160; in Upper Silesia, 44–45, 59, 98, 138, 211, 212, 225–226, 235, 236n, 238; in Ratibor, suggested, 50; in Romburk, advocated, 58; in German-Czech regions, discussed, 58, 60, 61; Austrian demands for, 61; Austrian and German demands for, compared, 62; in Teschen, 90, 93, 96, 98, 100, 101–102, 148, 150, 157–158; in Eastern Galicia, discussed, 114; in eastern Polish borderlands, advocated by Piłsudski and Paderewski, and opposed by France, 121, 128, 142, 143; in Marienwerder, 138, 160; in Wilno region, 184–185; in Subcarpathian Ukraine, proposed by Hungary, 189

Podolia, Podole, 110

Poincaré, Raymond: president of republic, 4; and Clemenceau, 4, 41, 377; supports Margerie, 4n; role in French-Russian agreement in *1917*, 9n; issues decree on Polish army in France, 11; on Czechoslovak army, 13; opposes American-British guarantee, 41; and Rhineland, 41n; and Upper Silesia, 231, 235; premier and foreign minister, 255; and French-British guarantee pact, 255, 256; Polish reaction to premiership of, 256; and Genoa Conference, 257; and recognition of Polish eastern frontiers, 258, 272, 273; and *rapprochement* with Soviet Russia, 258; on Rapallo, 261; policy toward Britain, 269; occupation of Ruhr, 270, 271, 288, 289, 290–291, 319; eulogized by Dmowski, 282; and French-Czechoslovak alliance, 285, 297, 300; on Soviet overtures to Poland, 290; and road to Locarno, 291; and Czechoslovakia, 292, 318, 385; and Masaryk, 298; on credits to East Central Europe, 304; fall of, 311, 312, 313; and Beneš, 317; and German-Russian collusion, 326; and Cuno's offer, 328; and Stresemann's security offer, 330; attacks German revisionism, 340; and *Cartel des Gauches*, 341; Briand and, compared, 348; on Locarno, 366; and *Comité des Forges*, 373; and foreign policy, 378; on eastern alliances, 379; and French Left, 380

Poland: outbreak of war and, 7; Russian commander's declaration on, 7; Central Powers' declaration on, 8; Nicholas II's order on, 8; Allied war aims and, 8, 13–14; Petrograd Soviet declaration on, 11; Russian provisional government declaration on, 11, 126, 129; ethnic limits of, advocated, 11, 12, 13, 40, 108, 126, 166, 176, 179; and Hungary, 12, 152, 153, 190, 191–193, 194, 198n, 203, 206, 224, 248, 343, 370–371, 376; October Revolution in Russia and, 13; independence of, 16, 18–19; situation in, 30; viewed as French instrument, 25, 29, 39; as barrier against Bolshevism, 41, 122; Jewish issue in, and German propaganda, 43; and Rumania, 105, 110, 113,

169, 201–202, 206, 207, 224, 286; partitions of, annulled by Bolsheviks, 120; minimum eastern border for (December *8, 1919*, line), 130, 131, 140, 155, 156, 175, 180, 181; cabinet crisis in *1920*, 153, 165; and Baltic states, 180, 251, 259; and Little Entente, 196–197, 202–203, 206, 207, 223, 225, 244, 245, 246, 248, 250, 251, 258, 259, 260, 263, 264, 286, 287, 307, 342, 343, 345; in Ionescu's plans, 201; French credits to, 218, 219, 261–262, 304; *rapprochement* with Czechoslovakia, 243–246, 309–310, 311, 341–343, 357–358; tension in, after Rapallo, 263; party strife and presidential elections in, 269; Soviet overtures to, 289–290, 358; reaction to *Cartel des Gauches* in, 313–314, 318–319; Paris legation becomes embassy, 314; German-Russian talks on, 314–315; overtures to Britain, 315, 316; customs war with Germany, 331, 353–354; Stresemann's security offer and reaction in, 331–334, 354–355; lack of Czechoslovak solidarity with, 337, 356–357; reaction to Locarno in, 364–365; and Germany (general), 370; and Soviet Russia (general), 370; geography and politics, 370; demography and politics, 371–372; economics and politics, 371–372; and trade with Germany, 372; social structure and foreign policy, 373; French cult in, 376; constitutional system and foreign policy, 380–381; international position of, 382–383; national minorities and foreign policy, 386–387. *See also* Alliances; Arbitration; Curzon Line; Eastern Galicia; Galicia; National minorities; Plebiscites; Polish political parties; Pomerania; Poznania; Press; Russian-Polish war; Teschen; Trade agreements; Treaties; Upper Silesia; War material; Wilno

Poles: in Teschen, 75, 79, 91–92, 95–96, 98, 159, 245, 247, 247–248, 309, 387; and Czechs, 24, 374–376

Polish and Czechoslovak commissions, *see* Joint Commissions

Polish army in France, *see* Haller's army

Polish borders of *1772*: and French, 12, 17–18, 20; and Balfour, 17; Dmowski and, 35, 36; and Soviet peace offers, 143; and Piłsudski-Petliura pact, 145; Treaty of Riga and, 179

Polish commission, *see* Commission on Polish Affairs

Polish federalist program: and Jagellonian tradition, 121; Paderewski, Piłsudski, and, 121; and self-determination of borderlands, 121–122; difficulties of, 122; and Dmowski, 123; and Quai d'Orsay memorandums, 124; Weygand on, 176; and peace negotiations with Soviet Russia, 178; and Polish Right, 381

Polish-Hungarian border: Polish interest in, 191, 203, 242, 243; Hungarians and, 191, 192

Polish-Lithuanian Union: and French, 22, 124, 184; Polish hopes for, 121, 180; and Inquiry, 125; Lithuanian opposition to, 180

Polish National Committee: established in Lausanne, 11; moves to Paris, 12; recognized by France, 12; and Czech historic borders, 15; agreements with France, 15–16; urged to become *de facto* government, 16; and German evacuation of Poland, 17; and Piłsudski, 18–19; question of Allied recognition, 19; French personalities and, 19n; negotiates with Piłsudski's envoys, 19–20; protests German-Austrian support to Ukrainians, 105; Piltz and, 204; Skirmunt and, 243n

Polish political parties

Of Left: Piłsudski and, 7; critical of French intervention in Russia, 139; and Polish reply to Soviet peace offer, 143; and French-Polish alliance, 214; and Sapieha, 219; and French economic expansion, 220; critical of Skirmunt, 247, 259, 263; and Czechoslovakia, 276, 277, 309–310, 322–323, 345, 382; and Javořina, 277; attacks Seyda, 284; and French-Czechoslovak alliance, 308; and *Cartel des Gauches*, 315; attacks Zamoyski, 315–316; and London Conference, 320; and Skrzyński, 322–323; and *Anschluss*, 344; critical of Locarno, 365; and foreign policy, 380–381, 383; and England, 382

Of Right: Dmowski and, 7; and French policy toward Soviet Russia, 139; critical of Allied Russian policy, 142; and peace with Russia, 143, 178; opposes Peasant-Socialist cabinet, 153; and Piłsudski, 173; and Sapieha, 219; and French economic expansion, 220; and Beneš-Skirmunt pact, 252; and Skirmunt, 263; and Javořina, 277; and Beneš, 284; and foreign policy, 288, 380–381, 383; defeat of, 291; and French-Czechoslovak alliance, 308; collaboration with French Right, 313; and Zamoyski's resignation, 316; and Skrzyński, 316; and London Conference, 320; and Czechoslovakia, 322, 382; and Locarno, 365; and Treaty of Riga, 381; and France, 382

See also Christian Democrats; Commu-

nists; National Democrats; Peasant party; Socialists
Polk, Frank L., 130
Polska Ostravá, 78, 80
Pomerania, Pomorze, 22, 30, 34, 35, 219, 354
Poniatowski, Prince Józef, 278
Ponikowski, Antoni, 249, 263, 380–381
Posthieux, J. J., 187
Poznań, 30
Poznania: German evacuation from, urged, 22; German-Polish hostilities in, 30, 33; Noulens mission in, 32–33; in Polish territorial claims, 35; Poles from, and Czechs, 376
Pralon, Eugène, 112, 220
Prešov, 63
Press
Czechoslovak: *Čas*, 205, 238; *České Slovo*, 107n, 151, 193, 267, 284, 301, 317; *Lidové Listy*, 301; *Lidové Noviny*, 317, 345, 351; *Národní Listy*, 79, 151, 195, 238, 277, 335; *Národní Politika*, 321; *Prager Presse*, 284, 335; *Prager Tageblatt*, 337, 352; *Pravo Lidu*, 153, 301, 317, 319–320, 335; *Tribuna*, 366; *Venkov*, 99, 102, 195, 287, 301, 321, 358
French: *L'Action Française*, 127, 139, 165, 168, 174, 177; *L'Avenir*, 331; *La Bataille*, 161; *L'Echo de Paris*, 139, 142, 198–199, 212, 227, 231, 366; *L'Eclair*, 139, 168, 196, 201, 366; *L'Ere Nouvelle*, 234; *Le Figaro*, 176, 177, 227; *La France Militaire*, 147; *L'Humanité*, 161; *L'Information*, 173, 230; *L'Intransigeant*, 203; *Le Journal*, 203, 230; *Journal des Débats*, 42, 44, 85, 93–94, 127; *La Liberté*, 366; *Le Matin*, 142, 206, 226, 227, 235, 331, 345; *Mercure de France*, 124; *Le Petit Parisien*, 142, 199, 226, 280; *Le Populaire*, 234, 316; *Le Radical*, 142; *Le Temps*, 175, 226, 227, 332, 339, 345, 350; *La Victoire*, 227
Polish: *Czas*, 121n, 224–225, 252, 277, 308, 313, 315, 332, 342, 343; *Gazeta Polska*, 102, 121n; *Gazeta Poranna*, 308; *Gazeta Warszawska*, 277, 284, 310, 313, 332, 350; *Głos Narodu*, 342; *Komunistyczna Trybuna*, 178; *Kurjer Polski*, 308; *Kurjer Poranny*, 175, 263, 315, 382; *Kurjer Poznański*, 213, 252, 313, 316; *Kurjer Warszawski*, 277, 284, 308, 313; *Naprzód*, 222; *Naród*, 206, 213, 214, 222, 228; *Nowa Reforma*, 121n, 214; *Polityka*, 264; *Robotnik*, 121n, 214, 284, 308, 315, 350; *Rzeczpospolita*, 213, 222, 252, 308, 313, 342
Prinkipo Conference, 119
Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, *see* Geneva Protocol
Ptaśnik, Professor Jan, 80

Quai d'Orsay: and Teschen, 15, 92; and Polish government, 19n; accepts Beneš line in Slovakia, 20; *Comité d'Études* and, 21; memorandums on Poland, 22, 107, 124; memorandums on Czechoslovakia, 22–23; and Upper Silesia, 47; on Russia and nationalities, 123; diplomacy of, toward East Central Europe, criticized, 137; favors Wrangel, 142; suspicious of Piłsudski, 142; on Poland and Russia, 177; and Wilno, 181–182; new Hungarian policy of, 188; and attitude toward Little Entente, 196, 200; changes at, 200, 348; and French-Polish alliance, 215, 218

Radek, Karl, 258, 259, 260
Radical Socialists (French): Polish borders of *1772* and, 17; occupation of Ruhr and, 270; lead *Cartel des Gauches*, 312; and foreign policy, 380; and Versailles, 380. *See also Cartel des Gauches*; Press (*Le Radical*)
Rakovsky, Khristian, 145, 258
Rakowski, Kazimierz, 228n
Rapallo, Treaty of: and Poland, 261; and German-Soviet military collaboration, 261; and France, 261–262, 314, 326; Czechoslovak reaction to, 262; British reaction to, 262; and Czechoslovak-Polish relations, 264; and Javořina, 267; and occupation of Ruhr, 270; and Locarno negotiations, 359
Rašín, Alois, 79
Rataj, Maciej, 272
Ratibor, Racibórz, 53, 57, 58, 59
Rauscher, German diplomat, 342
Rearmament, Hungarian, 191–192, 198
Reger, Tadeusz, 78n
Regional cooperation, *see* East Central Europe; Security
Renaudel, Pierre, 7n, 161n
Renner, Chancellor Karl, 60
Renouvin, Pierre, 137–138
Reparations, German: at Spa Conference, 153, 155; and Upper Silesia, 229, 230–231; and Cannes Conference, 254; and French-Russian exchanges, 258; Germany declared in default of, 269; and Czechoslovakia, 274–275; and Dawes Plan, 291; and London Conference, 319; and loans to Germany, figures compared, 319n
Requin, Colonel E., 294–295
Revisionism: Hungarian, 192, 193–194, 195, 198, 201, 240, 303; Poland and Little Entente coordinate opposition to, 259; Article *19* of Covenant and, 293, 295, 330, 335, 353; German, 303, 318, 326–327, 330,

333, 336–337, 339, 340, 343, 346–347, 353, 355, 368; Britain and, 319
Reynaud, Paul, 312, 367
Rhine, *see* Rhineland
Rhine Pact, *see* Locarno
Rhineland: French wartime approaches to Britain about, 8; French-Russian agreement on, 8–9; French security in, and Poland, 8–9, 22, 29, 349; French memorandums on, 28, 29n; separation from Germany urged by France, 37–38; separation from Germany opposed by Lloyd George, 38–39, 40; and Wilson, 38–39; and American-British guarantee, 39, 136; Allied occupation agreed upon, 41; Clemenceau, Foch, and Poincaré on, 41n; and Upper Silesia, 45; and Supreme Council, 57; French action in, threatened by Millerand, 169; and French-British guarantee pact, 254, 255; occupation of, and Masaryk, 274; separatism in, 289, 312n; French policy toward, and Czechs, 298; evacuation of, and Stresemann, 326, 327, 353; Britain and, 328; peace in, and Stresemann's security offer, 331; demilitarized zone in, and Poland, 349–350; evacuation of, and Locarno, 359, 363; problem of, and East Central Europe, 360; and eastern alliances, 368; borders in, 369–370
Ribot, Alexandre, 9n, 12
Richet, Charles, 316n
Riga, Treaty of: negotiations preceding preliminaries, 177–178; French views on, 177n, 179, 211, 258, 326; and Piłsudski's war aims, 177–178, 179–180; Byelorussia and, 178, 179; Ukraine and, 178, 179; Soviet views on, 178–179; appraised, 179; and *Conférence Politique*, 179; and Wrangel, 179; and Lithuania, 180; and Balduri Conference, 180; Minsk and, 182; French-British objections to, 184; and Czechoslovakia, 205, 247, 248–249, 250–251, 277; question of international recognition of borders, 258, 259, 272–274; and Polish Right, 381
Riga Conference, 259
Ripault, Louis, 19n, 142
Rolland, Romain, 161n, 316n
Romburk, Romburg, 58
Rome Congress of Oppressed Nationalities, 14, 76
Rozwadowski, Eugeniusz, 272, 275
Rozwadowski, General Tadeusz, 153, 154, 166–167, 171
Ruhr, occupation of: contemplated by French, 235; undertaken, 269–270; and French attitude, 270–271; and German-Russian cooperation, 270–271, 326; and Britain, 271, 290–291, 312; and Poland, 271–274; and Czechoslovakia, 274–276, 292; and Czechoslovak-Polish relations, 276–277; and French-Czechoslovak-Polish cooperation, 278–281; and Masaryk, 281, 297; and Polish Right, 282; Pyrrhic victory, 289, 319, 328; and United States, 290–291; and Herriot, 313; and Locarno, 365–366; and Czech Communists, 373; and Poincaré's fall, 378; and Radical Socialists, 380
Ruhrort, 230, 319, 355
Rumania: and intervention against Béla Kun, 72, 73, 193; question of border with Poland, 105, 113; and interventionist plans of Foch, 108, 139; and Eastern Galicia, 110, 169; secret French-Hungarian negotiations and, 188, 189; and Trianon, 190; and regional cooperation, 201–202; and Soviet Russia, 201; *rapprochement* and alliance with Poland, 206, 207; joins Little Entente, 207, 241; and Czech-Polish relations, 224, 286; French credits to, 304. *See also* Alliances; Bukovina; Little Entente; Transylvania
Russia: collapse of imperial, and French security, 3, 38, 117, 370, 377; outbreak of war and, 7; and Polish question, 7, 8, 9, 11–12; agreement with France on future borders, 8–9; and border with Poland, 8–9, 18, 22, 118, 120, 122, 123–124, 125, 129–130, 139–140, 143–144, 162, 170–171, 223; imperial, and Czechoslovak cause, 9–10; March Revolution and Czechs and Poles, 11, 12; provisional government declaration on Poland, 11, 126, 129; Bolshevik Revolution, international impact of, 13, 104; Czechoslovak troops in, 13, 49–50, 97–98, 150, 151; Polish troops in, 13, 109; Quai d'Orsay memorandums on Poland and, 22; French-Polish divergences in approach to, 25, 122, 124–125, 126, 215, 223; Czech and Polish divergent views on, 26, 205, 224, 225, 246, 248–249, 287, 310, 343, 375; Subcarpathian Ukraine and, 65, 66; Czech sympathy for, and Teschen, 93; Eastern Galicia and, 104, 107, 108, 109, 113, 114, 115–116, 117; Whites in, and Allies, 116, 122, 126–127, 130, 151; civil war in, 116, 118, 126, 130; nationalities in, 118, 127, 130n; repudiation of partition treaties, 119–120, 143; Allied lack of policy toward, 119, 130, 138–139; territorial settlement in, views on, 123–124, 125; Piłsudski's distrust of Whites in, 122, 128, 145n; French economic interests in, 125n, 147; "barbed wire" formula to-

ward, 130–131, 138; problem of recognition of Soviets, and Czechoslovakia, 150–151, 318; Lloyd George's proposal for peace conference with, 155; and revolution in Germany, 161; peace with Lithuania, 180; Franco-British concern for, and Riga preliminaries, 184; and Little Entente, 207n, 343; French-Polish alliance and, 217–218, 223, 314, 370; Genoa Conference and, 257; French overtures to, 258; treaty at Rapallo, 261; and military cooperation with Germany, 261n, 359; occupation of Ruhr and, 270–271; unrest in Germany and, 289; overtures to Poland, 289–290; French-Czechoslovak alliance and, 302, 308–309; *de facto* recognition of, by Britain, 311, by France, 311, 314; Herriot and, 314; overtures to Germany, 314–315, 359; France, Poland, and, 315; German entry into League and, 323, 354, 359; exchanges with Germany, 323–324; Stresemann and, 325, 326–327; security pact and, 351; overtures to Poland, 358–359; Beneš on cooperation with, 366; Locarno and cooperation with Germany, 367; outlook of Czechoslovak political parties on, 384. *See also* Byelorussia; Bolshevism; Curzon Line; Intervention; Trade agreements; Treaties; Ukraine

Russian-Czechoslovak border, *see* Czechoslovak-Russian border

Russian debts, 127, 168, 257

Russian-Polish war: first clashes, 120; period of inactivity, 138; war or peace, 139–140, 143, 144; France and, 141–142, 146, 147–148, 168, 176–177, 185, 195; offensive in Ukraine, 145; Polish victories, 147–148; Czechoslovakia and, 151–153, 164–165, 192, 195, 373; Hungary and, 152, 191–192, 194, 198; Russian advance, 153, 161; and Spa Conference, 153–157; Polish defeats and West, 161–164; Germany and, 161; Lenin on war aims, 162; Soviet peace terms, 162, 170–171; Allies and armistice, 170; Allies and peace terms, 171; Lithuanian neutrality in, 180; and Little Entente, 195–196. *See also* Borisov; Curzon Line; Franco-British mission; Hythe Conference; Riga, Treaty of; Spa Conference; War material; Warsaw, battle of

Russians of Hungary, *see* Subcarpathian Ukraine

Russophilism: of Kramář, 9, 24, 97, 107; of Masaryk, 12; of Czechs, 248. *See also* Pan-Slavism

Ruthenia, *see* Ukraine

Saar, 38, 39

Šafařík, Pavel Josef, 91

Saget, French deputy, 187

Saint Aulaire, Auguste, Comte de, 253, 254, 262, 367

Saint Germain, Treaty of, 62, 115

Saint Sauveur, Armand, Comte de, 188n

Salgotarjan, 69

Salvago Raggi, G. G., Marquis, 56n

Šamal, Přemysl, 76

Sapieha, Prince Eustachy: minister of foreign affairs, 153; and Russian-Polish war, 154, 155, 171, 172, 177n; and Wilno coup, 182; on France and Little Entente, 197; views on regional cooperation in East Central Europe, 203; Beneš's view of, 205; on Polish-Rumanian friendship, 206; and French-Polish alliance, 213, 216–217, 219; attacked by political parties, 219; talk with Beneš, 224; Upper Silesia and, 226; and French, 232; resignation of, 242

Sauerwein, Jules, 10n

Savinkov, Boris, 144, 179

Saxony, 289

Sazonov, Sergei D., 10n, 116n, 123, 125, 129

Schneider, E., 199

Schneider & Co., 324

Schneider-Creusot: investments of, in Teschen, 150, 199; and Škoda works, 150, 199; and Hungarian railroad, 188; and Prague machine works, 199; and Ruhr occupation, 270

Schubert, Carl von, 338, 346

Security: Britain and, 6, 29; France and, 6, 29, 38, 58, 339, 347, 360, 401; French, and France's eastern allies, 21, 37, 54, 137, 223, 227, 270, 329; German, and Lloyd George, 39; Polish, and international developments, 41, 179, 313–314, 329; American views on, 56, 58; and disarmament at League, 292, 293, 294–295, 320; and regional arrangements, 293; Czechoslovak, and alliance with France, 295–296, 299; and reparations, 313, 317–318; and Locarno, 367. *See also* East Central Europe; League of Nations; Locarno; Rearmament

Seeckt, General Hans von: and Russian-Polish war, 161, 173; and Trotsky, 173; and Ruhr occupation, 271; program of, and Stresemann, 325, 327; French paper on, 331

Sejm: Soviet peace offer and, 143; and Teschen, 148, 149; and French-Polish alliance, 213, 216, 274; on Czechoslovak-Polish relations, 277; and Stresemann's security offer, 333; and foreign policy, 380–381

Sejny, 180, 181

Selbstschutz, 235

Seyda, Marian: in Polish National Commit-

tee, 12n; author of memorandums, 43n; advocates *rapprochement* with Czechoslovakia, 276, 277, 282, 283, 288; minister of foreign affairs, 282; collaborator of Dmowski, 282; for cooperation with France, 282; and Javořina, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286; and Skrzyński, compared, 283; attacked by Czech press, 284; Beneš and, 284; criticized by Polish Left, 284; and Sinaia Conference, 286; resignation of, 288, 381; and Kopp, 289–290n; and foreign policy, 381, 382
Seymour, Professor Charles, 24, 25n, 56n, 69
Siberia, Czech and Polish troops in, *see* Russia
Sidorenko, G., 68n
Sidzikauskas, Vaclovas, 333
Sienkiewicz, Henryk, 321
Sikorski, General Władysław: premier, 269, 276; and occupation of Ruhr, 272; and recognition of Riga borders, 273; in Paris, 289, 323, 349–350; and military cooperation with Czechoslovakia, 306; complains of Herriot, 340; signs abortive protocol with French, 349; on security pact, 349–350; on Poland's access to sea, 354; complains of Briand, 355
Silesia: Poles from, and war, 6; German evacuation of, recommended, 22; and French-Polish military cooperation, 279. *See also* Upper Silesia
Silesia, Czech, *see* Teschen
Simon, Clement, 82
Sinaia Conference, 286–287
Sis, Vladimír, 76
Skarbek, Aleksander, 76
Skirmunt, Konstanty: in Polish National Committee, 12n, 243; pact with Beneš, 238, 249; foreign minister, 242; at Rome congress of oppressed nationalities, 243; ideas of, on foreign policy, 243–244, 382; and National Democrats, 243; and cooperation with Czechoslovakia, 243–244, 245, 246; criticized by Left, 247, 259; and Slovak separatists, 248; retains post in Ponikowski cabinet, 249; on Teschen, Spiš, and Orava, 251; criticized for pact with Beneš, 252; on Genoa Conference, 257–258; and recognition of Riga frontiers, 258, 273n; and Little Entente, 259, 307; attempts mediation between West and Russia, 259–260; talk with Barthou, 261; praises France and Czechoslovakia, 262; criticized in parliament and by Piłsudski, 263; resignation of, 263, 267; and Javořina, 265; and Czechoslovakia, 276; and League of Nations, 287, 293n; and Treaty of Mutual Assistance, 295; on Polish security, 313. *See also* Beneš-Skirmunt pact
Skoczów, battle of, 84
Škoda works, 150, 199
Skrzyński, Count Aleksander: foreign minister, 269; and occupation of Ruhr, 271–272; on France and England, 272; and Czechoslovakia, 276, 277, 317, 321, 341, 343; compared with Seyda, 283; delegate to League, 293n; foreign minister (second time), 316; program of foreign policy, 316; and Herriot, 316, 333–334; and Polish Right, 316; and Piłsudski, 317, 381; and Britain, 318–319; and League of Nations, 320; and Polish Left, 323; on Stresemann's security offer, 332, 334, 349, 357; talks with Briand, 333, 354–355; talks with Paul-Boncour, 333; in Prague, 343; visits United States, 355; on Czechoslovak overtures to Germany, 356; and Chicherin's visit, 358; at Locarno, 360–361; on Locarno pact, 364–365; on Briand, 365; and foreign policy, 381, 382
Skulski, Leopold, 153
Slavophilism, *see* Pan-Slavism
Śliwiński, Artur, 263
Slovakia: armistice with Hungary and, 20, 62–63; Hungarian withdrawal from, 20, 63, 72; demarcation line between, and Hungary, 50, 63, 70; in memorandums for Peace Conference, 52, 63–64; Beneš on history of, 55; union with Czech lands, 56, 62, 65, 66, 67, 68, 372; struggle with Hungary, 69, 70, 71, 72, 113; Soviet Republic of, proclaimed, 70; and Foch's interventionist plans, 70; and France, 70–71; Italian generals in, 71; French generals in, 71, 72; struggle in, and Poles, 71; autonomy of, and Hlinka, 73; Bohumín-Košice railroad, and Czech unity with, 83, 90, 91; Polish interest in, 96; separatist organizations of, and Poland, 102, 244, 248, 323; Hungarian plans for revolt in, 152, 191, 198; transit of war material through, 153
Slovaks, and Czechs, 376, 387
Smuts, General Jan Christiaan: as judge of Polish history, 43; investigates Grosse Schütt problem, 66, 67, 68; Lloyd George's expert, 68n
Šnejdarek, Lieut. Colonel Josef, 83
Sobieski, King John III of Poland, 377
Socialists
Czechoslovak: advocate recognition of Soviet Russia, 151; gain in elections, 151; pro-Bolshevik in Russian-Polish war, 161; and German Socialists, 161; and foreign policy, 383, 384

French: against Versailles, 135, 379; split, 135; on Germany and Russia, 136; oppose Polish offensive in Ukraine, 147; and war material to Poland, 161; on France's policy in Upper Silesia, 229; and occupation of Ruhr, 270; and Stresemann's security offer, 339; abstain from Painlevé's cabinet, 341

German, and Czech socialists, 161

Polish: support federalist program, 121; criticize French policy toward Russia, 142; and Soviet peace offers, 143; and Beneš-Skirmunt pact, 252; and Poincaré, 256; attack Zamoyski, 315; demand pro-English policy, 315; praise Herriot, 320; praise MacDonald, 320

See also Czechoslovak, French, Polish political parties (of Left); Labour party; Press (*Pravo Lidu, Le Populaire, Naprzód, Robotnik*)

Société d'Études Polonaises, 8n

Sokols, 62

Sonnino, Baron Sidney, 32n, 66, 114

Sosnkowski, General Kazimierz: minister of war, 147; and French war material, 163; and Hungarian rearmament, 192; and French-Polish alliance, 216–217, 218, 219; and military cooperation with Czechoslovakia, 306

Soukup, František, 79

Soviet Hungary, *see* Hungary; Kun, Béla

Soviet-Polish war, *see* Russian-Polish war

Soviet Republic of Slovakia, *see* Slovakia

Soviet Russia, *see* Russia

Spa Conference: and Eastern Galicia, 100n; and Teschen, 100n, 157–160; and Russian-Polish war, 153–157; French attitude at, 155; Danzig and, 155; and Franco-British mission to Poland, 165; and Polish-Lithuanian border, 165; Grabski's engagements at, and Riga preliminaries, 184; German reparations and, 230

Spiš (Spisz), 75, 250, 251, 265. *See also* Javořina

Šrobar, Dr. Vavro, 62

Stanek, František, 76

Štefánik, Milan, 10, 15

Stepan, Ukrainian leader, 191n

Stolberg-Wernigerode, Count, 326

Stranieri, A., 56n

Stranský, Jaroslav, 99

Strasburger, Dr. Henryk, 249

Stresemann, Gustav: and French-Czechoslovak alliance, 303; foreign minister, 325; outlook and policy of, 325–327; offers security pact to France, 325; and Poland's frontiers, 326; offers arbitration treaties, 330; Polish distrust of, 322; and Skrzyński, 332, 333, 361; and Beneš, 337, 338, 350, 351, 360–361; on Poland, 339; and Herriot's memorandum, 340; complains of France and her allies, 347; critical of French reply, 352; on French eastern alliances, 353; and evacuation of Rhineland, 353; agrees to Locarno Conference, 356; and evacuation of Cologne, 356; on arbitration treaties with Czechoslovakia and Poland, 356; confers with Krofta, 357, 361n; and Chicherin, 359; at Locarno, 359, 360–361; on Locarno Pact and French alliances, 363

Stroński, Professor Stanisław, 173n, 272, 365

Suarez, Georges, 9n

Subcarpathian Ukraine: question of, 49; and Czechoslovak memorandums for Peace Conference, 64–65; Ruthenian National Council and, 64–65; domestic opinion split on future of, 65n; Masaryk on, 66; Beneš on, 66; Italian views on, 67; status of autonomy for, 68; union with Czechoslovakia approved, 68; French views on, 69; Hungarian withdrawal from, and Foch, 72; Ukrainian-Hungarian fighting in, 105; Kramář on, 107; Hungarian plans for revolt in, 152, 191, 192; and secret French-Hungarian negotiations, 189; Hungarian claims to, 191; rumored transfer of, 201n; Hungary and, 205; and Czechoslovak-Polish relations, 205; French officers withdrawn from, 281. *See also* Polish-Hungarian border

Sudetenland, 50. *See also* Germans in Czechoslovakia

Supreme Council: meeting of January *29, 1919*, on Poland, 32, 50–52; discusses Teschen, 32, 50–52, 89, 90, 91, 95, 99; and Commission on Polish Affairs, 34, 37; postpones decision on German-Polish borders, 40; transformed into Council of Four, 40; appoints new committee on Danzig, 42; and Upper Silesia, 44–45, 326; appoints Commission on Eastern Frontiers of Germany, 45; meeting of February *5*, on Czechoslovakia, 55–56; and Commission on Czechoslovak Affairs, 56, 57, 67; approves Czechoslovak borders with Germany and Austria, 58, 59; transformed into Council of Heads of Delegations, 61; and Hungarian-Slovak border, 66, 68; and hostilities in Slovakia, 70; and intervention plans against Béla Kun, 72; warns against use of force in disputes, 86; and Eastern Galicia, 108, 110–111, 112, 115, 117; and Russian situation, 119; and recognition of Kolchak, 127; dec-

laration on minimum Polish border on December *8*, 130
Suwałki: and *Conférence Politique*, 126; changes hands, 161, 180; Polish-Lithuanian agreement in, 182
Švehla, Antonín: in Prague National Council, 79; and Teschen, 79, 84–85; acting premier, 85; and Beneš, 88; premier, 268; and German-Czechoslovak arbitration treaty, 356
Switzerland, regime of, and Czechoslovakia, 54, 55–56
Syria, 347
Syrový, General Jan, 296n
Szeged, 73
Szeptycki, General Stanisław, 306

Taborský, Eduard, 386
Tardieu, André: delegate to Peace Conference, 4; and Poland, 8n, 37; and Beneš, 10n; and *Comité d'Études*, 21; member of committee on Danzig, 42n; on Upper Silesia and Ruhr, 44; and Czech-Austrian borders, 61; and Czech-Yugoslav "corridor," 65; on Teschen, 100; on Clemenceau and Millerand, 162; and Upper Silesian settlement, 236; defeated in election, 312
Tarnopol, 105
Tarnowski, Adam, 232
Tchaikovsky, Nicholai V., 116n, 144
Teschen (Cieszyn, Těšín): and Beneš-Pichon agreement, 15, 79; and Quai d'Orsay memorandums, 22–23; conflict over, 26, 49, 74; Czech attack in, 32, 50, 83–84; Beneš and, 52, 75–76, 80, 81, 85–100 *passim*, 149, 150, 157–158, 159, 224; and Austria, 60; description of, 75, 94; wartime Polish-Czech talks on, 75–76, 76–77; the problem of coal in, 75, 79, 90, 92, 93, 98; mixed Czech-Polish commission and, 76, 81, 96; Czech-Polish agreement of November *5, 1918*, 78–79; Czech plans for military occupation, 80, 81–82; and Bolshevism, 81, 86, 87n; France and, 81–82, 93–94, 96, 100–101, 138, 149–150; election in, decreed by Poland, 83; international reaction to Czech attack in, 84–86; February *3, 1919*, agreement on, 87, 87–88, 89; Allied commission in 88–89, 90, 94–95; and Czechoslovak memorandum, 90–91; and Upper Silesia, 90n, 239, 240; Polish memorandum on, 91; British and American views on, 92–93, 94; ethnic division of, recommended, 94–95, 98; Cracow Conference on, 96–97; and Danzig, 99; analogy with Eastern Galicia, 100, 105, 112, 239; Hlinka on, 102; and Ukrainian-Czech contacts, 107; Millerand's and Clemenceau's policy on, 138; violence in, 149, 152; French economic interests in, 149–150, 199, 228, 372; arbitration and, 150; at Spa Conference, 155, 157–160; settlement by Conference of Ambassadors, 158; settlement, and Polish-Russian war, 164; Wilno and, 181, 239; resentment over, and Czechoslovak-Polish relations, 186, 203, 205, 245, 248, 322, 323, 387; Piltz on, 245; Czechoslovak population census and, 247, 309; and Beneš-Skirmunt pact, 250, 251, 252; and Javořina, 265, 266, 268, 277, 286; communal elections in, 309. *See also* Czech historic borders; Germans; Joint Commissions; Plebiscites; Poles; Supreme Council
Themenau, 53
Thomas, Albert, 11
Thugutt, Stanisław, 308
Thuringia, 289
Tisseyre, Charles, 187
Tittoni, Tomaso, 100
Tommasini, Francesco, 165, 288
Tower, Sir Reginald, 163
Trade agreements: French-Czechoslovak, 199–200, 221, 296–297; French-Polish, 218, 219, 221–222, 258; Czechoslovak-Polish, 249, 324; Czechoslovak-Russian, 262
Transcaspian territories, 127
Transcaucasia, *see* Caucasus
Transylvania, 201
Treaties: Polish-Ukrainian, 145; Italian-Yugoslav, 305; Czechoslovak-Italian, 305–306; Czechoslovak-Polish, 343–344, 345–346. *See also* Alliances; Arbitration; Beneš-Skirmunt pact; Brest Litovsk; Cracow Protocol; Kujtun; Lány; Little Entente; Locarno; National minorities; Riga; Saint Germain; Trianon; Versailles
Trenčin, 199
Trianon, Treaty of: delayed, 73; signed, 190; and Poland, 191, 242; Little Entente and, 193, 194; France and, 198n; Beneš's demand for enforcement of, 241; Skirmunt and, 243; and Stresemann's security offer, 335
Trier convention, 33
Třinec works, 150
Troppau, *see* Opava
Trotsky, Lev D., 140, 173
Trumbič, Ante, 192, 193
Tusar, Vlastimil: first cabinet of, 96; criticized, 97; and Teschen, 98; second cabinet of, 151; minister in Berlin, 276; on French-Czechoslovak relations, 304; cabinets of, and Czech constitutional developments, 384
Tyrrell, Sir William, 40, 42n

Uffler, Lieut. Colonel, 267
Uh River, 64
Ukraine: and Eastern Galicia, 114; independence of, proclaimed, 118; Dmowski and, 121, 123; and federal links with Poland, 121, 123, 178; claimed by White Russians, 125; France and, 142, 146; Polish borders with, and plebiscites, 143; independence of, recognized in Piłsudski-Petliura pact, 145; opposed by Czechoslovakia, 151; Soviet rule over recognized, 178; Treaty of Riga and, 178, 179, 180. *See also* Eastern Galicia; Russian-Polish war
Ukrainian People's Republic, 107, 110
Ukrainians: of Eastern Galicia, 104–105, 105–107; and Czechoslovakia, 243, 387
United States: France and, in *1919*, *5*; plans for a provisional Polish government in, 11n; enters war, 13; Senate rejects guarantees, 136; and peace between Poland and Russia, 140; and Ruhr, 290–291; and economic cooperation with Germany, 353. *See also* American-Britith guarantee; American Inquiry
Upper Silesia: German evacuation and Allied occupation of, urged, 17; represented in Poznań diet, 30; in Polish claims, 35; Foch and, 38, 214, 232; German objections to cession of, 43; debate on, in Supreme Council, 44–45; plebiscite in, decided, 45, 47, 59, 138; first uprising in, 46; Allied contingents for, 47; Americans and, 47; Czechoslovak claims in, *53*, *55*; Polish-Czechoslovak borders in, *58*; Eastern Galicia and, 111; tension in, 160, 211–212; battle of Warsaw and, 172, 212; Wilno coup and, 183; second Polish uprising, 212; French-British controversy over, 212, 233–234; coal fields in, and Britain, 212, 233; French troops in, 213, 232; and French-Polish alliance, 218; and economic gains by France, 222, 228–230, 372; Czechoslovak attitude toward, 225, 238–239, 242; plebiscite results, and France, 226; division of, and Germany, 226–227; Britain and division of, 226–227; France and division of, 227; Korfanty Line in, 227, 231, 236; Skarboferm set up, 229; Tarnoferm set up, 229; *Bund der Oberschlesier*'s activity, 230; German reparations and, 230–231; Le Rond's proposed division, 231; Percival-de Marinis line, 231; third uprising in, 231; France and uprising, 232, 234–235; international repercussions of, 232–235; French military preparations and, 235; French-British-Italian negotiations on, 235; question of industrial triangle in, 235, 236; and League of Nations, 236, 239, 293; division of, by Conference of Ambassadors, 236; convention on, 236n; and Teschen, 239, 240; Skirmunt on, 243; and French-British guarantee pact, 256; and Ruhr occupation, 272; and Russian overtures to Poland, 289; and French disarmament, 294; and Czechoslovak-Polish cooperation, 306; Beneš on, 337. *See also* Capital; Conference of Ambassadors; Plebiscites

Vatican, 341
Vaux, Baron de, 365
Versailles, Treaty of: and Upper Silesia, 46, 226–227, 231, 233, 234, 289; and protection of national minorities, 47; ratified, 47; ratification debate in France, 135–136, 137; Russian-Polish war, and destruction of, 162; endangered by Russian-German collusion, 169; and Beneš, 240; Skirmunt on, 243, 257; and French-British guarantee pact, 254, 256; question of recognition by Soviet Russia, 258; and Rapallo, 261; and occupation of Ruhr, 270; and Stresemann, 325, 326; and Stresemann's security offer, 329, 329n, 333, 335; and German-Polish arbitration treaty, 339; and *Anschluss*, 344; and western security pact, 349; French views on, 378–380
Vesnič, Milenko, 190
Viviani-Thomas mission, 8
Volhynia, 110, 113
Voska, Lieutenant, 83
Vyx, Lieut. Colonel, 20

Wandycz, Damian, 80
War material, transit of to Poland: and Czechoslovakia, 87, 152–153, 163, 164, 165n, 203; France and, 147, 161, 163; Germany and, 163; Danzig and, 163–164; Britain and, 163–164; and Czechoslovak-Polish treaties, 250, 344
Warsaw, battle of: and Rozwadowski, 171; and Weygand, 171, 172, 173; Piłsudski and, 171–172, 173; and Upper Silesia, 172, 212; and Foch, 172; Czechoslovakia and, 173; Seeckt and, 173; exploited politically by French and Polish National Democrats, 174; and Millerand's election, 174; Polish eastern advance after, and France, 175–176; and Lithuania, 181; and Hungary, 192, 198n
Washington Naval Conference, 174, 253
Wasilewski, Leon, 80
Westphalia, 235
Weygand, General Maxime: and Beneš on Slovakia, 63; on Polish advance in Lithuania, 127; in Franco-British mission to Po-

land, 165; and Piłsudski, 166–167, 171–172, 174, 183; counselor to Polish chief of staff, 166; and Rozwadowski, 166–167; and Henrys, 167; battle of Warsaw and, 171, 172, 173–174; favors cautious Polish advance eastward, 175; on Curzon Line, 176; and Wilno coup, 183; on Polish-Lithuanian union, 184; and Polish-Czechoslovak understanding, 204; and French-Polish alliance, 214, 216; and Upper Silesia, 236
Weyl, Henry, 199, 230n
White, Henry, 117
Wieniawa-Długoszewski, Colonel Bolesław, 215
Wilno: Polish entry into, 121; and Polish-Lithuanian union, 122, 124; and Quai d'Orsay memorandums, 124; and Inquiry, 125; Polish majority in, 125n; at Spa Conference, 155, 156, 180; handed over by Russia to Lithuania, 161; Bolsheviks and, 180; French views on, 181–182; Suwałki agreement and, 182; seized by Żeligowski, 182; coup against, and French, 183–184; and Upper Silesia, 183; and British, 184; and Riga preliminaries, 184; and League of Nations, 185, 293; Beneš on, 205; lack of Polish-Lithuanian agreement, 211; and Teschen, 239; Skirmunt on, 243; at Genoa Conference, 260; Lithuanian-German exchanges about, 333. *See also* Lithuania; Polish-Lithuanian Union
Wilson, Field Marshal Sir Henry, 119n, 156, 168, 234
Wilson, Woodrow: Clemenceau and, 5; and League of Nations, 6; and Allied war aims, 8; "peace without victory" address, 8; Allied reply to, 10; and Fourteen Points, 13, 14, 45; and German-Polish hostilities, 33; and report of Commission on Polish Affairs, 37; opposes France on Rhineland and Saar, 38–39; on Danzig, 42; and plebiscite in Upper Silesia, 44, 45, 46; Beneš and, 55, 89; ideas of, interpreted by Cambon, 58; and plebiscite in Ratibor, 59; Hungarian hopes in, 66; and Slovak-Hungarian border, 66; Dmowski's memorandum for, 78; and Teschen, 78, 89; and Eastern Galicia, 110, 111, 112–113, 114; opposes intervention in Russia, 119; death of, 311
Witos, Wincenty: and Teschen, 76; cabinet of national unity of, 165, 215; French attitude toward, 211; and Upper Silesia, 232, 233; replies to Lloyd George, 233; pro-Czechoslovak statement of, 246; premier of Center-Right cabinet, 282; for cooperation with France and Czechoslovakia, 282; resignation of, 291
Witt, Dr. Zikmund, 78n
Wojciechowski, Stanisław, 269
Wołkowysk railroad, 171
Wrangel, General Baron Pyotr: French interest in, 142, 145–146, 148, 168, 177; Polish lack of cooperation with, 148; recognized by France, 169; Paléologue and, 169n, 177; and continuation of Russian-Polish war, 176–177, 179n; and Riga preliminaries, 179; isolation of, 211
Wróblewski, Władysław, 286
Wysocki, Alfred, 165n

Yugoslavia: intervention against Béla Kun and, 72, 73; secret French-Hungarian negotiations and, 188, 189; and Treaty of Trianon, 190; and Little Entente, 194; and French-Czechoslovak alliance, 303; French credits to, 304; treaty with Italy, 305. *See also* Little Entente

Zaleski, August, 260
Zamorski, Jan, 149
Zamoyski, Count Maurycy: in Polish National Committee, 12n; minister in Paris, 141; on French attitude toward Polish eastern policy, 141, 143, 175, 176, 177; on Wilno coup, 183; on French policy toward Upper Silesia, 232, 233; and French-Polish alliance, 256; and Javořina, 268; demands recognition of Riga borders, 273; on Soviet overtures, 289; foreign minister, 307; and Czechoslovaks, 307; on French-Czechoslovak alliance, 307, 308; attacked by Polish Left, 315–316; resignation of, 316, 381; and foreign policy, 381, 382
Zbrucz, Polish advance to, 113, 114–115, 127
Żeligowski, General Lucjan, 182, 183, 184
Žika, Czech deputy, 99
Zimmermann, commissioner general of League, 344
Žitný Ostrov, *see* Grosse Schütt
Żyrardów, 219